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‘The languages of containment have taken a deep hold over our thinking on 
memory, whether it is the brain or the computer that provides the container 
that cribs and confines memory.’ This is Keith Ansell Pearson discussing 
Bergson’s theory of memory, with reference to a key point in Edward Casey’s 
Remembering: A Phenomenological Study.1 If Bergson’s account of memory 
has at times been described as hard to ‘grasp’, it is precisely due to its vehe-
ment resistance to all concepts and metaphors of grasping and holding, 
the very notion that memories are object-like entities that we keep safely 
stored away in some archival system whose stability, durability, and acces-
sibility are always the critical point. The brain, for Bergson, was certainly 
not such an archive, not a separate object or organ that produces and stores 
representations of the world. It was an integral part of the material world, 
and more specif ically – thanks to its ability to receive and distribute the 
stimuli that prepare the body for movement – part of the essential mobility 
of matter itself. If the brain seems to contain images or memories, it is only 
because the world itself is an aggregate of image sensations that constantly 
receive and produce the movement of stimuli. Images or memories are 
essentially actions, points of connection and disconnection, relays that 
draw sensations together.2
But the concept of container memory is also increasingly being chal-
lenged, on a practical and well as philosophical level. The reason is simple: 
for a long time now, we have been surrounded by technologies of memory 
that are premised on the constant activity of circuits and relays. Off icially, 
these technologies may speak the language of storage and containment. 
They tend to promote an unprecedented capacity for storing memory, now 
accounted for in the precise mathematical language of ‘bytes’ – a unit of digi-
tal information in computing, most commonly defined as a combination of 
eight zeroes and ones. Today we are all ‘counting’ storage space in terms of a 
thousand bytes to the power of two, three, four, f ive, and so on – megabytes, 
gigabytes, terabytes, petabytes. Yet the mathematical terms betray the 
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ambivalence of the promise of storage. With digital technologies, nothing 
is stored but code: the mere potential for generating an image of a certain 
material composite again and again by means of numerical constellations. 
Forget to update the software through which an encoded material is made 
visible, and there is little left – at least from the point of view of the cultural 
interface. This is not because information is ‘immaterial’ but because visibil-
ity is not a measure of its specif ic forms of material inscription: inscription 
is simply some kind of modif ication of an electromagnetic substratum.3 
If archives used to be described in terms of principles of ordering, they 
are now, as Wolfgang Ernst has pointed out, better understood through 
concepts such as ‘f ields’ and ‘dynamics’. With digital archives, documents 
and contents are no longer separated from the archival infrastructure: 
once the archive is based on networked data circulation, its emphatic form 
dissolves into the coding and protocol layer, into electronic circuits or data 
flow. Archival data have, of course, always been in circulation: the whole 
point of an archive is to allow documents to be mobilized for the shifting 
needs and inquiries of the present. But with the networked digital archive, 
this circulation becomes a feedback circuit whose material structure is 
that of vectorial dynamics and electromagnetic f ields.4 And this accounts 
for some of the ambivalences surrounding digital memory, the fact that 
computer archives are targeted as the source of archival destruction and 
loss of cultural memory. As Wendy Chun points out, software enables a 
logic of permanence that conflates memory with storage, the ephemeral 
with the enduring. Through processes of constant regeneration or ‘reading’, 
it produces an enduring ephemeral that promises to last forever, even as 
it marches toward obsolescence or stasis.5 The conflation of memory with 
storage is, in other words, undermined by a technical emphasis on dynamic 
processes of memorizing. To the extent that computer memory exists, it is 
essentially activity; virtual as well as actual, and its images are electronic 
events.
This technical conundrum presents numerous dilemmas for the various 
institutions of cultural memory that are the hallmark of modern, dynamic 
societies and their anxious obsession with memory in the face of always 
potential memory loss.6 Pierre Nora named them lieux de mémoire in 
order to emphasize their desire to f ix and monumentalize memory in 
terms of space and place and to distinguish them from the milieux de 
mémoire of premodern, rural societies, where memory – the unbroken 
bond with the past – was organically embedded in every gesture of a 
society’s members and where the question of safekeeping and memory 
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loss was not an issue.7 To digitize archives, records, and collections is in 
many ways to lighten the burden of archival site specif icity, the problem 
faced by every memory institution as ever more materials from an ever 
wider range of sources are deemed memorable and of public value. Serv-
ers, which present their own type of spatial challenges, nevertheless 
seem to exchange the question of space with that of time: expensive 
square metres are remediated as processing time, volumes as informa-
tion, subjected to varying degrees of ‘compression’ or ‘resolution’. There 
are other benef its as well: digitization facilitates searchability, making 
memory materials more or less instantaneously available to anyone, 
anywhere in the world. Digitization seems, at least in theory, to promote 
a radical democratization of memory: everything may, potentially, belong 
to everyone. A proliferation of digital paywalls and passwords is the 
reality; vestiges of a bounded, territorial concept of space, just like the 
duplicitous concept of storage.
Yet issues of fragility and ephemerality that come with informational 
transformation of space perennially haunt digital archives. How safe is 
cultural memory if it depends less on locked, temperature-controlled vaults 
than on software updating, compatibility, synchronization, energy flow, 
and channels of transfer? And how to select what to remember when the 
exponential growth in the processing power of microchips seems to promise 
that there will, in principle, be ‘capacity’ for everything?8 The question 
pertains not just to the encoding of non-digital objects and documents 
but – even more pertinently – to how digital society will memorize itself 
and the constant stream of instantaneous communications and interac-
tions that seem to be one of its key features. If the traditional archive is 
premised on the selection of a few original, exemplary, f inite objects and 
documents, each one attesting to one time and place,9 how can a world of 
networked mobilities, – relays, updates, negotiations, associations, and 
speculations – even be archived? How to decide where connectivity starts 
and where it ends?
These concerns are practical ones, challenging archives, libraries, and 
museums all over the world. Enormous efforts are invested in handling 
the numerous dilemmas of informatization. But they are also ontological, 
challenging not just ideas of what it means for societies to remember, 
but what concepts we have of ‘the social’ in the f irst place.10 Archival 
anxiety and the preoccupation with memory loss on a grand scale is not 
a universal condition but premised on a very specif ic image of sociality. 
It is premised, in the f irst instance, on a particular concept of ref lexivity: 
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that society, in order to exist, must have a self-image. Cultural memory, 
we are often told, is a portrait: it allows us to see who we are and who we 
have been. Aspects of this line of thinking emerged in Émile Durkheim’s 
The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, where he described religion as a 
celebration of a mythical past that confers identity on individuals and 
groups. Religion then allows us to understand shared memory as a key 
element of social life. Society is memory, and memory is recognition, 
identity.11 This emphasis on the way in which shared images and imagina-
tions of the past produce collective identity in the present was reinforced 
and deepened in Maurice Halbwachs’ On Collective Memory, where he 
described all those things handed down by tradition – languages, rituals, 
myths, songs, monuments, institutions – as the material frameworks 
through which collective memory and collective self-images assert them-
selves.12 But what if the material frameworks of memory seem to lack the 
type of stability and durability that confer identity on things? What is 
a society’s self-image if this image may be the object of instantaneous 
erasure, dispersal through multiple relays or information overf low, or 
transmutation through dynamic feedback circuits? What is society if its 
memory images are perhaps not even representations?
In many ways, it might seem as if modern societies’ accelerating monu-
mentalization of memory – its obsession with storage and safekeeping 
– is intimately connected with a type of ref lection ‘on’ the social that 
is a key characteristic of the same modernity. The role of the modern 
social sciences has notably been that of picturing society ‘as such’, as a 
distinct, f inite entity or substance that can be represented and hence 
also theorized, analyzed, compared, questioned, and managed. The more 
fundamental challenge posed by the contemporary changes in memory 
technologies then touches on the very relation between memory, repre-
sentation, and social ontology. If radical technological changes compel 
us to understand memory in new ways, will this not have consequences 
for how we understand whatever it is that we call collective or social 
phenomena?
This is the question informing the collection of texts in the present 
volume. Our aim has not been to add to the numerous and brilliant studies 
of the various aspects and complexities of social or collective memory 
practices but rather to provide some examples of recent mobilizations of 
memory that should compel us to rethink social memory from the ground 
up. These mobilizations are, as already indicated, at once technical and 
theoretical: radical changes in the material frameworks of memory are 
intimately interwoven with changes in the conceptualization of memory. 
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The material frameworks in question are, as already noted, a series of 
technologies that not only store time (in the sense that magnetic tape and 
f ilm could be seen to contain distinct passages of time) but produce and 
manipulate time in ways that may have certain rudimentary traits in com-
mon with the way in which the brain itself produces time.
This new emphasis on the material frameworks of time production is 
all-important. As Barbara Misztal has underscored, Durkheim understood 
time and space as social constructions, i.e. as objectively given social 
categories of thought produced within societies. The time of collective 
memory is primarily characterized by its abstract and strictly impersonal 
quality; it is precisely as a universal force that cannot be questioned that it 
can have an integrative function and be a social institution that is immo-
bilized in the group memory. Halbwachs contributes to this perspective by 
describing how tradition is upheld by an illusion of timelessness – an effect 
of the way in which groups order important dates within a commemorative 
sequence.13 Yet it is precisely this abstract, impersonal, timeless memory 
time that is taken apart with the increasing dominance of technologies 
that exposes us not only to a multiplicity of temporalities and measures 
but, even more pertinently, to a sense that time and events are a matter 
of technical production. From this point onwards, memory time is no 
longer a common given but a ‘gift’ in Derrida’s sense of the term – i.e. an 
excess production or game shifter that breaks open the habitual cycle 
of exchanges.14 No longer a neutral background or foundation, time and 
temporalization has become a dynamic foreground, a critical object in its 
own right.
Many have pointed out the fundamental change to social organiza-
tion that came with the introduction of the mechanical clock – not least, 
as Robert Hassan puts it, as ‘a scheduler and organizer of everyday life’ 
that ‘struck deeper and deeper into the world’s cultures and societies and 
capitalism spread and suffused modernity in its wake’. The power-time of 
capitalist industrialism universalized and standardized the measuring 
of time, colonizing or displacing the world’s variety of changing, context-
depending timescapes.15 Clock time subtends networked electronic and 
digital machineries as well, for instance through their all-important syn-
chronization processes which depend on universal and mathematically 
precise standards of measure. Yet there is a qualitative difference between 
the type of clock time that is used to organize and synchronize human 
labour and keep track of mechanical technologies of production, and the 
clock time subtending media and information machineries whose ‘raw 
materials’ and ‘product’ is time itself.
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For one thing, machine clocks at work in such technologies organize 
an ‘open-ended spectrum of temporalities measured from a picosecond 
(one trillionth of a second) upwards’.16 A huge number of these temporali-
ties, then, have nothing to do with any human sense of scheduling and 
organization, and knowledge about their existence promotes visions of a 
quasi-autonomous realm of machine operationality and machine agen-
cies. They exemplify Dominique Janicaud’s claim that there is no unif ied 
phenomenon that can be called ‘time’, since any sense of time is depend-
ent on some kind of measure and since such measuring instances are all 
highly different technological entities with their own distinct purposes 
and procedures.17 Many such operations complicate the idea of an apparent 
‘f low’ of time, just as the periodical series of frequencies in an alternating 
current breaks with the idea of electrical power as a continual f low. Here, 
time flow is broken up into counted regularities or measures that make 
the electromagnetic waves discrete and the electrophysical event of the 
‘spark’ (the moment of interaction between an electrical conductor and 
an electromagnetic f ield) a borderline phenomenon between singularity 
and repetition.
But the same spectrum of microtemporalities underpins a time produc-
tion that is marked not just by quantif ication but also by qualitative 
intensities, the free, measureless consciousness that Bergson called 
‘duration’. In fact, Janicaud claims that Bergson’s distinction between 
quantitative and qualitative forms of time – a distinction between what 
he saw as ‘spatially oriented’ mathematical time and ‘time as time only’ – 
should be seen as a subtle differentiation rather than a principled divide.18 
With machine additions happening in the f ifth millionth of a second, 
the most microscopically precise of measures also present themselves 
as in some sense ‘immeasurable’ or incommensurable: it is hard to see 
how electronic events at this scale could be said to privilege spatiality 
over time or in what way they actually differ from the inf initely rapid 
movements that underpin perception and thinking. The contractions and 
distributions of time material in electronic and digital media productions 
have therefore been viewed in the light of their structural resemblance 
to – and association with – human perceptual and affective capacities 
and mental/intellectual work. Real-time technologies operate on the 
single plane of the present as mechanisms that receive and return move-
ment, contracting and dilating time matter by transforming asignifying 
f lows into signifying f lows (signals and code): these are then also the 
key machineries at work in the industrial organization and exploitation 
of memory.19
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Archive, media archaeology, and individuation
Once the ‘social frameworks of memory’ include time-producing or time-
critical media – i.e. media constructed around technologies that modulate, 
compress, distribute, and differentiate time – the abstract sense of time 
subtending collective memory refracts into a myriad of different timescapes. 
Advanced synchronization clearly produces its own a-synchronicities. Such 
a scenario might provide another set of footnotes to the familiar narratives 
of modernity – the story of fragmentation, lack of social cohesion, loss of 
communal memory causing the ‘fabric’ of the social to fall apart, and so 
on. Another approach – the one we take in this book – is to ask whether 
social memory studies ever had a concept of the social that was equal to the 
technical dynamics and arrangements of memory. Robert Hassan touches 
on this issue when he writes that the truly revolutionary thing about the 
new information technologies and the network society they are rapidly con-
structing may be something social science has not yet given much thought 
to: notably the creation of a new form of time and a new relationship with 
temporality.20 This may well be true, but the focus needs to be radicalized 
with respect to the purported task of social theory. For the question is not 
just that of a new relationship with temporality but how this new sense of 
time may produce different understandings of what it actually means to 
say that something is ‘social’ or ‘collective’. We could in other words ask, 
with Maurizio Lazzarato, to what degree sociology ever gave much thought 
to memory – its ‘technical-mental’ aspects. It could seem as if it raced to 
the description of the thing called ‘the social’ without stopping to ask more 
fundamental questions about the temporalizing phenomena that actually 
produce mental links between people and make them think and behave 
in similar ways, over time and across distances. What exactly is the thing 
we call memory? And how does knowledge about technologies of memory 
impact social theory? What is, in other words, the connection between 
memory and social ontology?
A point of departure for elucidating this question may perhaps be found 
at the intersection of media archaeology, archive theory, and a social 
philosophy informed by (among other things) process ontology and new 
materialist perspectives. If the archive is in many ways the paradigmatic 
object of these inquiries, it is in large part because of its ambivalent status 
within the f ield of memory studies. For while the archive is often intuitively 
associated with the safekeeping of cultural memory, already its original, 
pre-digital modes of organization were based on a principle of generative 
technicity that is different from the collective memorizing of the past and 
18 Ina BlOM
the construction of historical consciousness.21 From its Greek and Roman 
origins to its role as the instrument of the expanding nineteenth-century 
bureaucracies, the archive was, as Cornelia Vismann has shown, designed 
for the eff icient performance of law and government. It was all at once 
obdurate and generative, topological and nomological: a place where docu-
ments are ordered so as to be able to perform and produce law. An archive 
would only become an object for historical research and memory once it was 
no longer in active political use.22 Despite the obvious differences between 
paper f iles and computer f iles, there is, in other words, some degree of 
continuity between the non-human topologies of the digital archive and its 
pre-digital orders.23 And for this reason the archive can also be approached 
as a discursive site where alternative conceptions or formulations of ‘the 
social’ may emerge.
The signif icance of media archaeology in this context is precisely its 
‘archival’ bias in favour of technics over history. Media archaeology studies 
the generative laws of technical media at the expense of media history 
and its emphasis on technical development. Already here, two distinctly 
different approaches to memory present themselves. Media history traces 
technical traditions and innovations, developmental lines and accumula-
tion of knowledge over time, inscribing media within the narrative horizon 
of historical memory. Media archaeology, in contrast, focuses on the strictly 
operational memory of technical machines and their various components 
– a form of operationality that may attest to historical context but that also 
radically ignores it, in the sense that a functioning machine, however ‘dated’, 
may produce effects in ever-new contexts. It may, in fact, generate ever-new 
contexts: as long as it can be made to work, its performative potential is 
in principle unlimited.24 From such a perspective, we are focussing on the 
diagrammatic aspects of media technologies, an operational power that
makes history by unmaking preceding realities and signif ications, 
constituting hundreds of points of emergence or creativity, unexpected 
conjunctions or improbable continuums. It doubles history with a sense 
of continual evolution.25
The deep signif icance of the concept of the diagram in this context is not 
only its resistance to (media) history as a representation of ‘preceding reali-
ties’ but also, even more pertinently, its emphasis on concrete, empirical 
situations of ‘emergence’ or ‘creativity’. There are, as Deleuze puts it, many 
diagrammatic functions and matters – as many as there are social f ields 
in history – because every diagram is a spatio-temporal multiplicity.26 The 
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diagrammatic functions of media technologies reside in their technical-
mathematical operationality, a special case of the ‘materiality in action’ 
that has been the focus of much recent theory. Diagrams are generally 
understood as ways of visualizing the ‘information patterns, circuits and 
relations that give an idea of how the otherwise so complex machines 
work’.27 But the circuit diagrams of electrical and electronic engineering 
might also be paradigmatic examples of what Deleuze indicated with the 
term diagram: notably an abstract outline for the production of new events, 
new instantiations of reality. Media archaeology focuses precisely on the 
multiplicity of temporalizing operations and spatiotemporal constellations 
that can be found in technical media, the many different ways in which time 
is made productive. Obviously, machines that operate on time scales equiva-
lent to a millionth of a second produce different realities than machines 
counting seconds and minutes, and they activate pre-existing materials 
and contexts in very different ways. Beyond a ‘purely’ technical fascination 
with machines, the critical impetus behind media archaeology resides 
in the possibility of paying attention to a multiplicity of memory forms, 
events, and operations that cannot be accommodated by the narrative 
framework of media history and its emphasis on past realities. This pertains 
in particular to the miniature dimensions of the time-axis manipulations 
that Friedrich Kittler saw as a key feature of modern media technologies 
in general.28 Once time-axis manipulation is no longer just a mechanical 
feature, as in the sound-reversing phonograph of Edison, but an effect of 
signal processing, the notion of static objects of memory is replaced by 
an understanding of technical memory as temporal events, def ined by a 
dynamics of difference and repetition.
It might be argued, of course, that the memory forms of signal-based 
processes have little to do with social memory since they so radically 
undermine the normal frameworks of human perception (as Kittler was 
always happy to point out). Yet it is precisely on this point that we have 
to interrogate what exactly it is that is ‘emergent’ in the diagrammatic 
operationality of microtemporal machines. From a strictly machine per-
spective – as represented for instance by the work of Wolfgang Ernst – media 
archaeology essentially focuses on the active agencies of a machine reality 
whose complexity cannot be reduced to a set of standardized operating 
systems underpinning the familiar culturally oriented interfaces based on 
iconographic, theatrical, literary, and journalistic modes of presentation 
and interaction. A supplementary term, media archaeography, is intro-
duced in order to further underscore the reality of machine autonomy and 
to save the realm of machines from always being explained in terms of 
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anthropomorphic f igures and modes of understanding. Hence the concept 
of media archaeography indicates a sort of epistemological reverse engineer-
ing in which the ‘media archaeologist’ is not necessarily a human scholar 
discovering the generative principles of technical operations. In contrast, 
technical media are seen as active inscription machines that may also figure 
as archaeologists of their own forms of knowledge: the feedback systems 
in cybernetic technologies point to the pertinence of such perspectives.29
Yet this all-important emphasis on machine autonomy, complexity, and 
reflexivity must not be confused with machinic solipsism. The emergent 
properties of technical operations – the events of machine memory – 
cannot be restricted to the realm of technical machines in the limited 
sense of the term. It is, in fact, diff icult to see how a viable delimitation of 
the machinic and the technical could ever be made without returning to 
substantialist and representational terminologies. To speak of technical 
agency is to recognize that machines become specif ic and autonomous 
precisely through their interaction with their ‘associated milieus’ – envi-
ronmental factors that may include anything from minerals and microbes 
to plants, animals, and humans. The term ‘associated milieu’ is taken 
from Gilbert Simondon’s foundational work on the modes of existence of 
technical machines – a forceful critique of facile humanist oppositions 
between culture and technics that blind us to a technical reality ‘rich 
in human effort and natural forces’.30 For Simondon, a technical object 
is, essentially, a unit of becoming: a f leeting moment in always ongoing 
processes of individuation or differentiation.31 There is such a multiplicity 
of machines that they are diff icult to def ine as a species: similar technical 
structures have very different functions in different machines, and the 
interrelations between particular machine functions and human actions 
further complicate attempts at def inition.32 The most general feature of 
the process of becoming machine is the process of concretization through 
which formerly separate functions converge in new and more specif ic 
technical beings. Simondon’s key example is the modern car, in which each 
piece is connected with the rest by reciprocal exchanges of energy – very 
much in contrast to the early car engines, where each element comes into 
play at a certain moment in the cycle of operations without affecting the 
others.33 Such processes are a result of feedback, or relations of circular 
causality, between technologies and their milieus, resulting in the sudden 
crossing of a threshold and the emergence of a new coupling. Associated 
milieus are here understood as the very conditions of possibility of innova-
tion and are never simply external to the technical objects as such.34 The 
autonomous technical object is, as Brian Massumi has underscored, the 
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very relation that clicks in as different functions or elements converge. A 
new and highly specif ic technical ‘individual’ may have been produced, 
but the process of individuation, which starts out from less-differentiated, 
pre-individual f ields, creates all at once a new individual and a new col-
lective or relationship.35
Social memory, social ontology
The question of individuation and concretization in Simondon provides a 
perspective that honours media archaeology’s emphasis on the autonomy, 
specif icity, and performativity of machines (against preformatted anthro-
pocentric interpretations) while recognizing that technologies do not con-
stitute a separate, self-explanatory reality. This perspective becomes crucial 
once we try to reframe the question of social memory from a perspective 
that takes the various technicities of memory into account – for the simple 
reason that such reframing must necessarily challenge the comfortable 
divide between the technical and the cultural. This divide may well be 
operative at the level of social discourses (historical narration and the 
cultural obsession with the past are, obviously, living practices that are 
radically different from the technomathematical logic that makes machines 
work36), but this does not imply that it provides the most valid ontological 
framework for understanding what the social actually is. Jussi Parikka has 
pointed out the potential limitations of a media archaeological perspective 
in which the analytic emphasis on hardware and technomathematical op-
erationality remains too isolated from everything else: it might, he suggests, 
benefit from a closer dialogue with the perspectives of political economy, 
among other things in order to ‘articulate more tightly the wider networks 
in which the techno-mathematics of media take place’.37 This may obviously 
be relevant when it comes to deepening our understanding of phenomena 
such as the new forms of labour that emerge in the age of digital networks 
or the relation between electronic microtemporalities, global markets, and 
the f inancialization of the economy, to take just two examples.38 Yet when it 
comes to rethinking social memory from the ground up, the key concepts of 
political economy – labour, capital, and exchange – may actually also serve 
to defuse the problem by having resolved it in advance, in the sense that 
everything pertaining to the social relation is understood to derive from the 
question of useful production and how the means and fruits of production 
are distributed. As it happens, insights into the material/technical forces of 
memory may outline a more primary relationality – an ontological ground 
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on the basis of which the production and distribution of necessities (and all 
related asymmetries and forms of subjugation) may be reframed.
Here, Maurizio Lazzarato’s reading of the ‘psychological economy’ of 
nineteenth-century social theorist Gabriel Tarde provides a distinct alterna-
tive.39 The advantage of reading Tarde in the context of radical technological 
change comes in no small part from the fact that he was writing at a time 
when sociology had not yet hardened into a discipline with close institu-
tional connections to the practical concerns of modern government: the 
question of what constitutes social facts was, in other words, still very much 
open. Where Durkheim defines social facts as the values, norms, and struc-
tures that transcend the individual and provide real constraints on human 
behaviour, Tarde casts his net much wider, refusing to def ine the social in 
terms of interhuman relations only. In Monadology and Sociology, originally 
published in 1893, he promotes the idea of the essentially social behaviour 
of all phenomena in the universe, from atoms and chemical substances to 
all living beings.40 In the f irst section of the book, he argues that Leibniz’s 
monads – designed to bridge the philosophical gap that separates mind and 
matter, movement and consciousness, object and subject, the mechanical 
and the logical – have slipped ‘into the heart of contemporary science’. 
Newton’s theory of gravitation and Schwann’s cellular theory provide him 
with examples of how the apparent unities of an older science (planets, 
organisms, and cells) ‘pulverize’ into multiple distinct elements that are not 
only linked to each other but also to the elements of other aggregates. Every 
form of being is a non-containable multiplicity.41 The capacity for constant 
aggregation or association is then not a special property of higher-level 
living beings (so-called ‘social animals’) but takes place at every level of 
material organization, down to the infinitesimally small. Two terms – belief 
and desire, ordinarily associated with mental properties only – are now 
used to account for the essential striving that informs all forms of material 
aggregation or ordering.42 No theory of a mystical vital force distinct from 
matter is needed. Social facts are, in other words, not predefined constraints 
on behaviour but the techniques of association that come into play with each 
new aggregation of elements.
The details of Tarde’s monist argument are of some interest when it comes 
to the relation between technology, human memory, and social ontology. 
Movement and consciousness are neither seen as two aspects of a single 
fact nor as heterogeneous phenomena that flow from a single source. For 
Tarde, the only tenable position is that matter is mind. Belief and desire 
play exactly the same role in the psyche, with respect to sensations, as do 
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space and time in the external world with respect to material elements. The 
concepts of belief and desire thus resolve the wavering between psychol-
ogy and mechanism that is found in the monist thinking of biologist and 
philosopher Ernst Haeckel. The lack of resolution in Haeckel derives from 
the fact that movement is def ined in quantitative terms, whereas mental 
properties – sensations – are def ined in qualitative terms. However, the 
concepts of belief and desire indicate mental states that also vary quanti-
tatively: we have more or less belief, stronger or weaker desire.43 And this 
technical property, which regulates every act of association – including 
memory’s task of connecting one sensation with another for the purposes of 
bodily action – invalidates the principled difference between the movement 
of matter and the states of mind.
Tarde’s brand of sociology is, in other words, based on an identity be-
tween matter and mind that places the basic, associative forces of memory 
at the heart of the social. And, as Maurizio Lazzarato has shown, this 
has wide-reaching implications for the theory of the social frameworks 
of memory on which the major body of research on collective memory is 
founded. Languages, institutions, rituals, artwork, and habits obviously 
play a major role in connecting the collective past with the present. The 
question is only what explanatory power these frameworks, as such, 
actually have. For without the basic temporalizing forces of memory/
matter – the ability to produce delays between sensations and to pull 
them together in new crystallizations of time and sensation – institu-
tions, languages, and rituals would simply be dead forms. To explain 
social memory in terms of social frameworks or (in Bourdieu’s case) 
habitus is to end up in a circular argument, and moreover one that is 
not really able to account for change. Social frameworks only persist as 
living practices to the extent that they are continuously animated by the 
temporalizing technicity of memory – or, more precisely, the events of 
new associations.44 In fact, Lazzarato shows that Durkheim, in contrast 
to Halbwachs, is aware of this fact: in a little known text from 1898, 
Durkheim actually comes close to a Bergsonian description of memory 
as a quasi-independent and creative force of associations that is not in 
itself imparted by social institutions and whose effects go beyond that 
of being an epiphenomenon of neuronal activity. And his sociological 
conclusion echoes important aspects of the social ontology of Tarde: 
the creative independence of memory shows that collective life cannot 
be reduced to the world in which it resides.45 Collective life is, in other 
words, not def ined or contained by given forms but is a function of more 
fundamental processes of invention.
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With these philosophical perspectives, we may return to the contemporary 
memory scenario that we are trying to address in this book. Here we have, 
f irst, a widely felt crisis in the institutional frameworks of human memory 
thanks to the increasing dominance of technologies that appear to turn 
all that was stable and contained into the fleeting events of transfer and 
updating in digital networks. Second, we have the theoretical and empirical 
discipline of media archaeology that provides insight into a host of machine 
agencies that constitute, each in their own way, forms of machine memory 
and machine realities. And third, we have the intuition that the dominant 
formulations of the ontological premises of shared memory are not adequate 
to the technological and technopolitical changes that are taking place. 
From a traditional cultural perspective, the prevalent descriptions of a new 
condition of memory loss or a disappearance of emphatic memory may be 
true and relevant, but is this really the best set of conceptual tools for a 
situation in which memory is, ever more emphatically, change or invention?
What needs to be considered, in other words, is how attention to the 
general technicity of social memory (over and above specif ic memory 
contents or pre-established institutional or ritual frameworks) may allow us 
to discover new types of aggregation across the spectre of human and elec-
tronic capacities. Tarde’s monadology suggests that there is no principled 
difference between the events of association/invention in different material 
composites: the electrochemical reactions that cause the contractions and 
distribution of time and sensation in the neuronal system of humans is 
simply one very particular aspect of the contractions and distributions of 
matter/memory taking place across the board. All are equally social – i.e. 
connective. This is also why he resists the anthropomorphism of political 
economy, which opposes human and machine work as the work of the living 
vs. the work of the dead. Instead, Tarde’s thinking is in many ways consistent 
with the much more f inely differentiated conception of machines that 
emerge in media archaeology, where cooperation between various types 
of ‘internal’ or ‘external’ machines may become visible. Such perspectives 
do not imply that brains (for instance) are like digital networks or that the 
operations of computing resemble those of the brain – that would be a gross 
misreading of all the very different technical processes involved here. To 
speak of the social character of brains and information technologies implies 
no identity between them, only a basic recognition of the fact that both may 
be approached in terms of a general capacity for production of time/differ-
ence that is the technical basis for all forms of association or aggregation. 
And this, by extension, affects the understanding of the social nature of the 
institutions, languages, artwork, and rituals that they animate or mediate. 
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Such perspectives are not simply theoretical or philosophical but impact 
research and practical organization as well as socio-political imagination. It 
makes a difference, for instance, whether or not the memory crises faced by 
large and small archiving institutions are instantly framed by the implicit 
terminologies of a managerial/sociological tradition designed to handle 
very different types of ‘social problems’, not to speak of the interests and 
terminologies of the expansive memory industries that turn cognitive and 
affective capacities into new types of products. To question social ontologies 
at a critical moment of archival reorganization is, at the very least, to insert 
a necessary margin of indecision – or delay – into the negotiations over the 
various forms of ‘care’ for memory.46
Sites of archival reflexivity
One of the tasks of this book has been to present and discuss a number of 
sites where such questioning or re-inscription of social memory has already 
taken place or is currently being performed. These are sites marked by what 
we may perhaps call ‘archival ref lexivity’, in the sense that the various 
technologies of the modern mobilized archive are foregrounded in ways 
that may indicate not just memory crisis but new collective modalities. 
What these sites demarcate or reflect is the distinctly social reality of ag-
gregations that extend across the boundaries between the human and the 
non-human, the spiritual and the material, the individual and the ‘dividual’, 
the qualitative and the quantitative, the living and the dead. Wendy Chun 
touches on these issues when she discusses how the packaging of program-
ming capacities in the notoriously elusive entities we call software has 
turned all information into a thing – with the proviso that ‘thing’ here 
is not simply used to indicate a commodity but should be understood in 
its older sense, which is that of gathering or amalgamation. Software and 
the related logic of programmability then point to profound changes in 
our understanding of what is internal and external, subject and object, 
tangible and intangible.47 And while such sites of archival reflexivity may 
be symptoms of, or responses to, the broad shift in inscription technologies 
called informatization – underway since (at least) Charles Babbage and 
Ada Lovelace’s early nineteenth-century work on the difference engine 
and the analytical engine – they also extend beyond the realm of digital 
technologies in the strict sense of the term. For the emphatic mobilization 
of the archive and the increasing displacement of the metaphor of container 
memory is a process that involves all the new media technologies of the 
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nineteenth and twentieth centuriesy – telegraphy, telephony, photography, 
f ilm, radio, sound recording, and video/television as well as the wider 
ecologies or processes of individuation of which they are a part. These 
are all privileged objects of digital remediation, but their various ways of 
facilitating transmission and distribution of cognitive and affective materi-
als across time and space have been closely interlinked with processes of 
informatization, both technically and discursively. On a technical level, the 
discrete worlds of bits and bytes never actually separated from the analogue 
world of continuous signal modulation: not only was the concept of signals 
the point of departure for the theory of information but electronic signal 
modulation also remains a vital component of computational operations.48 
And while some theories of informatization have launched the reductionist 
hypothesis that the technical basis of media specificity disappears on digital 
platforms that subsume all previously separate media under the logic of 
zeroes and ones, a more viable hypothesis is that programmability programs 
or individuates in unforeseeable ways, producing a proliferation of new situ-
ations of mediation, association, or aggregation. Such perspectives in turn 
fuel a new interest in the programming and individuating affordances of 
pre-digital media, whose various technical affordances are now understood 
in terms of their performative or processual powers rather than as a set of 
stable or formal ‘properties’.
Such approaches distinguish the contributions in this book from the 
main tenets of social memory research – including work on the relation 
between social memory and new media, where the emphasis is often less 
oriented toward the machinic or operational aspects of media memory and 
the nature of collectivity than on the specif ic contents of media memories 
and the new types of group boundaries and def initions they engender. 
Interest in technological change (such as the Internet revolution) therefore 
mainly serves to map new collective identities related to various types 
of networked users.49 Collectives are here essentially understood as as-
sociations between humans and based on ideas of a shared past that is 
invented or made relevant by means of material frameworks that have a 
certain capacity for repetition and propagation. As Jeffrey K. Olick and Joyce 
Robbins have put it, the expansion of social memory studies after 1980 is 
related to the persistent modern emphasis on mobilities and shifts in the 
realm of human association and marked by three major tendencies: multi-
culturalist critiques of the memories of dominant cultures, postmodernist 
critiques of essentialist approaches to questions of truth and identity, and 
hegemony theory’s focus on a class-based politics of memory.50 In addition, 
the growing sensitivity to issues of time and temporality provides a horizon 
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for bringing forth a modernity characterized by a ‘crisis of memory’ and a 
problematization of tradition: the loss of ‘living memory’ embodied by the 
everyday rituals of premodern societies, as described by Pierre Nora, or 
the dissolution of time in an age of simulation and high-speed information 
networks, as described by Andreas Huyssen.51
For all the evident merits of these approaches, they give relatively few clues 
as to how to think the collective in an age when intelligence and the capacity 
for memorizing are increasingly distributed among humans and machines. 
Yet such issues evidently touch on the question of agency – the ability of 
groups and individuals to act upon each other and the world – that is at the 
heart of the social sciences and which must also be key to any concept of 
social or collective memory. The media archaeological study of the way in 
which microtemporal operationality formats emergent realities beyond the 
scope of human intention (and power of attention/explanation) obviously 
extends the range of potential social agents to be ‘counted’ as part of ‘a 
collective’. But, more signif icantly, the concomitant focus on technical 
individuation and associated milieus serves to reframe the focus on agency 
as such. No longer an inherent property of certain predefined social beings 
(whether they are called human individuals, robots, groups, structures, or 
f ields), agency is a moving target that only expresses itself in the event of 
new associations: these are now a function of technical performance in 
both the narrow and wider sense of the term.52 These are perspectives that 
inform approaches to social memory that take a more pointed interest in 
the wide range of technical functions in new media.
From this overarching focus, a number of different approaches and 
concerns emerge. This collection of texts revolves around a series of 
distinct technological-social sites related to sound recording, f ilm and 
photography, analogue video/television, and computational technologies. 
Sound and sound recording perhaps represent the most obvious challenges 
to paper-based archives and monument-based memory frameworks. A 
paradigm of temporality, the series of frequencies that constitute sound 
had no means of storage before the age of electromagnetic technologies. 
Melodies and rhythms were relayed through repetition by memory or had 
to be transcoded into notational systems; the contextual, embodied, and 
environmental aspects of sound itself were, apparently, beyond the grasp 
of ostensive memory. In their contributions, Wolfgang Ernst and Sónia 
Matos explore different memory scenarios related to the affordances of 
sound recording. Emphasis on the specif ic media channels of storage 
reformulates the concepts of cultural tradition and collective memory as 
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a non-anthropocentric and technomathematical theory of transmission, 
Ernst asserts, before discussing Milman Parry and Albert Lord’s mechanical 
and electronic recording of the oral poetry of the southern Yugoslavian 
guslari culture in the 1930s. This oral tradition had caught Goethe’s interest, 
yet he accessed this culture through transcriptions that focused on words 
only: philology neglected the one-stringed Gusle instrument that was 
integral to the performance of a material that Leopold von Ranke saw as 
the sonic essence of nationalism. However, Ernst’s key point is that it is not 
national history that is recounted in such performances: rather, the past is 
made present by means of the type of reverberative memory that only the 
servo-motoric feedback circuits of live sound can engender. The sonicist 
relation between present and past is based on resonance: a non-historicist 
f igure of time that is itself temporal in its articulation. Sonicity, with its 
time-critical qualities, is here a metonym for the temporality of the world 
as event. This perspective is further underscored by the mnemo-generic 
capacities of recorded sound and in particular digitized sonic materials 
that are susceptible to the operative memory of algorithmic procedures. 
Sónia Matos has studied the archival potentials of a purely sonic language 
in danger of extinction, namely the whistle language known as Silbo Gomero 
that is still partly in use on the La Gomera island in the Canarian archi-
pelago. Not only is this language composed of sounds that have no relation 
to alphabetic transcription, its articulation is also very much a function 
of the spatial context, i.e. the exact placement of the speaker in the hilly 
landscape of the island. This means that generic recording and storing of 
linguistic units fail to convey the actual functioning of the language. How 
can such a language be ‘saved’ for cultural heritage? What type of technical 
storage might provide it with a continued, dynamic life? In her effort to 
approach this problem, Matos had to discard traditional ideas of archival 
preservation that usually support the protection of endangered languages. 
To gain a situated and embodied understanding of the whistled language 
and the different media needed to study it, she outlines an interactive digital 
approach to language transmission that draws on (among other things) 
bioacoustics and neurological data so that the ecological acoustics of the 
language’s sonic heritage becomes the key element. Ultimately, her analysis 
results in a reformulated concept of heritage as constantly disrupted by 
both temporal and spatial phenomena, and a call for linguistic archives in 
general to be more open to ambiguity and change.
Key to Matos’ work is both a practical and critical approach to the archi-
val functions of software, reflecting the increasing signif icance of software 
as agents of social memory. This is also a signif icant issue in the work of 
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Matthew Fuller, who has helped establish software studies as a critical 
discipline where close attention to the materialities and propensities of 
applications intersects with political, economic, aesthetic, and speculative 
concerns. In such a context, software are no longer simply f inished tools but 
seen to comprise ‘a social relation made systemic and unalterable’ – all the 
more natural since the techniques of structuration are often imperceptible.53 
To counter such naturalization, the strategy of software studies is therefore 
to interrogate the multiple scales of operation enmeshed in a particular 
technology. This is the approach taken in Matthew Fuller, Andrew Goffey, 
Adrian Mackenzie, Richard Mills, and Stuart Sharples’ research on the 
archival properties of Github, one of the largest dynamic repositories of 
software online, providing a platform for software sharing for millions 
of programmers around the world. As a sophisticated, distributed way of 
writing code in groups, Github could be studied from a perspective that 
tracks and analyzes the behaviours of a programming meta-community – a 
flow of practices that include patterns of work (coordination, development, 
and group structure) as well as the migration of such patterns across dif-
ferent settings. With a double emphasis on the granularity of this meta-
community and its large-scale aspects, the software archive is here not 
just seen as a place of storage but as a veritable media ecology, a social site 
that produces f ine-grained analysis as well as increasing divergence and 
incoherence. Following Jacques Derrida’s emphasis on the way in which the 
technical structure of the archive determines the structure of archivable 
content in its very coming into existence as well as in its prehension of 
the future, David M. Berry, for his part, approaches the digital archive as a 
producer of new abstractions that are closely related to its functionality. To 
make a material computable implies that it is abstracted twice over: f irst it 
must be encoded in a symbolic language, and second it must be captured 
in a grammar of actions, an algorithmic procedure that can be prescribed 
back onto physical activity. ‘Capture’ here implies the creation of a model 
of the underlying processes that are objectif ied in the physical world. The 
processes of abstraction that underpin the digital archive are therefore 
not technical processes in the limited sense of the term: they radically 
reshape the world, ‘transmitting the social bit by bit’. Algorithms recast the 
world into the shapes dictated by computational analysis and algorithmic 
processes: the expanded design thinking embedded in all aspects of com-
putational production – exemplif ied by Apple’s new ‘f lat design’ grammar 
and Google’s ‘material design’ counterpart – makes it possible to trace the 
application of the logics of computation in the organization of knowledge 
and action.
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The relation between biological and technical life forms is a longstanding 
concern that has become more acute in an age of bioengineering and ecologi-
cal crisis where the question of human futures and life itself is increasingly 
at stake. With his recent research into the mineral and chemical aspects 
of media technologies, Jussi Parikka reviews human communicational 
history and the concept of the archive in light of the geological timescapes 
of the natural resources that make up our media technologies as well as 
the critical futures that are evoked when the same technologies return to 
the ecosystem as toxic waste. In his text, Parikka revisits planetary futures 
that could be seen as instances of ‘programmed history’, demonstrating 
how various media technological contexts open for a production of future 
memories of the past, and how such memories may envelop both scientif ic 
knowledge production and political narratives in a technological culture 
facing possible collapse due to an ecological crisis. The span between the 
dystopic ecopolitical narratives of authors and scientists Naomi Oreskes 
and Erik Conway and media art pioneer Erkki Kurenniemi’s concept of 
future life as information give some idea of the various technical/geological 
timescapes underpinning the contemporary political moment as well as the 
complex collective of agents involved in the handling of our planetary crisis. 
While such perspectives have been radicalized in recent years, they are not 
new: my own chapter in this volume documents how experimentation with 
video technologies in the late 1960s produced a series of analogies between 
video feedback and basic life processes. The microtemporal operations in 
analogue video exposed artists and activists to the fact that memory is not 
just a function of humans handling a world of more or less stable or ephem-
eral things but a property of the myriad of cognizing systems that make up 
the material world. In this context, video came to figure as a quasi-biological 
entity, a key mediator between biological and technical memory systems in 
the context of the early 1970s ecocrisis and the concomitant organization of 
political action. In particular, a curious alliance between video and water 
resulted not only in new conceptions of nature but also of social ontology. 
The concept of technical/mediatic life is also at stake in Eivind Røssaak’s 
discussion of a contemporary attempt to reanimate Kurenniemi’s concept 
of extended informational futures in terms of today’s digital networks. 
Taking a transversal approach to Kurenniemi’s vast and heterogeneous 
personal archive, which comprises a vast range of media technologies 
and types of inscription, members of the Constant group’s Active Archive 
initiative use the principles of database interactivity and software sharing 
to transform Kurenniemi’s f iles into new social aggregates. Kurenniemi’s 
concept of bio-informational life is no longer premised on the idea of f inite 
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informational ‘bodies’ f loating in some kind of post-planetary space but on 
a principle of distributive imitation and invention that activates f iles on 
multiple levels of sharing. The combined effects of sharing f iles, sharing the 
knowledge of sharing, and sharing the knowledge of the users promote a 
vision of digital networks as living systems where memory above all f igures 
as a mode of action.
If digital technologies may have spurred the new inquiries into the 
archive and the question of social memory, they also shed new light on the 
infrastructural properties of photographic and cinematographic technolo-
gies. Trond Lundemo compares the Paris conjured up in the world-mapping 
cinematographic archive of Albert Kahn (1908-1931) with the Paris of relays, 
circuits, control, surveillance, and points of transit produced in Bruno La-
tour and Emilie Hermant’s digital interactive installation Paris ville invisible 
(2004). Both projects bypass the representational primacy that marks most 
mapping projects, constituting heterogeneous media networks or diagrams 
that produce distinct collective individuations. While Kahn assembled 
photographs and cinematographic snippets from cultural sites around 
the world in order to produce a recombinable, event-based cartography 
for a future when the locations would be irrevocably changed, Latour and 
Hernant bring out the invisible connective underpinnings of contemporary 
Paris, drawing out the new non-human incarnations of Paris in action that 
operate below the more famous Paris of memory images. In this context, 
photographic and cinematographic images are mainly discussed in terms 
of their unique capacity for propagation, for quickly relaying the belief 
and desires at work in the production of new social realities. This is the 
focus in Pasi Väliaho’s analysis of a gesture observed in a random shot 
from a semi-private celebratory occasion found in a photographic archive. 
Yet this modest image-gesture – emerging as if it were a still from a f ilm 
that was never made – is not alone but could be seen to weave in and out 
of the expanded cinematographic networks of Nazi Germany, part of an 
affect-based, dream-like flux that is never contained by any one medium but 
that mould actions and make history. It is, in short, an exemplary instance 
of the reality and agency of images.
Yet another mode of photography-related mobilization can be found by 
tracing the history of the international passport, and particularly the shift to 
the contemporary biometric passport, where personal information encoded 
in a microchip makes the passport into a digital archive in instantaneous 
communication with a host of off icial databases. As Liv Hausken argues, 
passports have contained biometric information all along, but the con-
nectivity of their current digital incarnations have made the boundaries 
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between police registries and other governmental registries far more fluid, 
increasingly inscribing mobile bodies into a global archive of pre-criminals.
The two f inal chapters of the book are devoted to more in-depth studies 
of the philosophical sources for the social ontologies brought forth in this 
volume. Drawing on Leroi-Gourhan’s theory of the technical milieu as a 
membrane between the interior and the exterior world, Yuk Hui returns to 
Simondon’s concept of the associated milieu of technologies in the light of 
industrial globalization and its impact on the concept of social memory. A 
key point here is that the technical milieu no longer functions as a membrane 
but increasingly becomes the force that determines all syntheses and hence 
loses its more limited function as a medium of exchange and protection. 
Simondon observes this qualitative shift in technical progress and proposes 
a new way of understanding the interaction between culture and technics. 
Tiziana Terranova returns to the Leibnizian roots of Tarde’s Monadology 
in order to outline an alternative to the neoliberal interpretation of social 
production, or peer-to-peer production, that has been presented in the 
work of Yochai Benkler among others. Acts of social memorization – the 
sharing of feelings, ideas, and values – are examples of a form of voluntary 
cooperation that is greatly facilitated by the peer-to-peer architecture of 
digital networks and that has become an important source of revenue, most 
famously through so-called social media. The falling cost of computer equip-
ment has amplif ied the power of decentralized individual action so that 
economic production in the realm of information is to a large extent based 
on the coordinate effects of non-coordinate actions. Yet while neoliberal 
economists usually explain such uncoordinated voluntary work in terms 
of the pleasure it gives each individual actor, post-workerist Marxists do 
not just see such cooperation as a source of value. It is, more signif icantly, 
the specif ic expression of living labour in an information economy where 
labour does not just involve the completion of predefined tasks but is also 
a socialization of invention and the production of new values. Terranova 
argues that the concepts of individual pain and pleasure cannot explain 
the connective, viral dynamic of social production and hence are not able 
to account for the genuinely creative or inventive aspects of voluntary 
collaboration. Peer-to-peer production depends f irst of all on the flow of 
basic affects that mobilize all mnemonic work and only secondarily on 
capital and the division of labour. And this is why Tarde’s psychological 
economy and his emphasis on the ontological priority of the connective 
forces of belief and desire are uniquely placed to explain what is genuinely 
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‘social’ in an economy that exploits the memorizing affordances of humans 
and technical machines alike.
With this f inal contribution, the present volume draws together at 
least three alternative approaches to the question of the archive: a media 
archaeological inquiry into the agencies of technical machines, a series of 
empirical sites in which the archive seems to question or reformulate its 
own practices, and a sociological critique of the memory industries that go 
beyond the well-rehearsed perspectives of political economy. Together, they 
provide a glimpse of what is at stake in the effort to rethink social memory 




3. In Matthew Kirschenbaum’s study of computer storage (2008), he draws 
a distinction between formal materiality and forensic materiality and 
uses the latter to study the many varieties of material traces and forms of 
inscription that exist in digital media. The study counters the myth of a new 
immaterial culture and also the privileging of the interface in the interpre-
tation of digital objects. 
4. Ernst, 2013, pp. 95-101.
5. Chun, pp. 137-140.
6. According to Aleida Assman (in Ebeling and Günzel, pp. 165-75), cultural 
memory is informed by both functional memory and storage memory. 
The latter injects cultural memory with a dimension of forgetting (storage 
is about hiding as well as safekeeping) – a forgetting that is made more 
dramatic with the mass of archival materials available through the Internet. 
In her view, the Internet then opens up for a redefinition of memory as 
forgetting.
7. Nora, pp. 7-24.
8. Cf. ‘Moore’s law’: Intel founder Gordon Moore’s observation that the num-
ber of transistors in a dense integrated circuit doubles approximately every 
two years. The history of computing hardware has so far confirmed the 
observation (Moore 1965).
9. Spieker, pp. 17-34.
10. It is impossible to account for the vast and rich field of recent social 
memory studies in this brief introduction. An excellent overview of the 
development of the field and its various lines of inquiry is provided in Olick 
and Robbins (1998). Misztal (2003) provides an introduction to the classic 
and contemporary theoretical foundations of the field, while expansive 
anthologies such as The Collective Memory Reader (eds. Olick, Vinitzky-
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Seroussi, and Levy) and Memory: History, Theories, Debates (eds. Radstone 
and Schwarz) assemble a rich body of classic texts on the subject as well as 
critical reflections on historical memory practices, memory and modernity, 
the physiological, subjective, and public workings of memory and memory 
practices as sites of controversy and contestation.
11. Durkheim, 1976.
12. Halbwachs.
13. Misztal, 2003. See also Halbwachs.
14. Derrida, 1992. Wolfgang Ernst (2012) repeatedly returns to the theme of the 
giving or producing of time in electronic technologies.
15. Hassan. See also Landes.
16. Hassan.
17. Janicaud.
18. Ibid., pp. 116-125.
19. Lazzarato, 2007.
20. Hassan.
21. As Wolfgang Ernst (2009: 182) points out, archives are not listed among 
Halbwachs’ ‘social frameworks of memory’.
22. Vismann.
23. The structural ambivalence of the archive was also the topic of the first sec-
tion of Jacques Derrida’s Archive Fever. Returning to Freud’s concept of the 
death drive and his description of the psychic machinery as a ‘mystic writ-
ing pad’ (Wunderblock), Derrida describes the archive as an exteriorized 
technique of repetition that takes place at the original place of the struc-
tural breakdown of living memory and recollection. This is, he asserts, a fact 
that becomes even more pertinent with the electronic technologies that 
seem much closer to memory operations than Freud’s mystic writing pad. 
The archive therefore represents the non-human forces of ‘unprecedented 
rhythms’ or events that operate in the midst of the apparatuses of cultural 
memory and the general search for archivable meanings. The increasing 
dominance of electronic technologies of inscription and their production 
of events show that the archive is more than a technique in the limited 
sense of the term: to fully acknowledge archival forces is thus to be open to 
juridicial and political transformations. 
24. Ernst 2013, pp. 55-59. See also Ernst, 2002.
25. Deleuze, p. 35.
26. Deleuze, p. 34.
27. Parikka, 2011, pp. 52-74.
28. Ibid., 58-59. See also Kittler, pp. 34-36.
29. Ernst, 2013, pp. 55-73.
30. Simondon 1989, p. 9. English quotes taken from Mellamphy, Mellamphy, 
and Mellamphy’s translation in progress (2010). 
31. Simondon’s account of technical becoming must, as Brian Massumi has 
pointed out, be seen in the light of his theory of individuation (Massumi 
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in De Boever, Roffe, and Murray 2009) See also Gilbert Simondon, ‘The 
Genesis of the Individual’, in Crary and Kwinter (1992). Simondon under-
stands individuation as ontogenesis rather than a process of becoming 
within a general state of being. For this reason, individuation can only 
be approached in terms of the principle of individuation and the related 
concept of metastability and not with reference to the finished individual 
(which is always a provisional phenomenon). It follows from this idea that 
the true principle of individuation is mediation and that it is the function 
of memory to operate the mediation between different orders of magnitude 
in the living individual.
32. Simondon, 1989, p. 19.
33. Ibid., pp. 19-23.
34. Mitchell. In this article, Mitchell problematizes Simondon’s distinction 
between machines and living beings (which might make his work seem 
less relevant to the recent development of biotechnologies). Simondon’s 
concept of associated milieus may, on the one hand, be related to Lamarck’s 
concept of the milieu as a condition of possibility of organic innovation 
and on the other hand to Claude Bernard’s idea that milieus are never sim-
ply ‘outside’ the animal.
35. Massumi in De Boever, Roffe, and Murray, p. 39. See also Simondon, 2007.
36. Ernst, 2013, pp. 55-73.
37. Parikka, 2011, p. 67.
38. See, for instance, Terranova or Boutang.
39. Lazzarato, 2002.
40. Tarde, 2012. 
41. Ibid., pp. 6-10.
42. Ibid., p. 16.
43. Ibid., pp. 16-21. Significantly, Tarde takes care to note that belief and desire 
are not anthropomorphic figures (they include unconscious states) and 
are not felt ‘by themselves’ but are applied to any sensation whatever and 
may therefore also apply to unknown and even unknowable phenomena. 
Ultimately, Tarde argues that belief and desire must be understood as forces 
that are objectifiable to the highest degree (18-20). At the level of human 
relations, belief and desire underpin the basic psychological and ‘intensive’ 
connection between human beings without which no form of exchange, 
communication, or collaboration is possible. This last point is elaborated in 
Tarde’s writings on sociology and economy (see Tarde 2010: 73-135).
44. Lazzarato, 2002, pp. 211-247. This emphasis on the primary technicity of 
memory and desire in Tarde (over the various discursive frameworks of 
emphatic memory) resolves the principled divide between the archive 
and social memory set up in the work of Wolfgang Ernst. Ernst references 
Halbwachs’ claim that memory is always a function of its social frame-
works but states that in the archive these frameworks are not the result of 
individual desires but rather of medial formats. This means that subsuming 
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the archive under the agencies of collective memory and its discursive pro-
cesses prevents us from paying attention to the difference of the archive as 
a set of technical procedures. In Tarde, such a distinction becomes devoid 
of meaning: like the archive, social memory is first of all a set of technical 
procedures of connectivity and distribution (Ernst 2009).
45. Lazzarato, 2002, p. 222. See Durkheim, 1898.
46. For a discussion of one particular form of care for memory, see Parisi and 
Goodman’s discussion of mnemonic control and the exploitation of future 
memories in an economy organized around the affective relation to brands. 
47. Chun, pp. 4-9.
48. Ibid., pp. 142-157.
49. See, for instance, Neiger, Meyers and Zandberg, 2011.
50. Olick and Robbins, p. 108.
51. Huyssen, 1995: 1-12.
52. See for instance the discussion of agency in Bruno Latour, pp. 44-86.
53. Fuller, pp. 3-4. 
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‘Electrif ied Voices’: Non-Human Agencies of 
Socio-Cultural Memory
Wolfgang Ernst
Present culture increasingly dedicates its individual and collective 
memories to electronic and digital records. Does it thus become non-human 
and asocial? A genuinely media-specif ic theory of storage technologies 
inevitably challenges classical theories of social memory agencies developed 
in sociology and cultural studies. Once storage is technically def ined in 
terms of specif ic media channels, concepts like ‘cultural tradition’ can be 
reformulated in terms of a techno-mathematical theory of transmission. The 
difference between technical and ‘social’ memory can thus be articulated, 
as well as the difference between communication studies of mass media 
memory and its technological def inition. From a media-archaeological 
point of view, the technological dynamics of memory devices call for de-
scriptions that investigate their hardware and software in order to reveal 
possibilities for a refreshed terminology of cultural ‘memory’ and ‘time’. 
This can be exemplif ied by analyzing the symbolic (or alphabetic) ‘tech-
nologizing of the word’ discussed by Walter Ong as well as the mechanical 
and electronic signal recording of ‘oral poetry’ exemplif ied by Milman 
Parry and Albert Lord’s work on southern Yugoslavian guslari culture. 
Such analyses direct attention to the creative possibilities emerging with 
the techno-mathematical mobilization of stored data.
A non-anthropocentric look at memory culture
Current discourse analysis drifts away from the ‘culturalist turn’ of the 
last two or three decades and its concern with individual and collective 
memory as an extended target of historical research. Instead, the focus is on 
the technologically induced temporal dynamics that is a function of recent 
storage technologies. ‘Changes in the dominant technologies of memory 
necessarily impact how we conceptualize sociality as such.’1 But rather 
than simply interpreting changes in social memory as a function of the 
technological a priori of a given society, a different interpretation might be 
allowed: technologies of memory drift apart from social memory, evolving 
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into an autonomous f ield of its own. While the term ‘memory’ has been 
used in early drafts of electronic computers to name the storage organs2 
(with the ‘organ’ taken here in its Aristotelian sense as a tool), it might now 
be appropriate to draw a clear distinction between the cultural semantics 
of ‘collective memory’ and micro-electronic embodiments of storage and 
intermediary data transfer. Time-critical micro-technologies and their 
algorithmic concepts, such as Kohonen’s Self-Organizing Map (SOM),3 run 
parallel with what neuroscience describes as the memory functions within 
the human brain. Conceptually (but not technically), the neural processes 
of immediate, short, and long-term memory within the brain resemble the 
current hierarchy of storage functions within microprocessors.
Electronic and digital recording does not imply that social memory is 
transformed into a direct function of intermediary and short-term stor-
age which successively shores up emphatic referential memory thanks to 
the immediacy of recall; in fact, social memory is not mirrored in micro-
technologies anymore. These new archives (in the Foucauldian sense4) 
def ine what can be electronically expressed and digitally articulated 
and deserve a techno-philological reading of their own. Such a reading 
requires a reversal of the traditional ‘archival’ idea of emphatic memory, 
since ‘electronic text is hopelessly ephemeral’.5 Dynamic technical memory 
systems (DRAM, SRAM) based on volatile binary storage elements can only 
be counterbalanced by analogue storage media like chemical or hardware 
inscription.6 When ‘the present’ itself turns out to be a function of interme-
diary memory-technical operations (both neurologically and digitally), the 
transformation of the traditional tempaurality of ‘collective’ memory – i.e. 
the transformation from ‘archival’ space to temporal memories – needs to 
be observed. This is not just another step in the historical evolution of social 
memory practices but an epistemic rupture. Dynamic micro-media produce 
a shift in cultural emphasis from permanent storage to restless transfer 
and f ile sharing. To decode this aesthetics of high-frequency ‘re:loads’, we 
need to pay attention to the fact that the new aff inity between storage 
operations and cybernetics now anchors memory in feedback processes 
and time-shifting operations.
Whereas the audio-visual recording of past experiences in today’s mass 
and online media might still be articulated in the sociological terminolo-
gies of collective or social memory, their technological conditions require 
analyses that refrain from anthropocentric categories. G.W.F. Hegel already 
elaborated the difference between dynamic Erinnerung (subjective remem-
brance which is always ‘in motion’) and technical Gedächtnis (memory as 
mechanical storage).7 Technological affordances and discursive logos move 
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in separate directions. From the phenomenological perspective, media 
temporalities affect the human perception of time; in a more radically 
media-archaeological analysis, such technologies enable a different logic 
of remembrance, one that transforms the classical notion of memory from 
within.
On the difference between technical and ‘social’ memory
Society is memory, Émile Durkheim stated. Society is communication, 
Niklas Luhmann answered. Both perspectives converge in a digital culture 
where the two media functions of storage and transfer merge. ‘Today’s new 
time technologies and the concomitant redefinition of the archive make 
us question not just the classic description of social memory but the social 
ontology that it presupposes.’8 There is a discourse of the ‘social’ to which 
media archaeology refuses to submit when it focuses on topological connec-
tions described in terms of engineering and of diagrams. Any technological 
analysis of social networks goes down to the level of protocols (as described 
by Alexander Galloway) and the source codes in computing that govern 
communication. Critical storage analysis is the application of a materialist 
and mathematical hermeneutics to the interpretation of computer ‘memory’ 
as hardware and software; it is a methodological combination of media 
archaeology and digital forensics9 which ultimately also understands the 
technological object as a subject or form of agency. Such sub-social material 
and logical hermeneutics practices a critical close reading of the electronics 
and wiring of storage media which is, at least for a moment, consciously 
detached from so-called historical, biographical, and social contexts.10
We should therefore not confuse technical storage with ‘collective’ and 
cultural memory in Maurice Halbwachs’ humanist sense of the term. The 
socio-historicizing or contextualizing discourse runs the risk of becoming so 
all-encompassing that it becomes limitless, undefined. For this reason, the 
analytic reduction of cultural memory to the materialities of storage tries 
to identify forces that escape human control, pointing at discontinuities 
between collective memory and techno-mathematical storage. In the late 
nineteenth century, Gabriel Tarde developed an ‘archaeological’ sociology 
that was closer to statistical data operations than to human subjective 
or collective agencies and which provided a framework for alternative 
descriptions of social memory.11 The techno-philosophies of Alfred North 
Whitehead and Gilbert Simondon have applied the concept of ‘the social’ 
to describe the connectivity of molecular communication and technical 
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ensembles,12 and, in contrast to the criticism of technology typical of the 
Frankfurt School of Sociology, Bruno Latour’s actor-network model has 
liberated the ‘social’ from its limited anthropocentric meaning, thus de-
constructing the conventional separation between brute technology on the 
one hand and social, cultural, and economic ‘external’ forces on the other.13
But even such extended usage of the term ‘social’ carries with it the 
metaphorical ghost of a human-like collective. Media archaeology, more 
radically, does not even aim at identifying social forces within technological 
formations but keeps both regimes analytically apart. By no means does 
media archaeology want to ignore the political, economic, and social vectors 
that co-determine technological configurations, but such contextualization 
rather leads to media historiography instead of archaeographical descrip-
tions of technomathematical conditions (the Heideggerean and Derridean 
arché, the Kantean and Foucauldean a priori).
An example of a more object-oriented concept of memory is the popular cas-
sette storage technology used in early personal computers like the Commo-
dore 64. There is, notably, a crucial difference between the technical format 
of data storage on tape which is, f irst of all, addressed to the microprocessor, 
and the popular culture where the same cassette tape has served as an 
almost anarchival device of non-legal distribution immediately addressed 
to the human ears for musical memory. On the one hand, there are the 
inherent temporalities or temporal properties of technological media; on the 
other hand, there are the temporealities that reflect how media time affects 
human perception. Once human memory is coupled to media like that of 
the dog Nipper listening to ‘His Master’s Voice’ from a phonograph, it is 
subjected to media temporalities that differ signif icantly from the cultural 
temporalities of social memory studies, which focus on tradition between 
human generations rather than on the technical conditions of storage and 
transmissibility. We should therefore not confuse the symbolical order of 
the institutional archive with human memory or recollection, nor should 
we confuse it with technological storage.
On the level of storage media, a non-social memory is at work, a rich 
memory culture that is based on its own inherent logic, tailored to the needs 
of the so-called ‘von Neumann architecture’ of computers which is still in 
use after more than half a century of computer development. Some names 
of the components of this techno-mathematical conf iguration like the 
‘register’ in the central processing unit actually constitute a metaphorical 
transfer of familiar terms of traditional archivology. The closer we look at 
this micromemory architecture, the more its topology and organization 
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turns out to be a mirror of traditional archival and administrative practices. 
However, by including the storage elements immediately into the action 
of the electrical current, computer architecture creates one operational 
horizon out of two phenomena that are separated in cultural discourses, 
notably storage and action. Once the technological archive takes over, 
media archaeology and its emphasis on machine action displaces traditional 
historical research. Technological archaeology is no longer an ancillary 
science to the master discourse of historical research, nor should its rather 
autopoietic autonomy and specif icity be absorbed by an extended notion 
of sociology which embraces non-human agencies as well.
Re-discovering the sound of ‘texts’: Oral poetry
Storage only happens when trusted to enduring structures, whereas memory 
phenomena can be ephemeral like discourse itself. For the longest time in 
occidental history, legends were vocalized segments of bygone events. While 
Florens Chladni was already experimenting with visualizations of ways 
in which the vibrations of a violin bow could create acoustic wave f igures 
in sand, ‘Goethe’s def inition of literature did not even have to mention 
[…] acoustic data f lows’ or signals that def ine oral poetry.14 Goethe took 
interest in the cultural knowledge made available thanks to Vuk Karadzic’s 
1814 transcriptions of Serbian oral epics, but philologists have for the most 
part neglected the fact that the singers are accompanied by the one-string 
gusle instrument. In The Serbian Revolution, Leopold von Ranke saw these 
songs as a form of oral history avant la lettre (in every sense of the term) 
and even as the sonic essence of nationalism, as described in the opening 
chapter entitled ‘State of Affairs before Agitation: National Sense of Being 
and Poetry’.15 For Ranke, such memory is definitely collective: ‘These poems 
appear to be the collective product of national interests and orientations. 
[…] The people regard them almost as natural occurrences.’16 It is not his-
tory that is recalled here; the past is related to the present by means of 
reverberative memory, both in the voice and the gusle string that together 
form a vocal-instrumental feedback circuit. The oral dictation by a poet 
to a scribe lacks the kind of servo-motoric feedback that is characteristic 
of the ‘musical’ performance, revealing the function of the accompanying 
string instrument. A time-critical temp/orality is at work when the poet 
simply dictates: ‘His mind moves ahead more rapidly than does the writer’s 
pen.’17 The real-time sensimotor feedback that arises in the interaction 
between human articulation and rhythmic gusle play turns out to be of 
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a servo-mechanical rather than musical character (unless we understand 
‘musical’ in media-archaeological terms).
The sonicist relation between present and past is therefore not a relation 
between a present moment and an archive of the past but is based on a 
non-historicist f igure of time which is itself temporal (and even time-critical 
in its articulation): resonance. Sonicity in its time-specif ic quality is here a 
metonym of the temporality of the world as event. As expressed by Ranke, 
all over the Serbian country one could ‘hear the sound of singing’,18 which 
is a concept of the national community as a sonosphere – an acoustic space 
in Marshall McLuhan’s sense of the term, extending to a non-historic but 
temporally emphatic ‘collective’ memory. The non-historical information 
in such oral poetry is radically non-archival and non-documentary, transi-
tive and immediate, and has the quality of acoustic communication: ‘One 
expresses what one experiences.’19
Until today (and even more after the Balkan wars in the 1990s), the gusle 
has been the main ‘voice’ in the transmission of national mythical memory 
in Serbia. This was documented in Pawel Pawlikowski’s 1992 BBC docu-
mentary Serbian Epics, where the leader of the Republika Srpska Radovan 
Karadzic at one point in the interview grabs a gusle to perform songs in front 
of the portrait of nineteenth-century Serbian linguist and song collector Vuk 
Stefanovic Karadzicas, as if he was his successor ‘or even his reincarnation’.20 
Coupled with the gusle, oral poetry is not a representation of historical 
memory but of the operative past, an act of re-presencing.21 The instrument 
is being addressed like the muses by Homer: it is an internalization of the 
sonic technology of the vocal alphabet itself. The gusle actually becomes 
a mediated double of the singer himself: ‘Hey gusle, beloved music-maker. 
You have always accompanied the Serbian tribe. Ever since the Slaves came 
to the Balkans, the gusle has been the Serb’s best friend. Since I took you, 
gusle, in my hand, how often I had to wipe tears from my eyes, remembering 
the wounds of my great tribe.’22 There it is: the traumatic reverberations of 
a sonic medium.23
Obviously, such memory does not come from a recording medium 
(though it is tempting to compare the single horse-hair string of the gusle 
to the Webster Chicago Wire Recorder with which Albert Lord recorded 
such performances around 1950). Oral epic memory is not called forth from 
an archive but is re-created with slight variations in each performance (as 
def ined in Milman Parry’s poetological ‘formula’ theory). For this reason, 
it does not make sense to put an inert gusle in a vitrine of an ethnologi-
cal museum. Like most other historical musical instruments, it actually 
has to be played in order not to decay physically. This form of direct use 
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– which can be compared with the fact that techno-historical electronics 
implies replacing some active or passive electronic elements24 – does what 
is strictly forbidden in traditional archives, notably to interfere with the 
original ‘record’. Re-performance and signal processing is the essence of 
musical and technical objects; the archive in motion or an active material 
philology is their only mode of existence. The gusle is then not simply a 
musical augmentation of the textual narrative but actually the device of 
re-actualizing this memory in acoustic re-presencing. In contrast to other 
forms of popular music that have become commercial audio-visual turbo 
folk in the meantime, the gusle therefore seems to resist becoming an object 
of the music and media industry: ‘It became a voice of the death, speaking 
to the living. Nationalistic rituals, in which the instrument played a central 
role, created an aura, which forbid its mixing with electronic instruments 
and new media.’25
What defies all transcriptions of oral memory transmission is approach-
able only by means of non-literary media: technical signal-recording of ‘oral 
poetry’. When, in the mid-1930s, Milman Parry saw the unwritten memoriz-
ing techniques of the guslari, the epic singers of southern Yugoslavian, as 
a living example of the Homerian epic, it was direct phonographic sound 
recordings on aluminium discs that formed the analytic basis for his theory: 
that the hour-long oral tales were regenerated for each occasion from a 
stock of existing formulae.
The practice of oral traditions in Europe has been mostly silenced by the 
general textualization and ‘only survive in written format; that is, under 
pre-technological but literary conditions. However, since it has become 
possible to record the epics of the last Homeric bards, who until recently were 
wandering through Serbia and Croatia, oral mnemotechnics or cultures have 
become reconstructible in a completely different way.’26 This difference is 
dramatic, since it implies a change from symbolic recording to signal record-
ing. ‘Even Homer’s rosy-f ingered Eos changes from a goddess into a piece of 
chromium dioxide that was stored in the memory of the bard and could be 
combined with other pieces into whole epics.’27 The traditional media-critical 
argument (since Plato’s dialogue Phaidros) is that alphabetic recording kills 
the living memory culture of oral poetry by dead letters. Textualization is 
a threat to oral traditions indeed. At a recent conference organized by the 
Milman Parry Collection at Harvard University, one of the topics was ‘The 
Textualization of Oral Traditions’.28 Was Parry’s theory of formulae-based 
oral poetry itself an effect of an analysis that relied on a transcribed and 
thus textual form – just as Aristotle gained his insight into the phonetic 
character of speech only after its literary elementarization by the phonetic 
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alphabet? The alphabetization of phonographically recorded oral poetry 
in philological studies involves a repression of its essential medium, which 
is that of sound. In a somewhat oxymoronic yet signif icantly honest way, 
the name given by Albert Lord to Harvard University’s impressive archive 
of recorded oral poetry from the former South Yugoslav countries is ‘The 
Milman Parry Collection of Oral Literature’. But from a media-archaeological 
perspective, there is no text here, only recorded voices and sound. And it 
was only after Milman’s original sound recording that this material was 
transcribed as text and musical notation (by Bela Bartók, among others).
As an acoustic event, oral memory does not necessarily demand a nar-
rative organization. The art form that is called Hörspiel in German – the 
radio play – is in the Anglophone world often called ‘radio drama’.29 This 
expression is still oriented towards a logocentric def inition of drama as a 
literary script in contrast to a medium-centric or radio-phonic emphasis 
on the relation between the word-based radio play and the acoustic-based 
Schallspiel.30 The latter dramatizes the materiality of the radio transmission 
and foregrounds a genuinely media-dramatic approach.31 The signal-based 
recording of oral poetry operates not beyond but below textuality – in 
the sense that it is both neurophysiologically subliminal and poetically 
‘sublime’. In the age of ‘electrif ied voices’32 and electro-mathematical media, 
memory has once more become transitory, even more so than what was the 
case in so-called oral cultures. In analogy to Walter Ong’s famous analysis, 
a kind of derived mem/orality takes place.33
Technically induced ‘secondary orality’
A misunderstanding starts once one mistakes oral poetry for literature. There 
is nothing ‘literal’ in oral poetry, no letters, no alphabet. The message of the 
medium is neurotemporal – it is real-time poetics, not literary spatiality. The 
musical aspect of oral poetry performances lies not in their melodic harmon-
ics but in their rhythms – the chronopoetic and time-critical dimension of 
prosodic articulation.34 With Edison’s phonograph, the sound of such language 
could for the first time be recorded not only symbolically but as a real audio 
signal. ‘We can’t understand orality without consideration of sound’, and the 
archaeology of sound at stake here is ‘closely connected to recording technolo-
gies that simultaneously […] shape our sensory experiences of oral poetry.’35
Before the phonograph, any sonic expression (be it speech or music) had 
to enter individual or collective memory or be symbolically translated into 
musical notation in order to survive over time. With technical recording, 
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sound immediately becomes inscribed in a new type of non-historical, 
non-human, signal-based archive, which – like the guslari performances 
and the turning disc – literally has to get in motion in order to get re-
presenced. With all the emphasis on dynamic recreation, both collective 
and technical memory here decouple the past from historical discourse, 
yet in different ways. ‘The concept of linear, historical time is denied, if not 
actually eliminated, by electroacoustic media. If a particular sound can be 
preserved and embedded within that originating from any other time, the 
concept of a linear flow of time becomes an anachronism.’36
Textual dictation versus sound recording
In order to open cultural articulations like ‘oral poetry’ to academic research, 
speech and sound events f irst had to be symbolically or technologically 
recorded and archivized so as to slow them down for careful and detailed 
analysis. Time-axis manipulation (‘slow motion’) is the a priori condition 
for scholarly analysis of the time-critical processes that Edmund Husserl 
once called pro- and retention and which in neuroscientific terms equals the 
three-second time span or ‘window of presence’ for a sung verse line (such 
as an ancient Homeric hexameter).37 An early application of sound f ilm for 
philological research is Milman Parry and Albert Lord’s recording of the oral 
poet Avdo Medjedovich, made in Montenegro around 1935. When listening 
to such a sound, we tend to be trapped by the referential illusion, believing 
that we are confronted with the indexical audio-visual signal. But let us pay 
closer attention: in any online or CD replay of such films (for instance the CD 
that accompanied the second edition of Albert Lord’s The Singer of Tales), 
discrete bit strings are in fact being processed. What we are confronted 
with here is sublime textuality operating on the subliminal level of our 
understanding – an unexpected technical realization of what Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz once described as an unconscious mathematical calculat-
ing perception, operative, for instance, when listening to breaking waves 
at the seashore. We should therefore not just ask what happens ‘beyond 
textuality’ – a question induced by signal-recording ‘analogue’ media – but 
also notice the powerful way in which textuality reappears within techno-
mathematical machines. The alphabet returns in a secondary writing, that 
is, in alphanumeric code and disguised as ‘secondary orality’. A note to 
Ismail Kadare’s novel The File on H. emphasizes: ‘In fact, part of the Milman 
Parry Collection of Oral Literature at Harvard has been digitized, and it is 
now possible to hear some of their f ield recordings online!’38
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Electrified memory
The legacy of Milman Parry and Albert Lord can thus not be reduced 
to philological transcriptions but encompasses the long-neglected col-
lection of original audio signal recordings as well. Is the type of social 
memory represented by oral poetry of a different nature if it is not me-
chanically recorded by a ‘graphic’ technology such as the phonograph 
or gramophone, as Milman Parry did around 1935, but electronically, 
on magnetic wire or tape, as Albert Lord did around 1950 with the same 
cultural material? As indicated by its very term, phonography and the 
gramophone relate to writing. But audio recording, which captures the 
acoustic signal itself, differs drastically from alphabetical notation, which 
codes phonetic speech as symbols. The act of alphabetical notation, which 
is primarily cognitive, is replaced in favour of the time-shifting operations 
of an actual physical event. In the preface to The Gutenberg Galaxy (1962), 
Marshall McLuhan declared his book a mere footnote to Albert Lord’s The 
Singer of Tales. The same McLuhan later envisioned the electronic age 
as a culture without writing. Electronic registration, transmission, and 
processing take us back in time to pre-literary forms of social memory. 
Yet the return of alphabetical communication in so-called ‘digital culture’ 
is based on alphanumeric code, which is invisible to most human users 
of such technologies.
What phonographs and cinematographs, whose names not coincidentally 
derive from writing, were able to store was time: time as a mixture of au-
dio frequencies in the acoustic realm […]. To record the sound sequences 
of speech, literature has to arrest them in a system of 26 letters, thereby 
categorically excluding all noise sequences.39
Such technological signal recordings stimulate a kind of scientif ic analysis 
which is no longer just philological or musicological: Through spectral 
analysis with electronic measuring media, it investigates sub-semantic 
poetic articulations at the media-archeological level, thus revealing a 
different but still poetic material. Phonographic recordings of real voices 
irritate the historical consciousness of cultural memory. The recordability 
of oral poetry as a physical audio event facilitates a re-presencing of past 
performances that is invariant to historical time. This allows for technolo-
gies of cultural feedback. When such a past recording is being replayed today 
to local cultures in Serbia, the political and even ideological bias might 
have been transformed dramatically, but by using the original recording 
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device, the Webster Wire Recorder puts us and the oral poets exactly in 
Lord’s position when he recorded a guslar performance.
Analogue sound signal recording does not reduce the memory of oral 
poetry to its literary value but keeps all the traces and noise of the actual 
event. More dramatically still, the digital processing of such recordings is 
not just another technical extension but an unexpected return of the very 
technique that drives oral literature in the very moment of its performative 
‘coming into being’. In a crude way, the algorithmic processing of poetic 
rhythms internally corresponds with the re-generative ‘formulaic’ principle 
that Parry identif ied as the poetic mechanism of reproducing epic memory 
in the absence of textual memory aids.
Technical recording versus symbolic transcription (Bartók)
According to a radical classicist thesis, the Greeks added vowels to the 
Phoenician alphabet for the explicit purpose of making the musicality 
of Homer’s oral epics recordable.40 But this notation was still symbolic, 
like the musical transcription that Bela Bartok provided based on Parry’s 
aluminium disc recordings of guslari songs. Recorded on these discs was a 
fig. 1.1: Webster Wire recorder magnetic spool with the one-string gusle in the background. 
photo: Media archaeological fundus, humboldt university, Berlin (Benjamin renter).
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certain surplus: non-musical articulations such as background noises and 
birdsong and even the singer’s occasional scoff ing. In contrast to notational 
transcription to a musical score, signal recording of cultural articulations 
involves electro-physical measuring of recorded events, digitally done by 
‘sampling’. And this process subjects the cultural event to experimenta-
tion, enabling a non-hermeneutic analysis of cultural articulations on a 
sub-philological, sub-alphabetical level.
So oral poetry as well as noise was recorded, yet the transcription into 
musical notation treats the sonic event as ‘oral literature’, thus keeping the 
analysis within the disciplinary discourse of the researchers (Milman Parry 
was a trained philologist). Emphatically opposed to ‘notebook-orientated 
scholars’,41 Alan Lomax, for his part, used mechanical and electronic record-
ing devices to catch folk songs more precisely than any symbolic score 
notation can do, since such notation was developed to suit ‘harmonic’ oc-
cidental music. From this practice, Lomax also derived the methodological 
impulse to analyze such sound recordings by electro-technical means – a 
literally media-archaeological way of uncovering latent sonic knowledge:
Today it may be possible with modern scientif ic measuring instruments 
such as the visible speech machine, the electromyograph and other 
instruments, to describe the various types of vocalizing in precise sci-
entif ic terms. […] there seems to be evidence that these unconscious but 
culturally transmitted vocal patterns are direct evidence of deepening 
emotional conditions […]. Thus, ethnomusicology may bring us close to 
deep-lying aesthetic forces that have been dynamic in all human history.42
At the end of the twentieth century, the legacies of Milman Parry and Albert 
Lord – both the textual and pictorial documentation of the Yugoslavian 
research journeys and some of the recorded guslari songs themselves—
were transformed into digital f iles. Does this sampling-based digitization 
transform the essence of such a memory? And how can we describe the new 
‘archive’ to which such online f iles give access? What happens to oral poetry 
when the ‘online’ performance (on the gusle string) and the ‘online’ record-
ings (on Lord’s wire spools) become accessible ‘online’ in the World Wide 
Web sense of the word? For millennia, the tradition of songs and tales took 
place through mnemotechnics of oral transmission that were increasingly 
supplemented by notational writing (the vocal alphabet, musical notes). 
The early twentieth century enabled a media-induced re-entry of orality 
– in Walter Ong’s view, a secondary orality based on analogue recording 
technologies like phonography, magnetic tape, and cinematography. In 
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the late twentieth century, symbolic notation took revenge in the form of 
alphanumeric computer code. The digitization of the audiovisual legacy 
of Parry and Lord on aluminium discs and wire spools makes a difference 
to the testimonial essence of its cultural content; Plato’s original ‘media’ 
critique of writing as an ambivalent memory technology becomes valid 
again when phono-graphical signals are being processed alpha-numerically. 
Memory, here, turns into information.
The poetic event should, however, not be reduced to its verbal semantics. 
It makes a media-archaeological (rather than philological) difference for the 
notion of ‘oral poetry’ when its notation made available for analysis does not 
take place in symbolical writing but by electro-physical recording media. 
One might then be able to consider micro events in the performance of oral 
poetry, such as near-discontinuous change and mathematical probabilities 
of transitions as well as retentions and protentions that require stochastic 
rather than statistical analysis. Oral poetry can be re-generated by the 
machine, transforming Parry’s formulae by algorithms. Claude Shannon 
once def ined artif icial languages abstractly as ‘a stochastic process which 
generates a sequence of symbols’43 – the exact definition that Jacques Lacan 
gave to the mechanism of signif iers within the human unconscious.
New options of sound and image retrieval
From the technification of Serbian epic songs, we now switch to the mnemo-
generic capacities of recorded sound. Once digitized, auditive and visual 
memory records are accessible for algorithmic procedures. Implemented in 
electronic computers, algorithms produce new forms of operative memory 
– a form of memory that differs from the performative social or individual 
mechanisms of human memory. Even if (re)search interests still need to be 
driven by the epistemologically curious human mind, algorithmic memory 
operations reveal a past that has never been accessible to historiography.
The archive is not a semantic memory or storage technology but an 
organizational form, a well-def ined system, a symbolic order based on 
inventorizationorality – a rule-bound procedure that is non-invasive in 
relation to its object. We may, however, imagine ‘experimental archives’ that 
differ from the organizational form of the institutional archive. Sampled and 
quantized (digitized) analogue f ilms can be transformed into a vast image 
bank which can then be unif ied as data sets and subjected to image-based 
search operations such as matching of similarities, object feature detection, 
statistical colour value comparison, and entropy.44 With algorithmically 
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driven ‘automated’ tagging, a type of metadata gained from within the 
sonic signal event reveals its endo-temporality. Such digital immersion into 
ancient sound (which might be called ‘archaeonautics’) is the opposite of 
‘social tagging’ but may still be combined with it in Open Access Web 2.0 
circulation, which is non-classif ied in similar ways: a hybridization of order 
and random access, of techno-logical and ‘collective’ memory. Therefore the 
very notion of the archive is in transition. As long as there were only symboli-
cal, alphabet-based archives, the phantasm of recording the acoustically real 
has generated imaginary and supplementary modes of sonic memorizing.
Rereading archival records has for a long time been thought of as reani-
mation – a historians’ syndrome.45 Stephen Greenblatt once openly declared 
his new historicist impulse an explicit wish ‘to speak with the dead’, like 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet in the graveyard.46 This prosopopoietic desire takes 
place against the better knowledge that every dialogue with the past only 
mirrors one’s own voice.47 The textual gramophone (written letters) inevi-
tably belongs to the realm of the symbolic, which is the order of the archive 
and which differs from the immediacy of physical-indexical traces (such as 
the rays of light in photography or soundtracks of recording media). Such 
technical memories are no longer archives or libraries. But as a new type 
of record, the phonograph was still subjected to forms of inventorization 
and administration that were developed for the long temporal horizons of 
paper-based archives.
The moment phonographic records had to be digitized in order to pre-
serve them against physical entropy, a new epistemological option emerged. 
Retrieved by technical sampling, sound recordings can be stored on digital 
media not just for archival purposes but also for further processing; the 
sonic memory that is read off of rotating Edison cylinders or gramophone 
discs gets in motion indeed. ‘Big data’ are generated by the retro-digitization 
of analogue sound archives, but the surplus value lies in the algorithmiza-
tion of these data, not in their pure quantity, since unstructured data as 
such are useless. The transformation of the archival order is not only the 
beginning of a different history but ‘Il y a substitution d’histoire’48 – but 
maybe not even history any more. (Multi-)media archaeology thus points 
out the discontinuities that arose with the invasion of audiovisual records 
in traditional archives, libraries, and museums in the twentieth century, 
resulting in a rethinking of the options of retrieval under digital media 
conditionsorality orality – transcending the notion of the archive itself 
by the technical and cultural application of stochastic order out of media-
immanent signal disorder: i.e. search operations such as similarity-based 
sound retrieval.
chaptEr OnE 55
Between media archaeology and cultural semantics
Whereas genuine signal-recording media such as the phonograph repre-
sented a challenge to the text-based archives, digital media and its binary 
encoded electronic records signal the return of the archive as a symboli-
cal regime. The vocal alphabet as writing system had been developed 
already in an attempt to analyze (literally dis-connect) oral speech into 
its sub-phonetic elements. Here, a ‘semantic gap’ opens between the her-
meneutic approach and its focus on cultural ‘understanding’ as practiced 
in musicology and the emphatic measuring approach that is facilitated 
by appropriate software for audio analysis, such as spectrography. When 
measuring melodic similarity, human versus algorithmic judgements49 do 
indeed clash: whereas the hermeneutically disciplined human perception 
strives to identify immediate causal relationships between temporally 
adjacent events, algorithmic signal processing in big data (such as the NSA 
or Google ‘archives’) identif ies correlations, replacing visual surveillance 
by potentials for predicting (human) behaviour .
Micro memory is already involved in the sonic sensation of presence; 
this present is by no means experienced as a punctual ‘now’. During the 
Second World War, Norbert Wiener based his time-critical anti-aircraft 
techno-mathematics on such a calculation. What Wiener, in somewhat 
Pythagorean terms, called harmonic analysis is today the predictive ana-
lytics of big data, where algorithms do not focus on the individual event 
but detect patterns, rhythms, and regularities to be extrapolated into the 
future.50 From this emerges the notion of the pro-active archive, which 
differs from the historicist function of the nineteenth-century archive. 
Collective memory is thus no longer a reference to a remembered past 
but a way of analyzing the present as a collection of big (meta-)data in 
real-time for future prediction. When the analysis of sound is no longer 
the work of musicologists/historians but of software acting as media ar-
chaeologists listening to audio(visual) recordings from the past, linguistic 
programmes such as Praat come into their own. The f irst computational 
algorithms for voice recognition were developed in the f ield of linguistics; 
since then, for example, the analysis of vocal pitch in historical f ilms has 
led to sociolinguistic insights. All of a sudden, new forms of micro-social 
memory emerge, replacing the traditional ‘historical source’ material.51 
‘Will we become the atoms in the “social physics”, f irst dreamed by the 
founder sociology Auguste Comte in the middle of nineteenth century?’ The 
question was posed by Lev Manovich when he presented an algorithmic tool 
for comparing facial expressions in ‘self ies’ collected from social media such 
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as Instagram in order to detect the distinct ‘visual signature’ of individual 
cities.52
In such a context, questions of privacy arise. The archive has always been 
the opposite of open access. It refuses instant usage for non-authorized 
agencies and favours instead a temporal delay (which apostle Paul, in his 
second letter to the Corinthians, called the katechon). With the online 
archive, a challenge arises: how to temporarily shelter data from external 
access – the well-known archival ‘classified’ restriction – by logical/symboli-
cal or physical dis-connection. With the temporary (en)closure of records 
and archival resistance to the claims of collective access in the ‘social web’, 
social memory might be appropriately replaced by time capsules.
Notes
1. As expressed in the outline for the Rethinking Social Memory conference 
(Oslo, December 5-6, 2014).
2. von Neumann, pp. 34-79.
3. See Kohonen.
4. Foucault, pp. 129 and 131: The archive ‘governs the appearance of statements 
as unique events’, whereas archaeology ‘questions the already-said at the 
level of its existence […] and the general archive system to which it belongs’.
5. Kirschenbaum, p. 50.
6. The common use of the term media has the tendency to create misunder-
standings. In the following argumentation, it does not refer to its discursive 
mass-media meaning but to the material and mathematical essence of 
technological signal and data transmission.
7. See Schmitz, pp. 37-44.
8. Ina Blom, Eivind Røssaak, and Trond Lundemo, call for contributions to the 
present volume (distributed to the authors in January 2013).
9. See Kirschenbaum.
10. For a more compromising version of this radical point of view, see the intro-
duction (on ‘Critical Code Studies’) to 10 PRINT CHR$(205.5+RND(1)); : GOTO 
10, p. 6: ‘CCS invites code-based interpretation that invokes and elucidates 
contexts.’
11. Gabriel Tarde, especially p. 99 and p. 114.
12. According to Simondon, ‘technical objects are always embedded within 
larger networks of technical ensembles, including geographic, social, tech-
nological, political, and economic forces’. N. Katherine Hayles, p. 90.
13. See Bruno Latour.
14. Kittler, p. 7.
15. See von Ranke. 
16. Ibid., p. 35, as quoted in Zimmermann, p. 404.
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17. Albert Lord, as quoted in Foley, p. 41.
18. Von Ranke, p. 36.
19. Ibid.
20. Zimmermann, p. 407.
21. I owe this term to Vivian Sobchack, pp. 323-333.
22. As quoted in Zimmermann, p. 407.
23. The one-string Pythagorean monochord belongs to the most ancient ‘media’ 
of epistemological experimentation in the Occident.
24. Such is the case with the early electro-acoustic instrument Subharchord in 
the archive of the Academy of the Arts, Berlin.
25. Zimmermann, p. 409.
26. Kittler, p. 7, referring to Ong.
27. Ibid.
28. Singers and Tales in the 21st Century: The Legacies of Milman Parry and Albert 
Lord (3-5 December 2010), Conference on the occasion of the 50th anniver-
sary of the publication of Albert Lord’s seminal Singer of Tales and the 75th 
anniversary of the death of his mentor Milman Parry who developed the 
oral-formulaic theory.
29. See Crook. 
30. See Kolb, Knilli, and Huwiler.
31. Schöning.
32. This term in the title of the present contribution is inspired by Electrified 
Voices, edited by Zakharine and Meise. 
33. Kittler, p. 7: “Primary orality” and “oral history” came into existence only 
after the end of the writing monopoly, as the technological shadows of the 




37. See Turner and Pöppel.
38. http://www.amazon.com/File-H-Novel-Ismail-Kadare/dp/1559706279; 
accessed 22 September 2006. For such digital audio files from the Milman 








45. See, for example, the metaphor of the historian’s task in Lamprecht, p. 4.
46. Greenblatt, p. 1.
47. Shakespeare, Hamlet, act V, 1st scene. See as well the final passage in Der-
rida’s La voix et le Phénomène.
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48. de Certeau, p. 5.
49. Müllensiefen and Frieler.
50. See the entry ‘Predictive Analytics’ in Geiselberger and Anderson, p. 301.
51. See Müller.
52. E-mail disseminated by Lev Manovich on 27 May 2014. See www.selfiecity.
net.
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 Chapter Two
Can Languages be Saved? Linguistic Heritage and the 
Moving Archive
Sónia Matos
Drawing on Wolfgang Ernst’s understanding of archival media as ‘active agents’, 
this essay will discuss the questions that have instigated the design of learning 
materials for Silbo Gomero, an endangered form of language still used on the 
small island of La Gomera in the Canarian Archipelago. Looking specifically 
at the unique perceptual and interconnected materialities afforded by digital 
media, I will problematize the preservation of endangered languages through 
the techniques of storage and transmission. If language is an emblematic 
example of a living and moving archive that is passed on from one generation 
to the next, we are confronted here with a form of heritage that is constantly 
disrupted by both temporal and spatial phenomena. In particular, the digital 
appropriation of Silbo Gomero suggests that a linguistic archive should also 
open space for ambiguity and change. Memory, tradition, and heritage cannot 
be saved, only rematerialized, renegotiated, and reinvented – a process that 
resonates with an understanding of culture as a performative act.1
In 2007, I travelled to the small island of La Gomera in the Canarian 
archipelago with the intent of learning Silbo Gomero, a whistled form of 
language that can still be heard on this small Atlantic island. Part of my 
doctoral studies at Goldsmiths College, University of London, my aim was 
to design didactic materials for the local schools that still currently teach 
this ancient and whistled form of language. Upon arrival, I immediately 
encountered two distinct ways of understanding and in fact learning this 
form of language: f irst, by directly accessing the wealth of knowledge 
transmitted by two local teachers who learned this form of language in 
their youth and while working in the f ields of the island, and second, while 
studying the body of work proposed by the linguists who have successively 
analyzed Silbo Gomero. Both bodies of knowledge and their contrasting 
depictions explored in this contribution clearly illustrate some of the key 
ideas discussed by Wolfgang Ernst when addressing the possibility of an 
archaeology of ‘sonic heritage’ – a term that appears in the 2013 English-
language collection of his work.
My aim here is twofold: f irst, to explore the distinct ‘readings’ of Silbo 
Gomero while exposing their contrasting knowledge practices as well as 
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their underlying media archival practices, and second, to examine the 
ways in which each body of knowledge – ‘scientif ic’ and ‘indigenous’ – are 
characterized by distinct ‘media’ but also to examine how these two distinct 
paradigms inform different approaches to the design of educational materi-
als. As a result, this contribution will propose a shift from a ‘phonological 
stage’ toward an understanding of the whistler’s own cognitive milieu, a 
process that ultimately leads to an alternative approach to the revitaliza-
tion of this form of language – one that is less based on safeguarding the 
language itself but rather one that sets forth the importance of revitalizing 
its sonic heritage.
This movement between two distinct approaches and bodies of knowl-
edge will shift the underlying project – designing a language support 
system for Silbo Gomero – from the systematic recording and analysis 
of whistled utterances towards an interactive media approach where 
the ecological acoustics of the language’s sonic heritage becomes the 
key element. While incorporating bioacoustics and neurological data 
as well as drawing on the whistlers’ own accounts, the purpose of this 
study is to gain a situated and embodied understanding of this whistled 
form of language and of the different media involved in its study and 
safeguarding.
Silbo Gomero: A phonological study
In his latest book El Silbo Gomero, Nuevo Estudio Fonológico from 2006 (f irst 
published in 1978), Professor Ramón Trujillo establishes a clear separation 
between the three different phases of study that have largely influenced our 
understanding of Silbo Gomero: the ‘impressionist’ (or ethnographic) stage 
conducted by Juan Betthencourt Alfonso and Antonio Maria Manrique in 
the late nineteenth century; the ‘phonetic stage’ of Max Quendefelt (1887), 
Joseph Lajard (1891), and André Classe (1957); and f inally the ‘phonological 
stage’, where the work of Ramon Trujillo himself as well as the work of 
linguist Annie Rialland (2005) can be located.
It is in this same body of work that we discover that it was only with 
the phonetic stage (particularly with the article ‘Pfeifsprache auf der Insel 
Gomera’ by Quendefelt) that one finds the first linguistic and scientific study 
of this unique form of language. As suggested by the linguist himself, after 
many foreign and impressionistic accounts, for the f irst time Quendefelt 
recognized that Silbo Gomero was not a language in its own right since it 
simply imitates the Castilian Spanish spoken on the island; in fact, what is 
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being whistled are the syllables of words that are locally spoken2. As sug-
gested by the author, Quendefelt’s work established a foundation for further 
linguistic theorization while postulating that Silbo Gomero manipulates the 
basic units of spoken words (both consonants and vowels) and can therefore 
only be understood as a surrogate of speech.
This phonetic stage was later surpassed by the ‘phonological stage’ as 
seen in the work of Trujillo himself and in the work of Annie Rialland 
mentioned above. Therefore the ‘phonological stage’ presents Silbo Gomero 
as an independent phonological system:
that contains a reduced number of phonic schemes that are used to 
produce different sonorous substances […]. The Silbo has its own logic 
that cannot be simplified by direct representation. For example, the grave 
vowel /A/ […] is not a simplif ication of the Castilian Spanish grave vowels 
/o/, /u/ and /a/, but is a different vowel altogether because it belongs to 
an independent phonological system.3
In this sense, ‘the Silbo’ (corresponding to ‘el Silbo’, a term used by local 
islanders) has: ‘a rigorously articulated structure which clearly distin-
guishes it from standardized sign systems and whose most notable 
attribute is that the meanings of its smallest consistent units cannot be 
analysed’.4
According to this account, the formal simplicity of the whistled language 
– with its two groups of vowels and four groups of consonants – means that it 
can be used to communicate any given non-tonal language such as Castilian 
Spanish. As a result of the data collected during the ‘phonological stage’, one 
is able to attribute precise values to each vocalic element. We can therefore 
say that the grave vowel corresponds to the /a, o, and u/ vowels used in the 
spoken regional Castilian Spanish language. As Trujillo suggests in both 
editions of his phonological study, their frequencies correspond to: 1800, 
1600, and 1600 Hz. The acute vowel corresponds to the /i and e/ vowels and 
correspond to the values 3300 and 3000 Hz, an idea that is also presented 
by the same author. The limitation of the whistling apparatus is considered 
by Trujillo to be the main constraint, which explains why a whistler can 
only produce simple differences in terms of tone visible in the ‘grave’-‘acute’ 
distinction. The linguist also suggests that while spoken vowels rely on a 
different set of physical resonators (allowing one to distinguish between 
acute/grave, open/closed, partial/intermittent, and complete vowels), the 
whistled vowel is shaped by and depends upon one resonator only: the 
mouth.
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One of the authors to disagree with the strict categories of ‘acute’ and 
‘grave’ vowels is the linguist Annie Rialland, in a 2005 article. In response 
to Rialland’s approach, Ramon Trujillo writes the following:
[…] within the Silbo Gomero we can only f ind two ‘whistled vowels’ or 
groups of frequencies; two blocks that behave as they would in ordinary 
language […] where functional confusion is impossible from a phonologi-
cal perspective […] properties that are always distinctive and those that 
are not consistently distinctive (depending on the context, the situation 
or what the whistler knows) cannot be considered […]. Obviously, these 
latter properties, which Annie Rialland sometimes calls ‘optional’ […] 
do not form part of the structure of the whistled language because they 
depend on external factors.5
When attending Silbo classes in the local schools or while recording in 
the f ields with Maestro Isidro Ortiz and Maestro Lino Rodriguez (Maestro 
is the Spanish word for ‘teacher’) ‒ two teachers that are part of an older 
generation of whistlers – I found that whistled languages are in fact highly 
‘dependent’ on what a ‘phonological stage’ would call ‘external factors’. In 
fact, here it is important to introduce the idea that both Maestro Isidro 
fig. 2.1: Spectrographic representation of whistled utterances performed by Maestro lino in the vil-
lage of la palmita and corresponding to the castilian Spanish name ‘Octavio’ (author’s own archive).
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and Maestro Lino are able to whistle and perceive at least two further 
groups of vowels within the grave/acute separation. To further complete 
the description initiated above, and in considering the ‘phonological stage’, 
the ‘acute’ and ‘grave’ vowels should be completed by the addition of two 
other groups of consonants, the ‘acute/grave continuant’ and the ‘acute/
grave interrupted’, as suggested by Professor Trujillo and as stated below:
whistled consonants are nothing more than intonation curves, tran-
sitions or interruptions in the ‘whistled line’ of what we have called 
whistled vowels. […] The vocalic lines – between 1000 and 3000 Hz – are 
altered with the ‘help’ of the whistled consonants. In these terms, an acute 
consonant will always point the following vowel to a higher frequency; 
the opposite will happen when it is preceded by a grave consonant. All 
of the above ‘consonantal intonations’, whether continuant or inter-
rupted, correspond to spoken Spanish, except for /s/ (that cannot easily 
be whistled) while […] a continuant is transposed into an interrupted […].6
To add to the discussion presented so far, when attending classes for children 
and teenagers (from six to eighteen years of age) in the different schools of 
the island in February 2007, one thing that struck me was that both Maestro 
Isidro and Maestro Lino did not teach how to whistle the isolated units 
that we conventionally associate with the vowel/consonant distinction. 
In their classes, one learns how to whistle words or melodic segments by 
grasping the contours of different syllables. One also learns that Lalo is 
whistled differently than Lala, a distinction that contradicts the assumption 
that Silbo only exploits two groups of vowels: one acute /e and i/ and one 
grave /a, o, and u/. Maestro Isidro and Maestro Lino teach students how to 
appreciate the possibility of whistling and perceiving two more sonorous 
segments within the presented acute/grave distinction. Also, in discussions 
with Maestro Isidro, I learned that certain words are whistled in exactly 
the same way, as for example ballena (‘whale’) and gallina (‘chicken’), an 
example also given by Professor Trujillo in both publications dedicated to 
the study of Silbo Gomero.
The ‘phonological stage’ has mostly impacted the design of educational 
materials created to support the teaching and learning of Silbo Gomero 
within the space of the classroom, as seen in the 2005 study El Silbo Gomero: 
Materiales Didácticos (The Silbo Gomero: Didactic Materials) by Ubaldo Brito 
and colleagues, published by the local educational bureau. However, Julien 
Meyer’s bioacoustic study from 2005 has opened the way for a renewed 
understanding of the role that intelligibility and the orography of the island 
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might play when learning a whistled form of language such as Silbo Gomero. 
In fact, Meyer’s study differs from a phonological approach while expanding 
the recorded and sampled data and by incorporating and measuring levels 
of environmental noise and while focusing its object of study on the role of 
intelligibility. His study is supported by a 2005 neurological study by Manuel 
Carreiras and colleagues that demonstrates that whistlers exercise regions 
of the brain in ways that are not exploited by non-whistlers. Combining 
both the bioacoustics and neurological approaches, one can conclude that 
the whistler’s cognitive milieu is more in tune with that of a musician, an 
idea that is also proposed by Meyer.
Both bodies of work illuminate an important hypothesis: can we consider 
the local environment an integral aspect of whistled forms of language 
such as Silbo Gomero? As suggested by Maestro Isidro during an informal 
conversation in 2007: ‘you cannot separate the whistler from the environ-
ment, they are one.’ This idea implies a distinct approach to the study of 
Silbo Gomero, one that delves beyond an analysis of whistled vowels and 
consonants while focusing on a more integrative approach and where Silbo 
can only be understood while taking into account the orography of the 
island. As suggested by Meyer, Silbo is only the ‘tip of the iceberg’ of a more 
complex ‘linguistic and acoustic phenomena’.7
fig. 2.2: Maestro lino and the author Sónia Matos recording in the village of la palmita, island of 
la gomera (author’s own archive).
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Language and sonic media
To give continuity to this discussion, a closer inspection of the techno-
scientif ic mediums that have guided the recording and analysis of whistled 
utterances seems pertinent. This is particularly true if we consider that the 
main conclusions drawn by the ‘phonological stage’ are based on recordings 
that were made on a magnetic tape and then later examined with an oscil-
loscope8 and a spectrograph.9 As suggested by Professor Trujillo himself, the 
results from the oscilloscope were not very useful; the spectrograph, on the 
other hand, produced ‘clearer visual transcripts’ of the whistled language 
phenomena. It is important to note that in the first study it appears, from the 
lack of ‘visual evidence’, that an analogue rather than a digital oscilloscope 
was used.10
Drawing on the evidence that is presented above, one could speculate 
whether the instruments used in the recording and analysis of whistled 
utterances are at the heart of the ‘disagreement’ between linguists and 
whistlers when referring to the number of whistled vowels. It is therefore 
relevant to investigate these instrumental appropriations and their underly-
ing knowledge practices in order to consider fully the information provided 
by the ‘phonological stage’. Here it is important to understand the role of 
scientif ic data – particularly recorded data – in relation to a given mode 
of instrumentation that, in this particular case, entails techno-scientif ic 
approaches to sound recording and visualization.
Today, most phoneticians are acquainted with the use of the spectro-
graphic analyses – an optimal tool that treats sound as a discrete object 
prone to visualization and quantif ication11. To better understand this, one 
has to account for an important contribution made within the history of 
Western physics and mathematical practice: the development of ‘Fourier 
analysis’ and the application of the ‘Fourier series’ in the study of body 
heat flows. As suggested by Trevor Wishart in his book On Sonic Art, f irst 
published in 1985, it was in the nineteenth century that mathematician Jean 
Baptiste Fourier devised a way of representing ‘an arbitrary mathematical 
function by a sum of (possibly inf inite) simpler functions’.12 Later, physicist 
and mathematician Georg Ohm would apply the theories devised by Fou-
rier, transferring them from the analysis of body heat flows to the domain 
of sound.13 Here, he would use the ‘Fourier transform’ – a mathematical 
function that translates one variable into another – to analyze a tone 
while breaking it into other more simple units.14 Today, and based on the 
achievements described above, it is possible to convert information on the 
variation of amplitude within time into information about the changes 
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of amplitude within frequency (conventionally measured in Hz, or cycles 
per second). It is also possible to think of an inverse ‘Fourier transform’, 
where information concerning frequency and amplitude is converted into 
information concerning amplitude and time.15
In The Computer Music Tutorial, electroacoustic composer Curtis Roads 
recounts this story while stating that physicist Hermann von Helmholtz 
further developed Ohm’s studies, later inventing a ‘method of harmonic 
analyses based on mechanical-acoustic resonators’, a device that oscillates 
given specif ic frequencies.16 Later in the nineteenth century, physicist John 
Tyndall – inf luenced by Helmholtz’s ideas concerning harmonic stable 
states (largely derived from Pythagorean mathematics) – would work 
towards the creation of new techniques of sound visualization.17 In fact, 
Tyndall would experiment with the idea of timbre as an added mingling 
of two or more tones to create ‘imaginative experiments’ with the intent 
of actually visualizing sound.18 These achievements led to the idea that 
‘instrumental timbre’ is largely determined by a steady state spectrum 
– thought of as the sustained part of an instrumental tone.19 From these 
sorts of experiments, various forms of mechanical ‘visualization’ of sound 
were developed, further reducing the qualities of timbre to the quantif iable 
measurements of frequency.20
It was only in the 1940s that scientists working with the oscilloscope, an 
electronic instrument that visualizes signal voltages in two-dimensional 
wave graphs, would actually apply the principles of ‘Fourier analyses’ to 
the visualization of sound, now conceptualized as a ‘wave’.21 The procedure 
required photographing the image represented on the oscilloscope and then 
manually tracing it back into a mechanical Fourier analyzer.22 As detailed 
by Roads, it wasn’t until the development of cybernetics, with Norbert 
Wiener’s ‘generalized harmonic analyses’, that a shift occurred from the 
analysis of a harmonic spectrum to incorporate new continuous sounds, 
here including ‘noise’.23 Building upon Wiener’s accomplishment, in 1958 
Blackman and Tukey saw the relevance of using Fourier analysis while 
manipulating diverse levels of sampled data.24 The method opened the way 
for the development of the ‘fast Fourier transform’, releasing the need for 
vast amounts of computer calculation.25 A new era of sound visualization 
appeared ‒still influenced, however, by the Helmholtz reliance on harmonic 
structures.
Returning to Wishart in On Sonic Art, this connection had its basis in 
Pythagoras’ harmonic universals, where the vibrating quality of a string 
(the wave-like structure) and the perceived quality are in strict numerical 
correlation, with the length of string and the quality of tone (now conceived 
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as quantity) conforming to pre-established ratios.26 This is most visible in 
the further development of the Western musical tempered scale but also 
in that of particular instrumental appropriations of sound as in the Fourier 
transform.27 Here, sound was understood through a particular reading of 
pitch as that which is composed by various Fourier sine waves. By calculat-
ing their fundamental frequency, one could locate the fundamental pitch, 
further relegating timbre to a ‘secondary role’.28 It is important to add to 
this discussion a critical understanding of timbre as a complex category 
– an idea that is in line with the work of experimental psychologist Albert 
Bregman who, in collaboration with Steven McAdams, states that timbre 
is ‘the psychoacoustician’s multidimensional waste-basket category for 
everything that cannot be labelled pitch or loudness’.29
The brief history of the Fourier is fundamental to the analysis of Silbo 
Gomero (as presented by a ‘phonological stage’), since perceived vowels are 
here measured and ‘translated’ from their transient sound qualities (that are 
f irst and foremost perceptually audible) to a reading of pitch/frequency. In 
strict correlation, spectrographic analyses and the spectrogram itself appear 
as powerful tools, particularly when one considers that the spectrogram 
provides an elegant representation of transient auditory phenomena.
To further complete this brief historical description, Roads states that 
the use of the spectrogram or sonogram in speech analyses became per-
tinent.30 Often compared to the organic functioning of the human ear, it 
was soon stipulated that the spectrogram could simulate very accurately 
the way human beings actually hear sounds.31 Reading the brief history 
of spectrographic analysis as detailed by Wishart and later by Roads, it is 
almost inevitable that both the ear and the ‘Fourier transform’ would be 
conceived as approximate perceptual-archetypal models. In fact, and in line 
with Wishart’s critique of the relationship between the Fourier transform 
and organic ear function, some researchers have now acknowledged that 
frequency/periodicity or spectral information may not always represent 
how a sound might actually be heard.32 This is all the more true if we 
consider the fact that ‘we do not hear, we listen’, an idea f irst proposed by 
American psychologist James J. Gibson in his timely 1966 contribution The 
Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems.
It might seem redundant to compare the use of spectrographic analyses 
in the linguistic domain with its impact in the musical domain. However, 
by taking Silbo Gomero beyond its status as a language surrogate, some 
paradigms might have points in common, particularly when one considers 
that the development of particular modes of analyses of auditory experience 
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stem from a similar instrumental history, one that f inds a common root 
with Pythagoras, Helmholtz, and Fourier. This is even more pertinent if 
we take into account Curtis Roads’ idea that ‘the dynamic range of music 
is much wider than speech’.33
However, at this point it is relevant to interrupt this discussion and 
recall the ideas advanced by the ‘phonological stage’. It is important to 
remember the one element that seemed to be contradictory, notably the 
number of whistled vowels. While some whistlers are able to produce and 
perceive at least four vowels, a phonological account will only outline two 
groups of vowels as suggested by Trujillo. We must, in other words, take 
into account the fact that the ‘phonological stage’ is determined by scien-
tif ic data of recorded whistled utterances. Considering the presentation 
of Fourier analyses – the basis of spectrographic analyses of sound – one 
might consider this point of disagreement to be inherently influenced by 
the way in which distinct modes of perception and interpretation interact 
with specif ic mediums.
The analytical exercise described in this section in fact resonates with 
Wolfgang Ernst’s discussion of the possibility of a ‘media archaeology of 
sonic articulations’, as represented by the following passage: ‘The media-
archaeological exercise is to be aware of the fact that at each technologically 
given moment we are dealing with media, not humans, that we are not 
speaking with the dead but dealing with dead media that operate.’34 And 
while Ernst would contend that the ‘[digital] reproduction of sound succeeds 
in the same exact way as the original’,35 further inspection might actually 
allow us to draw a quite different conclusion. In fact, and drawing here 
on the work of Roads discussed above, one could present the limitation of 
spectrographic analysis as the inability of a Fourier transform to demarcate 
two different but very close frequencies.36 This description points towards 
a paradox where the properties of the medium itself condition the analyses 
of an embodied experience of sound. Above all, this parameter arises from 
a compromise that imposes itself when analyzing complex and situated 
phenomena and where observed phenomena are further influenced by the 
techno-material exigencies of the measuring apparatus.
Returning to some of the key ideas proposed by Ernst, I would like to 
contend that while the human auditory sense might not suff ice when 
performing an archaeology of the acoustic – an idea suggested by Ernst 
himself37 ‒ neither will the media that is used for measuring sonic articula-
tions. A true ‘archaeology’ (in the words of Ernst) will require both. In line 
with Wishart’s and Roads’ analysis presented above, one will f ind the earlier 
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work of physicist Niels Bohr who, in Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge 
(1958), was able to demonstrate that an analogous paradox is found within 
the modern representations of the physical theory of light, an idea that is 
explored by theorist Karen Barad in her 2007 book Meeting the Universe 
Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning. 
In chapter three, the author discusses the work of Bohr by highlighting 
the ways in which the scientist showed that our understanding of light as 
either wave or particle was intrinsically linked to the qualities of distinct 
measuring apparatuses. By reading Barad’s contribution, the reader is able 
to conclude that within the domain of physics, this breakthrough offered 
a new understanding of scientif ic knowledge as something that is intrinsic 
to the materialities and performances of measuring apparatuses.
Looking specif ically at an analysis of Silbo Gomero, the nature of the 
measuring apparatus has to be considered as both ‘inclusive’ and ‘exclusive’, 
as suggested by the philosopher Alfred North Whitehead (1925). This will 
open the way for an understanding of the Silbo language that is reliant 
on an analysis of what is whistled as well as on an understanding of what 
is actually heard. In this light, apparatuses can no longer be conceived 
of as simple mediating, archival devices that provide a straightforward 
record of sonic heritage. They are, rather, intrinsic to the formation of this 
same heritage. As suggested in the passage below, this approach is in line 
with Ernst’s own understanding of media archaeology and its role in our 
understanding of sonic heritage:
fig. 2.3: Spectrographic representation of a whistled utterance performed by Maestro Isidro 
out in the Barranco (valley) de la Matanza, island of la gomera. It corresponds to the castilian 
Spanish sentence: ‘a Sonia… cuando te vas…de la gomera’ (‘to Sonia…when are you leaving….la 
gomera’) (author’s own archive).
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True media archaeology starts here: the phonograph as media artefact 
preserves not only the memory of cultural semantics but past techni-
cal knowledge as well, a kind of frozen media knowledge embodied 
in engineering and waiting to be revealed by media-archaeological 
consciousness.38
Designing didactic materials for Silbo Gomero
It is now time to provide an overview of the ongoing efforts that have been 
made by Silbo’s cultural and educational community when developing di-
dactic materials for the local schools of the island of La Gomera. In fact, and 
considering the generational gap between teachers and students, Maestro 
Isidro, while tinkering with the written alphabet, was able to design his own 
didactic approach: the Silfateo (see f igure 4 below). Designed as a memory 
aid for children to take home, according to this system, the consonants t, ch, 
and s used in spoken Castilian Spanish are represented by ‘CHE’. Therefore, 
when learning how to whistle sientaté (sit), the word is better understood 
if written as chiénchache. In this way, different whistles correspond to the 
group of consonants CHE (t, ch, s); YE (d, n, ñ, l, ll, y, r, rr); KE (p, k, f), and GE 
(b, m, g, j). Maestro Isidro uses the alphabet in an onomatopoetic fashion, 
as if presenting the notes of a musical instrument..
On the other hand, Maestro Lino has based his teaching on a conver-
sational interaction between students. Similar to the idea of ‘learning by 
doing’, here a ref inement of the senses becomes key and uncertainty is 
exploited to its fullest potential. Even when the student does not know 
how to fully articulate a whistled utterance, Maestro Lino is the f irst to 
encourage experimentation with what is yet unknown.
Here, we should also pay attention to the activities taking place in the 
scholarly context of the Silbo Gomero community, namely the activities 
that are portrayed in the publication El. Silbo Gomero: Materiales Didácticos 
(Silbo Gomero: Didactic Materials) developed by the Canarian Bureau for 
Education, Culture, and Sports in 2005. Building on the advice of Profes-
sor Trujillo and Maestro Isidro amongst others, this publication presents 
several pathways worth exploring when teaching Silbo Gomero. The f irst 
recommendation refers to an exploration of traditional situations of com-
munication while taking into account the orographic terrain of the island. 
It argues that such situations are best explored if one can simultaneously 
reference the topographic maps of the island, visually demarcating the 
places where Silbo was most commonly used.39
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A second recommendation entails an exploration of bodily configura-
tions required for the performance of this peculiar form of language. This 
can be done while exploring the position of the tongue and the use of the 
f ingers to modulate different tones and control the interruptions of the 
emitted utterance. To further strengthen this exploration, the book suggests 
that the learner should explore other instruments that give rise to similar 
auditory experiences, such as the local herder’s f lute.40 The third recom-
mendation, which largely follows the logic of a ‘phonological stage’, refers to 
the close inspection of the spectrographic representations (or spectrograms) 
of whistled words or, alternatively, to explore Maestro Isidro’s Silfateo.41
The publication also recommends exploring the common communicative 
utterances used in the f ields, for instance the various expressions used in 
salutation; when identifying oneself; when identifying and locating objects 
and people; when describing, narrating, expressing necessities, quantifying, 
etc. Following the same logic, a further study of the most typical diff iculties 
encountered when decoding an uttered message – such as strong wind, 
intense reverberations, or extremely long distances –is advised. These dif-
f iculties can be contoured by selecting an adequate and clear vocabulary 
in addition to using a set of questions and answers to produce discursive 
redundancy as presented later on – a method commonly deployed by both 
Maestros as I was able to testify while attending their classes. In the same 
fig. 2.4: transcription of numbers one to five using Maestro Isidro’s Silfateo (author’s own archive).
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section, the reader is introduced to the idea that the student should also 
be able to situate Silbo within the vast panoply of whistled languages. And 
f inally, all of these recommendations should be explored with the intent 
of providing the student with an enrichment of linguistic capacities as an 
expression of both social and cultural value.
One aspect that is left to be considered is the complex sonic dimension of 
this form of language – ‘the tip of the iceberg’, as once suggested by bioac-
oustician Julian Meyer. This ‘tip’ is not necessarily located in the brain or in 
the code as an isolated unit of analysis but rather in the complex interaction 
between the whistler and the orography of the island as also contended by 
Meyer. Although mentioned in the f irst line of recommendations described 
in the book El Silbo Gomero: Materiales Didácticos, the issue seems to have 
been relegated to a purely visual bias. In this sense, it is important to look at 
the complex auditory, temporal, and spatial qualities in a space that opens 
up educational design towards the construction of new auditory artifacts.
One could, however ask: why not proceed with local instruments such as 
the herder’s flute, the spectrogram, visual topographic maps, or even on-site 
training? The challenge is that the local herder’s f lute does not sustain the 
same corporeal relation that characterizes the performance of Silbo Gomero, 
particularly the position of the f ingers and tongue, which are essential 
when learning how to whistle. The local flute might ‘tune the ear’ to similar 
temporally dynamic and melodic lines, yet this instrument does not offer 
the possibility of a more thorough exploration of complex sonic attributes, 
particularly the characteristic echoes and reverberations that modulate the 
auditory experience when performing Silbo in the mountainous environ-
ment of the island. And while on-site training is provided once a year at the 
annual gathering of all schools in an exterior environment, actual access 
to the most remote areas of the island where Silbo was extensively used is 
out of the question for most schools due to the complex logistics involved. 
While this does not mean that new artifacts are always necessary when 
developing design solutions for the transmission of whistling techniques, it 
is important to recognize that the required auditory, temporal and spatial 
qualities open a space for incorporating digital technologies that more 
readily facilitate exploring such phenomena.
This attention to the multisensorial dimensions of linguistic learning is 
paired with an attempt to f ind ways to safeguard an immaterial culture 
that entails the transmission of a wealth of cognitive skills as opposed to 
‘frozen’ cultural objects as suggested by the United Nations’ Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization in a 2004 publication ‒ an organization 
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that has, in fact, recognized Silbo’s value as a form of intangible heritage.42 
Pairing these concerns not only opens up space for ‘innovation’; it also 
demands – particularly from those who design learning materials for 
endangered languages such as Silbo Gomero – a delicate balance between 
the knowledge transmitted by this ancient form of communication and the 
new opportunities it presents to young Gomerans when learning a whistled 
form of language. The design of a new educational platform will therefore 
require an ‘alternative approach’, a ‘media-archaeological re-enactment’ 
that draws on a distinct ‘temporal regime of auditory memory’, here drawing 
once again on the words of Wolfgang Ernst.43 This is a ‘regime’ that is not 
conf ined to the restrictions of sonic recording and playback but rather 
takes advantage of computational tools in the design of new educational 
materials.
Such an approach celebrates what designer and software developer 
Michael Murtaugh (2008) has identif ied as central themes when design-
ing for interaction with computational mediums – the themes of ‘live-
ness, plasticity and incompleteness’. ‘Liveness’ here means that not all 
possible paths of interaction can be pre-programmed, thus opening up 
unexpected potentials and paths for exploration. ‘Plasticity’ means that 
the designed artifact, medium, or system can be shaped to one’s intent, 
fig. 2.5: Image of the mountainscape of the island of la gomera. here, one can still see the 
rugged terrain supported by artificial terraces that creates stable land for agriculture. the Silbo 
gomero was commonly used by local islanders when working in thus rugged terrain (author’s own 
archive).
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and ‘incompleteness’ indicates the degree of openness of the system when 
incorporating ‘unpredictable input’. These are precisely the type of features 
that the phonological stage would describe as the inconsistent traits of Silbo 
Gomero, traits that are ‘dependent on the context, the situation or what the 
whistler knows’.44
El Laberinto del Sonido (the sound labyrinth)
A continuing engagement with Silbo’s sonic dimension has become the 
key underlying component in the design of didactic materials, thus taking 
the potential to re-enact this linguistic form beyond the preservation of 
a surrogate code while recreating the ancient body of knowledge and its 
sonic heritage. This instigated the design of the application El Laberinto 
del Sonido, developed in collaboration with computer engineer Theo Burt 
at the Music Research Centre of the University of York.45 The interactive 
platform was designed for children ranging from seven to nine years of 
age (the primary school years) and who attend the different schools of the 
island of La Gomera. The platform, currently harboured by the Canarian 
government’s website as part of the educational project Abriendo la Escuela 
(‘Opening the School’),46 essentially consists of a software application that 
allows children to develop auditory-spatial virtual worlds while providing 
a framework for non-linear narrative creation and exploration as the basis 
of intuitive auditory exploration. The application was designed with the 
intention of further strengthening the embodied skills of the children who 
learn Silbo Gomero, on the assumption that verbal-auditory and non-verbal-
auditory skills are entangled.
El Laberinto del Sonido presents a first-person experience of the creation 
and exploration of an immersive, auditory, and virtual space. In fact, such 
‘virtuality’ is in line with mathematician and cultural theorist Brian Rot-
man’s exploration of the term, particularly since it transverses different 
media and since digital media opens a space for embodied forms of explora-
tion while deploying more complex proprioceptive qualities that provide 
distinct virtual effects. As stated by Rotman – referring to philosopher of 
mind Andy Clark – ‘it is harder and harder to say where the world stops and 
the person begins’.47 It is exactly this ‘effect’ that the application exploits.
In order to explore linguistic and ‘audile’ spaces (to use a concept bor-
rowed from communication and sound theorist Jonathan Sterne),48 the 
application is divided into distinct nodes that are visually accessible to the 
user/s in a grid-like shape (see f igure 6). These nodes become potential cribs 
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for the creation of distinct scenarios, acts, etc. Within this grid, the user is 
able to create new nodes or to move and reconfigurate existing ones. Each is 
accessible for direct sound recording or to be used while importing sounds 
created elsewhere in the computational medium. To this feature, software 
developer Theo Burt added an algorithm for the virtual binauralization of 
sound.49 This algorithm is best understood within a psychophysical context 
where theories of spatial hearing acknowledge that the position of our 
ears on both sides of the head as well as our constant mobility are the base 
of a peculiar psychoacoustic phenomenon. Hearing in both ears notably 
occurs with a small time delay, most commonly known as ‘interaural time 
differences’.50 And this delay constitutes one of the most important features 
in the configuration of our sense of acoustic-spatiality.
The time-delay of binauralization is further enhanced by the possibility 
of directly manipulating distinct levels of reverberation while ‘painting’ 
each preselected reverb onto the grid of the narrative space. The application 
also offers the possibility of switching between a dual visual/auditory and 
an isolated auditory mode – a feature that opens up the potential for the 
user to exploit distinct perceptual channels when creating narratives that 
are later explored by other users. Also, and returning to the nodes presented 
above, these elements are divided into three categories that are readily 
identif ied through distinct colours. The first, represented by the colour 
orange, corresponds to ambient-like sounds that are in constant loop; the 
fig. 2.6: Snapshot of the application ‘El laberinto del Sonido’ (author’s own archive).
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fig. 2.7: Snapshot of the application ‘El laberinto del Sonido’ (author’s own archive).
fig. 2.8: Snapshot of the application ‘El laberinto del Sonido’ (author’s own archive).
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second, corresponding to the colour blue, also harbour ambient-like sounds 
but with a smaller duration and therefore triggered by proximity. The 
third, corresponding to the yellow colour, was created with the intention 
of harbouring recorded whistled utterances, a node that is also triggered 
by proximity during the navigational experience. Of course, this logic was 
programmed with a certain degree of flexibility in mind, and each node may 
be rearranged at any time while deleting the outside circle of both blue and 
yellow nodes (see f igure 8 below). In this way, different scenarios become 
layered through an interactive exploration of spatial-temporal qualities: 
the user is driven to explore the intricate relations between nodes while 
trying to decipher different whistled utterances within the cacophony of 
a sonic narrative.
Auditory virtual environments
The application El Laberinto del Sonido takes into account both the linguistic 
and sonic heritage of Silbo and draws upon the historical development of 
electro-acoustic tools. In this sense, it stands in stark opposition to other 
linguistic heritage applications such as ‘Little Linguist’,51 developed in an 
attempt to safeguard and revitalize indigenous language scripts.52 Because 
Silbo’s wealth of skills pertains to a distinct body of knowledge, it seemed 
most necessary to gain insight from the invention of virtual acoustic spaces 
– in distinction to the usual attempt to safeguard endangered languages 
through the preservation of alphabetic scripts, dictionaries, and other 
textbooks.53
As argued by Barry Blesser and Linda-Ruth Salter in Spaces Speak, Are 
You Listening?, since the mid-twentieth century the development of electro-
acoustic tools has formed our understanding of acoustic space through 
parameters that go beyond rhythm, melody, timbre, and tempo – the key 
affordances of classical musical instruments54. Besides its obvious signif i-
cance in the f ields of ‘avant-garde, postmodern and experimental music’,55 
these tools have instigated the design of complex ‘aural architectures’ (a 
term used by the authors) that exist beyond physical constraints and that 
expand our auditory imagination. Since space is no longer purely physical 
or def ined by the acoustics of ‘real’ environments, virtual auditory spaces 
confront us with material dimensions that were previously unforeseen.
While it might initially seem that El Laberinto del Sonido is attempting 
to replicate the mountainous environment of La Gomera, the design of the 
application is actually consistent with some of the ideas set forth by Blesser 
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and Salter, particularly when focusing on the authors’ discussion of the 
simulations or replicas of ‘real’ physical/auditory structures:
Aural architecture of virtual spaces becomes the design of a spatial 
experience for each individual listener, not the aural architecture of 
the composite space. Space is individualized, with listeners having the 
same individual control over their listening environments that audio 
engineers have over their spatial synthesizers. Space becomes an indi-
vidual experience, rather than a common environment with relatively 
uniform properties.56
We may therefore suggest that the application is not concerned with the 
actual acoustic environment of the island but rather with the sonic ‘effects’ 
that this form of language has on the development of a particular ‘audile’ 
culture that is characteristic of Silbo’s linguistic community. The concept 
of the sonic as an ‘effect’, f irst proposed by Augoyard and Torgue in Sonic 
Experience: A Guide to Everyday Sounds, suggests that we understand sound 
as multivarious phenomena. Instead of separating the diverse spheres of 
knowledge and their interpretations of sound (and let’s keep in mind the 
discussion regarding the number of whistled vowels), we might take into 
account the ways in which our performative actions and their locations 
and mediums provide distinct perceptual and conceptual understandings. 
As suggested by the authors, these effects are not only the products of a 
physical study of the acoustical source – the ‘basic effects’ of distortion, 
f iltering, or variation of the propagating medium – or even the study of the 
effects of each sound’s concrete, inhabited space, such as reverberation.57 
They conceal, more precisely, a world of culturally situated perceptions – a 
verbal-auditory body of knowledge that is a form of sonic heritage in its 
own right. This transition will allow the study of whistled languages to 
be situated within a wider frame of cultural heritage, one that is not only 
linguistic but also sonic, as seen in the design of the language support 
system for the Gomeran community.
One of the driving forces behind El Laberinto del Sonido has therefore 
been, on the one hand, to fully explore Silbo Gomero as a source of sonic 
heritage and, on the other hand, to instigate a reenactment of linguistic 
heritage through narrative construction. In this sense, the application 
has attempted to safeguard a cultural tradition, recreating a collective 
memory of sound through the constant reappropriation of both past and 
present media. The fact that digital media may afford new and unique 
sonic experiences also presupposes a renewed understanding of the archive 
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in the context of linguistic heritage. Silbo Gomero appears in the end not 
simply as a form of language that is worth safeguarding but as a body of 
knowledge that traverses time and space. More importantly, it traverses the 
generational and media divide that endangers many language forms and 
their attempts to survive the demands of contemporary life.
Notes
1. Discussions of the project and some of the data presented in this chapter 
have previously been published in Farias et al., Design Frontiers. 
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45. For more information on the work of artist and software developer Theo 
Burt, see http://www.theoburt.com.
46. For more information, see http://www3.gobiernodecanarias.org/medusa/
ecoescuela/abriendolaescuela/?p=1049.
47. Rotman, p. 8.
48. ‘Audile’ is a term that is used by Jonathan Sterne in The Audible Past and 
refers to: ‘a person in whom auditory knowing is privileged […] the term is 
useful because it refers to the physiological process-based sense of hearing 
[…] and because it references conditions under which hearing is the privi-
leged sense for knowing or experiencing’ (p. 96).
49. For more information about binaural algorithms, consult Roads, p. 469
50. Blauert, pp. 13, 51.
51. Developed by filmmaker Don Thornton in collaboration with the Cherokee 
Nation tribal council and the Neurosmith Corporation. For more informa-
tion, see https://itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/ndntv.com-native-american/
id88236516?mt=2.
52. Eglash and Tedre.
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Big Diff, Granularity, Incoherence, and Production in the 
Github Software Repository
Matthew Fuller, Andrew Goffey, Adrian Mackenzie, Richard 
Mills, and Stuart Sharples
This chapter will discuss the way in which Github, one of the largest dy-
namic repositories of software online, can be seen to operate as a mode of 
archive which in turn re-engineers the question of what an archive is. In 
very simple terms, Github is a place where software is stored online and 
from which it can often be downloaded. More expansively, it provides a 
sense of the archive as simultaneously a site of f ine-grained analysis and 
of incoherence, of storage and of production. To get to Github, we need to 
start with Git, a ‘source code management’ (SCM) system designed by Linus 
Torvalds in 2005.1 Git was initially based on the characteristics of a f ile 
storage system familiar to its author as the initiator of the Linux aspect of 
the GNU/Linux operating system.2 Whilst it claims to be ‘a stupid content 
tracker’,3 in practice Git is a highly sophisticated, decentralized, and distrib-
uted way of writing code in groups on scales ranging from an individual to 
that of large organizations. Git encourages branching or multiple versions 
of the same project at the same time and provides many different ways of 
merging, tracking, duplicating, and integrating code repositories distributed 
across many developers. It facilitates and encourages copies and variations 
as well as the tracking and auditing of changes in almost any kind of digital 
data. Since 2007, Github.com – a separate organization – has served as a 
largely public host platform for Git repositories or ‘repos’. It has encouraged 
software developers and programmers to store, work on, and retrieve the 
source code and texts associated with software projects on many scales, 
again ranging from individuals to large organizations. It has augmented 
the many operations afforded by Git with ‘social coding’ affordances such 
as ‘starring’, ‘watching’, the distinctive ‘pull-request’ mechanism, various 
more formal organizational arrangements (teams, organizations, etc.), and 
visual descriptive devices (graphs in particular). Github has grown rapidly 
since 2007 to become perhaps the most important online code repository of 
the moment, hosting around 10 million projects in total with several million 
people contributing to them, albeit with widely varying levels of activity. 
We might understand Github as the formal enterprise that organizes – and 
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somewhat ironically, centralizes – the informal de-centralized organization 
of Git. Github itself publishes much data about the growth of repos. The 
public legibility of platform dynamics is typical of contemporary software-
mediated culture: things are made to be readable by many. Github.com also 
produces and encourages the production of various forms of visualization 
and tabulation of what goes on there. To illustrate this legibility, we could 
choose important or famous repositories on Github – the Linux kernel, for 
instance, still led by Linus Torvalds, is a much-vaunted FLOSS project that 
has become economically and technically central to the development of 
the Internet – and analyze the flows of meaning, texts, and readers/writers 
connected to that repository.4 Relatively quickly, individual contributions 
could be analyzed, and we could begin to characterize the composition 
of the group of people who keep this important software object working 
and up to date. But this work is largely already done by Github.com itself.5 
Indeed, the site is characterized by a high degree of granularity of the data 
it holds. This is understood to mean the availability of multiple kinds of 
highly detailed, and to some degree tractable, information of the processes, 
material, and actors it gathers. Since Github is notable for the ‘socialization’ 
of software production, in which the above-mentioned social media forms 
are built into the archive, there is, in turn, a deep integration of quantif ica-
tion into the working processes of the archive.
Coding processes and architectures
The development of software has entailed a history of self-reflection of 
certain kinds. The discourse and practices of software engineering, for 
instance, were born of a need to intensify the quality and standardization 
of code, in turn stabilizing factors such as the culture of engineering and 
desirable qualities of personnel.6 Here, we should also note the strong differ-
entiation between the engineering and software development approaches 
and the concomitant differences between hackers and engineers that run 
through them. Software engineering historically relies on the standardiza-
tion and systematization of work in relation to large-scale projects. Hacking, 
by contrast, emphasizes informality and virtuosity.
Faced with the explosion of programming and the applications in which 
it is being deployed, computing has also developed numerous techniques 
of management or methodology, modularity and re-usability, to stabilize 
the nature of work and to make it more amenable to enjoyment or at least 
to management. Programming methodologies develop out of various 
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formulations such as the need to co-ordinate across often increasingly large-
scale projects or, conversely, the need to develop project requirements as 
the system develops. Echoing such imperatives, examples such as Waterfall 
(a software development model predicated upon strict division of stages) 
involve an ordering and hierarchy of projects and products; conversely, 
Agile methodology is a mode of close collaboration between coders and 
clients, emphasizing the quality of working life, fast iteration of code, and 
tight participation of the user. Alongside these organizational systematiza-
tions, programmers rework, add to, and link pieces of code. This may seem 
an obvious statement, but the process also implies the development of 
languages, programming environments such as IDEs (Integrated Develop-
ment Environments) or the text editors (such as VIM or Atom) in which 
programmers work as well as the use of systems of pre-written software 
at different scales such as frameworks, classes, libraries, and objects. In 
parallel, and in the wider contexts of digital work, new conditions for the 
storage and management of f iles are generated. Music and architecture are 
related areas that generate thousands of memory-intensive f iles and vari-
ations on those f iles, implying archival necessities such as version control. 
In turn, the question of what constitutes a f ile is reconfigured: objects are 
now increasingly understood as a particular state space within a matrix of 
variable data, structured and inflected in turn by the specif ic qualities of 
the kind of media that is being worked – as in the difference between a text 
f ile and an architectural drawing, or a layer in an animation file. To a certain 
extent, these version control systems can be seen as part of the general 
modularity of work in the gloriously undulating f ields of the contemporary 
Bürolandschaft, echoing or reciprocating the modularity of paradigmatic 
computing systems such as Unix.7 Part of the condition of such systems is 
a general move towards a relatively high degree of granularity of objects 
and, concomitantly, of the modes of analysis and use to which they may be 
put, something in turn effecting the nature of their condition as archive 
and as engines of production. We will explain this further below. Within 
the specif ic domain of FLOSS (Free, Libre, and Open Source Software) code 
repositories, what is particularly interesting is that they fuse thedistribution, 
production, and consumption8 or use of software into the same architecture. 
They constitute part of the establishment of a code commons that involves 
some of the means of negotiating over and managing disagreements, and 
they also provide the means of generating what we propose, following recent 
work in biology, to call metacommunities: sparsely or thickly connected 
populations of objects, users, producers. However, in distinction to the 
biological or ecological use of the term, calling these systems ‘meta’ means 
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that they also partially draw up the matrix of possible operations that may 
constitute communities. Here, the software that encodes such operations 
is of crucial interest. FLOSS code repositories include GoogleCode, Source-
Forge, Savannah, Code Snippets, and Tigris.9 Some of these repositories 
support multiple version control systems. Savannah, for instance, supports 
CVS (Concurrent Versions System), Subversion, Git, Mercurial, and Bazaar, 
though many if not most projects use CVS.10 Some of these systems will 
be used in parallel, with code being developed on Git, and stable versions 
of a programme being made available by multiple sources. Equally, an 
organization may often make use of a public facing repository and have 
one or more private ones in which the daily work is done. Github, as a 
company, makes much of its money from providing the latter service on a 
commercial basis. There are also many smaller, project-specific repositories 
such as Rastasoft, CPAN (Comprehensive Perl Archive Network), or Python.
org that provide the output of a specif ic group of programmers or, more 
expansively, the basic materials to work with a particular language. There 
are also sites that are not repositories but that act as directories of projects. 
What is crucial here is the question of version control. An example of simple 
version control for non-software use would be the wiki software that was 
originally developed for project documentation and collaboration around 
Agile software development and that now forms the basis for systems such 
as Wikipedia.11 Version control allows users of a system to develop more 
than one version of a project, to have many people working on elements 
of a project simultaneously without overwriting each others’ work, and to 
archive and make available completed or ongoing versions of a project as 
they develop. Code repositories act as part of the mix of systems used in 
software development such as the bug trackers, mailing lists, IRC channels, 
and messaging applications that particular metacomunities or teams might 
work with in the development of a programme. These operate by means 
of creating lists of work to do or by allowing fast means of communication 
that can be both synchronous and asynchronous. On another scale, code 
repos can be seen in relation to discussion forums such as Stack Overflow, 
privately owned operations that in turn sometimes shape and cull conversa-
tions according to commercial imperatives. With many FLOSS projects, 
too, there is a merger between development and marketing, garnering new 
users and developers that also constitutes the prospective shaping of a scene 
around the platform and the various constituencies that use it.12 Equally, 
these projects often rely upon a legal and discursive framing via the use 
of free and open source software licenses. These are generally def ined and 
differentiated by the way in which they either attempt to perpetuate the 
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software as a common good or as a resource free of the encumbrance of 
obligation to others. As we will see below, this is also something subject 
to change.
Anatomies of forks
One of the crucial aspects of Github’s architecture is that it also upends 
what is called the ‘taboo of the fork’ in free or open source software. This 
is the taboo against splitting or duplicating a project, an act that often 
potentially breaks apart the community around the code. Git, the system 
that Github relies on, inverts this established software community ethic by 
making the fork its fundamental operation, something that in turn reframes 
the debate around the archive as the focus of storage, conservation, and of 
communities of research.13
FLOSS has developed numerous terms for working with software and 
practices of copying and changing. Cloning a piece of software is to copy it 
either at code level or at a higher level, for instance in terms of functionality 
and interface.14 Branching is to make a variant version of an existing body of 
code within a project, perhaps to create a prototype or for other purposes. 
Derivations are improvements or variations on an existing programme that 
differ whilst maintaining existing compatibilities. In this chapter, we are 
specif ically interested in the way that Git, and by extension Github, has 
worked with the question of forking.
Forking is the practice of taking a body of code by making a copy of it 
and revising that code. Someone who forks some code may do so in order to 
improve it by making variations; to release a variant version of something 
modified for a more specific purpose. The term fork has a variable genealogy 
within computing. In the POSIX operating system, a fork is a process making 
a copy of itself. A fork bomb is a work of hacker craftsmanship in which a 
process is launched to make a copy of itself.15 As each subsequent process is 
launched, a further copy is made. One of the characteristics of a fork bomb 
is that it exponentially uses up the resources of memory of the computer. 
Forking software, as a techno-social operation, is often regarded as having a 
similar consequence: using up the attention and capacity of all the develop-
ers in a community. Unlike a fork bomb, however, such an operation cannot 
be ameliorated by a simple reboot. In this sense, it has historically been a 
powerful taboo, since it drains resources and creates a division in what is 
called the community. For Benjamin Mako Hill, author of a thoughtful text 
on forking in FLOSS development, prohibitions on forking operate as social 
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taboo with large costs.16 An alternate view, offered by artist and program-
mer Aymeric Mansoux, is that the inability to fully differentiate a project 
on Github, a situation that arises with the inversion of the forking taboo, 
leads to other kinds of problems: ‘Forking has become so cheap, merging 
and collaborating became tedious and consensus is no longer such a loved 
value.’17 The inversion of the taboo ‒ indeed automating it to the extent that 
there is a button on the Github interface reading ‘Fork This Project’ – may 
perhaps deserve a psychological reading which describes the trajectories 
of communities founded upon a crime (as if they arise any other way). 
Forking is often studied as part of the f ield of software engineering, where 
it is generally analyzed as part of the problem of eff iciency, communication, 
and duplication. Research into the quality assurance of software also typi-
cally relates an analysis of forks to the motivation and career-mapping of 
developers by marking their productivity and through various metrics. The 
economic analysis of software development projects may also be carried out 
in these terms. Quantitively based empirical research on these systems is 
relatively intensive in terms of memory, computation, and network‒though 
involving analytical abstractions as a methodological imperative‒has 
historically tended to involve a close engagement with the problems of 
network outages and variability in processing power.18
Generations of versions
Different version control systems articulate the problems of forking, branch-
ing, and cloning in different ways. Along with these variations, they generate 
variant ideas of the habitus of the programmer or developer, what forms 
the constitution or the pacing of a project, and what goes into the activity 
of software development. In order to trace this, before returning to the 
analysis of Github, we want to briefly describe the different generations of 
version control systems and repositories.
The f irst generation of repositories is in many ways epitomized by CPAN, 
which is simply an index-based directory of software written in the Perl 
language, alongside software for working in Perl, that has been run since 
1995. That it is a directory-based repository implies a high level of familiarity 
or willingness to attain expertise and mastery as the basic condition of 
programming. Software repositories of the f irst generation employ minimal 
interpretative f ilters, leading to a certain charm if not always a ready intel-
ligibility to the uninitiated. There is a clear distinction between what they 
store and make available, the structure that indexes them, and the systems 
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that are used to produce and work with the software. The second generation 
of repos was set in motion by Sourceforge, a MySQL-based directory of 
software projects that became a central resource for FLOSS activity at the 
end of the twentieth century and after. This repo grew in the f irst wave of 
massif ication and visibility of FLOSS as a social and economic movement 
alongside the growth of discussion forums such as Slashdot, and is owned 
by the same company. Sourceforge ties project documentation and release 
notes into a download site but also brings in project rankings, user reviews 
of software projects, and user profiles, where users could be viewed accord-
ing to the languages they used, projects they are involved in, and the stream 
of their activity. Alongside these, it brings in advertising for tech jobs and 
other related information. Users also have straightforward permissions as 
admin or developer as well as team co-ordination tools for concurrency 
management (in wiki or source code management environments). More 
recently, Sourceforge has incorporated Git, Mercurial, CVS, and Bazaar 
as a range of systems that projects may use from its central site. Amongst 
these, it also includes cross-platform compatibility – allowing projects 
to migrate from one platform to another or to exist across platforms. As 
such, Sourceforge now epitomizes both the second generation and the third 
generation of repositories. This third generation are decentralized version-
control systems such as Git, Mercurial, or Bazaar. They are characterized 
by their speed of operation; the f ine granularity of analysis of code, of 
use, and of users that they allow; and their distributed infrastructure. As 
software author and developer Joel Spolsky notes, Github tends to follow the 
requirements of freelancing FLOSS developers.19 A more corporate, in-house 
version-control system would imply hierarchical levels of access governed 
by permissions structures, code reviews rather than promiscuous copying, 
and most likely a clear prohibition against the sharing of code. The data that 
is captured, stored, and made addressable in certain ways implies a social, 
cognitive, or processual order that can make use of it. Amongst others, 
Philip Mirowski interprets neoliberal economics, particularly in the work 
of Friedrich Hayek, as the dream or ruse of a perfect information machine. 
There are certainly accounts of DVCS that have such an inflection, or they 
make the explicit correlation to idealized markets.20 The wider question 
of open data in government may be a parallel here. What is counted as 
informative and what is not constitute some of the key functions of a social 
order. Bureaucracy arises, in James Beniger’s terms, from the need to control 
the vast amount of variables, information, and contingencies in running an 
enterprise.21 What we see in some sense in the present wave of social media 
is the adoption of bureaucratic forms in the management of friendship, 
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dating, music acquisition, and so on. These are all more ostensibly trivial 
aspects of life when compared with the intercontinental import and export 
of goods, the movement of armies, and the mass markets of consumers 
implied by continuous production machines such as the conveyor belt. At 
the same time, their incorporation into control systems changes the nature 
of both in different, non-symmetrical ways.
Events in the API
As a typical social media platform, Github also publishes much data about 
what happens on Github.com through its APIs (Application Programming 
Interfaces), an interface to provide information about the database and 
some of its contents to other software. The data provided by the API is 
indeed mainly intended for software applications and web services built 
around Github. But the combination of the Events API endpoint, the API 
that supplies a more or less ‘live’ feed of events on the Github.com platform 
(https://api.github.com/events), and the archived copies of events stored 
since 2011 at the GithubArchive22 means that Github can in principle be 
analyzed using what some currents in social science refer to as ‘live methods’ 
(research approaches based on the dynamics of experimental and collabora-
tive events across a variety of media platforms).
The tools and devices for research craft are being extended by digital 
culture in a hyper-connected world, affording new possibilities to re-
imagine observation and the generation of alternative forms of research 
data. Part of the promise of live methods is the potential for simultaneity 
in research and the possibility of re-ordering the relationship between 
data gathering, analysis, and circulation.23 The scale of the platform (only 
millions of participants, not hundreds of millions) and the existence of 
archives mean that social researchers can envisage analyzing the whole 
of Github, not just one month of data or a selected group. There are both 
great potentials and diff iculties in doing so. The fact that we have ready 
access to the Github event timeline is testimony to this. But what is most 
available from that data is a set of pre-formed 18 event types.24 These event 
types subsume much of the traff ic around Github but give us little way of 
deciding what is an important event and how to elicit – from the hundreds of 
millions of events in the event timeline – which ones matter and which ones 
do not. At the same time, we know from ethnographic and other studies 
of software that the very detailed and f ine-grained tracking of work and 
activity that is inherent to Git means that, in principle, repos and software 
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projects themselves can be analyzed in great depth. Patterns of work, flows 
of meaning, borrowing and imitation of constructs and practices, and shifts 
in interest and importance should be publicly legible in the repos and, 
importantly, in the f low of code between repos. But the possibilities of 
perceiving these f lows and patterns presuppose capacities to f ilter and 
select events in the stream that neither confirm the unsurprising impor-
tance of certain high-prof ile software projects (Linux, Mozilla, node.js, 
etc.) or overwhelm us with the buzz of transient or ephemeral repositories, 
a discussion of which we will move to below after also noting some of the 
other overall features of the system.
‘Post-FLOSS’ archiving and the archive as engine
So, broadly speaking, what patterns of archiving are there? Users use Github 
in different ways: in a canonical open mode of use, making all code and 
forks visible; performing merges and the evaluation of code offline, invisible 
to others, but keeping what is published clean; and, in a related way, to 
publish changes in private Gits. There are also multiple hacks of the system, 
where a repo or a f ile might be named or entered on the fly by users that 
then rename a f ile locally to work on and subsequently reload it without 
reference to any broader project. Equally, the question of which pull, merge, 
and commit has priority has to be resolved locally within the work group 
or organization around the repo. This means that large aspects of even the 
most well-organized repositories remain inscrutable.
Alongside the constraints on access to data via the API such as those men-
tioned above, Github works via the encouragement of contribution. Some of 
this encouragement is achieved through an efficient and useful system – via 
the extensive adoption of user experience design, contemporary ‘flat design’ 
style graphic design, and, of course, a cartoon mascot. Equally, the site 
operates by numerous types of granularity of access to analytics. There are 
numerous ‘social’ features such as letting you view the repos ‘people you 
may know’ have starred, (with starring being a mechanism to ‘liking’ or 
drawing attention to). Project sites include images, videos, comments, and 
tags. Such features also extend to a greater metricization of programming 
culture, allowing users to view the rate at which something is updated, 
see the number of users following a project, peruse network diagrams of 
branches of code, and so on. Here we have the archive also operating as a 
matrix of capture and semiotization devices, driven by the imperatives to 
rate, share, participate!  As an economic factor, such hyperauditing devices 
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allow the site to become a means of f inding and hiring programmers; Git 
and Github profiles become key to coders’ CVs as a means of displaying the 
productivity, uptake, and signif icance of the work produced. In this way, as 
in others, the archive is a site of production, an engine for the development 
of new software that involutes the sense of the archive as a repository of 
the unchanging past. Storage becomes the site of production when the 
form of production is variation. This is not necessarily an entirely easy 
condition to navigate and one that in turn ties back to the question of the 
fork. Github tends to encourage the possibility of multiple versions of the 
same code being developed, often in parallel, which sometimes fails to 
fully reap the benefits of coordinated action. For instance, in a blog post, 
Ruby developer Seth B contends that in one version of some code he was 
wanting to work with, there were seventy versions of the same piece of 
code with incoherent information about which branch was in which state 
of development, including information as to where, if at all, a particular 
bug had been resolved. Github, one can thus say, is an environment for 
making a workflow rather than something that imposes a workflow of a 
certain kind. This implies that a project needs a certain kind of organization 
or at least a means of f lagging or archiving defunct branches, those with 
‘dirty’ code, experimental branches used for f ixing and testing certain 
approaches, and so on. Discussions of Github online do tend to show the 
vexed question of how exactly to organize a repo well. Addressing this, quite 
a number of large-scale organizations with repositories maintain one that 
is public, where users are able to retrieve the latest versions of code and in 
general act as public-facing. They will also maintain another that is where 
the actual development work is done. Concomitantly, our f indings from 
statistically analyzing the Github archive show that the largest repos come 
accompanied by organizations, i.e. organizations organize Git. Git and other 
such systems propose a set of abstractions of software development from 
and in which projects may compose themselves. The speed and granularity 
of changes is one of the ‘innovations’ of FLOSS. But within this is a variation 
in styles: the imperative to ‘release early, release often’ promulgated years 
ago by software polemicist Eric Raymond can be compared to the Debian 
Linux distribution which characteristically takes two years for the gesta-
tion of each stable release. Alongside the kinds of software development 
characteristic of the classical forms of FLOSS, we also see what can here be 
termed as ‘post-FLOSS’ forms of development. Post-FLOSS is characterized 
by a general indifference to the discussions of and loyalty to certain kinds 
of licences and the sense of ethics (GPL) or business models (Open Source) 
that these drew upon. Large amounts of the material placed online through 
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Github tend to be without a licence assigned to it. This is not to say that some 
people don’t use these licences or that the imaginary of software as culture 
that they map has no traction. Rather, they seem to exist alongside an 
expanded and incoherent universe of code objects, projects, and practices 
that is somewhat different from the legendary world of the Unix greybeards, 
whose insistence on crafted, knowable code with powerful and rigorously 
applied abstractions and a matching ethos and legal apparatus has been so 
fundamental to the development of the Internet and of free software. In the 
majority of cases on Github, code is uploaded to the repository, perhaps to 
be treated as public domain, or simply abandoned. What relationship this 
has to the wider ethos of the system and whether it signif ies a change in 
the nature of programming work – showing it to be more or less precarious, 
perhaps, or marking the ‘coming into public’ view of another kind of coding 
practice ‒ is unverif iable. Post-FLOSS inhabits conditions in which code 
objects, scripts, css, config f iles, etc. form so much a part of everyday generic 
stuff and thus not worth protecting in the way that the adoption of a license 
implies, even when that license is available as a drop-down menu.
Diff as infrastructure
Aside from the cluster of large-scale projects with their pattern of high levels 
of activity around complex software objects and systems, much of what is 
on Github tends to be of a much more diffuse kind, with high degrees of 
variation concerning project size, type, and code, including the rapidity and 
scale of variations. We can say that in just about every parameter where 
variation is possible, it can be found. And here we note the source of Big Diff 
as this chapter’s title. Diff is a Unix command that shows the differences 
between f iles. Git is similarly based on a f ile structure that works on the 
basis of marking the differences between objects stored in the repository. 
A diff is based simply on a character-by-character analysis of a f ile. Every 
change is logged and is retrievable by choosing the right commit.
Needless to say, this has interesting effects on the notion of the repository 
as archive. Archives tend to work with exemplars, not variations. With Git, 
as with all forms of computer memory that always involve making copies of 
f iles, objects no longer need to exist uniquely; indeed, they cannot do so if 
they are to be used within the system. The archive in this case comes into be-
ing as a process of structural differentiation rather than as a thing. Overall, 
Git is a massive graph structure and each code object, each archived f ile is 
a set of trajectories across this graph. Based on a f ile structure that amasses 
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hashes of symbols and diffs, the archive transitions into a systematization 
of the archive as an engine of minutely and massively assembled processes 
of addition and variation. Rather than the archive storing history as a set 
of exemplary if not necessarily unique entities, history is involuted in the 
archive rather than stored in it. With a system of versions at the core, versions 
generate histories and versions become generative. Different kinds of repos, 
such as public-facing repositories, working repos, and empty repos exist in 
memory and perhaps in use alongside those that are set up as websites, code 
deployment platforms, agile infrastructures, and mechanisms for publishing 
and working on apps and frameworks for making them. This generativity is 
not simply one of a ceaseless, vitalist overproduction. If we were to phrase 
it in terms of evolutionary modelling and to draw the archive as a form of 
f itness landscape, what we f ind is that there are millions of objects stuck in 
basins of activity. The phase space of the graph is a constellation of numerous 
entities, many of which are lonely asteroids drifting amongst thousands of 
archives of abandoned space junk, themselves giants against the millions 
of motes of dust that form their background.
Organising incoherence
One of the aspects of Github that echoes the problematic nature of much 
social media is that within the system it is impossible to have a ‘delete’ event, 
so once a f ile is on the system, there it stays. This is one factor that may lead 
to an understanding of Github as in many ways positively incoherent. To 
put this another way, any initial scan of the system as a whole will f ind a 
power law distribution for the size of the projects. (Crudely put, most activ-
ity clusters around a small group of very large projects, with much of the 
remainder of the work being in tens of thousands of smaller projects of sizes 
decreasing in inverse proportion to their number.) Much of this is simply 
because there are low barriers to entry – a repo is easy to start but harder 
to maintain. Just as there are junk repos, uploaded only once, modif ied a 
few times or less, and left to drift, there are others that continue to gain 
occasional downloads years after posting. There is an enormously diverse 
range of patterns of use. Alongside lots of very small but somehow long-lived 
projects, there are people updating repos to check the differences between 
pieces of code, bots making various attempts to push changes, and multiple 
tools for managing and analyzing Git data potentially implying a form of 
recursive public or a certain kind of narcissistic f iddling that is not without 
its pleasures. Notably, many people use Github to circulate configuration 
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f iles for text editors such as vim and for operating systems such as OSX. 
Github is used as a platform for sharing machine configurations on a very 
large scale, and such f iles are rarely worked on as a project. The transverse 
movements of such f iles aren’t really captured by the mechanisms of dis-
tributed version control, since they are so ephemeral. Equally, some users 
may also use Github as their mode of cloud back-up, with no contributions 
sought from others – they simply use additional features such as bug tracker 
and wiki as a means of interaction with users of their code. Here it’s worth 
comparing this system to other code-sharing systems such as Pastebin, 
where f iles are just left alone on the off chance that they might be used 
or picked up by bots or onsite scripts scanning them for certain kinds of 
data – credit card information, serials, website layouts, URLs, usernames 
and passwords, scripts, my little pony porn, and so on. With Pastebin, the 
‘drive-by commit’ is all there is; the system is simply used as a generalized 
open notepad. Github is a far more variable and multi-dimensional f ield 
of entities with high degrees of differential use and relation to the idea of a 
project and, in turn, to the question of production and sharing.
As an archive, then, Github.com is exemplary in its crystallization of 
certain aspects of contemporary software cultures. It is a zone of mas-
sive, concerted activity and simultaneously a ground for the dumping and 
drifting of f iles characteristic of post-FLOSS; a space of atypical formations 
disparately linked across directory structures and smeared unevenly across 
timestamps and between users; a social factory of difference founded upon 
the violation of a communitarian norm that it in turn also constitutes; and 
a site of perpetual audit and production and an architecture for the free 
form, the shapeless, and the corporate that is in turn perpetually being built 
up for a hoped-for but deferred valuation on the stock market. As a site for 
unearthing the f inely grained ambivalence of the contemporary archive, 
it is indeed something to keep tabs on.
Notes
1. Git, online at http://Git-scm.com.
2. Git uses the MIT Licence, http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT.
3. Torvalds.
4. The Linux Kernel is archived at https://GithubGithubGithubGithub.com/
torvalds/linux.
5. One of the aspects of the discussion of archives in the era of open data 
and of big data is the way in which the archive as a site for the exercise and 
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communication of expertise can sometimes be quite literally dumped—up-
loaded and then abandoned‒following the idea that unspecified emergent 
forces will sort out the questions of legacy, interpretation, and preservation 
that are characteristic of the archive as an institutional form. In relation to 
this aspect of the debate, this chapter, like others in this book, suggests that 
archival architectures find quite variegated forms and that the archive as 
structured information, with attached practices of expertise, maintains the 
condition of being a mutable field in contemporary software development.
6. Ensmenger.
7. Macpherson, ‘US Operating Systems at Mid-Century, the intertwining of 
race and unix’.
8. For instance, in Github.io, which provides the conditions for software to run 
directly from Github servers.
9. Alongside the FLOSS-oriented systems, there are tens of proprietary source 
control management systems, and many IDEs include version-control facili-
ties. 
10. See Yuill. 
11. Labouef and Cunningham.
12. For instance, the Mozilla Foundation’s regular Mozillafest.
13. In turn, there are a number of implementations of Git in several languages 
and that also run on various platforms (Gitorious, Gitlab, Gitprep [a direct 
clone of Github], etc).
14. The analysis of cloning here is often coded in relation to the question of 
intellectual property, predicated on the idea that one body of code may 






20. Mirowski. See also Mirowski’s acerbicly perceptive, if partial, comments on 
Wikipedia in his postscript to Philip Mirowski and Deiter Plehwe’s The Road 
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21. Beniger.
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23. Back and Puwar.
24. Constraints on access to data via the API also take other forms. Events sup-
port pagination; however, the per-page option is unsupported. The fixed 
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The Post-Archival Constellation: The Archive under the 
Technical Conditions of Computational Media
David M. Berry
In the present age, the archive is no longer hidden away in national librar-
ies, museums, and darkened rooms, restricted in access and guarded by 
the modern-day equivalents of Jacques Derrida’s archons – the guardians 
of the archive.1 Indeed, researchers and archivists’ hermeneutic right 
and competence – and the power to interpret the archives – have been 
transformed with digitalization and the new technics of computational 
surfaces. Through computation, access to archives is made possible and 
often welcomed ‒ through rectangular screens that mediate the archives 
contents or through interfaces and visualizations that reanimate a previ-
ously inert collection. We might consider this not only a de-archiving of 
what we previously understood an archive to be but also as a creation of 
new archival forms through practices of re-archiving.2 Indeed, Wolfgang 
Ernst argues that the original role of an archive was ‘to preserve […] for 
an indefinite time, or even to bar present access, conserving […] for later, 
unexpected, and hence truly informational use’.3 For Derrida, the ‘gathering’ 
of an archive was the ‘dwelling in a location’ and a place for objects and 
knowledge to be sheltered. It was a place of classif ication and putting into 
order a process of archivization.4 Indeed, as he argued, ‘archivable meaning 
is also and in advance codetermined by the structure that archives’.5
This is another way of saying that the archive, as printing, writing, 
prosthesis, or hypomnesic technique in general is not only the place 
for stocking and for conserving an archivable content of the past which 
would exist in any case, such as, without the archive, one still believes 
it was or will have been. No, the technical structure of the archiving 
archive also determines the structure of the archivable content even in 
its very coming into existence and in its relationship to the future. The 
archivization produces as much as it records the event.6
The means by which an archive is produced as an archive through archival 
practices and materialities is a crucial aspect of the argument I want to 
make in this essay. However, the archival materialities and practices that 
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are generated and reinforced through computation raise important ques-
tions about how an archive is mediated when abstracted, delegated, or 
remapped through software. Archives still tend to preserve the physical 
record of their production but increasingly the notion of the archive has 
expanded to include metadata, catalogues, scholarly editions, databases, 
interfaces, and digital tools.7 The archive, which is ‘traditionally that which 
arrests time, which stops all motion, [instead] is set in motion in the age 
of digitization’.8 In this chapter, I explore how the archive is increasingly 
linked to the notion of a diagram, such as a database, and how it is mediated 
through the computational interfaces and surfaces that set archives in 
motion. By examining the projective nature of computational processes, 
both in terms of the visibility of the remembered and the dark memory of 
the forgotten, this chapter explores how the post-archival constellation 
creates a generalized condition of forgetting. To make something com-
putable requires that it be abstracted twice over: it must be encoded in a 
symbolic system of digital abstractions and captured in a grammar of ac-
tions that can be prescribed back onto physical activity. Abstraction is thus 
a feature of functionality: Philip E. Agre has argued that the less ‘capture’ 
that is operationalized in a computational system, the less functionality 
the system has. By capture, Agre indicates the process of acquiring data 
which is passed along to a database as well as the creation of an ‘ontology’ 
(or formal schema) that models a physical system.9 These procedures are 
fundamental to the creation of a model of the underlying processes as well 
as the objectif ication of this model in the physical world. Procedures of 
abstraction make different knowledges comparable, calculable, and subject 
to re-engineering and reconstruction: they radically reshape the world in 
terms of the model that was originally abstracted and most likely in the 
shape of strategic-instrumental rationality.
Abstraction thus raises the possibility of a technical derangement of 
knowledge, practices, and artifacts, and it is from this perspective that I 
view the emergence of a new ‘post-archival’ constellation. I will tentatively 
trace the implications of abstraction for the concept of social memory and a 
new social organization of knowledge. The archive is changed in the sense 
that it ‘transmits the social bit by bit, transforming it technologically and 
becoming its key stimulus for evolution and industrial revolution’. Through 
its digital remediation it is put in a condition of performativity and, thereby, 
accelerated.10 Thus, culture itself, understood as a kind of tertiary formation, 
is remade when materialized in a digital form.11 By the post-archival, I am 
gesturing towards the notion of a ‘post-digital’ re-materialization of digital 
technology and its integration into physical environments but also the idea 
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of a historical phase of development that comes after the digital and changes 
the concept of the archive as a means of memory storage.12
A new dimension has been added to the archive, now that its veloci-
ties support not just storage but also innovation: the archive must ‘erase 
information not only through economic reality but in order to be able to 
remember ‒ even if delegation of “reading” to machines working at the speed 
of light allows for the sheer mass of memorisable material to be significantly 
increased’.13 We are here confronted with a process in which the links be-
tween the contents of archives and their internal structure are increasingly 
lost or hidden, while a computerized ledger abstracts the archive from 
its representation. This changes the frameworks of social and individual 
memory – a fact that becomes manifest in epistemic communities that 
form around archives but which cannot always decode what is written or 
may even be overwhelmed by the sudden increase in archival materials 
previously subject to the constraints of access and storage. It also becomes 
manifest in the techniques and practices used in social reproduction such 
as teaching, learning, and specif ic literacies as well as in the problems of 
access that arise once memory is stored and transmitted in non-human 
readable forms. Could it be that the computational transformations in the 
structure and use of archives may act as a canary in the coalmine for wider 
changes in knowledge in society more generally?
To explore this question, I will f irst look at the idea of ‘de-archiving’ 
the archive through processes of computation. In the next section, I turn 
to the question of materialized abstractions and the way in which these 
abstractions mediate the archive through interfaces that function as a 
newly mobile resource. Finally, I draw these strands together to discuss the 
way in which these elements represent a new constellation, a post-archival 
situation that not only problematizes the very notion of a (relatively) static 
archive but that also sees computational opacity as the very ground of the 
archive’s form and institutional structures.
De-archiving the archive
The traditional pre-digital structure of archives and practices of archivization 
were captured and stabilized through memory institutions such as museums, 
national libraries, universities, and national archives, often funded by the 
state. These institutions provided an organizational form and institutional 
structure that made possible a political economy for archives as such and 
hence an economic stability to the archive in question. Institutions provided 
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a decision-making centre around the collection of archives, in essence an 
institutionalized archivization process that delivered judgment in combina-
tion with curatorial functions. Indeed, the archive became ‘defined as a given, 
preselected quantity of [artifacts] evaluated according to their worth for 
being handed down’.14 The structure of traditional institutional arrangements 
around the archive was legitimated through a complex chain of practices and 
institutionalizations that authorized decisions to be taken about which parts 
of the present (and past) should be kept and what should be discarded.15
In contrast, in an age when digital technologies are delegated greater 
responsibility for a collection, computational rationalities are also increas-
ingly granted the task of archiving and re-presenting materials: through 
computational analytics and user data, the archive creates a second-order 
archive.16 This reflexive database (metadata) of the archive’s use and motion 
can be used to f ine-tune, curate, and prune the archive algorithmically, 
and in some cases also literally, in the sense of discarding artifacts that 
are not needed or which do not appear to have the cultural value initially 
expected. The ability of softwarized archives to make visible previously 
‘hidden’ archives also serves as a justif ication for how an archive might be 
judged, such that ‘increasingly, materials that are electronically inacces-
sible are simply not used’.17 A paradox of digitality is the way in which its 
convenient surfaces serve to conceal that which is not digital.
We are indeed faced with new archival machines that demand not just a 
different social ontology but also different ways of exploring and interacting 
with archives. These new gateways to social memory are manifested in 
algorithms that instantiate a new archival imaginary – a post-archival 
constellation that is constantly modulated and ‘augmediated’.18 This is not 
a deterministic claim; rather, it requires the (re)building of new strata of 
organization that couple humans and non-humans in new and complex 
assemblies. As Christopher J. Prom argues, ‘archivists should not treat 
[archival systems] as magic bullets. They will only prove to be effective in 
encouraging processing and descriptive eff iciency if they are implemented 
as part of a strategic management effort to reformulate processing policies, 
processes, procedures.’19 In Ernst’s view, in ‘the age of technology-driven 
media, both material archaeological strata and the symbolical order of 
the archive are progressively being conceived as essentially processual by 
nature’.20 This processuality changes the way in which the archive functions, 
not least when it comes to selection: the quantif ication that comes with 
digitalization and the concomitant production of metadata feeds back into 
the qualitative judgments about what should be stored. This is often seen as 
a useful outcome of digitization, since the ability to track usage statistics, 
chaptEr fOur 107
etc. may lead to the development of precise qualitative and quantitative 
measures for the evaluation of special collections.
With the increasing interpenetration of computational systems and pro-
cesses, we are thus witnessing a dramatic change in the material structure 
of memory institutions – in part due to technical changes but also due to 
the social ontologies that computational logic seems to produce. The digital 
creates a different kind of collection: digital archives are malleable and 
reconfigurable in multiple ways and do not necessarily need to conform to 
the organization structures and systems of traditional archives. The new 
archival management systems have been claimed to ‘play a role in making 
archives more eff icient and collections more visible’,21 yet the possibility 
of ‘inf inite archives’ creates a new set of problems, particularly in born-
digital and digitized collections where huge quantities of articles, texts, 
and data are suddenly made available. Now we are offered the possibility 
of generating comprehensive and exhaustive archives rather than curated 
ones.22 Crucially, such archives are ‘deeply computational in structure 
and content because the computational logic is entangled with the digital 
representations of physical objects, texts and “born digital” artifacts’.23
Computation therefore threatens to de-archive the archive, disinterme-
diating the memory institutions and undermining the curatorial functions 
associated with archives. Many of the concerns of humanists have reflected 
an uncertainty about what the loss, or change, of archives might mean 
(although of course this could also reflect a decline in paper-based cultural 
capital), especially where medial changes imply epistemic change.24 Indeed, 
the logic of digitization implies that rather ‘than being a purely read-only 
memory, new archives are successively generated according to current 
needs’ – thanks to the use of computational searches, aggregations, col-
lections, and application programming interfaces (APIs) that facilitate the 
interoperability and networking of archives.25 In other words, digitization 
‘tends to move the archive toward an [informational] economy of circula-
tion: permanent transformations and [constant] updating’ which can also 
paradoxically result in a static archive of physical artifacts.26
To explore the assemblages that create the conditions under which 
computational systems are operative requires an understanding of the way 
in which algorithms structure not just knowledge but also space and time. 
Computational systems utilize feedback in the sense that they operate on 
their own algorithms and metadata to improve their processing, complexity, 
and structure. The fundamental programmability of computational media 
thus raises new questions for storing knowledge and culture: the archive 
‘is no longer simply a passive storage space but becomes generative itself 
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in algorithmically ruled processuality’.27 Basic principles of computation 
– modularity, iteration, abstraction, optimization, etc. – are applied across 
the multiple levels of the computational system’s operation. The question 
of the archive is therefore increasingly linked to new digital spaces and 
microtemporalities and the way in which they structure, organize, and 
mediate archival systems, institutions, and political economies.
In changing the structure of archives, and the memory institutions that 
curate and store them, computation renders them anew through a gram-
matization process that discretizes and re-orders. This process can be as 
simple as the infinitely re-orderable process of creating a database. It is also 
amenable to spatial planning and algorithmic analysis that presents the 
opportunity for a logic of objectification: through computational mediation, 
new approaches and methods are made objective and thereby instrumental. 
For example, the Internet is an archive that represents an open-ended ‘ag-
gregate of unpredictable texts, sounds, images, data, and programs’ but that 
is nonetheless navigable and open to traditional archival practices. However, 
when the Internet is transformed into an archive, it is also subject to tech-
nologies such as search engines that make its commodification possible.28
It is this process of objectif ication that I am interested in. Here, I am 
using objectification in Adorno’s sense of the term: taking the concept as the 
source of reconfiguration for the object or allowing the concept to require 
a reordering of the ‘real’ so that the real will conform to the concept.29 Such 
objectif ication is what Adorno calls identity thinking ‒ highly prevalent in 
a computational logic that tend towards strategic-instrumental forms of 
rationality. For Adorno, identity thinking is understood as a style of thought 
that subsumes particular objects under general concepts and as a result 
the particular is absorbed into the universal. Reality is abstracted and 
closed when we think we have succeeded in framing reality within our 
conceptual systems, which today are increasingly materialized in compu-
tational machinery. This is compounded by the reif ications of commodity 
fetishism – that is, when social relations between people are transformed 
into or misunderstood as relations between things. The Frankfurt School 
instead provided a model of the relationship between social processes, social 
institutions, and consciousness by providing a sociological explanation of 
the socially determined yet relative autonomous emergence of new social 
forms. Such an approach critiques a political economy that automatically 
assumes the economic determination of the social and the cultural. It asks 
us, rather, to examine the way in which, for example, a phenomenon such 
as social memory might be crucial for explaining the emergence of certain 
social formations and the processes of capitalism more generally.
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In other words, computation recasts the material world into the shapes 
dictated by computational analysis or computational processes in a process 
of objectification. With archives, the first move has been upon us for a while, 
observable in large-scale digitalization projects (sometimes understood as 
digital humanities type projects) and in the use of encoded archival descrip-
tion (EAD) software and standards.30 Following this initial process, with its 
emphasis on the digital overlay or mediation of the artifact, new techniques 
of control and management become possible such as re-ordering, search-
ing, discovery, optimization. New tools of analytics, data visualization, 
dashboards, and information management systems are then often deployed 
to examine the previously latent forces of the archive. Indeed, ‘the archive as 
the condition for our knowledge of history becomes dependent on the media 
of its transmission’, which is increasingly mediated by computation forms.31
Digitalization puts pressure on the need for the storage of originals, and 
many objects are sent off to less-expensive locations far from the centres 
of population. But it also raises the question of the need for originals as, 
sooner or later, the access or footfall (which is tracked) shows a declining 
access rate for the original materials. In some cases, the digital versions 
are considered superior to the originals due to the quality and resolution 
of the scanning processes. New digital formats also present the materials 
in new interfaces such as PDFs, HTML5, ePUB, and other storage formats. 
Some of these are remarkably plastic compared with the original materials 
and also amenable to computational self-analysis – reinforcing the move 
towards a logic of distant reading. This derangement in the organization 
of knowledge is critical to the functioning of computation but potentially 
at the cost of human intelligibility.
To the extent that social memory is understood as an artifact of the 
organization of media, the entire process outlines a new modality in our 
engagement with culture. Such a perspective gets support from Bernard 
Stiegler’s idea of tertiary memory as a site of materialized memory beyond the 
human brain. The question of storage is transformed by the computational: 
most notably when the long memory chains of temporally connected artifacts 
that are stored by institutions and media are rebuilt around the requirement 
of short memory chains that are continually refreshed and updated. These 
procedures are not always human-readable, nor human-centric. For example, 
in Amazon’s equivalent of an archive, multiple objects are packed tightly into 
a warehouse space that is computationally managed through a technology 
stack.32 Here I am interested in the spatial dimension of reorganization 
through computational processes ‒ more developed in capitalist warehousing 
systems but also reflected in library and archive storage facilities that have 
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the same pressures on cost, labour, and funding. Amazon uses a principle of 
simplicity and an idea of ‘flatness’ to create a computational archive of physi-
cal objects. All objects are treated as records to be entered into a database, 
and they are processed through a grammatization framework which flattens 
the object not only into the data store but also within the warehouse space: 
the singularity of the object is, in other words, abstracted away by the tech-
nology. Objects are retrieved using computer-controlled robots from Kiva 
Systems, which glide swiftly and quietly around the warehouse. To do this, 
Amazon uses a so-called ‘chaotic storage’ algorithm that optimizes storage 
through mediating databases. For example, if Amazon receives a shipment 
of 500 copies of a specif ic book, they do not store the 500 copies together in 
one location. Rather, they distribute the books to different areas of empty 
shelf space across the warehouse and record the locations in the database 
through barcodes on the shelves and on the objects. This is very different 
from human-centric notions of archival cataloguing and organization, where 
one tends to group similar items together.
This storage and optimization is done computationally: Amazon knows 
the exact dimensions of every product in its warehouses and the exact 
dimensions of vacant shelf space. The robots glide the objects to be stored 
to the most eff icient places. This is reminiscent of Ernst’s claim that the 
Internet itself adopts a similar chaotic storage method – an anarcho-archive 
– such that so much information today is ‘chaotically shelved – leading to 
archival phantasms of disorder’.33 From the outside, the Amazon system 
looks horribly disorganized and illogical. In fact, the warehouse represents 
the objectification of the chaotic storage algorithm. It is constructed with the 
logic of objectif ication such that due to the computational mappings that 
technology makes possible, neither the range of artifacts to be archived as 
a whole nor the number of particular artifacts need to be known or planned 
in advance. The warehouse is in effect a reif ication of the code into the 
materials of stone, metal, plastic, and human labour.34 The system functions 
at the highest rates of eff iciency in the retail industry and relies on humans 
being separated from the act of stowing things and relegated to the role of 
‘picking’ objects as dictated by the computational system. Storage capacity 
and its cartographies of space are delegated to algorithms.
Materialized abstractions
In order to explore these changes, we need an approach that can map 
the multiple levels of activity and complexity that computation creates. 
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Additionally, it is important that the principle of irreducibility is brought to 
bear on the problem of computation. If not, we fetishize silicon rather than 
giving attention to the appropriate abstraction layer – crucially the material-
ized abstraction. In Critical Theory and the Digital (2014), I undertook some 
of this preparatory work by developing an implicit understanding of the way 
in which abstraction layers functions within the design, implementation, 
and execution of computational systems more generally such that software 
becomes ‘deep’.35 I want to briefly summarize this typology to provide a 
number of abstraction layers that can serve as a means of analyzing the 
materialized digital. The aim is to ensure that analysis takes place at the 
right level of abstraction: one should take into account the principles of 
computational thinking that takes place in that layer yet still be able to 
drill deeper into the computational framework if required.
A useful way of exploring how computation is expressed across multiple 
layers is through the heuristic notion of a laminated system. By laminated 
system, I am referring to the work of Roy Bhaskar who uses this notion to 
draw our attention to the problem of the levels of ontology when studying 
things. This approach can help us ‘develop a language for understanding 
and describing our object(s) of study at an “appropriate” ontological level’.36 
However, as this approach tends to present an unnecessarily static model 
that misses the interaction and interoperability between layers in software 
implementation, it may be better to understand these layers as elements in 
a constellation of technologies that make up the technology ‘stack’. Adorno 
argues that one must create constellations by ‘assembling the whole out 
of a series of partial complexes that are, so to speak, of equal weight, and 
concentrically arranged on the same level; their constellation, not their 
succession must yield the idea’.37 By the term ‘stack’, I am referring to the 
way in which technologies are brought together to create computer systems 
such that they build upon each other and create a vertical stack of tech-
nologies. For example, one stack might include the operating system, the 
database technology, the middle-ware, and the applications. The specif ics 
of the technical implementation, such as GNU/Linux, MySQL, node.js, and 
Chrome indicates one specif ic example of the materialized technical stack, 
whereas Microsoft Windows, SQL server, .net, and Internet Explorer gives 
another.38 It is, however, crucial to understand that these technologies do 
not need to form such a vertical structure and may also be organized in a 
more open-ended horizontal or rhizomatic structure; hence the attraction 
of the notion of constellation.
A stack constellation contains six key moments: (i) physical: the material 
and transactional level (of the hardware), (ii) logical: the logical, network, 
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and informational transactional level (level of software as diagram or 
platform), (iii) codal: the textual and coding logics (level of code, algorithms, 
software as text and/or process), (iv) logistical: the social and organizational 
structure (at the level of institutions, economies, culture, etc.), social on-
tology, socialities, etc., (v) individuational: the stratif ication of embodied 
personality (the psychology of actors, the user, etc.), (vi) interactional: the 
surface/interface level (between human beings and non-humans mediated 
through code). The moments presented here are ideal types and may simply 
help us understand the complexity and composition of computational 
systems. Each moment has to be explicitly designed, implemented, and 
structured within the computational system under construction – they 
require (often hidden) work to bring them together and ensure they function 
as a system. Due to the modularity of computational systems, however, 
it is not necessary to build from scratch for each system. Indeed, many 
layers are now available as software services that allow for the majority 
of these levels to be bought off the shelf, accelerating the development of 
stack-based systems.
Due to limitations of space, I am going to focus on only one of the mo-
ments mentioned above – the interactional in relation to the post-archival 
Individuational
Stratification of embodied personality
(the psychology of actors, the user, etc.)
Logistical
Social and organizational structure
(at the level of institutions, economies, culture, etc.).,
social ontology, socialities, etc.
Interactional
Surface/interface level 
(between human beings and non-humans mediated through code)
Codal
textual and coding logics 
(level of code, algorithms, software as text and/or process)
Logical
the logical, network and informational transactional level 
(level of software as diagram or platform)
Physical
Material and transactional level 
(of the hardware)
fig. 4.1: computation expressed across multiple levels through a heuristic notion of a laminated 
system (See Berry, 2014, p. 58).
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constellation.39 I have chosen to focus on the interactional in order to 
highlight the problematics of the interface and the surface. I particularly 
want to shed light on what has grown to be called design thinking; the idea 
that design is embedded in all aspects of production rather than being 
an ornamental or f inal stage of a process.40 This wider notion of design, 
articulated by Buchanan as ‘the conception and planning of the artif icial’, 
points to the inherent multidisciplinary nature of design work and the 
complexity of communications across multiple f ields of knowledge.41 It also 
points to the idea of deep design that is increasingly informing the design 
thinking that goes into computational systems and which means that the 
interface as a material and conceptual system influences and determines 
decisions made in the design and implementation of the archival system.
In the post-archival constellation, we see the application of certain logics 
of computation in the interactional moment itself. This is located in the 
organization of knowledge but also in its display, interactivity, and so forth. 
Here, I want to explore two competing metaphors which become obdurate 
in the interactional interface designs that are selected in particular design 
grammars. My argument is by nature speculative due to the fact that many 
archival management systems predate the new design grammars that are 
emerging within the design and technology f ields. However, the speed at 
which these paradigms are taking hold of the models of interface design 
in computing will inevitably push on the archival systems, at f irst as an 
abstraction away from the legacy systems that are based on relational 
databases and textual screens until their ‘simple’ design philosophies begin 
to penetrate the underlying codal and logistical levels of these systems.42
The two systems I want to focus on are Apple’s new design grammar, 
which has become known as ‘f lat design’, and Google’s competitor design 
grammar called ‘material design’. I focus on these f irstly because they are 
increasingly hegemonic interactional patterns, and secondly because their 
organization and logic bear their computational origins in their visualiza-
tion, etc. As we increasingly read archives computationally, these display 
metaphors – foregrounding simplicity, minimalism, and lightweight ap-
proaches to complexity – structure the way in which knowledge is presented 
and manipulated.
These two new competing interface paradigms are deployed in the lat-
est version of Apple and Google’s operating systems but more notably as 
regulatory structures to guide the design and strategy related to corporate 
policy. The f irst, ‘f lat design’, was introduced by Apple through iOS 7/8 
and OS X Yosemite as a refresh of the ageing operating systems’ human/
computer interface guidelines. The strategy was essentially that stripping 
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the operating systems of historical baggage related to design techniques 
intended to disguise the limitations of a previous generation of technology 
both in terms of screen resolution and processor capacity. For example, 
visual interfaces would use techniques such as anti-aliasing to deceive 
the eye into thinking a higher resolution was being shown than techni-
cally possible – mainly through the careful use of light and shadow. The 
second, the ‘material design’ introduced by Google in its Android L, now 
Lollipop, operating system, also sought to bring some sense of coherence to 
a multiplicity of Android devices, interfaces, OEMs, and design strategies.
It is, however, important to note that Apple avoids talking about ‘f lat 
design’ as its design methodology, preferring to talk in terms of platform 
specif icity, that is, about iOS’s design or OS X’s design. More generally, ‘f lat 
design’ is ‘the term given to the style of design in which elements lose all the 
stylistic characters that make them appear as though they lift off the page’.43 
As Apple argues, one should ‘reconsider visual indicators of physicality 
and realism’ and think of the user interface as ‘play[ing] a supporting role’: 
the idea is that techniques of mediation in the user interface should aim 
to provide a new kind of computational realism, presenting ‘content’ as 
ontologically prior to, or separate from, its container in the interface.44 This 
approach contrasts with rich design, which has been described as ‘adding 
design ornaments such as bevels, reflections, drop shadows, and gradients’.45
I want to explore these two main paradigms – while acknowledging the 
flat-design methodology initiated as ‘Metro’ in Windows 7 and the (since 
renamed) ‘Microsoft Modern’ interface – by looking at Apple and Google’s 
comprehensive attempt to produce a rich and diverse umwelt or ecology, 
linked through what Apple calls ‘aesthetic integrity’.46 The attempt is a 
response to a growing landscape of devices, platforms, systems, apps, and 
policies but also aims to provide a sense of operational strategy in relation to 
computational imaginaries. Essentially, both approaches share an axiomatic 
approach to the construction of a thought system, reflecting a primitivist 
predisposition that draws from a neo-Euclidian model of geons (such as 
circles, triangles, and polygons for Apple), as well as notions of intrinsic value 
or neo-materialist emphasis on essential characteristics (such as shadow cast 
from objects for Google). Such approaches then encapsulate what I think of 
as flat theory. Both Apple and Google are trying to deal with the problematic 
of multiplicities in computation and the requirement that multiple data 
streams, notif ications, and practices have to be combined and managed 
within the limited geography of the screen. In other words, both approaches 
attempt to create what we might call aggregate interfaces by combining 
techniques of layout, montage, and collage onto computational surfaces.47
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The ‘f lat turn’ has not happened in a vacuum, however, and is the result 
of a new generation of computational hardware, smart silicon design, 
and retina screen technologies. This has been driven in large part by the 
mobile device revolution which has not only transformed the taken-for-
granted assumptions of historical computer interface design paradigms 
(e.g. WIMP) but also the subject position of the user, in particular as 
structured through the Xerox/Apple concept of single-click functional 
design of the interface. Indeed, one of the striking features of the new 
paradigm of f lat design is that its design philosophy is geared towards 
multiplicity and multi-events. The f lat turn is about modulation, not 
enclosure: it is a processual form that constantly shifts and changes and 
that could be seen to act as a signpost for future real-time algorithmic and 
adaptive surfaces and experiences. It is easy to see how the language of 
f lows and interactivity might be seductive to archivists seeking to make 
their archives more interesting, relevant, and mobile. Indeed, the structure 
of control for the f lat design interfaces could be said to follow that of the 
control society in the sense that it is ‘short-term and [with] rapid rates of 
turnover, but also continuous and without limit’.48 To paraphrase Gilles 
Deleuze, humans are no longer in enclosures, certainly, but everywhere 
humans are in layers.
Apple uses a series of concepts to explain a notion of f lat design that 
includes aesthetic integrity, consistency, direct manipulation, feedback, 
metaphor, and user control.49 Reinforcing the haptic experience of this 
new flat user interface has been described as building on the experience 
of ‘touching glass’ in order to develop the ‘f irst post-Retina (Display) UI 
(user interface)’.50 The concept is based on the idea of layered transparency, 
or better, layers of glass upon which the interface elements are painted 
through a logical internal structure of Z-axis layers. This laminate structure 
enables meaning to be conveyed through the organization of the Z-axis, 
both in terms of content and in terms of its place within a process or the 
user interface system itself.
In a similar way, Google has reorganized its computational imaginary 
around a flattened, layered representational paradigm centred on the con-
cept of material design. Matias Duarte, Google’s Vice President of Design, has 
declared that this approach is based on the notion that it ‘is a suff iciently 
advanced form of paper as to be indistinguishable from magic’.51 However, 
it is magic that has constraints and affordances built into it, since ‘if there 
were no constraints, it’s not design ‒ it’s art’.52 Indeed, Google argues that 
the ‘material metaphor is the unifying theory of a rationalized space and 
a system of motion’:
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The fundamentals of light, surface, and movement are key to conveying 
how objects move, interact, and exist in space and in relation to each 
other. Realistic lighting shows seams, divides space, and indicates moving 
parts… Motion respects and reinforces the user as the prime mover… [and 
together] they create hierarchy, meaning, and focus.53 
This is a weird notion of materiality in as much as those at Google
steadfastly refuse to name the new f ictional material, a decision that 
simultaneously gives them more flexibility and adds a level of metaphysi-
cal mysticism to the substance. That’s also important because while this 
material follows some physical rules, it doesn’t fall into the techniques 
of skeuomorphism, which represented digital interfaces as if they were 
similar to physical objects. For example, an audio recorder might look like 
an old tape player in the interface to help communicate the affordance 
or functionality of a design element. The material isn’t a one-to-one 
imitation of physical paper, but instead it’s ‘magical’.54
Google emphasizes this connection, arguing that ‘in material design, 
every pixel drawn by an application resides on a sheet of paper. Paper has 
a flat background colour and can be sized to serve a variety of purposes. 
A typical layout is composed of multiple sheets of paper’.55 The stress on 
material affordances – paper for Google and glass for Apple – are crucial to 
understanding their respective stances in relation to flat design philosophy.
glass (Apple): translucency, transparency, opaqueness, limpidity and 
pellucidity.
paper (Google): opaque, cards, slides, surfaces, tangibility, texture, 
lighted, casting shadows.56
In contrast to the layers of glass that inform the logics of transparency, 
opaqueness, and translucency in Apple’s flat design, Google uses the notion 
of paper remediated as a digital material, since this ‘material environment is 
a 3D space, which means all objects have x, y, and z dimensions. The z-axis is 
perpendicularly aligned to the plane of the display, with the positive z-axis 
extending towards the viewer. Every sheet of material occupies a single posi-
tion along the z-axis and has a standard 1dp thickness.’57 One might think 
then of Apple’s design as painting on layers of glass and Google’s design as 
thin paper objects placed upon background paper. However, a key difference 
lies in Google’s use of light and shadow, so that a light source, located in a 
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similar position to the user of the interface, may produce shadows of the 
paper objects onto the objects and sheets of paper that lie beneath them.58 
Nonetheless, a laminate structure is key to the representational grammar 
that constitutes both of these platforms.
Interestingly, both design strategies emerge from an engagement with, 
and reconfiguration of, the underlying principles of the Swiss style in design, 
sometimes called the International Typographic Style.59 This approach 
emerged in the 1940s, and
mainly focused on the use of grids, sans-serif typography, and clean 
hierarchy of content and layout. During the 40s and 50s, Swiss design 
often included a combination of a very large photograph with simple 
and minimal typography.60
The design grammar of the Swiss style has been combined with minimalism 
and the principle of ‘responsive design’, placing emphasis on the fact that 
the materiality and specif icity of the device should be responsive to the 
interface and context being displayed.61 Minimalism is a ‘term used in the 
20th century, in particular from the 1960s, to describe a style characterized 
by an impersonal austerity, plain geometric configurations and industrially 
processed materials’.62 Robert Morris, one of the artists associated with this 
tendency and author of the influential Notes on Sculpture, used ‘simple, 
regular and irregular polyhedrons, influenced by theories in psychology 
and phenomenology’ which he argued ‘established in the mind of the be-
holder “strong gestalt sensation”, whereby form and shape could be grasped 
intuitively’.63
The implications of Apple and Google’s competing design worldviews are 
far-reaching in that much of the world’s initial contact, or touch points, for 
data services, real-time streams, and computational power flows through 
the platforms controlled by these two companies.64 In addition, they are also 
deeply influential across the programming industries, and we see alterna-
tives and multiple reconfigurations emerging in response to the challenge 
raised by the ‘flattened’ design paradigms. In other words, both represent, if 
only in potentia, a form of power that places a particular ideological veneer 
on computation more generally. With the proliferation of computational 
devices and their associated screenic imaginary, a new logic appears that 
underpins, justif ies, and legitimates these design methodologies.
It therefore seems to me that these new flat design philosophies produce 
an order of precepts and concepts that gives meaning and purpose not 
only to interactions with computational platforms but also, more widely, 
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to everyday life. Flat design and material design are philosophies that offer 
alternative patterns of creation and interpretation: they are meant to have 
an impact not only on interface design but also on the practices and the 
experiences of computational technologies more broadly conceived. One 
could think of these moves as a computational foundation that generates 
or provides arguments for an axial framework of building, reconfiguration, 
and preservation.
As an instance of the materialization of the interactional in the post-
archival constellation, the analysis of f lat design helps us examine the
history locked in the object […] mindful of the historic positional value 
of the object in its relation to other objects ‒ by the actualization and 
concentration of something which is already known and transformed by 
that knowledge. Cognition of the object in its constellation is cognition 
of the process stored in the object. As a constellation, theoretical thought 
circles the mode of thinking it would like to unseal, hoping that it may 
fly open like the lock of a well-guarded safe deposit box, in response, not 
to a single key or a single number, but to a combination of numbers.65
Focus on stack constellations go beyond the specif icity of the device as 
privileged site of research and reorient critical attention toward the complex 
computational layers that constitute them. For example, interface tech-
niques are abstracted away from the specif icity of the device, for example 
through Apple’s ‘handoff’ continuity framework, which also potentially 
changes reading and writing practices in interesting ways.66
These new interface paradigms, introduced by the flat turn, have very 
interesting possibilities for the application of interface criticism and allow 
us to unpack and explore the major trends and practices of ‘the Stacks’. 
‘The Stacks’ are my term for the corporations that increasingly rely on 
computational technology stacks for prof it and power such as Google, 
Apple, Facebook, and Amazon (sometimes called GAFA) ‒ but also the 
technical imaginary formed through the diagrammatics of stacks. By 
diagram, I am indicating an abstraction speculatively determining the 
future: Wolfgang Ernst uses the term to highlight the generative dimen-
sions of technical diagram, which may also be understood as a modality 
of power.67 The notion of layers are instrumental when trying to mediate 
the experience of an increasingly algorithmic society (think dashboards, 
personal information systems, the quantif ied self, etc.): it may provide an 
interpretative framework for a world of computational patterns in addition 
to constituting a grammar for building such systems in the f irst place. The 
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concept of the post-digital may perhaps be useful when questioning the 
link between archives, computation, and knowledge given here.68 Yet the 
concepts of materiality deployed by archivists working within flat design 
and material design paradigms – whether of paper, glass, or some other 
‘material’ substance ‒are even more important for our understanding of 
these systems and their relationship with social memory.69
Flat design provides and more importantly serves as a translational or 
metaphorical heuristic for re-presenting the computational, but it also 
teaches consumers and users how to use and manipulate new complex 
computational systems and stacks. Thanks to a striking visual technique, 
f lat design communicates the laminate structure of the computational 
stack on which the Stack corporations are themselves constituted. In this 
organization, history is indeed locked within the object.
In an age in which archives become computational, they are themselves 
subject to the frequent rearrangements and reconf igurations of a new 
medium of inscription and new sites of control. The question of how these 
computational paradigms connect to the archive itself remains a key criti-
cal question and one that must be distinguished from the perspectives of 
technological determinism. Principles of instrumentality are embedded not 
only in computational systems but also in a neoliberal order that legitimates 
through principles of performativity, eff iciency, and a political economy 
of value and that forces the archive to conform and interoperate. It is here, 
crucially, that the humanities must learn to provide critical approaches 
that contest and make visible archival systems and their embedded logics.
The post-archival constellation
One way of thinking about computational archives and new forms of 
abstraction they produce is the specif ic ways in which they manage the 
‘derangement’ of knowledge through distance.70 I can only gesture towards 
this derangement by way of the theological concept of the coincidence of 
the opposites that ‘comprehends all else in undifferentiated and unlimited 
unity’71 ‒ the notion that, from the standpoint of inf inity, all difference 
is reconciled (in contrast to the dialectical notion of aufhebung). This is 
similar to the notion of the aesthetics of singularity that Fredric Jameson 
describes as particular to postmodernity.72 Flat design could, for instance, 
be said to place the user-subject in a similar position of inf inity/singular-
ity: it enables the reconciliation of multiple fragments not by having one 
element replacing all the others but rather by using a metaphor, such as 
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glass, in order to allow palimpsest-like inscriptions to be stacked in an 
infinitely thin laminate of computational surface. This particular technique 
of ordering extends to many aspects of computational design that facilitates 
the collection of diverse objects as well as their ordering, calculation, and 
reconfiguration. As Derrida argued, archival technology ‘conditions not 
only the form or the structure which prints, but the printed content of the 
printing: the pressure of the printing, the impression, before the division 
between the printed and the printer. [It] has commanded that which even 
in the past instituted and constituted whatever there was as anticipation of 
the future.’73 Indeed, through the new modes of computational ordering, a 
new de-archived archive emerges, one that is tightly coupled to information 
systems and instrumental principles of making things ‘stand by’.74
Notes
1. Derrida, p. 10.
2. By de-archiving, I am gesturing towards the transformation of the archive 
from a static space into one that is informed and interpenetrated by com-
putation that restructures space through formatting, structuring, and clas-
sification. We should also note that archives can be multi-layered and their 
structural organization may have deeper and shallower forms of archive. 
That is, that some artifacts may be more amenable to access than others, 
and there may be archives within archives which may require access and or-
der codes before they are available. However, even so, computation reaches 
into the depths of all archives, and in doing so reorganizes knowledge, arti-
facts, objects, and systems on the principle of computational knowledge. 
3. Ernst, 2013, p. 93.
4. Derrida, p. 11.
5. Ibid., p. 18. 
6. Ibid., p. 17.
7. Palmer, p. 404. 
8. Røssaak, p. 12. 
9. Agre, p. 744.
10. Stiegler, 2010, p. 151.
11. Stiegler, 2008, p. 42.
12. See Taffel for a useful discussion of the notion of the postdigital.
13. Stiegler, 2008, p. 128. 
14. Ernst, 2013, p. 86
15. Ibid., p. 122.
16. Archives would previously have had a second-order documenting system 
associated with it, but it would have been paper-based and not subject 
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to the same degree of calculability of a digital records system or archival 
management system. 
17. Jones, quoted in Spiro, p. 2.
18. For a discussion of the concept of augmediation, see Mann. 
19. Prom, quoted in Spiro, p. 5.
20. Ernst, 2013, p. 27.
21. Archival management systems are a kind of software that typically provide 
integrated support for the archival workflow, including appraisal, acces-
sioning, description, arrangement, publication of finding aids, collection 
management, and preservation. See Spiro, p. 1.
22. Berry, 2012, p. 2.
23. Ibid., p. 13.
24. By ‘paper-ish’, I am gesturing towards Eisenstein’s notion of ‘bookish’ cul-
ture, Eisenstein, p. 10.
25. Ernst, 2013, p. 81.
26. Ibid., p. 99. But see also the documentary film Cold Storage, co-written by 
Jeffrey Schnapp and Matthew Battles, which explores Harvard Depository, 
Harvard’s off-site library storage facility. Cold Storage (1991) Directed by Cris-
toforo Magliozzi [Film], USA: metaLab at Harvard, available from http://
librarybeyondthebook.org/cold_storage.
27. Ernst, 2013, p. 29
28. Ibid., p. 29
29. Berry, 2014, p. 102.
30. Berry, 2012. Encoded archival description (EAD) is an XML-based standard 
for representing archival finding aids, which describe archival collections. 
EAD allows the standardization of collection information in finding aids 
within and across repositories.
31. Ernst, 2013, p. 42
32. Greenfield.
33. Ernst, 2006, p. 120.
34. Kitchin refers to this process as ‘transduction’. 
35. Berry, 2014.
36. Ibid., p. 58.
37. Adorno, 1977, p. 126.
38. Terranova offers a political reading of the importance of the notion of the 
technology stack and the possibility for contestation in the shaping of these 
stack-based structures. 
39. Although the interactional is the focus of this chapter, it is clear that the 
protocols and standards (codal level) around archival systems, such as the 
encoded archival description software, would also be a productive site for 
further critical analysis. 
40. See Rowe.
41. Buchanan, p. 14. 
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42. There are already abstraction layers and technologies that present the 
underlying data or archive in a form more conducive to the simplicity and 
speed demanded by flat design, for example node.js, MongoDB, Cassandra, 
redis, and the JSON data format. In many ways, flat design can be seen as 
the natural outcome of the performative requirements of complex network 
systems that require simple axiomatic protocols, data formats, communica-
tions channels, abstraction layers, and modularities to enable them to be 
built rapidly. What is new and interesting in relation to flat design is the 
underlying material metaphor for the components, e.g. glass or paper. 
43. Turner, 2014. 
44. Apple, 2014.
45. Turner, 2014. 
46. Apple, 2014.
47. Berry, 2014, p. 70. 
48. Deleuze, p. 6.
49. Apple, 2014.




54. Bohn, 2014. 
55. Google Layout, 2014.
56. The choice of paper and glass as the founding metaphors for the flat design 
philosophies of Google and Apple raise interesting questions for the way 
in which these companies articulate the remediation of other media forms 
such as books, magazines, newspapers, music, television, and film. Indeed, 
the very idea of ‘publication’ and the material carrier for the notion of pub-
lication is informed by the materiality, even if only a notional affordance 
given by this conceptualization. It would be interesting to see how the book 




59. Ashghar, 2014; Turner, 2014. One is struck by the posters produced in the 
Swiss style that date to the 1950s and 60s but which today remind one of the 
mobile device screens of the twenty-first century.
60. Turner, 2014.
61. For an example, see Bootstrap, 2015. 
62. MoMA, 2014.
63. Ina Blom has pointed out ‘there are contradictory ‘effects’ of minimalism 
and the Gestalt theory of influence in Morris’s early work is only one aspect 
of the minimalist legacy in art—the phenomenological dimension of mini-
malism (also explored in Morris’s writing) produces a rudimentary form 
of context awareness in the spectator, who is confronted with him/herself 
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given the minimal work’s absence of internal relations or tensions. Mini-
malism thus initiates the type of awareness that produced phenomena such 
as institution critique in art, site-specific art, ‘context art’, etc.’ For more on 
the topic, see Foster, p. 35-70.
64. MoMA, 2014. There are also some interesting links to be explored between 
the Superflat style and the postmodern art movement founded by the artist 
Takashi Murakami that is influenced by manga and anime, both in terms of 
the aesthetic but also in relation to the cultural moment in which ‘flatness’ 
is linked to ‘shallow emptiness’ (see Drohojowska-Philp, 2001).
65. Adorno, 1973, p. 163.
66. Hattersley, 2014. 
67. See Parikka, 2011. 
68. Berry and Dieter, 2015.
69. There is some interesting work to be done in thinking about the non-visual 
aspects of flat theory, such as the increasing use of APIs, such as the REST-
ful api, but also sound interfaces that use ‘flat’ sound to indicate spatiality in 
terms of interface or interaction design.
70. By distance, I am thinking in terms of near and far. 
71. Stanford, 2013.
72. Jameson, 2015. 
73. Derrida, p. 18.
74. Heidegger, 1977. 
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Planetary Goodbyes: Post-History and Future Memories of 
an Ecological Past
Jussi Parikka
If there is a material, technological, and industrial pollution, which exposes 
weather to conceivable risks, then there is also a second pollution, invisible, which 
puts time in danger, a cultural pollution that we have inflicted on long-term 
thoughts, those guardians of the Earth, of humanity, and of things themselves. If we 
don’t struggle against the second, we will lose the fight against the first. Who today 
can doubt the cultural nature of what Marxists used to call the base?
 – Michel Serres1
All techniques for reproducing existing worlds and artificially 
creating new ones are, in a specific sense, time media.
 – Siegfried Zielinski2
When Does the Future Begin?
In a live chat organized by The Guardian newspaper in November 2014, 
science f iction author William Gibson was asked the rather blunt question 
by one of the web participants: ‘When does the future begin’? One could 
easily have answered in a sarcastic or ironic way, but Gibson refrained 
from such negativity and took the question seriously. He observed how 
the question includes the reference to the future in lower case; it comes 
without the modernist twentieth-century idealization of one big Future 
waiting for us. Perhaps, meditated Gibson, we are merely in anticipation of 
lower-case futures, which has lost the vibrancy or energy that was around 
in the 1980s. He continued:
It might represent a kind of very wide cultural maturation. Americans, for 
instance, no longer believe in the future as some completely other place. 
Europeans never believed in that, because in Europe the evidence is all 
around us that the future is built in the past. We’re surrounded by the past 
in Europe. The American vision of the future was over the hill, down the 
highway, we’ll build a new world. Americans have gotten the message. I 
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think that Blade Runner was very important in that, in its wonderfully 
European depiction of a future Los Angeles that grew perpetually out 
of its own ruins. A very un-American vision, radically un-American. 
Something came from that.3
Whether it is maturation or just melancholic disappointment remains to be 
decided. In many ways, the lack of a future has been raised as a dilemma 
of temporal politics that is haunted by a persistent memory of the past 
as a sort of a block of imagination; this is what Mark Fisher notes as the 
hauntological tendency of contemporary popular culture and also what is 
articulated in political philosophies such as Fredric Jameson’s. For sure, 
this cannot be resolved through a nostalgic reiteration or reattachment to 
a past and yet it raises the question: what sort of a future and memory of a 
future are we then able to produce?
Futures are being constantly imagined, but the emphasis on ruins is 
as visible in the midst of such narratives of future projection. Much of the 
contemporary imaginary is full of speculations, images, and narratives of 
the earth before/after humans; the scientif ic cartographies of the sixth 
mass extinction are complemented with the political cartography of an 
audiovisual kind: the cinema of catastrophes, of the extra-planetary, of 
futures and future pasts without humans.4 Philosophy and cultural theory 
also engage with the non-correlated world without us – possibly partly 
triggered by the certainty of not merely a past preceding us but also a future 
without us.5
Following Gibson, one can continue to speculate: is it that the other 
side of this spatialized history – the future that is still somehow tied to 
this planet – is not anymore imaginable in the midst of the encompassing 
ecological crisis? Is this imaginary instead something that needs to be 
rethought in relation to the automated infrastructure that encompasses the 
planet? But the question to Gibson had actually one potential meaning that 
remained unanswered. It was perhaps not so much a question about the 
future as such as it was about when it might begin. This already places time 
out of its joint by referring to imagined futures, which turn the historical 
notion of the trace on its head. If the trace refers to the past, the business of 
archaeologies of the future, to paraphrase Fredric Jameson, is one of utopias, 
their diff icult ontological balancing of the existence and non-existence 
of the future in the present, and the reminder that despite this apparent 
defiance of logical order, the ‘not yet being of the future’ has to be considered 
‘no less worthy of the archaeologies we are willing to grant to the trace’.6
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So the future might as well be the now in its uncertain existence, a fact 
that is underscored by the literal non-existence of a future for specif ic 
forms of life including humans. Research projects and bodies are already 
speaking of the sixth mass extinction under way, illuminating that instead 
of speculation, such a trend is rather visible.
I will continue with two parallel narratives that structure the argument 
of this chapter concerning the possible situations in which the escape 
velocity of the ecocrisis might unfold as one temporal axis to anchor our 
discussion in relation to memory, time, and the so-called political. Both of 
the narratives talk of the future and a future past that is determined in the 
contemporary scientif ic and technological imagination. In one way, this 
imagination could be considered a sign of the post-historical; not an episte-
mological determination that history has ended (as Francis Fukuyama7 had 
it) but a recognition of the role of history becoming a programmable object, 
a mediated narrative, and a media-technological context for understanding 
notions of time that cannot be reduced to the linearly written.
The post-historical comes out in different versions of contemporary 
media and cultural theory. This can be seen as a reference to Vilém Flusser’s 
thoughts in the collection Post-History:8 we will return to them after having 
presented the parallel narratives that structure an idea about different 
temporalities and what constitutes the present as a form of contemporane-
ity9 that sustains the past and future as creative potentialities, not merely 
the dead rhetorical weight of an inert, spatialized horizon.
The concept of post-history, or ‘programmed history’, is also used in this 
text to underline the way in which media-technological contexts are part 
of the memory of future pasts and how this envelops scientif ic knowledge 
production and narrativization in a technological culture facing a cataclys-
mic collapse due to ecological crisis. While the intellectual trope of the ‘end 
of history’ has its nineteenth-century precedents in Hegel’s philosophy of 
world history reaching its apex,10 it is also a mode of thought that pertains 
to the contemporary situation of geopolitics and the memory of and from 
the future, in the context of the planetary era. In the 25 years that have 
passed since the fall of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the binary 
world system, the end of history has come to refer less to the ‘victory’ of 
the liberal order11 than the sinister feeling of the liberal world order being 
unable and unwilling to tackle ‘the end’ of natural history.
But the post-historical also can be understood in terms of Steven 
Shaviro’s notion of the post-cinematic12. Shaviro’s focus on understanding 
the aesthetics and politics of audiovisual expression through new forms 
of cultural dominants can be also tweaked to address the question of the 
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post-historical. If one cannot claim that history has disappeared, it may no 
longer be the culturally dominant way of making sense of time or memory. 
It might, in fact, be in the process of being replaced by modes of thinking 
that interconnect natural history and social/human history, connecting 
the future with the past and the political imaginary with technological 
fabulation. Besides offering a particular narrative framework, it is also a way 
to address the variety of temporalities that pertain to a reality conditioned 
by increasingly sophisticated technologies.
Furthermore, the perspectives presented in this chapter indicate a shift 
in the use of the term ‘archive’. Displaced from the contexts of cultural 
heritage institutions and the protocols and materials of bureaucratic and 
historical documents, it now pertains to discussions of geology, the earth, its 
natural history, and hence this scale of the supra-historical. This realization 
has found expression in recent cinema culture through f ilms such as Into 
Eternity - A film for the future (2010) and Patricio Guzmán’s documentary 
Nostalgia de la luz/Nostalgia for the Light (2010). It has also been the topic 
of a number of media art projects as well as theoretical discourses: a key 
example here is the concept of the Anthropocene discussed in Dipesh 
Chakrabarty’s ‘The Climate of History’13 ‒ a text addressing the joining of 
global social history and natural history. What all of these projects have 
in common is a line of argument that reframes the question of the archive 
and memory in planetary terms.
In short, the Anthropocene refers to the discussions in the field of geology 
about whether human involvement on the planet merits a new geological 
term that follows the Holocene. The discussions have been wide and varied 
over the past 10-12 years, but they have already had an impact in the humani-
ties and arts, offering, among other things, a new conception of human and 
technical agency and their uneven, unequal global natures. Such perspectives 
displace the past and the future from the more limited horizon of historical 
time, relating them also to the geological time of future. We will return to 
this idea later, particularly related to the notion of the ‘carbon-combustion 
complex’, which offers a political-economic angle on the issue.
Post-planetary
The f irst narrative of post-history summons a future. In one of the odd 
moments offered by Erkki Kurenniemi, the Finnish media art pioneer, he 
gazes back from the year 2048 without a physical body, without a slimy 
existence of the f lesh. This strange fantasy is itself not without a body 
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but recalls the specif ic historical context of 1980s cyberfantasies, where 
after the singularity, AI, and the quantum computer, the future is able to 
reproduce the past as memories for a future mankind that lives in outer 
space in a digital format.
If the brain is software, it has the temporal span of a different sort of a 
future than the one limited to our embodied existence. ‘Software can be 
pretty much immortal in that good programming solutions and algorithms 
are really sustainable’, to quote Kurenniemi’s account from an interview 
with the film director Mika Taanila. Kurenniemi’s vision of cultural heritage 
is determined by this:
… but one clear reason is that we as humans are interested in history. We 
have museums and we’re interested in strange things like archaeology 
and old music using the original instruments and arranging medieval 
plays using authentic costumes. We’re constantly trying to reawaken the 
past and IT is a great tool for that, because in f ifty or a hundred years when 
people are interested in the past they will be able to create virtual models 
of the entire human history. We will be able to transport ourselves into 
historical reconstructions of different eras in our everyday life. If we’ll 
be able to make the reconstructions work and truly virtual it will also 
become an important tool to plan for the future instead of just following 
some new technology blindly. We can create virtual models of how society 
will work once it spans the entire solar system and in time, the whole 
Milky Way. A cloud of golf-ball-sized quantum computer servers, which 
10 billion living people could inhabit.14
Kurenniemi jokes that by 2048 he could be one of those resurrected artificial 
intelligences looking back. One wonders. What happened? Why did we 
abandon the Earth? Why should the escape velocity discovered in the 
twentieth century become a vector for a whole narrative of civilization 
wanting to escape what became perceived as a claustrophobic trap of a 
planet? The emergence of planetary computation works in parallel to the 
modern desire or necessity of leaving the planet for other worlds, so often 
articulated in science f iction in the past but also in more recent produc-
tions such as Christopher Nolan’s Interstellar (2014), a f ilm set in an eco 
crisis-ridden Earth where the dust storms of the planet trigger a f ilm-length 
meditation of cosmic dimensions.
Kurenniemi’s vision does not give much in terms of technical detail, 
cultural contexts, or political and economic conditions. It’s premised more 
on his technical and scientif ic view of the human being and the brain as a 
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f inite automaton that evolution created in its specif ic slime-based way but 
that artif icial intelligence would show as only one among many possible 
evolutionary genealogies. Fantasies of reanimation become embedded 
in storage capacities. They resonate with the 1980s visions, but we are 
constantly reminded that this belief in the technological determination of 
history has not in any way disappeared. It’s an AI-determined way of think-
ing about time but also a form of reflection that takes into consideration a 
time of events – a temporal mode that def ines future perspective in terms 
of technological imaginaries where intelligence is deterritorialized from 
human capacity to machinic entity.
The idea is not determined as part of science f iction, but the escape 
velocity of intelligence to synthetic intelligence is in operation across the 
industries of search and networking. In Wired, Kevin Kelly, a later con-
temporary of Kurenniemi, presents his vision of a future Google that is 
not based on search but on artif icial intelligence, enabled by three major 
technological breakthroughs: 1) cheap parallel computing where neural 
network models are seen as neurons of the brain, 2) big data and the vast 
collections of quantif ied information that constitute an understanding of 
social life by way of collating massive data in search of patterns that surpass 
individual volition, 3) better algorithms to process the data.15 If one wants 
to consider Kurenniemi in the context of the contemporary archival mania, 
one should also expand that investigation into the political economy of the 
algorithmic AI, since this is becoming yet another way of prescribing the 
conditions of memory.16
However, there is one interview in which Kurenniemi pursues further the 
rhetorical trope of leaving the planet. This short meditation complements 
his long-term vision of 2048 but in ways that offer a political economy of 
the limited resources in the planetary context. In Kurenniemi’s ‘premature 
self-obituary’ entitled ‘Oh, human fart’, he discusses the resource basis of a 
post-planetary future. Kurenniemi’s odd relation to environmental thinking 
produces the idea of turning the planet into ‘Museum Planet Earth’,17 a 
fully-f ledged planetary preservation programme that stops population 
growth, biosphere changes, etc. In politically and technologically enforced 
ways, it sees the end of change, a sort of fabulated end of history, as the 
solution to the material issues of the planet. The nineteenth-century birth 
of the museum as a preservation of non-European/Western cultures is here 
extended to the planetary condition.
Kurenniemi’s post-welfare-state science f iction economy includes 
transporting all forms and dynamics of change to outer space: ‘economic 
expansion, population explosion, genetic science and nanotechnologies 
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of unimaginable power, warfare’. Only a limited amount of Earth licenses 
allow selected people to stay on Earth. Instead, human life as we know it 
will be continued in data forms and in space. In a rather fragmented way, 
Kurenniemi explains the logic of the licenses:
In 2100, for example, print 10 billion ‘Earth licences’ [sic] and distribute 
them to all the then-living humans. No more licences will ever be printed. 
Licences can be sold. This way, the people who want long life and long-
lived children can have them, but only by migrating into space. This 
will be cheap, because there will be people wanting to stay down here, 
purchasing Earth licences at a price that will amply cover the price of 
the lift to orbit for the seller.18
In other words, the mythological desire of leaving the planet – a key feature 
of Cold-War-era science f iction too19 – is offset by the ones desiring an 
unchanging sustainability of the planet, which of course is a parody of the 
idea of sustainability without change.
A future nomos
The second narrative also imagines a future but deals with the geopolitical 
changes that follow from staying on the planet. It is written from a different 
position as well, despite the somewhat similar future-past perspective. 
The Collapse of Western Civilization is a short, fact-based fabulation, a 
science-fact story of sorts written by Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway, 
two historians of science. Subtitled ‘A View from the Future’, this short 
book offers a view of an imaginary future written by a ‘future historian. 
Living in the Second People’s Republic of China, he recounts the events of 
the Period of the Penumbra (1988-2093) that led to the Great Collapse and 
Mass Migration (2073-2093).’20 These events are seen as milestones in a new 
world order catalyzed by climate change, where the shifting of land and 
water fronts is the key force of political changes that Carl Schmitt would 
have referred to in terms of the ‘nomos’, notably the division of the land in 
political-legal-economic power relations, which in European legal history 
was above all a question of troubled relations with the sea and with water.
Since the Renaissance and early modernity, new technologies of measure-
ment from the compass to techniques of mapping were instrumental to the 
nomos of understanding and capturing global space,21 yet they were always 
bordering on and negotiating the problem of water, which remained more 
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diff icult to measure, map, and divide than land. Hence there is a certain 
geopolitical irony in the fact that industrially produced global warming 
is leading to rising sea levels and the (re)capture of the politically and 
economically signif icant dry lands, thus shifting the nomos once more. 
The once-mythical water now returns in the form of changing legal and 
governmental borders.22
The narrator of The Collapse of Western Civilization is in China, where he 
observes the chemical aspects of the industrial revolution. One of the most 
remarkable features of the Anthropocene discussions that have been going 
on for the past decade has been the recognition that this geological era is 
also one of massive chemical dosages. Oreskes and Conway remind us that 
the planetary placements of CO2 have also been the industrial hot spots 
of the past 200-300 years: the United Kingdom (1750-1850); Germany, the 
United States, the rest of Europe, and Japan (1850-1980); and China, India, 
and Brazil (1980-2050).23 The geopolitical order is determined by modes of 
production but also in terms of the role that geology and chemistry have 
played in establishing modern society. This order comes with its own set of 
temporal shifts, with multiple chemical modernities creating hot spots of 
production and pollution. Placed in the contemporary context, one can also 
delve into the differential tempos of the ecological crisis that are evidenced 
in the geopolitical distribution of waste. This distribution does not neces-
sarily follow the borders of nation-states but becomes visible in statistics 
demonstrating that the majority of emissions come from a limited number 
of companies belonging to the ‘carbon-combustion complex’. Among the 
familiar names of Chevron, Exxon, and BP, one f inds the information 
that ‘the 90 companies on the list of top emitters produced 63% of the 
cumulative global emissions of industrial carbon dioxide and methane 
between 1751 to 2010, amounting to about 914 gigatonne CO2 emissions.’24 
This demonstrates the impossibility of talking about the Anthropocene in 
the singular as if it was one uniform drive; it is, rather, embedded in the 
accentuated actions of certain agencies, corporations, and nation-states and 
in the uneven impact across spaces where legal protection is less eff icient or 
where the companies anyway have such strategic interests as to f ind ways 
to bypass legal, political, and ethical frameworks.
The geopolitical stakes of the planet are readable through the chemi-
cal levels, which also affect the heat absorbed in the atmosphere, as we 
know through various techniques of measurements. The narrative escorts 
the reader through general facts concerning the political, scientif ic, and 
policy-related determinations of environmental issues, from calculating the 
capacity of the planetary sinks – i.e. the places where wastes and pollutants 
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end up ‒ to the emergence of practices and the idea of ‘environmentality’ 
or ‘sustainability’. Different political systems respond in different ways, 
and the narrative reveals the sudden eff iciency of the centrally governed 
Chinese system:
There were notable exceptions. China, for instance, took steps to control 
its population and convert its economy to non-carbon-based energy 
sources. These efforts were little noticed and less emulated in the 
West, in part because Westerners viewed Chinese population control 
efforts as immoral, and in part because the country’s exceptionally 
fast economic expansion led to a dramatic increase in greenhouse 
gas emissions, masking the impact of renewable energy. By 2050, this 
impact became clear as China’s emissions began to fall rapidly. Had 
other nations followed China’s lead, the history recounted here might 
have been very different.25
The planetary temperature rise of up to four degrees had a significant effect 
in terms of water levels and massive areas of land flooded by the Arctic sea. 
Yet the main thrust of the text is not yet another narrative of catastrophic 
proportions but a meditation on the paradoxical scientif ic discourse that 
produced such a situation. Instead of the assumed controversy concerning 
the interpretation of scientif ic data, the results concerning causalities of 
climate change had for years shown a one-sided result as to the causes 
and impact of what was to come. Oreskes and Conway introduce the term 
‘carbon-combustion complex’ as a way of making sense of this context in 
terms of the political economy of the Anthropocene:
a network of powerful industries comprising fossil fuel producers, 
industries that served energy companies (such as drilling and oil f ield 
service companies and large construction f irms), manufacturers whose 
products relied on inexpensive energy (especially automobiles and 
aviation, but also aluminum and other forms of smelting and mineral 
processing), f inancial institutions that serviced their capital demands, 
and advertising, public relations, and marketing f irms who promoted 
their products.26
The short book’s narrative evaluates the role of public discourse on science 
in the post-WWII United States and its effect on political decision-making in 
the context of what is labelled market fundamentalism. Since the 1970s and 
1980s, neoliberal policies have produced an attitude of scepticism towards 
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scientif ic positions, which from an economic perspective undermines the 
specif ic knowledge perspectives produced by research. This was a radical 
break with Friedrich Hayek’s philosophical neoliberalism,27 which was 
founded on a close relationship with the insights provided by research and 
scientif ic methods.
The future memory that is being written is at the same time a mix of 
the most obvious– we knew that this is happening so what’s so special 
about it? – and the most complex: the political, scientif ic, and economic 
determinations of the geopolitically specif ic and yet planetary dimensions 
of the sink(ing) ecology. From this perspective, Félix Guattari’s ‘three ecolo-
gies’28 – the idea that there is in addition to a natural ecology also a social 
and mental ecology – sounds almost too innocent a way of addressing 
the suicidal neoliberal capture of future perspectives. The collapse of the 
Arctic ice cap is an ecological event in an ecology of multipliers or active 
forms29 that have catalytic impact on the sea, land and air as well as on the 
economy, urban planning, global politics, security policies and more. The 
water that was understood as anomalous or diff icult to control/define in 
the political space of old Europe30 becomes once again a determining factor 
of the geopolitical earth, but this time because rising ocean surfaces flood 
coastal areas and metropolises.
Oreskes and Conway’s bestseller narrative is parallel to, but also clearly 
different from the framing of the planetary in Kurenniemi’s visions.31 Both 
raise the question of the future memories of the contemporary technological 
and scientific forces that determine our epistemological and ontological sense 
of the planetary. However, their differences have to do with accentuated 
takes on what the planetary as a geophysical entity actually means, and how 
the temporality of the future determines the ecological crisis as a point of 
reference that defines the contemporary. Hence I want to turn to a discussion 
of the contemporary and the post-historical as significant temporal-political 
concepts. For it is through these concepts that future-past perspectives 
gain currency in the evaluation of the political agenda. In short, Oreskes 
and Conway’s short meditation on the issue of climate change produces an 
interesting juxtaposition to Kurenniemi’s. The future memory produced 
by the duo and their short novel offers a political economic account of the 
Anthropocene, even if they choose not to use this specific term. Kurenniemi’s 
vision is still politically undeveloped in contrast to the specific geopolitics 
that Oreskes and Conway offer and which ‒ in contrast to Kurenniemi’s post-
planetary dreams – is based on staying in the changing planerary biosphere 
and geosphere. Their different narratives trigger different ways of thinking 
about the presence of the future in contemporary cultural discussions.
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Politics of chronoscapes
In the context of this book, the alternative conceptualizations of social 
memory proceed by way of an explicit reference to Gabriel Tarde.32 If Bruno 
Latour has used Tarde’s sociological theories as a resource for rethinking the 
social, we should be able to think about memory and temporality in ways 
that offer similar effects. Latour’s key idea was to abandon the blanket use of 
the term ‘social’ as if referring to a particular type of substance whose nature 
can be separated from, say, ‘the material’, ‘the biological’, or ‘the economical’. 
Instead, in Latour’s use of the term, the social is simply ‘a movement, a 
displacement, a transformation, a translation, an enrollment’ – a perspec-
tive becomes clearer when he refers to it as ‘an association between entities 
which are in no way recognizable as being social in the ordinary manner, 
except during the brief moment when they are reshuffled together’.33
If social science becomes refashioned as a science of associations, links, 
and transformations, how could we use this insight to think about that 
other term that is so often attached to ‘the social’, notably memory? How is 
social memory to be understood once memory is understood to be funda-
mentally premised on a multitude of temporal determinations, situations, 
and techniques? We could then also address memory in terms of the various 
productions of f igures, materials, and techniques of time. Cultural history is 
full of different techniques for keeping time – almanacs, calendars, clocks, 
and more.34 But we can also approach the abundant techniques and associa-
tions of time as design strategies that introduce conceptual shifts in our 
management of temporal categories.
This work of ‘design’ includes narratives that are part of the material 
effects of design: the various techniques and technologies in which memory 
is embedded and which complicate linear sets of past-present-future co-
ordinates. Instead, the contemporary moment seems to be increasingly 
def ined by a multiplicity of times and the various ways in which we are 
trying to make sense of these multi-temporalities, or chronoscapes, to use 
Sarah Sharma’s term.35 It is against the backdrop of such a chronoscape that 
the entities of a ‘politics of nature’ ‒ most notably the various expressions 
of climate change (from global warming to changing chemical balances 
in air, soil, and oceans to the threat of mass extinction) ‒ are to be judged. 
The key premise of this chronoscape is, as already noted, the fact that the 
ecocrisis is not just a present dilemma but a future that acts on the now.
In terms of the notion of the contemporary, the narratives presented 
above are ways to get us thinking about the multitemporal stakes of 
this political category, so signif icant for modern politics.36 They involve 
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implicit and explicit ways of dealing with ideas of programmed futures, 
future pasts, and the agenda of post-history that have penetrated the 
political scene since the 1990s at least. In the post-communist era ‒ after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Soviet Union, and other institutions and 
symbols of the Cold War era‒ discourses regarding the end of history also 
emerged.37 This popular, and neoconservative populist, sense of temporal-
ity paralleled the rise of various projects, discourses, and corporations 
of global digital culture. Kurenniemi’s ideas were partly a product of the 
same historical period, whereas the more recent, ecological narrativiza-
tions are the next phase of an approach that may be called ‘post-historical’: 
it ranges from popular culture examples such as the documentary series 
Life After People (History Channel, 2008), the scientif ic discussions of 
the Anthropocene, and such critical insights in f iction and scholarly 
work as The Collapse of Western Civilization. In some popular cultural 
narratives, such as the f ilm Interstellar, commentators such as George 
Monbiot perceive a melancholia of political helplessness that he labels 
a ‘politically defeatist fantasy of leaving the planet’.38 One could easily 
see this relating to key features of Kurenniemi’s thought and to part of a 
longer history of science f iction of underground and extra-planetary life.39 
However, to be clear, Interstellar’s view of the temporality of the planetary 
condition is not actually about a future perspective of leaving the planet 
(the future as an alternative place to be occupied): it is a twist on the 
familiar Spielbergian meditation on the crisis of the family system, seen 
in terms of the cosmic dimensions of the eco catastrophe and time-critical 
relativity theories.40
But a key argument of this chapter is the fact that the concept of the post-
historical refracts into multiple historical and temporal directionalities. 
At this juncture, discussions of time and its involvement in the planetary 
political crisis is one of the most important theoretical issues to consider. 
One would imagine that recent debates on accelerationism could work in 
this direction, for at some implicit level, the 1990s cyberfantasies of Nick 
Land respond to the future-oriented singularities of Kurenniemi. The dif-
ference is mainly that Land produces a more explicit thematization of the 
‘forward investment in the future’41 and the cybernetic mutation of the 
body. The post-historical comes out also in the versions of accelerationism 
that try to execute a determination of the contemporary moment through 
fabulations about a capitalist future of non-human, cybernetic artif icial 
intelligence. These latter and more sober developments of accelerationism 
are premised on a temporal scheme that thinks in terms of future pasts 
while taking into account climate-crisis-ridden, economically stagnating 
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capitalist contexts42 as well as the crises that ensue post-9/11 and the series 
of economic crashes and austerity measures marking the last decade.43
But this is not the only sort of temporal determination that is able to 
engage with a governmentality of the planetary or a politics of time and the 
political imaginary of a future memory. The current discussions concerning 
the Anthropocene or the microtemporalities of media culture refer back to 
an idea of the variety of temporalities that are constantly synchronized in 
relation to a horizon that we could call the contemporary and that might 
inform our way of understanding the present. It is in relation to this body 
of theory that Wendy Brown44 articulates her concise theory of the highly 
signif icant temporal determinations of the political. Notions of genealogy, 
hauntology, and other temporal concepts emerging in works of cultural 
theory from Freud to Benjamin, Foucault, and Derrida are indispensable 
for the political vocabulary of modernity.
The importance of the genealogical has been already incorporated into 
much of contemporary media theory – especially media archaeology45 – in 
ways that resonate with Brown’s articulation of the task of the genealogical 
method: ‘to denaturalize existing forces and formations more thoroughly 
than either conventional history or metaphysical criticism can do’.46 But 
if the genealogical method opens up the past in terms of ‘faults, fractures, 
and f issures’,47 as critical media histories have done to demonstrate the 
scientif ic and technological determinations of the now, might there be 
a way to expand this focus to take into account the multitemporality of 
our contemporary moment? Such a possibility is already implied in the 
genealogical method in the sense that it is a ‘political ontology of the 
present’48 (as Brown states referring to Foucault.) But the contemporary 
can be seen as a further elaboration of the immanence of temporality to 
both a material context as well as the ‘questions, meaning, or projects’49 that 
invest it. Brown draws on Walter Benjamin’s theses on history as a way to 
develop a political notion of time that is all at once a critique of notions 
of linear progress, Rankean objectivity (approaching history ‘the way it 
really was’), and other reductionist approaches to the temporality of the 
contemporary. But implicitly it also raises the question of how to further 
develop a political theory grounded in complexities of time with respect 
to a situation when our relation to the future is also proscribed by science, 
technology, and media culture.
It is no wonder, then, that recent political and cultural theory has increas-
ingly turned to acknowledging such aspects of the future as signif icant for 
a post-9/11 world of media-informed cultural politics: I am here referring 
to Brian Massumi’s work on the future anterior, Richard Grusin’s concept 
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of ‘premediation’, and, for example, Greg Elmer and Andy Opel’s work on 
preemptive security strategies. Albeit with different emphases, all work 
upon the same terrain of the future that is constantly present whether as 
an atmosphere of fear (Massumi) or as constantly premediated, prescribed, 
and through narrative techniques of controlled potentiality (Grusin).50
With reference to Brown’s theoretical elaborations and Sharma’s eth-
nographic research, I want to underline the possibility of thinking about 
the contemporaneity of the present as informed by multiple temporalities 
and synchronization across the time scales. The rethinking of social tem-
poralities and memory proceeds by way of an entanglement of narratives, 
material contexts, and a recognition of the different ways in which the 
future imagined becomes a questioning of what the present-contemporary 
actually is. Sharma’s emphasis on power chronographies becomes a way of 
accounting for the differentially existing timescapes that are produced in 
relations of labour, gender, ethnicity, and, broadly speaking, the geopolitics 
of contemporary capitalism. Critics who claim that homogenization of time 
is one of the characteristics of capitalism miss out on this more nuanced 
perspective on capitalism’s multitemporal operational logic.
Sharma’s ethnographic methodology offers ideas for a wider cultural 
analysis of time, media, and capitalism. It also brings a different angle to 
discussions of social memory. In many ways, the contemporary context for 
imagining future memory has been heavily influenced by the presence of 
a variety of concepts of longue duree that prescribe futures of apocalyptic 
proportions. The environmental crisis in particular unfolds as a production 
of discourses of sustainability and apocalypse, and yet both are unfulf illing 
when it comes to handling the complexity of the situation. A rhetoric of 
sustainability which dominates current policymaking is not able to question 
the more fundamental political and economic stakes in the situation. An 
apocalyptic rhetoric is, for its part, in danger of undermining all sense of 
agency, producing melancholic forms of subjectivity deprived of capacity 
for action.51
It’s clear that we need more effective ways of making sense of the 
contemporary, drawing on an imaginary future and its pasts. A more 
satisfying solution is to think of the uneven and multiple overlapping 
temporalities that help to determine the otherwise broad concepts of 
the political contemporary. Indeed, in the context of discussions of the 
planetary and the Anthropocene, one is constantly reminded that the 
narratives of the contemporary technological condition have to do with 
the multiple temporalities they produce. It is clear that Kurenniemi’s type 
of narrative differs from the more ecologically minded narrative of Oreskes 
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and Conway, despite the superf icial parallels. Indeed, the concept of a 
sensitive co-existence of many times is a way of approaching a political 
imaginary of time where the projections of the future that derive from 
computer simulations of climate crisis and its effects (say, the changing 
temperature of the planet) is already acting on levels that all entail different 
temporalities: the time-critical operations of computerized epistemologies, 
the narrative prescriptions of possible futures, the political decisions based 
on such data, etc. Instead of the cyber critique of homogeneous cyber time 
or the homogenization of time in policy, one should actually emphasize 
the multiciplities of time as a way of grasping the relationship between the 
planetary and the computational.
Wendy Chun speaks of the (computer) modelled aspect of time in terms 
of the software ontology of our programmed knowledge of the future. This 
is most clearly stated in her analysis of the simulations concerning global 
temperatures and carbon emissions, where projections build on existing 
historical data. In her words: ‘The weirdest and most important thing about 
their temporality is their hopefully effective deferral of the future: these 
predictive models are produced so that, if they are persuasive and thus 
convince us to cut back on our carbon emissions, what they predict will 
not come about.’52
Indeed, one can reveal a range of micro and macrotemporalities that 
govern the future-past temporalities of the post-historical. Any determina-
tion of the ‘post’ of history has to become true to the understanding of 
technologies and techniques of time relevant to our sense of historicity. 
The post-historical reveals itself through instances other than the historical 
writing and production of time. Hayden White’s concept of ‘metahistory’ 
was important for understanding writing as a media technology that was 
as essential to the historical epistemology informing modernity. But it is 
equally important to understand Wolfgang Ernst’s media-archeological 
emphasis on the microtemporal dimension of machinic time.53 The various 
concepts of time that result from a close analysis of the circuits of cybernetic 
machines show us that there is a fundamental difference between the older 
techniques of keeping time (calendars, watches, etc.) and machines that 
automatically produce their own timings.
Vilem Flusser’s idea of post-history might then be the necessary link 
between the various approaches to the future past, even if it entails taking 
Flusser beyond the original framework of his thinking. The idea of the 
programmed dimension of post-history is not envisaged as a postmod-
ern collage but is identif ied in the various applications and platforms of 
computation, in which time is bent and twisted in a variety of ways that 
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resurface as distinct alternatives to history writing.54 The post-historical 
is a concept of time and politics that arises once we pay attention to the 
actual functions of a technical apparatus removed from the programmer’s 
intentions, argues Flusser. We can develop this claim so that its concept of 
‘post-history’ becomes a key epistemological framework for the future past 
as well. Flusser notably reminds us that in order to understand the program-
mability of time/history/memory, ‘[w]e must neither anthropomorphize nor 
objectify the apparatus’.55 In other words, approaching the issue of the future 
past and the geopolitics of capitalism does not necessitate a perspective 
of monorail temporality but careful analyses of multiple temporalities 
that in technical and in epistemological ways narrate56 the future as an 
archaeological existence of projected spaces of potentiality.
Conclusions
In Maurice Halbwachs’ accounts of memory, he reminds us that memory 
always takes place in and across collectives.57 Memory is never determined 
as an individual affair but always takes place among strangers: the collective 
practices, techniques, and technologies of passing on cultural repetition 
is a way of sustaining a sense of the collective. Memory and its collec-
tive basis are, in other words, co-individuated. It is, however, extremely 
important to underline that the list of strangers making up memory is 
longer than we might imagine: with new forms of communication media, it 
becomes extended to new platforms, techniques, and habits. The strangers 
who are our memory and who help to propagate it exist in the middle of 
a circulation of information, goods, and people ‒ governmentalities that 
extend far beyond those of the nation-state or other institutions of planetary 
signif icance (whether security and intelligence agencies, NASA, or some 
standard bodies of global governance).
When discussing any contemporary analysis of techniques of memory 
– whether platforms, practices, or technologies – one is forced to ask how 
this contemporaneity produces its own pasts, presents, and futures. In this 
chapter I have tried to address this issue through two alternative narratives 
of a future present engaging the contemporary moment of ecocrisis and 
technopolitics. Those narratives compel us to consider the cultural politics 
of time as one of geopolitics and temporal multiplicity, from the imaginary 
of outerplanetary technological futures (Kurenniemi) to tightly narrated 
ones that form part of the changing nomos of the planetary and of climate 
change (Conway and Oreskes).
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Indeed, in the sense that temporal concepts such as the genealogical 
have become important for a politics of and out of history (to use Brown’s 
phrasing), we are facing the crucial ecological task of creating vocabularies 
of the future that will help us make sense of the contemporary post-9/11, 
post-2008-bank-crash, post-catastrophic ecological crisis, and post-capi-
talism.58 All of these events may to some extent defy traditional notions of 
history and instill in us the necessity of returning to the terminologies of 
a natural history that addresses geological periods and durations without 
humans. This is not in order to naturalize the contemporary cultural or 
economic situations but to demonstrate how the cultural politics of time 
is also prescribed through its relations with the non-human. To return 
to the point made earlier: cultural heritage, cultural memory, and social 
memory are increasingly debated in relation to the planetary, the geologi-
cal, and the Anthropocene‒scenarios involving chemical, geological, and 
biological processes that displace the concepts and frameworks that are 
normally associated with ‘the social’. These are powerful reminders of the 
various ecological materialities that determine the times we are living in 
and living towards, and they sustain the idea of memory as an actively 
producing force, an archaeology of the future. The contemporary shift in 
the conceptualization of the ‘archive’ ‒ from governmental instrument 
and cultural heritage institution to a wider understanding that comprises 
geophysical, ecological, and even chemical storage ‒ is emblematic of a 
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 Chapter Six
Video Water, Video Life, Videosociality
Ina Blom
For me it seems a time to understand limpets, barnacles and alaria rather than 
lawyers, circuits and marketing.
– Paul Ryan1
In 1976, Avery Johnson, a neurophysiology researcher at MIT who was in 
close dialogue with the Radical Software circle of video pioneers, took 
a moment to write a personal letter of complaint to social philosopher 
William Irwin Thompson. The object of his annoyance was a critique 
of TV culture that Thompson had published in the 10 June 1976 issue 
of The New York Times.2 In this article, Thompson deplored a televisual 
paradigm that ‘can expand around the world spatially but that conflates 
everything with the present and the codes of ‘presentation’. The gist of the 
critique was that the televisual present destroys not just history but also 
a productive imagination of the future, which is guided by mythology. 
Johnson turned the very terms of this critique against Thompson himself, 
angrily attacking him for having written text that ‘intellectually ref lects 
what you deplore in TV: making past and future meld into an instant 
world’. In his view, the article itself evoked a ‘specious present’ which 
obliterates memory.
Yet the memory loss identif ied by Johnson was of a different order than 
Thompson’s concern for historical memory and the cultural archives of 
the past. Johnson was concerned with memory in the biological sense of 
the word: the physical preservation of the past in the present that is the 
very condition of the survival of genetic traits. Since the introduction of 
molecular biology, the capacity for memory has notably been established as 
that which defines life and that separates it from the non-living.3 It was this 
concept of memory that made Johnson state that the critical obsession with 
the televisual present does not recognize us – inhabitants of TV culture – as 
‘biological organisms that can move and struggle’. His advice to Thompson 
was to stop ‘attacking institutions with elegant rapier jabs’ and instead 
engage in the work of the biologically oriented ‘1/2 inch porta-pack video 
freaks’ (sic).4
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Johnson’s anger turned on a crucial point in the reception of TV’s reality. 
The ability of live television to capture attention and format the world 
according to its logic of presentness was apparently not just something 
that afflicted the general public. It seemed to format most of the critical 
approaches to the social and political reality of television as well. Richard 
Dienst accurately sums up this tendency in his 1994 Still Life in Real Time. 
Right from television’s beginnings, ‘f low’ was put to work as a critical 
concept. Thinkers as different as Rudolf Arnheim and Dziga Vertov saw 
televisual liveness and simultaneity as a totalization of the social f ield 
that might provide the basis for new economic utopias ‒ capitalist for the 
one, socialist for the other. Jean-Paul Sartre, for his part, understood the 
same phenomenon in terms of suppression: the totalizing simultaneity of 
television attested to a power collusion between state, elite, and capital 
that served to disarticulate social groups and their differences thanks 
to TV’s emphasis on a form of pure presence where nothing is said and 
everyone is happy.5 Televisual presence and liveness was tantamount to 
ideology, a technopolitical conf iguration of reality whose social powers 
should be the object of scrutiny and intervention. If television’s f low relies 
at once on a specif ic technology and a cultural construct comprising a 
wholly new structure of visibility, one must, as Raymond Williams noted, 
not just read existing television through the mutual determinations of 
technology and cultural forms but also rescue both technology and culture 
from the embrace of present-day television.6 Television seems to survive 
precisely through flow, whose transmission washes away the particularity 
of messages along with the reception of them, draining perception of the 
resistant holding powers of memory.7 Countering the ideal of direct speech 
that underpins William’s argument, Dienst reframes the very centrality 
of the concept of ‘f low’ in television criticism. The term seems to have a 
strange kind of grip, as if it were an aesthetic fetish f igure, a sublime object.8 
Liveness and presence apparently have the capacity to stun and fascinate 
at all levels – which is why the critical emphasis on television’s live flow is 
perhaps not just an exercise in materialist analysis but also a symptom of 
unresolved metaphysical impulses in the theorization of television. If TV 
produces new abstractions covering up the contradictions of everyday life, 
it does so no less in the thinking of its major critics.
Against this fixation on the televisual present, the association between video 
and a concept of televisual ‘life’ is of some consequence. In early video art, the 
question of life hinged less on a general obsession with the signal as an index 
of living presence than on more tersely formulated questions of memory and 
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its physiological basis – memory as a feature of biological life. This perspec-
tive contrasts with Williams’ rather traditional qualif ication of memory as 
that which in principle resists flow, the cultural particularities whose relative 
stability provide platforms from which critical distance may be exerted. In 
fact, video’s distancing of both television and the kind of critique it produced 
was an all-important factor in the emergence of an entirely new set of ac-
tions and preoccupations. Avery Johnson’s diatribe against William Irwin 
Thompson is symptomatic of this reorientation. Focus on the totalizing TV 
presence too easily views the human body in equally totalizing terms, i.e. 
as passive relays in a global electronic network. But to Johnson, biological 
bodies are never passive relays but independent capacities for action. Hence 
television must be understood in terms of its specif ic ways of interacting 
with such centres of action. Here, ‘televisual liveness’ was not a key term in 
a relatively abstract theory of the new infrastructural organization of reality 
and politics but a concept that opened onto the analogies and complicities 
between the technical particularities of video systems and the dynamics 
of living systems. Once the agencies of video became part of new, unruly 
composites, freed from the strictures of broadcasting institutions that had 
initially adopted televisual technologies as a way of adding images to radio, 
video seemed to make people rethink the tenets of televisual life. For one, 
it enjoined them to test new camera-monitor relations. If distributing pre-
formatted cultural content was no longer the key issue, why not just turn 
the camera to the monitor that displayed the real-time flow of images? If a 
journalistic or cinematographic representation of the world was not on the 
agenda, why not explore how video memory would function – what video 
memory would actually be ‒ if it were forced to relate to its own circuits 
only? In a 1984 article in Physica journal, James P. Crutchfield, a research 
physicist at the University of California with close connections to video art 
pioneers such as Steina and Woody Vasulka, aff irmed the early intuitions 
about a connection between video and biological memory.9 In his article, 
video feedback was presented as a space-time simulator or, more precisely, a 
space-time analogue computer that made it possible to approach a number 
of problems in dynamical systems theory, such as iterative image processing, 
cellular automata, and biological morphogenesis.10 Video feedback could, in 
other words, function as a cheap and fast simulator of the type of complex 
behaviour that was at the time being introduced as a possible model for the 
very dynamics of life.11 It seemed, in other words, to model processes of emer-
gence that second-order systems theory describe in terms of ‘operational 
closure’. The individuation of a technical system in its complex processing 
of matter operated on the same principles as natural systems.
156 Ina BlOM
An autobiographical life form
In the early 1970s, then, analogue video emerged as a quasi-biological entity, 
an instance of the memory at work in basic life processes. This was quite a 
step for a technology that had been designed in order to provide television 
with something that it seemed to lack: a proper memory, a cultural archive of 
its programming. The problem for early television was that ‘analog systems 
are so dumb they can’t store any information, so the stuff’s got to come out 
as fast as it goes in’.12 Nothing remained beyond the moment of transmis-
sion. TV simply could not store its emissions within the framework of its 
own electronic circuits but had to resort to ‘outside’ technologies like the 
kinescope that would f ilm TV images off the screen. Hence, in 1951, David 
Sarnoff, chairman of the board of RCA and founder of NBC, challenged his 
engineers to invent a ‘videograph’, a ‘television picture recorder’ that would 
make it possible to ‘reproduce TV programs from tape at any one time, in 
the home or elsewhere’. 13 Yet it was Ampex that came up with a solution 
that was suff iciently speedy and compact for realistic archival purposes: a 
nifty four-headed recording mechanism that used a transverse, tape-saving 
scanning principle for light and linear scanning for sound.14 This was in 
1956: from this moment onward, television could store and retrieve ‘live’ 
moments cut out of the flow of time, according to a principle reminiscent 
of the f ilm or photographic archive. What was perhaps not planned for was 
the ways in which analogue video – television’s modest supplement ‒ would 
problematize the very question of information storage: it would not so much 
hold on to as critically re-view the tenets of televisual time. And ultimately, 
video would come to embody a type of memory that had little to do with 
the dynamics of archiving and document retrieval.
The emergence of ‘biological’ video coincides with video’s relative techni-
cal and economic independence from the broadcasting framework, facili-
tated by the introduction of portable video cameras for the private market 
and the intensive development of tools for experimental work on scanning 
patterns and signal modulation that followed. Yet the phenomenon was also 
almost instantly registered at the level of social ontology, the way in which 
the ‘social’ as such is def ined and understood. Video’s self-differentiation – 
its shift away from its designed role as television’s archive, its emergence as 
a quasi-living entity – was an aspect of a technopolitical event whose force 
reverberates in contemporary efforts to grasp a post-archival culture in 
which social memory is increasingly tied to electronic transfer and updating 
functions that accommodate and track the movements of f leeting com-
munications and passions on a massive scale.15 Today’s anxious obsession 
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with storage may above all be a symptom of a technological regime in which 
collectivities are no longer so easily grasped in terms of stable documents, 
images, or representations and in which ‘the social’ increasingly emerges 
through real-time recursive dynamics that complicate traditional efforts 
to model it as a ‘fact’ or a ‘f ield’.16
The ontologizing thrust of video initially affected the sphere of 1960s and 
70s art production. Yet art history or art criticism may not really have been 
equipped to register its impact. The overarching focus on artistic subjectiv-
ity and aesthetic reception tends to cast technology in a subservient role as a 
tool in the theatre of human experience and social organization. And hence 
the agency it seemed to exert – traceable in numerous artistic documents 
from the time – somehow got lost. Media archaeology – the detailed study 
of the generative principles of machinic functions that occupy a realm 
beyond the human sensorium – is indispensable for retracing this agency 
yet cannot on its own account for the associations or events that emerge as a 
result of technical performance in a particular situation. Only a transversal 
movement tracing the specific associative effects of technical agency – in 
this case, video memory’s trajectory across different material strata – may 
bring out the full scale of the event in question.17 A strategic choice may 
therefore be to view video as a quasi-subject: ‘Video’ in this context is the 
name of an autobiographical life form exploring its own memory capacities 
and their ramifications. Such an ‘autobiography of video’ traverses the f ield 
of early video art: if artists could be said to ‘deploy’ video for a variety of 
existential, aesthetic, and political purposes, one could equally well say that 
video technology ‘deployed’ art institutions, materials, and individuals in 
a reflexive unfolding of its memory powers.
The displacement of the televisual archive was the catalytic event in video’s 
association with biological life. But by the same token, analogue video 
also placed itself at a certain remove from early computing discourses, 
where insight into the volatility and contingency of information process-
ing (its dependence on constant updating fuelled by a stream of analogue 
signals) was suppressed in favour of the notion of stable storage for future 
use.18 To video, memory was not a ‘concern’. The emphatic, anxious ques-
tion of memory was, to paraphrase Wolfgang Ernst, undermined by an 
implicit emphasis on memorizing; a dynamic process based on a network 
of micromemories and interacting micromemorial hierarchies.19 The live 
microtemporal procedures of video took precedence over safekeeping of 
macro units on tape, what Bill Viola disparagingly referred to as an ‘mag-
netic city dump’.20 This was how video memory approached the operative 
158 Ina BlOM
memory of living beings in action. And this also accounted for a major 
catalytic effect: a video that did not just pose as a quasi-biological entity 
but, more specif ically, as an ecopolitical actant with particular abilities 
to share and distribute perceptions of a nature in crisis. Ultimately, it was 
through this identif ication with the nascent environmental politics of the 
1960s and 70s that video came to posit a process-oriented ontology of the 
social, informed by technical capacities for connectivity and contagion 
across all types of material composites. In other words: the f irst systematic 
exploration of the powers of video life took place in an atmosphere of risk, 
crisis, urgency, and failure in which biological life could for the f irst time 
no longer just be taken for granted.
The water crisis
It was, above all, a question of water. Water – the primary medium for 
biological life and the established signif ier for televisual ‘f low’ – came to 
mediate the questioning of collective memory that marks modern media 
culture.21 Video would, generally, be ‘with’ water: as a ‘creature of feedback 
patterns’ it would, as Warren Brodey put it in a text on biological optimizing 
systems, not make you ‘build dams and causeways to stop the waves’ but 
‘build active surfboards’.22 At a more precise level, video allied itself with 
water in order to reconfigure the role of perception. On the one hand, the 
association between video and water evoked the distracted or ‘memoryless’ 
perception that is usually seen as the unfortunate by-product of a perpetual 
present marked by informational overflow and a constant production of 
events.23 But on the other hand it also evoked a preoccupation with the 
perceptual and technical conditions of attentiveness, a preoccupation that 
Jonathan Crary has described as the f lip side of the modern culture of 
distraction24. Now the question of attentive perception was brought to 
bear on a situation where water was not just a token for televisual f low in 
general, but, more specif ically, for ecological crisis, systemic breakdown.
Acid rain – the object of much observation and research in the late 1960s 
– was just one part of the story. On the American West Coast, water had 
become an urgent political issue due to an imbalance between precipitation 
patterns and population concentrations that threatened to turn the entire 
Los Angeles area into a desert. ‘In California, feelings about water run 
high’, observed Paul Ryan, one of the founders of the Raindance media 
collective; he himself used video to handle his feelings for what happened 
to water in a number of places, including the coast of Cape Ann (south of 
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Boston), the Hudson River in New York, and the Passaic Watershed in New 
Jersey with its constant flooding problems.25 Flowing water had, in other 
words, become a f igure for a vast and dangerous realm of contingencies 
and toxicities that called out for new levels of human engagement and 
action. A similar imagination was still at work in Félix Guattari’s 1989 text 
The Three Ecologies, where the ‘waters of Venice’ were said to be ‘invaded 
by monstrous mutant algae’, just as ‘our television screens are peopled 
and saturated by “degenerate” images and utterances’.26 Filthy water flows 
equated filthy signal flows: what was needed was an ecological operator able 
to move transversally between the different registers of f low that seemed 
to suffuse the natural, mental, and social worlds.27 In such a situation, video 
became an ecological activist, a set of affordances that could be a crucial 
aid to human memory when it came to keeping track of the problematic 
flows and perceiving their various types of dynamics. Yet this ability to ‘get’ 
water also came to def ine video itself. In a situation of ecological crisis, the 
capture of a set of properties named ‘water’ became a form of activity that 
allowed video to explore how its particular memory capacities could be 
implicated in the production of a shared environment.
The six-channel video installation named Symptomatic Syntax is paradig-
matic. Produced in 1981 by Frank Gillette, another Raindance founder, it 
encapsulates some of the more fundamental aspects of the ‘media ecology’ 
that was promoted in Raindance’s 1970-74 publication project, the Radical 
Software journal. In this work – a perpetual close-up image world without 
indication of context – water is actually the only instantly recognizable 
thing. One simply assumes it must be water, unless there is some other 
translucent fluid that will catch the light and put objects in motion. Not 
that the movement is very dramatic: whatever natural phenomena are 
seen on screen – ferns? small buds? a butterfly wing? torn petals? – seem 
to feel no obligation to provide any sense of action, much less to explain 
themselves. On f irst impression, they come across as minor contingencies 
on a picture plane. A tangle of billowing red and white shapes remain 
locked in a sort of vibrating standstill until interrupted by a brief f licker-
ing darkness imposed by the video editing system. As the image returns, 
some crumpled red objects float sideways across the monitor, ceremonially 
swirling toward each other before darker and more complicated stuff takes 
over, stuff with hard edges, sharp protrusions, and shiny surfaces, bulging 
armours that might put some alien military division to shame. A horseshoe 
crab, evidently ‒ but at this moment of screen exposure it is mainly a piece 
of terrifying organic machinery that just sits there, exposing greyish, slimy 
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insides. The water pushes tiredly against its lower end. The camera angle 
shifts, but no new information emerges.
To view the multiple-screen set-up of Symptomatic Syntax is to be im-
plicated in a project of monitoring – the mode of perception that Stanley 
Cavell identif ied with television and its specif ic conception of the world. 
In f ilm, we perceive a world recorded and separate from us, even if we may 
want to be part of it and secretly hope that it cannot exist without us. In 
contrast, televisual perception is anxiety-ridden: its constant stream of live 
signals keep us connected to a here and now that is understood as this world, 
our world, no matter the distances of transmission or the temporality of 
programmed contents.28 The monitoring facilitated by signal streams con-
structs the world as a precarious entity whose survival seems to depend on 
our constant watchfulness: the much-discussed deficiencies of the modern 
capacity for attention comes to light precisely in a televisual context where 
every critical instant seems to count. The Worldwatch Institute, founded 
in 1974, seems to precisely encapsulate this modality of environmental 
perception. In fact, the growing ecological sensibility of the 1960s and its 
propagation of the image of a fragile little planet threatened by excessive 
human activity could also be seen as a by-product of television’s ‘global’ 
monitoring and televisual modes of keeping track of life itself through 
technologies that seem to attain the status of living entities.
The point of view in Symptomatic Syntax is not monitoring in the more 
abstract or general sense of the term but, very emphatically, that of surveil-
lance. A still camera takes in the scene below, registering its events in 
a disinterested manner. Electronic disturbance intervenes as the image 
or angle shifts abruptly, as if produced by a closed-circuit multi-camera 
system and a set of automated switches. Surveillance systems are, as we 
know, intensif ications of the general condition of televisual monitoring: 
as a concentrated mode of attentiveness, they make evident its inherent 
association with anxiety and control. Still, video’s construction of life, 
nature, or worlds in this work is far from obvious and enjoins us to see the 
peculiarities of the type of environmental monitoring that became one of 
the key formats of early video art. For here, the reduction of the world to a 
precarious object – the crisis version of McLuhan’s global village – is coun-
teracted by the contingencies of interaction between monitoring systems 
and the world. These might, of course, be the normal effects of monitoring, 
since surveillance cameras tend to capture strange passing shapes that are 
often hard to make out. But in Gillette’s work, the strangeness of what is 
monitored is of a different order. The video takes on another life as if engag-
ing a set of uncategorizable forces that explode normal gauges of mediation 
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and measure: at exactly what distance will the objects of this world start 
to make sense to us? In what time frame? Related to which preconceived 
patterns, which memory systems? A biologist might have precise ideas about 
this and might choose a microscope or a satellite depending on the scientific 
argument at stake; if collaborating on a television nature documentary, she 
would make sure the natural objects were clearly identified and inscribed in 
a coherent narrative. But a video surveillance system is not a biologist and 
bases its environmental engagement on technical properties that seem quite 
random compared with the established scientif ic, journalistic, and artistic 
disciplines of nature representation. One of them is sound: Symptomatic 
Syntax relays a constant wavering between the ‘realistic’ sound of running 
water and the type of indefinite ambient noise that only recording with a 
microphone will produce. What we encounter here is a natural world that 
is explicitly multifarious and expansive ‒even monstrous. Paradoxically, 
video here seems to use monitoring in order to demarcate a distance to 
human perception, to refuse the televisual idea that video is simply a kind 
of extended human eye/body. The almost abstract video biotopes of slowly 
shifting shapes and colours seem to take on the autonomy of percepts, 
Deleuze and Guattari’s term for the blocs of sensation and perception 
that may be produced in artworks and that exist as such, i.e. as instances 
of a desire to exceed the lived and the momentary that add themselves 
to the non-human landscapes of nature.29 It is f itting, of course, that the 
soundtrack also includes scattered references to John M.E. McTaggart’s The 
Unreality of Time (1908) ‒ a philosophical argument against any unif ied 
ontology of time. For to monitor an ecology where biological organisms 
and percepts are part of the same continuum is to confront, head on, the 
fact that this ecology is also invented by the velocities of the monitoring 
technologies – invented, that is, by microtemporalities and techniques 
of frequency modulation at odds with any human sense of time or, more 
signif icantly, any human capacity for attention or watchfulness.30
This was the type of realization that emerged at that particular intersec-
tion of cybernetics and dynamical systems theory called video feedback. 
Frank Gillette was one of its pioneers: his 1969 Wipe Cycle, created in col-
laboration with Ira Schneider, was celebrated as a groundbreaking case of 
video being used to alter television’s one-way flow of transmission so as to 
make viewers part of complex temporal and informational circuits. And this 
again gave a whole new twist to the idea of environmental responsibility.31 
As perceptions of nature take on the objective status of entities that live on 
and add themselves to nature, humans would no longer oversee nature as if 
from the outside but would be forced to see themselves as part of all sorts of 
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continuities and recursions. In recent years, such insights have led to calls 
for the abolition of the very concept of nature: as Timothy Morton argues, 
the focus on ‘nature’ as such is symptomatic of a form of ecological piety that 
refuses to take into account the many agencies or instances of mediation 
that are part and parcel of the emergent biological/technical world. The 
love of ‘nature’ actually holds nature at arm’s length, as an object apart.32
If the work and writings of the Raindance media collective and their many 
associates did not exactly spell out this last argument, their attachment to 
the feedback loops in which a ‘nature in crisis’ was at once monitored and 
produced implied a mode of direct involvement in nature that was material, 
technical, and pragmatic through and through. Paul Ryan used the term 
‘video perception’ in order to underscore that whatever was produced by the 
video camera was not a representational image but an immediate and live 
‘taking in’ of the world shaped by the technical/perceptual apparatus ‒ just 
as the human nervous system always already shapes the visions that seem 
to just ‘hit’ the eye. Such perspectives complemented Gillette’s repeated 
meditations on the future-oriented dimension of the memory apparatus, 
against all nostalgic tendencies to f ixate the past through historical rep-
resentations.33 The ‘nature’ of video was neither an original ‘condition’ to 
which one should return nor a separate entity whose need for protection 
could simply be proven with accurate scientif ic representation. Rather, 
both the imagination of crisis and the means to crisis management lay in 
constant perceptual and aesthetic involvement, a non-stop innervation 
of the sensorial apparatus that, so to speak, enforced a new and explicit 
type of feedback loops between industrialized humans and their larger 
biological world. Environmental responsibility could not be imposed on 
humans from without, as a moral obligation anchored in transcendental 
principles, but had to be a function of a heightened sense of involvement in 
the reflexive continuities that exist between the human sense apparatus 
and its environment.
The attentive mode produced in video monitoring did not just turn 
around the quest for knowledge and understanding. With reference to 
Gabriel Tarde, one might more accurately describe it as an effort that springs 
out of desire and that aims at ‘the specification of a nascent sensation’ ‒ with 
the proviso that this specif ication is as much an effect of video production 
as of human psychology.34 Getting eff icient environmental action from 
risk-averse, affluent, and protected First World individuals would depend 
on precisely such a form of specif ied sensitization so as to trigger basic 
survival impulses at work in the organism/environment feedback loop. A 
first move towards such a goal would be to explicitly restage the inhabitants 
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of a post-industrial world of information and media technologies as Avery 
Johnson’s ‘biological organisms that move and struggle’. And such a restag-
ing could not take place by pointing to some nature ‘out there’, beyond the 
modern technological world. It would, in contrast, have to take place in 
terms of the specif ic affordances of their electronic network environments.
Belief in belief
This may or may not have been a viable strategy for a new environmental 
politics; in any case, it is too early to pass judgment on what was just the f irst 
steps of a broader technopolitical reorientation. From another perspective, 
however, Gillette’s work allows us to see how video technology deployed a 
situation of environmental crisis as a way of qualifying the type of liveness 
that was routinely ascribed to it. Environmental monitoring quite simply 
became one of video’s key autobiographical modes. It was a set-up through 
which it could discover its sympathies with the generative dynamics of life 
systems and explore the consequences this had for the modelling of a new 
type of live memory or living archive. But, even more signif icantly, video’s 
association with environmental monitoring in a situation of ecological 
crisis also placed the collective or distributed dimensions of its live memory 
in sharp relief. If video poses as a living subject of sorts, it is here, in this 
pragmatic political context, that one is confronted with the collective 
dimensions of its subjectivity. For the whole point of its form of memory 
was its obvious capacity for distributing sensations and for engendering 
concerted action between multiple actants. It was this aspect of video that 
made Frank Gillette speak of ‘the divisible’ as ontological and of a ‘collective 
subject tracking the objective’.
These formulations emerge in the opening passages of Between 
Paradigms, a 1973 essay preceded by over 30 pages of drawings of patterns 
evoking various states of f low or turbulence. The text itself picks up on 
Buckminster Fuller’s call for a new metaphysics or meta-technics that will 
help make new technology a constructive and globally integrated tool 
rather than the destruction machinery it seemed to have become.35 At 
stake here was a redefinition of the very dynamics of collective memory, 
and Gillette’s efforts to produce a ‘meta-technics’ seem directly informed 
by experiences with a technical system where synchronizing pulses – a new 
and distinct technical invention ‒ are essential to keep the flows of volatile 
signals coordinated and on time: in this sense they are also indicators of 
the way in which the energy flowing through the system is also easily lost 
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or dissipated.36 Video signals were then always already a ‘collective body’ 
in constant movement – def ined by regulatory cohesiveness yet through 
that very regulation always susceptible to unpredictable or ‘unruly’ crowd 
behaviour.37
In a biological context, distributed or collective memory has sometimes 
been discussed in terms of the controversial science of memetics, which 
describes cellular behaviour in informational terms and understands ideas 
to be no less biologically ‘real’ than neuronal activity. A typical claim of 
memetics is that memories are not stored in the brain cells themselves but 
distributed in the gaps of the neural networks that make up the brain’s 
synaptic plasticity: as a consequence, memory is also distributed among 
the cultural agents that shape the brain and constitute its environment. 
Analogue video of the 1970s could, however, not as yet mirror itself in neo-
Darwinian theories of the feedback loops between biology and culture 
and had to waver between physical/technological and more sociologically 
oriented formulations about the contagious or distributed dynamics of its 
form of memory.38 The terms ultimately used by Gillette were ‘mood’ and 
‘belief’. Between Paradigms’ subtitle was The Mood and its Purpose, and a 
chief target of the text was the damaging effects of a modern history that 
sacrif ices the productive powers of mythological imagination. History is 
here vested in a distinction between true and false that f ixates the past as 
an undisputable reality that, in turn, determines the future. An extremist 
example of this mode of thinking might be scientif ic socialism, which 
defines a precisely delimited collective ‒ the proletariat – in terms of such a 
historical truth and is hence able to extrapolate the inevitable revolutionary 
future of this collective. Yet, as the actual practice of Stalinist or Maoist 
socialism shows, this predetermined future tends to work as a self-fulf illing 
prophecy in the sense that it is carefully managed and controlled by the 
guardians of historical truth, at the expense of attention to actual events 
and conditions of change.
The dynamics of belief is wholly different: neither true nor false, belief is 
a type of mental formatting or infrastructure that organizes the intuitions 
through which the future acts on the present. It is essentially a navigational 
tool, which is why Gillette speaks of a ‘self-organizing topology of beliefs’ 
and associates belief with the relational logic of cybernetic models.39 But, 
as importantly, belief is per def inition collective in the non-contained or 
distributive sense of the term: it attests to the contagious dynamics of 
imitation and invention that, according to Gabriel Tarde, defines the social 
as such.40 In fact, the video-informed conception of collective life forms in 
Gillette’s writing is closer to the basic tenets of Tarde’s sociology than to the 
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discipline of memetics that Tarde’s work is often said to have anticipated. 
Memetics is caught up in a discussion of how ‘a’ meme is to be def ined and 
in what ways it could be said to be the cultural counterpart to ‘a’ gene – a 
notoriously diff icult question, since the physical substratum of memes is 
hard to define: is it sounds and images? or the acts of communication? And 
what exactly does it mean to say that they are replicated in culture? Tarde’s 
approach, unconcerned with the gene/meme parallel of neo-Darwinist sci-
ence, is different. What is imitated is not specif ic expressions or behaviours 
but beliefs and desires: we take on the beliefs and desires of others, and these 
provide patterns for judgments and actions that in turn affect the structure 
of belief.41 Here is, in short, the sociological parallel to Gillette’s cybernetic 
description of belief as a ‘self-organizing topology’. The ‘meta-technics’ 
of video developed (in fragmentary form) in Between Paradigms is then 
a theory of being in which the principle of emergence that characterizes 
both biological and technical life now explicitly opens onto a model of 
social memory.
Again, the political context that provoked this particular meta-technics is 
all important. In a situation where technological, economic, and ecological 
concerns converged in a scenario of imminent crisis (dehumanization, 
overpopulation, pollution), video presented itself as a subject-like monitor-
ing system capable of unprecedented intimacy with the endangered ecolo-
gies ‒ an ecological activist countering the narrative of increasing loss of 
control over a future dominated by destructive machines. To this end, it 
presented itself as a f inely tuned perceptual/sensorial apparatus capable of 
both taking in and sharing the specif ic ‘intuitions’, ‘moods’, and ‘concerns’ 
of life systems under threat, making them the connecting points of a wider 
social topology. It was, in fact, as if video took it upon itself to rehabilitate the 
seemingly lost capacity to act by also producing a belief in a new dynamic of 
change ‒ a dynamic that would be based on shared situational perception 
and in this way would undo the authority of historical archives and their 
predictive grip on the future. Video’s meta-technics quite simply set out to 
produce a belief in belief, an imagination of the political potential of new 
collective imagination.
Such belief in belief seems to have informed Avery Johnson’s f inal riposte 
to William Irwin Thompson’s lament about the decrepitude of television: 
‘C’mon man, stop ZAPping us. Let’s move together.’ (sic)42 It might sound 
like simple hippie jargon, and to some extent it was, of course, exactly that. 
Yet it also expressed the way in which the attitudes and behaviour patterns 
that mobilize others was the very object of imitation and sharing. This trust 
in the ‘motions’ of belief also informed the kinaesthetic strategies through 
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which video could also establish intimacy with natural phenomena – for 
instance in situations when still-camera surveillance was not an option. 
In Frank Gillette’s Quidditas (1974-75), seven distinct places or ‘phases in 
natural process’ (as Gillette called them) ‒ a pond, a lake surrounded by 
woods, scrub pines, salt marshes, tidal f lats, dunes, and the sea – occa-
sion a particular type of video gesture or kinaesthetic experience. Rather 
than simply ‘recording’ these uninhabited spots of Cape Cod woodland 
and coastal landscape, video seems to imitate the perceptual acts of the 
landscape itself, as if in sympathy with its intuitions, its own approach to the 
environment. It is above all the camera movement that enacts this imitative 
behaviour ‒ and once again, the contrast with nature documentary could 
not be greater. In nature documentary, the camera invariably works as a 
stand-in for the curious human eye, spying on other species. Hence the 
most common movement is a wide angle shot that zooms in on particular 
details. The camera establishes the place or context in which the observer 
f inds herself, before focusing on specif ic objects of interest that are seen 
as natural components of the place. Quidditas completely reverses this 
movement. Again and again, the camera produces rapid gestures of zooming 
out from some small detail, a constant rhythm of rapid outward expansions. 
The things of the natural world – branches, rocks, leaves, f lowers, tufts of 
grass, waves, patterns in the sand – are barely established as visual facts 
before the camera suddenly widens its angle of vision. These are, in fact, 
imitations of the imagined perceptions of these natural objects, their at-
titudes or reflexes: it is as if each of them are casting series of rapid glances 
that serve to establish their immediate environment. They are presented 
as cognizing, sensing beings taking in the world around them; video does 
not so much observe them as imitate their powers of observation.
In a paper presented at the 1974 World Man conference in Moltrasio, Italy, 
Gillette described the video network as a connection between the world 
and a perceptual system terminating in the prefrontal neocortex: through 
a kinaesthetic signature, the loop between eye/body, the technology, and 
the process of recording are individuated, so that random information 
becomes a pattern.43 This statement attests to what had become something 
of a truism in the late 1960s, notably the idea of video as an extension of 
the human nervous system. Yet if video is allied with the human nervous 
system, Quidditas presents this system mainly in terms of its capacity to 
imitate the intuitions or desires of other bodies, to take on and internalize 
their ‘kinaesthetic signatures, their specif ic ways of ‘reaching out’. But then 
again the title hints at precisely such relations of commonality. In scholastic 
philosophy, ‘quidditas’ was the Latin term for the essence of an object – its 
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‘whatness’ – yet with the twist that this essence denotes properties that it 
also shares with others of its kind (in contrast to the term ‘haecceity’, which 
indicates the qualities that make an object different from all others). The 
quidditas referred to in this work are, then, not just the natural objects 
caught on tape. It is, more precisely, the shared capacity for perception 
and memory typical of the collective body of cognizing beings that, in this 
particular historical and political context, came to call itself ‘video’.
The politics of sharing perceptions
Crisis, however, tends to call for mobilization on multiple levels and at 
widely different scales. ‘Getting’ water was fine, but as an ecological activist/
collective, video faced a problem of organization: how to make its particular 
topology of belief politically evident and effective at the more pragmatic 
level of everyday information processing? How to get to the point where 
thousands – or even millions ‒ of individual nervous systems might be 
made to share and feel ecological concerns in real time?
Symptomatic Syntax, Quidditas, and the series of other works in the 
same vein may have functioned as models or test beds for such sharing, but 
video was more ambitious: it wanted something more systematic and more 
explicitly distributed. The medium of this ambition was f irst and foremost 
Paul Ryan, who had already attempted – and failed – to produce a new ‘tribe’ 
of video makers sensitive to ecological concerns. This failure could, in Ryan’s 
view, be attributed to his own mistaken approach to ritual. Following the 
sudden death of his father in 1971, he had produced a 12-hour-long work in 
which video footage of his living father was overlaid by his own family-
related laments mixed with ranting about the problems and possibilities 
of video and its technical and epistemological corollaries: the work was 
then made available to audience viewing in Ryan’s apartment for days on 
end, as a profane version of the Catholic wake.44 ‘It was a bust’, Ryan stated. 
The technology may have been video, but it was harnessed to a project 
that was too rooted in the idea of criticism and examination. According 
to Ryan, his attempt to create a ‘complete and consistent set of ultimate 
sacred proposition that would be recorded for all to see’ failed due to its 
inability to intuitively catch on. Forty years earlier, Kurt Gödel had formally 
proven the impossibility of constructing a complete set of unambiguous 
propositions: for propositions to be taken as true in the ultimate sense, they 
must be believed without questions. To invite people to examine statements 
on tape undercut that possibility.45
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The f irst inkling that the ambition to realize collective perception at a 
larger scale might actually be possible came in the form of the f irst outline 
of Ryan’s Earthscore Notational System – a model that would be continuously 
developed during the years to come: in 1985-86 it formed the basis for Ryan’s 
Ecochannel Design for a television-monitoring project. Again, water was 
key. Water functioned as a sort of priming material, a means through which 
Ryan would f irst attempt to integrate video into his own perceptual system. 
During a prolonged stay in the Shawangunk Mountains, he spent much 
of his time in a nearby stream with a video camera strapped to his body, 
training himself to do continuous half-hour taping without stopping. He 
would subsequently watch the recorded interactions of the water patterns 
and his own bodily movements over and over until he could recreate them 
as events in his mind without watching the videotape.46
The result of this intensive discipline was a non-verbal catalogue of be-
havioural patterns: ‘bubbles-foam, drops, sheets (stretching between edges, 
bent over edges), folds in sheets, water channelling through rock, water 
poured from rock, poured water capturing drops, rushing water split by 
rock, rushing water fantailing over impediment, water splashing on water, 
water splashing on rock, rushing water curled back on itself, raindrops on 
water. These patterns were actually what biologist C. H. Waddington called 
chreods or ‘necessary pathways’ – the specif ic ways in which life systems 
fig. 6.1: paul ryan, video stills from Earthscore: Bronx Falls, 1989. courtesy of Jean gardner.
fig. 6.2: paul ryan, video stills from Earthscore : Nature in New York City, 1989. courtesy of Jean 
gardner.
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deal with discontinuous phenomena or the events that occur when an 
equilibrium is broken.47
A more formal understanding of the emergence of such patterns was 
introduced with mathematician René Thom’s catastrophe theory, a topo-
logical modelling of the four dimensions that supports any equilibrium 
surface and hence also any rupture of the equilibrium. Thom had shown 
that there are only seven possible forms of discontinuities or catastrophes 
in nature. For Ryan, who was suff iciently enthusiastic about Thom to send 
him a nervous letter of appreciation alongside the paperback version of his 
1974 book Cybernetics of the Sacred, these rupture forms might be seen as 
a set of elementary notes that made it possible to see nature as an evolv-
ing musical score that could be instantly understood ‒ if, like a musically 
educated person, you knew the notational system.48 In this context, water 
was not just a key symbol of crisis but a pedagogical object that allowed 
you to learn a new sign system.49 While numerous catastrophe patterns 
are too slow or too quick for the human eye, water flow – now allied with 
signal f low ‒ allowed you to learn natural change patterns at the speed 
of televisual events. It is, of course, of some signif icance that many of the 
water patterns caught on Ryan’s tape have superf icial visual resemblance 
with the live video feedback patterns running non-stop on Skip Sweeney’s 
page on the Video Free America website.50 Water was, in other words, the 
strategic gateway to video’s ecoactivism, the telegenic mediator through 
which it asserted its basic alliance with life.
Individual readings of the score of water patterns or other natural phe-
nomena would not be of much use, however: they would be too random 
and biased, not suff iciently reflective of the individual’s own position in 
relation to the course of events. This is why Earthscore was formulated as 
an ambitious organizational project – a method for systematically sharing 
the intuitions and perceptions in nature and of nature. Ryan imagined 
three-person teams of videographers who would constantly broadcast from 
a select number of natural locations: an early idea for a channel named W 
(Your Wire to the Watershed) was supplanted by the more general Ecochannel 
design.51 Over time, the video teams would pick up behavioural patterns 
or chreods of the individual ecosystems: the identif ication of such chreods 
would produce an intuitive notational system through which to interpret an 
emergent natural world in real time. As notational systems go, Earthscore 
was essentially a perceptual syntax: the whole point was to facilitate a 
veritable ‘orchestration’ of perceptions, so that a collective of TV viewers 
would start to intuitively see and feel both regularities and critical changes 
in the environment.
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If the project depended on TV’s capacity to transmit real-time events, 
it would also transform broadcasting in fundamental ways. The key to the 
project’s difference lay in the design of the camera teams. Ryan’s insist-
ence on the three-person team model had to do with his effort to install a 
dynamics of emergence at every possible level of operation. If the viewers 
were to actually share and act on the percepts of nature, and not just pas-
sively consume representations of natural sites, the very production of 
video images would have to be ecological through and through. It had to be 
systematically diverted from the simply subjective point of view, become 
part of ‘inhuman nature’ itself. It had, in other words, to be connected to 
the feedback systems that characterize all life or, more precisely, nature’s 
own way of communicating with itself. Even if the feedback possibilities 
of video technologies might attest to their general complicity with life 
systems, an institutionalized usage of video could easily just slide back 
into the superf icial attachment to the present seen in most broadcasting. 
Hence dynamic feedback processes would have to be extended to the level 
of social organization as well, and to this end Ryan drew on yet another 
formal model. The three-person camera teams were above all a means 
to work in terms of the relational or triadic logic of mathematician and 
philosopher C.S. Peirce – i.e. a logic that is not based on a set of axioms but 
on the divisions and definitions that characterize the functioning of signs 
and that pertains to the performance of actual entities in the real world.
Any such real-world action is seen in terms of the relations between a 
f irst set of immediate perceptions or expressions, the reaction or resistance 
they provoke, and, f inally, the principles or rules that govern the relation 
between the f irst and the second moment; this understanding functions 
as a guide to future behaviour and may itself become a new f irst-level 
phenomenon. This process of constantly shifting perspectivation was a key 
to all understanding of nature – hence it seemed sensible to use the shifting 
relations and perspectives that necessarily emerge in groups of three as 
a point of departure for producing perceptions. Once a specif ic natural 
fig. 6.3: paul ryan, video stills from Triadic Tapes, 1975. courtesy of Jean gardner.
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site would be repeatedly recorded in terms of different takes on f irstness, 
secondness, and thirdness and organized in rhythmically alternating pat-
terns, the combined perceptual result would take on a form of facticity and 
independence that would also be a measure of its potential for sharing.52
While Peirce provided the logical foundation, a more direct inspiration 
came from Warren McCulloch’s late intuitions that his binary ‘computer 
model’ of brain functions was missing something essential about living 
entities – from the neuronal level and up:
The problem I am up against is the problem of organization of many 
components, each of which is a living thing, each of which, in some sense, 
senses the world, each of which tells the others what it has sensed, and 
somehow a couple of million of these cells get themselves organized 
enough to commit the whole organism. We do not have any theory yet 
that is capable of handling such a structure. 53
McCulloch’s efforts to conceptualize a ‘calculus of intention’ based on a 
triadic relationship caught the imagination of Ryan as well Avery Johnson, 
who spun this idea over several articles in Radical Software. If McCulloch 
had ultimately left it to ‘the youngsters’ to recognize the possible answers 
to this problem, Johnson and Ryan doubted that he would ‘have expected 
a relational calculus to reduce happily to words on paper, with or without 
diagrams’. ‘He would’, as Johnson conf idently stated, ‘more likely have 
turned to videotape with its facility for infolding and self-reference as the 
appropriate medium for thinking and teaching about it’.54 As a non-scientist, 
Ryan was consistently modest about his ability to work with these problems 
on a mathematical level. But, with additional inspiration from Thom’s topol-
ogy, McCulloch’s intuitions seemed to justify allowing video to become the 
super-ambitious mediator through which the ‘problem of organization of 
many components, each of which is a living thing’ could be taken from 
the neuronal level to the social level. Only in this way could ‘perceptual 
imperialists’ like CBS anchorman Walter Cronkite be effectively challenged 
in their top-down handling of crisis information.55 Only in this way would 
the Earthscore Notational System and its alternative broadcasting networks 
function as a truly ‘relational circuit’ – Ryan’s term for the implementation 
of ecological modelling at every possible level of organization. The rather 
complicated triadic production procedures were, in Ryan’s view, ‘a short 
cut to ecological sanity by way of aesthetics’: knowledge about possible 
damages to the ecosystem would no longer be disembodied facts hurled at 
one by specialists and activists or more or less convincing representations 
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of catastrophic ‘realities’. They would be the actions and reactions of a 
shared sensorial apparatus that did at least have a shot at connecting with 
the actual complexity of living systems in general. Once they were properly 
perceptually integrated and shared, subtle but symptomatic changes in 
water flows, plant growth, or spawning behaviour might become as much 
of a conversation piece as a sudden hailstorm and perhaps also generate 
as much hurried action.
Postscript to a failed movement
It was perhaps an ambition doomed to fail. For one thing, the level of practi-
cal organization demanded was just mind-blowing. Preliminary studies by 
Ryan may well have demonstrated the feasibility of organizing perception 
according to the triadic logic of relations: in the 1989 Nature in New York City, 
six-second passages of shifting relational positions alternate rhythmically in 
the production of each of the four chosen urban spots. Instant impressions 
of phenomena like horseshoe crabs laying eggs or a dismal clay pit pond 
surrounded by trees, grass, and abandoned cars alternate with more precise 
encounters with the concrete details of their complicated existence and 
the overarching rules or patterns that characterize such behaviours and 
habitats. More than anything, these recordings attest to the way in which 
video seemed to quicken Ryan’s unique sensitivity to the rich confluence of 
psychological, social, and political registers that inform any environment. 
Yet no teams of three were actually involved in these productions, and 
Ryan’s vision of the wider organizational context of such teamwork certainly 
never came to fruition. For Earthscore was notably also imagined as the 
blueprint for a more encompassing community project in which each one of 
a total of thirty-six video makers would be part of three different triads: one 
occupied with caring for community members, one with f inding economic 
support, and the third with producing video. A monastic system, more or 
less, conceived on the ruins of Ryan’s three-year-long effort to develop a 
video community with Steven Kolpan and Robert Schuler ‒ a project in 
which a ‘stabilized repertoire of triadic behavioural patterns’ and a ‘triadic 
decision-making process’ had not yet been established.
But also, as Ryan dryly notes, the money ran out. Following the 1969 
budget expansion from two to twenty million dollars, The New York State 
Council on the Arts started supporting the entire video scene ‒ alongside 
numerous social change advocates who rubbed shoulders with artists in 
competing for funding from this welfare-state-type institution. But in 
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1976, support for Ryan’s work on video and nature dried out, and with it, 
apparently, the most openly organizational ambitions of video. Ryan soon 
conceded that his understanding of how to use video to interpret ecological 
systems was now so formalized it could be accomplished directly in the 
world of work, where it would no doubt have to negotiate numerous other 
economies and feedback circuits.56 In addition, in a situation in which 
activist projects – community cable projects, alternative TV ‒ often received 
both sympathy and funding, the project may have failed to hit the general 
political imagination. Given the ever-more monolithic channelling of TV 
perception into the feedback loops of entertainment capital, the concept of 
a video-based perceptual collective may have come across as a particularly 
high-minded form of utopianism. Attention was mainly understood in 
terms of an economy of scarcity – mental time measured in clock hours of 
leisure time ‒ and the battle over mental time access seemed decided in 
advance. A project built around precisely the type of aesthetic attachment 
to the real-time apparatus that was also the driving force of capitalist media 
did not have much political leverage. It simply did not gel with the guerrilla 
tactics of much of the 1970s counterculture – attacking institutions and 
corporations at the macro level, feeding off antagonisms.57
Today, however, Earthscore’s mode of action and reflection (if not its 
technical and organizational solutions) may seem less quixotic. As ‘Kyoto’ 
and ‘Copenhagen’ have become depressing shorthand for the failure to 
produce political and legal consensus on eff icient environmental action, 
thinkers as different as Gernot Böhme and Bruno Latour have argued for 
the need for increased aesthetic and perceptual sensitization to the issues 
at stake: facts need feelings in order to mobilize, atmospheres in which to 
expand.58 And today we know, for better and for worse, the technologies 
of tracking and coordinating the most microscopic sensibilities, the ‘likes’ 
and ‘dislikes’ that make up vast intuitive communities. No political theorist 
in her right mind would today fail to take into account the tangible real-
ity of these volatile clouds of psychological attachments and the various 
environmental systems they belong to.
Yet, by the same token, the very concept of media ecology – highlighting 
feedback loops between technical systems and life systems – no longer 
presents itself as an alternative to the dominant understanding of real-time 
technologies and their modes of disciplining and organizing. The recursive 
processes of invention and emergence that result from the messy associa-
tions across separate domains of sensing, knowing, and doing are at the 
heart of today’s electronic networks.59 As demonstrated through the wide 
selection of examples in Matthew Fuller and Andrew Goffey’s Evil Media, 
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entirely new forms of political awareness and strategizing are needed in 
order to maintain degrees of freedom and self-determination within a 
diffuse or ‘gray’ realm of databases, group-work software, project-planning 
groups, or other discreetly participatory media that access habits, passions, 
and relations on a large scale.60 In short, all this means that the specific force 
and meaning of video’s association with life-as-memory was a function of 
a precise historical situation: one in which capital still appeared to be on 
the side of mass production and the task of making life one-dimensional, 
serial, and manageable. Capitalist real time media – television – seemed 
to prove the point by reducing time and memory to an eternal present, a 
non-genetic quasi-life that was easily equated with passivity and death.
With hindsight, it is easy to see how the emergent information economy 
of the 1960s opened towards a far more variegated exploitation of life forces. 
And the Modular Video Matrix that Frank Gillette, Ira Schneider, Paul Ryan, 
and John Riley designed in 1969 for the American Can Company might 
also have provoked some intuitions about this, given the way in which it 
confronted them with the need for strict control over feedback software. 
This elegant assembly of 56 Plexiglas-encased monitors and stainless steel 
supports provided all the positive feedback opportunities of Gillette and 
Schneider’s groundbreaking Wipe Cycle: camera input for live presenta-
tion or playback and programming for mixing live, delayed, and pre-taped 
materials. Yet, since American Can had decided that the software should 
be assembled by the more commercially oriented multi-media company 
Harvey Lloyd Productions, the ecological circuit in operation at industrial 
trade shows essentially just added a bit more ‘life’ to a commodity and its 
most obvious apparatus of production and distribution. In the word of the 
disappointed designers, it ‘consisted mainly of bald-headed men touting 
American Can products intermixed with men (live camera) gawking at 
cheesecake hostesses’.61 Video life was, in itself, neither good nor bad: as 
Gregory Bateson had pointed out, ‘there is an ecology of bad ideas, just as 
there is an ecology of weeds’.62
Even so, to Paul Ryan and his collaborators in Radical Software, video 
presented itself – against media capital ‒ as a set of affordances in which 
life was def ined as ‘variety and diversity, quality not quantity, differences 
that make differences’.63 In this context, video was attributed with con-
siderable, almost limitless powers and a level of generality that belied its 
extremely specif ic technical and material foundations. Not only would 
video apparently help sorting out mathematical problems of the highest 
order, it was the exemplary instance of a ‘technological life form’ – a strange 
composite being that drew its powers from making directly accessible, as 
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processes, the generative dynamics of physical, perceptual/psychological, 
and social/distributive systems. Hence it f igured as the key to harnessing 
collective powers of invention that would operate across domains that 
modern science and culture had artif icially separated. For a brief moment, 
the ‘living force’ that was video held the stage as the most convincing 
facilitator of complex, reflexive continuities between one form of material 
life and another. Contra the presumed institutional strictures of off icial 
television and media capital, it seemed to promise that social memory 
would not be at the service of pre-formatting and serializing identity but of 
diversifying life. Hence, video staged itself as a biopolitical agent well before 
it emerged as an instance of modern biopower in general.64 And during 
this brief moment in the activist limelight, when real-time technology f irst 
met real-world crisis, video was the name for a distinct effort to rethink 
social dynamics from the ground up ‒ so as to transform the very notion 
of political action.
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concepts of chaos theory and those found in the electronic avant-garde’.
10. In 1970, mathematician John Horton Conway devised the cellular automa-
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the sense that its evolution is determined by its initial state and requires no 
further input.
11. In video feedback, Crutchfield found a dissipative dynamical system – i.e. a 
system in which the energy flowing through its various interacting com-
ponents is lost to microscopic degrees of freedom. This involves a spatial 
interpretation of the system’s temporal behaviour, meaning that its time-
dependent behaviour is best described in terms of state space, in which 
the temporal evolution of the system is defined as a trajectory through a 
sequence of points in the state space. Crutchfield’s discovery was that at 
certain control settings, true unpredictability (temporally aperiodic image 
sequences) emerged. Importantly, such aperiodicity was not just temporal 
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ways. This feature, which made video different from other systems with 
complex dynamics such as chaotic nonlinear oscillators, might put you 
on the track of a theoretical understanding of the complex dynamics of a 
natural world. Crutchfield, pp. 229-245.
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(Latour 2005: 43-62).
18. As Wendy Chun (2011: 137-174) has shown, early computer theory produced 
a conflation of the concepts of storage and memory, thanks to a certain 
level of disregard for the material substratum of both computers and neu-
ronal operation. Warren McCulloch and Walter H. Pitt describe neuronal 
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in order to account for the capacity of the machine to store the numbers 
and functions necessary for computing. The effect was that the concept of 
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from the contingencies of the material world (including the contingencies 
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to read and write values, and this is the simple reason why the digital para-
digm reinterprets memory as storage. Hence, the dynamic and regenera-
tive dimension of memory was suppressed in favour of a mode of thinking 
preoccupied with the safekeeping of a stabilized stock of pure information, 
reinforced by the constant references to more permanent archival media 
such as documents, files, and folders. 
19. Ernst, 2013, p. 100.
20. Viola, p. 125.
21. TV early on associated with aquatic life: in the many non-commercial 
channels of early European television, the concept of infinite contentless 
presence was often buttressed by showing close-up views of aquarium 
fish swimming around. One of Nam June Paik’s early actions was to set 
up closed circuit feeds between fish tanks and monitors, displaying not 
presence as such but the ecological systems at the heart of the televisual 
networks (see for instance Video Fish, 1975). Over the years, Paik played this 
ecological metaphor to the hilt, with TV sets hung from the ceiling as live 
electronic skies or placed like shimmering flowers in lush garden environ-
ments (see TV Garden, 1974 and Fish Flies on Sky, 1985). In Liberation Sonata 
for Fish, performed during Charlotte Moorman’s 1969 Avant Garde Festival, 
Paik distributed envelopes filled with tiny dried anchovies that were to be 
returned to the sea. The fish were presumably to take on new forms of life at 
the behest of random mediators.
22. Brodey, pp. 34-36.
23. In ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’, Walter Ben-
jamin famously associates cinema with distracted reception (but with a 
revolutionary potential); Irwin Thompson for his part saw television as 
producing a present without memory. 
24. Crary, 2001, pp. 11-79.
25. Paul Ryan, 1992, p. 120. Not incidentally, this collection of text from Ryan’s 
long publication career is ‘dedicated to the waters of planet earth’ and 
focuses specifically on the video/water relation explored in his early video 
exercises as well as a number of later works such as Coast of Cape Ann 
(1985), Ecochannel Design (1985-86), Five Waterfalls (1988-89), and Nature in 
New York City (1989).
26. Guattari, p. 135.
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27. Guattari’s call for a mode of thinking that no longer accepts that ‘action on 
the environment, the psyche and the socius’ must be separate is very much 
in accordance with the concept of ecological operation associated with 
video, particularly through the work of Paul Ryan and Frank Gillette (Guat-
tari 1989: 134). 
28. Cavell, pp. 192-218. See also Doane.
29. Deleuze and Guattari, pp. 163-168.
30. Similar questions related to monitoring nature emerge in a number of other 
works by Gillette. Key examples include Track/Trace, Tetragrammaton, Sub-
terranean Field, Terraque, and Gestation Growth – all constructed for his 1973 
exhibition Video: Process and Meta-Process at the Everson Museum of Art 
in Syracuse, New York. Each presents variations on the combination of live 
video technologies and living systems (human or animal) installed in the 
exhibition spaces, each expose different temporal ecologies and produce 
specific technical/natural permutations. A final monitoring work named 
Integration Matrix remixes information from all the different ecologies on 
ten monitors for a more intensive comparison. 
31. The vol. II no. 5 issue of Radical Software, devoted to the theme Video and 
Environment, documents Gillette’s Syracuse exhibition of that year and also 
includes several of Gillette and Schneider’s individual designs for feedback 
video environments. It is interesting to note, however, that the issue is 
actually not significantly more focused on the environmental dimensions 
of video than a number of the other issues: environmental themes in every 
sense of the word run through the journal project as a whole.
32. Morton, 2007. 
33. In the text part of Frank Gillette’s 1973 book Between Paradigms: The Mood 
and its Purpose, the critique of historical thinking is a key point, particularly 
to the extent that historical thinking predicates the future on a ‘preserva-
tion of the precedent’, a fixated, archived past. In such a system, prior 
patterns of identity impose themselves on the elusive swarm of unfixed 
data experienced in the present. As an alternative to this model of thinking, 
Gillette enjoins us to see that ‘the history of a thing is the demonstration 
of its impermanence’. He wants a ‘model of no-model’ in which the future 
resides in the present (Gillette 1973: 4-6, 11, 13, 17).
34. ‘So without attention, no sensation … now what is attention? One can 
answer that it is an effort that aims at the specification of a nascent sensa-
tion. But it should be noted that the effort, in its psychological guise and 
abstracting from the concomitant muscular action, is a desire’. Gabriel 
Tarde (1895) quoted in Lazzarato 2006: 185.
35. Gillette, 1973, p. 2.
36. Wolfgang Ernst (2012: 223-227) has underscored the media-archaeological 
significance of the various synchronization processes in television systems: 
they teach us that what happens in the TV image is always a microtemporal 
media event subjected to strict and always critical negentropic processes. 
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37. On a different level, such perspectives might find additional inspiration 
from the research on what Laura U. Marks (161-176) calls the ‘herd behav-
iour’ of electrons: quantum physics has shown that the behaviour of a 
single electron may in fact be seen as a function of its entanglement with 
the other electrons joined with it in a common wave (if one electron moves, 
it affects all the others). It is, in fact, this collective behaviour that makes 
it possible to understand how electrons ‘remember’ – i.e. how they are 
able to actually act across time and space. Marks draws on David Bohm’s 
development of Louis de Broglies’ pilot wave theory in which Bohm argues 
that a single electron is a member of a whole of many electrons joined on a 
common wave. Each electron on a given wavelength has the wave function 
encoded into it. It remembers where it came from and thus remains linked 
to other electrons sharing the same wave even when they are physically 
distant. This means that the photons of sunlight that warm our faces are 
physically connected to the star that emitted them, arriving on a common 
wave.
38. Memetics was only popularized in the years after the publication of Richard 
Dawkins’ The Selfish Gene (1976). The modern memetics movement dates 
from the mid-1980s onwards and was significantly reinforced by the publi-
cation of Daniel Dennet’s Consciousness Explained (1991).
39. Gillette, 1973, p. 29.
40. Tarde, 1969, pp. 177-208, and Tarde, 1899.
41. The differences between Tarde’s theory of imitation and neo-Darwinist 
memetics is discussed in Schmid, 103-118. See also Sampson.
42. The ZAP in ‘zapping’ may be a reference to the underground comix maga-
zine ZAP that was part of the youth counterculture of the late 1960s.
43. Frank Gillette, 1976, p. 219.
44. An excerpt from the tape was published as ‘Video Wake for my Father’ in 
Ryan, 1974, pp. 69-90.
45. Ryan, 1993, pp. 53 and 77. See also Ryan, 2011.
46. Ibid., pp. 53-54.
47. The 2001 text ‘The Earthscore Notational System’, (at www.earthscore.org) is 
one among many where Ryan credits Waddington as a source of inspiration 
for his Earthscore project. 
48. Paul Ryan, Letter to René Thom, 7 August 1974 (Paul Ryan holdings, Smith-
sonian Archive.) Cybernetics of the Sacred includes numerous references to 
the work of Thom.
49. ‘In my work as a video artist, I have repeatedly returned to moving water as 
the richest single source for developing a vocabulary of ‘chreods’ in nature 
… In 1975, I spent a year recording over thirty-five chreods on videotape at 
the waterfall in High Falls, New York.’ (Ryan 1993: 390). The 1988-89 video 
work Five Waterfalls can be seen as a repetition and renewal of this study. 
50. http://videofreeamerica.com/site/category/skip-sweeney.
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51. In 1978, Paul Ryan was invited by Roy Skodnick, director of the Passaic Valley 
Video Project, to do work on the Passaic Watershed and its flood problems 
– the subject of numerous official reports so as to meet flood control needs. 
The contradictory information provided by these reports (due to scientific 
disagreement about what constitutes environmental destruction) had con-
sistently halted political action and the production of feasible and publicly 
acceptable plans. As a response, Ryan produced the concept of a Watershed 
Watch based on video monitoring: this would produce shared perceptions of 
water patterns that would in turn form the basis for political consensus and 
plans of action. The Channel W would enable such shared perception among 
the 2.4 million inhabitants of the Passaic Watershed area. According to Ryan, 
‘it would not be designed to compete with other channels but would be 
shaped for a second, “background” television set that would provide images 
of the watershed at all hours of the day like a painting on the wall, and to be 
focused on when watershed issues are hot.’ (Ryan 1993: 159-164, 165).
52. The concept of three-way communication was equally important to other 
Radical Software associates such as Juan Downey. The vol. II, no. 5 issue 
includes his 1972 design for a 3-way comunication (sic) event using voice 
transmission laser beams and super-8 movie projections as well as video 
recording. 
53. Warren McCulloch, Communication: Theory and Research quoted in Paul 
Ryan 1974: 49-50. The essay was originally part II of the article ‘Cybernetic 
Guerrilla Warfare’ that Ryan published in Radical Software vol. 1, no.3, 1971.
54. Avery Johnson, pp. 10-11. Johnson was close to McCulloch through his work 
at the MIT neurophysiology lab in the 1950s and 60s. (After 1951, McCulloch 
was associated with the Research Laboratory of Electronics at MIT, doing 
research on spinal cord physiology). As a graduate student, Johnson con-
tributed research to several papers produced by McCulloch and his team of 
researchers. 
55. ‘We laughed our heads off digging each other’s tape while the old percep-
tual imperialist Walter Cronkite explained Earth Day to us’. Ryan, 1971.
56. Ryan, 1993, pp. 59, 319-321. 
57. Ryan (1971) was highly aware of these differences: in his view, cybernetic 
strategy could learn from the guerrilla tactics of relying on the irregular and 
non-repetitive, but he wanted to provide an alternative to the ‘film scenario 
of the NYC urban guerrilla warfare “Ice”: Using machine guns to round up 
people in an apartment house for a revolutionary teach-in is not what the 
information environment is about. All power does not proceed from the 
end of a gun.’ 
58. Böhme, 1995 and Latour, 2004.
59. Fuller (2005) provides a series of in-depth case studies of such ecologies. On 
a more general level, Felix Guattari’s concept of ecology is key to this mode 
of thinking 
60. Fuller and Goffey.
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61. ‘Modular Video Matrix,’ uncredited. Radical Software vol. 2, no. 5, 1973, pp. 
18-19.
62. Bateson, quoted in Guattari, p. 131. 
63. Ryan, 1971b. In this text, capitalism is essentially contrasted with the ecolo-
gies information machines.
64. The distinction between biopower and biopolitics does not just hinge on 
the distinction between a general harnessing of life powers and a specific 
conjunction between economy (the government of the family) and politics 
(the government of the polis). As Lazzarato (2002: 112-25) has pointed out, 
Foucault’s concept of biopolitics indicates an ontological shift that breaks 
with the concept of political economy and its privileging of the capital/
labour relation and that instead concerns itself with the whole range of 
relations between forces that run through the social body. Hence biopolitics 
cannot be understood as the capacity to legitimize sovereignty but con-
stantly targets powers that do not properly belong to it, that always come 
from some outside. 
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 Chapter Seven
FileLife: Constant, Kurenniemi, and the Question of Living 
Archives
Eivind Røssaak
The archive has increasingly come to be understood as a cultural paradigm, 
transfiguring notions of collective memory and the complexities of historical and 
temporal processes.
– Geoff Cox, Michael Murtaugh, and Nicolas Malevé1
Archives are never neutral. They are dynamic spaces of knowledge and 
power, never passive, always active. However, most archives tend to hide 
their shaping and transforming role. As they enter the digital age, this role is 
reinforced by machine operations that have their own realm of invisibility. 
With the implementation of computation and digital f iles, documents are 
not only readable but also writable and executable. Archival documents 
have become new media, and the routines and standards subtending them 
have become techno-logical. I will explore this problem through a study 
of the Belgian art and media group Constant and its engagement with the 
f ile/life of the Finnish artist-engineer and composer Erkki Kurenniemi. 
Constant foregrounds the digital life of an archive by practicing what it calls 
an ‘active archive’. Unlike most online archive initiatives Constant places 
emphasis on the generative and active part of making an archive come 
alive.2 They do not primarily make the archival f iles more easily accessible 
but carry out an ‘active forensics’, as it calls it, on the f iles.3 Etymologically 
speaking, ‘forensics’ comes from the word ‘forum’ and deals with how to 
demonstrate an argument before a court by examining its various parts. 
Constant reveals how ‘an archive is in a permanent state of mediality, 
always in temporality, always re-writing itself’ by intervening directly in 
the computational regimes that govern the arrangement and accessibil-
ity of the archived f iles.4 This implies adapting Foucault’s concept of the 
‘archive’ for a new media age. Foucault separates ‘archives’ (in plural) ‒as 
physical places one can visit ‒from ‘the archive’ (in singular) as pertaining 
to general rules regulating the visible and the articulable or what is seeable 
and sayable. While Foucault never addressed digital archives, his distinction 
is still useful. Media archaeologists like Wolfgang Ernst have argued that 
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with the advent of codes and computer algorithms as the new arché or 
command system of knowledge, we have to reload Foucault’s archaeology 
of knowledge for a new age.5 We need to look into how computation and 
digital f iles have intervened in the rules governing knowledge. This is where 
Constant ’s practice is instrumental. The group does not simply open up the 
holdings of an archive (what it says and shows) but tries to engage with the 
codes and algorithms or the arché itself of the archive with what constrains 
the sayable and visible in a digital age. Furthermore, Constant makes ac-
cessible this archival infrastructure for its user as a new mode of sharing 
the archive. It focuses on the new dynamics or life of some of the smallest 
items of prosthetic memory, codes and f iles, on how they are constructed, 
transformed, and connect to other f iles. This is the life of f iles – or what 
I call f ilelife, a phenomenon rendered tangible in Constant’s operations. 
Their approach seems to lay the ground for new ways of conceptualizing 
social memory, provoking a set of questions that may benefit from insights 
concerning the life and agency of objects in actor-network theory as well 
as philosophical and media-theoretical investigations of the concept of 
life itself.
I will focus on Constant ’s take on Erkki Kurenniemi, whose work was to 
a large extent premised on the idea of the extended life of f iles. More pre-
cisely, Kurenniemi set out to create an archive of his own life for a possible 
artif icial life resurrection in the future. While Kurenniemi was oriented 
toward the question of new life forms based on compiling archival materials 
in a variety of media forms, Constant cares more about the infrastructure 
of these f iles – their technical and social prof ile. To assess what I call the 
social prof ile of f iles, one needs to explore how the f iles are constructed 
and shared. Moving from a traditional archival f ile (Akten in German, or 
acts) to a digital f ile implies nothing less than a technological revolution 
relating to many of the issues familiar from the media discourse on the 
transition from old to new media. But what does this transition imply 
from the perspective of social memory, which is traditionally formulated 
around the concept of the relative stability or repeatability of the objects and 
frameworks that attest to a communal past? The digital f ile implies a new 
temporal dynamism in the archive, with constant updates, regenerations, 
and affordances forging new connections and associations.
I will follow some of the strategies of Constant that reveal how this 
new dynamism expresses itself through a constellation of technical and 
human agencies, generating what I will call a memory network. Here 
the network does not simply refer to the digital infrastructure through 
which f iles are generated, stored, and transmitted; the sense of a network 
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is indeed implemented in the construction of the single f ile as well. My 
approach takes its cue from Bruno Latour’s concept of decomposition and 
his emphasis on ‘The … many folds [of a f ile that] become visible as soon as 
one moves a bit closer to where agencies are made to express themselves.’6 
One decomposes the f ile to better assess the network of forces constituting 
its operations. Such forces or agencies may be seen as key components in a 
reformulated understanding of social memory. Now, it goes without saying, 
social memory is always technical in some sense. However, we need to 
make a distinction between a concept of social memory informed by rela-
tively stable materials (paper-based archives, for instance) and a concept 
of memory informed by temporalizing technologies (electronic/digital 
archives) – i.e. technologies that produce time as difference (events). To the 
extent that the latter seems to foreground a concept of social memory based 
on constant mobilization, it may also make us question representational 
approaches to the social as such. Following Latour, it would appear that the 
social is less a special thing or substance than new events of association 
and connection.
Constant creates a laboratory where these temporalizing technicalities 
are more precisely delimited and reimagined: the more emphasis it places 
on the specif ic features of technical performance, the more it reveals the 
social dimensions of the technologies in question. In other words, here, 
social memory must be understood in terms of events of association that 
include human and non-human capacities alike. I will investigate how such 
interaction may express itself in the context of an archival practice based 
on algorithmic operations – i.e. on the techno-mathematical language of 
commands and machine performance.
The life log
Files and their relation to potential life was a key concern for Erkki Kuren-
niemi. During the 1960s, he was mostly known in Scandinavia as a maker of 
experimental f ilms and music and as an inventor of electronic instruments 
and synthesizers. It was only later that it became widely known that he also 
obsessively documented his everyday activities: From about 1970 until 2006, 
when he fell ill, he collected vast amounts of audio-visual-textual material 
to make what he calls a digital ‘backup’ of his life ‘in the belief that in f ifty 
years at the latest they can be downloaded onto a pocket computer and be 
reanimated.’7
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It is diff icult to say exactly when Kurenniemi started the archive project. 
However, there are scattered thoughts on memory and documentation in 
his notes, cassettes, and diaries going back to the early 1970s, where he 
refers to a particular memory system. In a cassette recording from 1971 
he says:
I have it in my bag with me. I feel like I’m getting all stuck in my ways, 
getting all pedantic and reclusive. Hahaha, fantastic, this. Mm, get-
ting more organized by the day. I’m not cleaning or anything, no… 
It’s about systems. Organizing the suitcase, having an assigned place 
for everything in there. Recorder on the left, a slide rule behind it, a 
microphone in front and empty, f illed-up cigarette cases to be placed 
on the mantelpiece when I get home. Some A4 material upright on the 
right side. Lost ones on the bottom, current ones on top, topmost. A 
book, some tissues, and a box for cards. A case for f ilm, photographic 
f ilm, that with small modif ications turned out to work great as storage 
for the small cards, about a hundred of them that otherwise f ill my 
pockets. There’s a system for the cards, different colours: white for long 
term memory, yellow for short-, short term memory, blue for projects, 
red for components and so forth… or something. That last one, at least, 
isn’t quite clear yet.8
He kept the memory cards in small f iling cabinet-boxes. Some of the memory 
cards contain mind maps, and a signif icant one dated 28/7/1972 includes 
an indexed inventory of the early cassette recordings (see f igure 1). They 
are mostly classif ied according to time and place. Some of them have more 
elaborate and idiosyncratic explanations. He seems to have recorded many 
of his cassettes while driving his car. Some of them have annotations like: 
‘driving [my car] in the night, [on the road] Viitamaa, Helsinki’. In another, 
the speed is also indicated: ‘100km/h’. Some are also more crypto-poetical, 
‘The dream of Sahara’ (Saharan Uni).
His life archive project transformed both his way of life and a certain 
notion of life itself on a more general level. His own life became an experi-
mental surface for recording devices. The archive was not something he 
created during his spare time. Rather, he let a wide variety of recording 
media‒both analogue and, after the mid-1980s, digital (from the diary to the 
cassette recorder, f ilm, and photography as well as a variety of classif ication 
systems) – become an integrated part of his daily life, whether he was alone 
or among friends. He even felt ‘stuck’, as he says, in his own recording and 
classif ications apparatus.
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Furthermore, his archival project seems to be an experimental aspect of 
a more general fascination for research into new modes or notions of life 
and collectivity. Intellectually, he was deeply enthused by science f iction, 
cybernetics, and the unresolved problems of contemporary mathematics. 
He lived through a period of revolutions within science and technology, 
such as the emergence of the computer, artif icial intelligence, biotechnol-
ogy, the human genome project, and the Internet. He was aware of the 
writings of scholars such as Vannevar Bush, J.C.R. Licklider, Ted Nelson, 
Alan Key and Ray Kurzweil who developed and questioned the creative 
and co-evolutionary capacities of computation, memory, and knowledge, 
and he subscribed to the journal Systems, Man, and Cybernetics published 
by the Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). A com-
mon denominator for many of these interests is the gradual breaching of 
the distinctions between life and machines or what has been called the 
informatization of life principles.9
As Eugene Thacker has concluded in an overview of these tendencies, our 
notions of life underwent important changes during these post-war decades: 
‘the advances in genetic engineering and artif icial life have, in different 
ways, deconstructed the idea that life is exclusively natural or biological.’10 
This tendency in the sciences is crucial for understanding Kurenniemi’s 
idea that an archive of f iles or information about a life as it is lived can 
actually also be or become a life form. He therefore explored many models 
for the continuation of life by other means. In his article ‘Relative Life’, he 
discusses the possibilities of f inding the mathematical formula of life, and 
he seems inspired by the cybernetic dream, once mentioned by Norbert 
Wiener, that it would be theoretically possible to send human beings ‘over 
a telegraph line’ as information.11 He was always interested in what he 
calls research into ‘the giant brain or electronic brain.’ The f irst electronic, 
fig. 7.1: Kurenniemi’s index cards. courtesy of Erkki Kurenniemi’s archive, finnish national gallery. 
photo: ainur nasretdin.
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general purpose computer, ENIAC, was launched in 1946 as a ‘giant brain’. It 
had a speed of one thousand times that of electro-mechanical machines, and 
as the speed of such machines would continue to increase exponentially, 
future computers ‘can be programmed with the entirety of our conscious-
ness and emotional substance,’ Kurenniemi thought.12 Furthermore, he 
argued that life should, for practical and ecological reasons, be continued 
artif icially and computationally rather than genetically. The fusion of life 
and information runs as a leitmotif throughout his argument and vision: ‘all 
these things [consciousness, character, identity] we used to connect with 
a biological living entity – and especially the human – are found out to be 
universal and independent of the underlying material’ and ‘we can transfer 
our consciousnesses [sic] and minds and personalities onto computers’. 13 His 
own life archive seems to be an integrated experiment into this possibility:
If cryogenics and reanimation can’t be attained biologically, there’s this 
other possibility: you store the mind and consciousness as bytes and, even 
though we don’t yet have a quantum computer which could allow the 
consciousness to continue living, then it at least makes sense to make a 
backup by registering everything from images and sounds and thoughts 
and burn them on a CD and rest in the belief that in f ifty years at the latest 
they can be downloaded onto a pocket computer and be reanimated.14
Kurenniemi translates the discourses of cybernetics and life sciences into 
an experimental self-archiving fantasy where the passage from life to 
information is believed to culminate in a from-information-to-life option. 
Furthermore, it seems that he saw his own experiment as a preemptive 
attempt at testing out a situation that all of humanity will have to face 
in the future. He calls our time the age of ‘the Great Transcription’.15 This 
refers to the fact that most cultural heritage industries (museums, archives, 
libraries) are now in the process of digitizing their holdings. In the future, 
Kurenniemi believes, this heritage will be subject to the same dynamic, 
futural logic as his own life archive. With the help of super computers, the 
global cultural heritage will be reanimated through virtual modelling. ‘I 
like to think of the Earth as a museum,’ he says.16 Due to overpopulation and 
ecological depletion, humanity will need other sites for living. Kurenniemi 
wants to solve this problem not by seeking refuge on other planets but 
rather by creating artif icial environments in outer space. He pictures each 
individual’s consciousness as computationally compressed into small chips. 
One golf ball can thus contain ten billion people, he explains. In their spare 
time, these populations will enjoy virtual models of their past lives on Earth, 
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or, as he says, ‘watch porn’. 17 If you want to be part of this, ‘you don’t have 
to wait for the actual Technology [to arrive]’; he encourages you to:
just store every tram ticket and store receipt, and photograph everything 
using a digital camera, where [sic] you don’t have to pay for development…
take a hundred pictures every day, write or dictate all your thoughts on 
a tape and you’ll have at least easily accessible raw material, which can 
perhaps be used for your consciousness reconstruction later on. 18
Indeed, in addition to his collections of audio-visual recordings of his own 
life, he assembled a vast amount of ephemera such as bills, tickets, tax return 
documents, and various gadgets, games, and computers.
From archival files to computer files
After Kurenniemi fell severly ill in 2005, he gave most of the collected mate-
rial to the Central Art Archive of Finland’s National Gallery of Art in 2006, 
where it is being catalogued and digitized.19 In 2012, a smaller portion of 
this was handed over to the art and media group Constant. If Kurenniemi 
believed in f iles becoming life, Constant uses the same f iles to investigate 
the life of f iles.
Constant (with Nicolas Malevé and Michael Murtaugh as principal 
investigators) were commissioned by the group KURATOR (led by Joasia 
Krysa), Kiasma, and Documenta 13 to create a prototype of an online archive 
of the Kurenniemi f iles.20 The material they were given can be considered 
a sample. It consists of almost all the pictures, some of the cassette diaries, 
a few home videos and transcripts of the most recent diaries (including 
the digital f iles from the Newton MessagePad) from around the mid-1990s 
and up until 2005 ‒ all totalling one terabyte of information. Kurenniemi’s 
early musical compositions, his experimental f ilms, and his gadgets and 
ephemera were not included in the samples.
To understand the complexity at play in the Kurenniemi f iles and in 
Constant ’s work on the f iles, we have to look at what has happened to 
the f ile more generally in the twentieth century. The transformation 
of the f ile from being the off icial record of a political and administra-
tive system to becoming itself a governing entity in a computational 
network is actually a revolution with huge ramif ications. Not only does 
it mobilize the f ile itself, both conceptually and practically the very no-
tion of an archive and its functions ‒recordkeeping, storage, cancelling, 
190 EIvInd røSSaaK
manipulation, destruction, distribution, search, and access—undergoes 
drastic changes.21
Files are the stuff that archives deal with. As Cornelia Vismann has 
shown in her history of the archival ‘f ile’, the f ile has been there ever 
since the beginning of the modern archive. ‘For the administration of the 
Western world, a life without f iles, without any recording, a life off the 
record, is simply unthinkable,’ Vismann demonstrates. Historically, f iles 
were ‘the administrative underbelly of the law and its representation’, and 
from there they proceed to become ‘trellised, inaccessible chanceries’, 
Vismann writes.22 Essentially, f iles and archives were diff icult to access. 
With computers, a signif icant change occurs in the operationality of 
f iles. ‘The appearance of f iles as stylized pictograms or icons on computer 
screens indicates the end of the epoch of f iles,’ Vismann maintains.23 This 
is a bold statement. However, f iles in a computer are no longer simply f iles 
documenting the commands and protocols of a political system but are 
now themselves carriers of algorithms, the new commands and protocols 
of a computer system. As Vismann writes, today ‘f iles and their techniques 
organize the very architecture of digital machines […] they ensure access 
to all internal operations by controlling both instructions and data, as 
well as their addresses.’24 The f iles are no longer simply the static record of 
the actions of an administration but have themselves become an integral 
component of a world of algorithms and codes that carry out a complex 
series of operations as well as suturing them into visibility and remediating 
them into pictographs looking like old media (a ‘document’ on a ‘desktop’, 
etc.). The operations that control their visibility are, just like the old f iles, 
inaccessible to most users. Their operations work in the hidden abode of 
computational systems, and their operations are so manifold that most 
users are happy if they can avoid dealing with them.
The sociality of files
A number of algorithms work in all digital devices. ‘In mathematics and 
computer science, an algorithm is a step-by-step procedure … used for 
calculation, data processing, and automated reasoning.’25 They operate 
as an interlocutor between machine input and machine output. Constant 
intervenes in this process, and the art and media group’s approach combines 
two methods. The f irst is a media-archaeological approach in which they 
bring out some of the hidden operations (algorithms and codes) at play in 
new media. The second approach underscores the social dimension of f iles 
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and computational procedures. They use open source software to interact 
with the f iles, and they document, step by step, the codes they use. In this 
way, they both rely on and foreground a dynamic memory network of shared 
codes.26 Their focus on the potential for constant sharing and reworking 
directs our attention to a different concept of social memory when such 
processes constitute the materiality of both our ‘objects’ and ‘frameworks’ 
of memory.27 Early on in their ‘Kurenniemi online’ logbook, Constant writes:
When starting an archive project, one reveals the sociality inherent 
in the documents. All items in an archive are shared objects. They are 
produced in a transaction, through collaboration with instruments (pen, 
paper, camera, recorder, etc), software agents (programs, algorithms) 
and people.
Constant ’s focus on sharing and sociality places it beyond a purely media-
archaeological approach.28 The media-archaeological groundwork carried 
out by Friedrich Kittler and Wolfgang Ernst, among others, has been an 
important corrective to that strain of media studies that has been too con-
cerned with the content or social context of media and too little concerned 
with how the logic of media machines structure knowledge. However, Con-
stant pushes the questions of media archaeology into a more socio-political 
terrain by showing how machine logics are constantly renegotiated and 
interrupted by shifting forms of sociality and modes of sharing. If Constant 
addresses the inner workings of new media, it is only to demonstrate how 
this internal dynamic co-evolves with a complex series of actions organized 
externally through processes of sharing. From the hacker’s perspective, new 
media are constructed through models of sharing and enclosure. Alas, it 
is also a battlef ield over control and ownership. Constant has made a clear 
choice to systematically work with processes based on open access and 
sharing. This approach demonstrates an underlying politics of sharing 
which implicitly critiques most social media web 2.0 platforms, as they 
tend to hide and copyright their algorithms.
As Eric von Hippel has shown, the Internet and its culture have become 
the new ground for collaborative innovation. He calls it ‘democratizing 
innovation’, and the development of open source software is a key example 
of ‘user-centered innovation systems’ that ‘supplant product development 
carried out by manufacturers’.29 Constant is part of this turn to user-centred 
innovation based on openness. Codes are developed and shared in teams, 
and this sharing is expressed as collaborations between human and non-
human capacities. Algorithms give instructions as to how a certain feature 
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is supposed to interact with other types of software and so on. Files make 
new connections and links, they operate precisely by always ‘assembling 
new allies’, to paraphrase Latour. The very def inition of ‘open source code’ 
is that it is meant to be implemented in new media in such a way as to be 
open for further elaboration and manipulation. It assembles allies (and 
foes) by default.
The development of free and open source software (FOSS) is a form of 
collaborative innovation which aligns itself nicely to the way f iles work. 
Computer f iles work by collaborating with other f iles in series. These 
collaborations involve several layers of transactions on a synchronic and 
diachronic axis. Diachronically they rely on forms (such as open source 
software and algorithms) that have been tested and tried out in a series 
of earlier innovations, collaborations, and practices; synchronically they 
communicate and collaborate with other programmes and instructions to 
execute their tasks. Constant applies its knowledge of FOSS communities to 
archives, and thus extends its practices of sharing further than most FOSS 
communities. It moves from ‘sharing in’ (sharing in a restricted community 
of experts) to ‘sharing out’ (sharing with a larger public) to even ‘sharing 
across’ (having the non-experts comment and intervene in their practices).30 
Let us look more precisely into how Constant organizes its acts of sharing 
within an archive context.
Constant is committed to several acts of sharing. It wants to share Kuren-
niemi’s f iles. Forging accessibility is something most state archives and 
national libraries in the democratic world do (unlike many private archives), 
and such archives and libraries (unlike private book repositories like Google 
Books) are committed to free and open access to their search and metadata 
standards. However, while libraries, for instance, try to enter the digital age 
without radically changing their system of metadata standardizations, FOSS 
communities like Constant openly apply their knowledge of how metadata 
regimes are implemented in digital f iles and how they co-evolve with other 
ICT standards relating to formats, f iles, and protocols. Constant wants to 
share this new infrastructure of archives and f iles. It does this in a critical 
way, and the story behind its alternative approach in this particular case 
is curious.
Due to the often sexually explicit content of some of Kurenniemi’s video 
and image f iles, much of the material is ‘unshareable’ because of privacy 
rights, despite Kurenniemi’s own desire to share. These restrictions forced 
Constant to invent new ways of presenting the material. Even if some of the 
images are unsharable as images, that is, on the level of ‘cultural material’ 
(the visible layer of data), they are still ‘sharable’ as ‘techno-mathematical 
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material’ (the data underneath the visible layer). The f iles are opened up 
to affordances the law could not imagine. Indeed, Constant’s algorithmic 
approach allows them to share what would otherwise be unsharable due 
to legal restrictions. The legal restrictions release a playful retake on the 
archive. Constant addresses the f iles so as to activate dormant affordances, 
enabling it to assemble new connections and allies through interactivity 
and sharing. The source codes organizing the group’s archive are not only 
free and open, sharable in themselves, but make objects ‘not for distribu-
tion’ sharable. Constant ’s ‘active archive’ is an experiment in sharing. In 
Constant ’s view, the entire Kurenniemi archive body is a source code to 
be shared.
In this essay, we take the archive-body to be an exemplar of an active 
archive, not as f ixed materials or a mere collection of objects but some-
thing more like source code that is modif iable and shareable.31
Constant’s ‘active archive’ is an experiment in sharing following the hackers’ 
ethics. Its online archive does not share files in the way most online archives 
do (‘click to open’); it wants to share the digital infrastructure of the archive 
itself. It operates in between an experimental archive and a git hub (an 
archive for shareable software).
Navigation through Constant ’s archive is diff icult. It does not have one 
single interface but several entries and few overviews and is more like a 
hypertext with a plethora of samples, links, and extended blog commentar-
ies resembling a lab log or a research paper in progress. The layout brings 
out associations with an anti-immersive, Brechtian web editor promoting 
Verfremdung and reflection rather than classif ication, overview, and easy 
access. It resists the merchandization of a collection. Constant addresses the 
potential construction of an online archive rather than the finished product, 
and f inally, its commitment to the politics of sharing turns archiving into 
an ethical issue way beyond the Kurenniemi holdings. Nevertheless, it is 
all done in the spirit of Kurenniemi who was himself committed to the 
hacker ethos of the 1970s.
Essentially, Constant opens up a single f ile in its multiplicity. It activates 
the f ile’s data, codes, histories, f ixed and potential connections, as well as 
its possible transformations. This involves at least three different forms of 
sharing:
1) Sharing the f iles. This is done by opening up the other side of the f ile 
to access the data governing its affordances and metadata; this enables 
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Constant to legally share information about a f ile that would otherwise 
be legally unsharable.
2) Sharing the knowledge of sharing. This is Constant ’s most elaborated 
mode of sharing and involves several operations: it uses free and open 
source software (FOSS) to access and read the f iles—it refers to it as 
‘seeing through the lens of algorithms’ and it manipulates FOSS for its 
own purposes and shares its code amendments with the user in an online 
logbook, so that he or she can activate them elsewhere.
3) Sharing the knowledge of its users. This is done in some of Constant ’s 
samples by inviting the user to interact with the f iles by tagging them 
on the fly.
Furthermore, these processes of sharing add new data to the archive and 
become part of it. The archive, here, is an evolving and dynamic entity with-
out closure. Below, we will examine how these modes of sharing are specific 
to a digital age and how they challenge our longstanding understanding of 
social memory as related to the way things are shared in a society.
Seeing with algorithms
Constant ’s most extended investigation into how to share archival f iles 
is explored in its take on Kurenniemi’s picture f iles. Numerous ways of 
reorganizing the material according to its internal data structure are tested. 
In the probe called ‘Sample Data’, it extracts the technical metadata (not the 
picture itself) of 17,000 picture f iles. This goes way beyond what archives 
usually consider valuable metadata and it demonstrates how the hidden 
multiplicity of a f ile is activated. It opens up the nested other side of the 
picture f ile which contains various technical data such as the date and time, 
focus length, colour information, camera type, etc. Furthermore, Constant 
uses open source sorting algorithms for face detection, contour detection, 
colour measurement, and metadata extraction. This gives a multi-faceted 
commentary to the image f iles displayed in its online archive on a two-row 
grid.32 Unlike most digital archives, it upsets the WYSIWYG (what-you-see-
is-what-you-get) logic of the computer interface. Instead of suturing the 
viewer into the somnambulist normalcy of a graphic user interface, where 
you click and see a picture, Constant creates what Alexander Galloway 
has called an ‘infuriation event’.33 When you click, you are suddenly taken 
into a new space of multiplicity. The user can spend hours clicking her way 
through the samples.
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In a commentary called ‘montage’, Constant explains how it reads f iles 
algorithmically, for instance when using easily available Python-based 
software. The f iles are rearticulated through a series of simple commands, 
available on its website log. By executing the codes < #!/usr/bin/env python> 
and <#-*- coding:utf-8 -*->, Constant is able to present all the images from 
Kurenniemi’s trip to Venice as a running script overlaid by clusters of im-
ages.34 In another more detailed and extensive probe entitled ‘Thumbnails 
by time’, Constant again uses the folder Kurenniemi has entitled ‘Kuvia’ 
(Finnish for ‘image’) containing 17,000 images. This is referred to as a ‘test 
folder’. The ‘Kuvia’ folder is used for a variety of algorithmic approaches like 
sorting algorithms and different scripts. The script is based on ‘the pyexiv2 
library’.35 This is an open source code library for the manipulation of EXIF, 
IPTC, and XMP image metadata. The python module allows ‘your python 
scripts to read and write metadata (EXIF, IPTC, XMP, thumbnails) embed-
ded in image f iles (JPEG, TIFF, etc)’. 36 This algorithm sorts the images both 
as a text (spreadsheet) and as thumbnail data (see f igure 2). Constant f irst 
use ‘a script’ (erkki_walk.py) to create a spreadsheet, and then another script 
(erkki_draw.py) that ‘reads the spreadsheet and draws a new single image 
(10,000 x 1,000 pixels) where the thumbnails are each drawn individually 
with horizontal position related to their timestamp of creation, and vertical 
position random’ (see f igure 2).37 We do not see a single picture from the 
Kurenniemi folder as readable by the human eye but instead as an image 
of the content of the (almost) entire folder, i.e. thousands of images as read 
and organized by computer vision according to time and colour indicators.
This latter visualization model may resemble a typical way of visualizing 
big data research within digital humanities and cultural analytics. David 
Berry has identif ied three distinct phases of digital humanities, which 
involve: starting out as ‘humanities computing’ dominated by linguistics 
(phase one), whereupon emerge the big data projects of various digital 
humanities labs (phase two) which often aim to create new semantic or 
relational links within and between huge corpus of cultural texts, followed 
by a critical phase (often involving media archaeology) where computation 
and the software tools themselves are being questioned (phase three). 
Constant may be said to belong to this latter phase where software studies 
and critical code studies are involved.38 However, as we have underscored 
earlier, with its keen commitment to a politics of sharing, Constant also 
bypasses many of the well-known phases of digital humanities.
Algorithms are far better at addressing big data than the human brain 
and, signif icantly, they make it possible for us to enter and understand 
various aspects of f iles, folders, and formats and share it with users. ‘When 
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we delegate our vision to a series of algorithms and programs, we begin to 
realize the complexity of the connections that bind the format together, 
the device and the use,’ Constant writes.39 The complexity referred to are all 
the algorithms, protocols and code libraries that build up a digital device 
to make its operational flow continuous from capture (input) to processing 
and, f inally, to screen image (output). Furthermore, to make f iles shareable 
fig. 7.2: a set of photos from Erkki Kurenniemi’s archive ordered in five different ways by 
constant. horizontal placement relates respectively to timestamp of creation, time of day, red, 
green, and blue values. 
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and interoperable between platforms, tech f irms have agreed upon a vast 
number of technological standards in more or less willing cooperation 
with international standard-setting bodies such as ISO (the International 
Organization for Standardization). Sorting algorithms like the ‘pyexiv2 
library’ rely on these standards. However, they may work f ine for a while (on 
a synchronic level), but as soon as new developments change the standard, 
they are no longer interoperable, and that is why digital formats commu-
nicate so badly across time (on a diachronic level). Incidentally, this is also 
why the sorting algorithms Constant uses only work on certain portions of 
the f iles; Kurenniemi used any industrial standard available at the time 
of recording, not worrying about their interoperability but hoping that a 
future super computer would be able to process it all.40
Signif icantly, Constant foregrounds the way in which a digital device 
leaves its material and archival imprint on a recorded f ile. These imprints 
say much about the human-machine assemblages which in this case is a 
series consisting of the user, the camera, the f ile, and its repository. Algo-
rithms work in the interstices along this series to transform and profile the 
data. Constant uses a specif ic digital image, ‘DSC02048.JPG’, as its example. 
According to the f ile’s metadata the picture is shot on a digital Sony camera 
by Kurenniemi on the 6th of November 2004 at 21:56:37. Again, we are not 
shown the picture ‘itself’. Constant uses open source algorithms to address 
the data and format standards of the picture f ile, focussing in particular 
on the Design rule for Camera File system (DCF). This is a key industrial 
standard system for the indexing and sharing of f iles. It works as a complete 
archival registry unto itself inside the digital device. It generates data about 
the who, where, and when of every image and decides who is its ally and who 
is its foe. It serves as an archival protocol for digital images and guarantees 
their interoperability across media. In other words, it regulates the image’s 
possible connections and associations. Its specif ications def ine the f ile 
system for the digital camera. DCF replaces the paper card index classif ica-
tion system that Kurenniemi used back in the 1970s. While Kurenniemi’s 
analogue system could potentially work across media, the DCF directory 
structure conforms to only a limited number of f ile extensions, such as the 
JPEG (Joint Photographic Experts Group).41
In a funny comment, Constant mentions the fact that some of the axioms 
governing the algorithms of the JPEG lossy compression formats are not wholly 
justifiable: ‘The Joint Photographic Experts Group thinks that the eye is less 
sensitive to fine color details than to fine brightness details.’42 We all know that 
regardless of what JPEG ‘thinks’, we can all see the difference if we increase 
the size of the image. We can say that the JPEG method of lossy compression 
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actually represents lousy archival work on the level of preservation but is 
nevertheless useful when it comes to distribution, as smaller files are easier to 
dispatch. By entering into a ‘negotiation’ with these methods (DCF and JPEG), 
Constant shows how an ecology of formats, standards, and algorithms works 
underneath the visual image, revealing archival agencies other than the ones 
operating in an analogue archival registry like Kurenniemi’s. Their approach 
also allows for other cartographies and more automatic implementations of 
the consolidated knowledge hidden in the hundreds of algorithms at play in 
the filing assemblage (user, camera, f ile, repository).
Another set of algorithms is implemented in the RGB (red, green, blue) 
colour protocol, which decides the colour spectrum of the image. It is based 
on the Young-Helmholtz trichromatic colour vision theory, developed in the 
early to mid-nineteenth century, and on James Clerk Maxwell’s colour trian-
gle elaborations (circa 1860).43 The algorithms constituting the RGB model are 
a condensed and very efficient version of centuries of colour theory. The high 
speed of execution enabled by the digital components makes the model work 
at paces faster than human recognition. Constant uses a sorting algorithm 
that can read the RGB notations and sort the pictures accordingly. By only 
reading the numeric colour separation equations of the image, Constant can 
say quite a lot about the picture f ile – without showing the ‘picture’.
While a traditional analogue archive would sort the visible image, 
Constant sorts the picture by accessing the archival procedures within 
the digital f ile itself. If each of these methods (DCF, JPEG, and RGB), with 
their hordes of algorithms, could be called robotic archivists, we could say 
that Constant reveals how each digital f ile is constructed by a network of 
archivists, and that the way the f iles are programmed actually implements 
and consolidates a long knowledge tradition going back to Helmholtz and 
ancient archival methods originating in Babylonia. The f iles absorb this 
tradition and turn it into the subaltern workforce of digital media.44
The third way Constant activates sharing is by engaging the user as an 
active participant in the tagging and commenting upon the f ile or running 
script in question. This is most often done in connection with a live stream-
ing rendition of the audiovisual f iles such as videos and tape recordings. 
In the Dataradio project, Constant creates a new kind of folksonomy (col-
laborative tagging or social indexing) by using the open protocol Internet 
Relay Chat (IRC) as an annotation tool. Users can tag and share on the fly 
a ‘live stream’ of a selection of Kurenniemi’s audio-diaries by writing down 
comments and associations as they listen to the recording. Each tag becomes 
part of a larger indexing system and creates a minor crowd-sourced evolving 
filing cabinet.45 A similar operation is carried out in connection with a ‘video 
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stream’ of his diary f ilms. This experiment is called ‘Blind Annotation’.46 
The viewer tags image sequences as the video is played. By pressing the 
replay button, the f ilm is replayed, showing only the tagged passages. The 
viewer’s interactivity, under heavy constraints, creates a new cut of the f ilm.
These experiments address and problematize the differences between 
human processing (perception and experience) and algorithmic processing. 
What comes in, what comes out? How do human and machinic processing 
work together? How do these collaborations transform the object? Or, as 
in the latter case, how does it transform the human into something else, 
while at the same time questioning the transformation? What is semanti-
cally signif icant? As the user in the Blind Annotation probe has to tag 
the f ile on the fly, the user’s brain is called upon as a reflex mechanism 
rather than as a contemplative reader of, say, a book. The hasty tagging may 
be said to mimic the super-fast operations of algorithms. A human script 
runs alongside a machinic script. The human user becomes a robot-like 
archivist or a digital workforce tagging and reassembling f iles according 
to more or less subconscious impulses. The title of the project seems to 
cover this becoming-machine of the user quite well: ‘Blind Annotation’. 
While Constant ’s probes with pictures show how sorting algorithms work 
as pseudo-human archivists, Dataradio and Blind Annotation show how 
a human user can become a pseudo-sorting algorithm. From a semantic 
perspective, however, the output is of a different kind. Hence, the active 
archive opens up an interactive space as a precarious zone where the 
human user slides toward becoming machinic and the machine towards 
becoming human. Implicitly, this reflects upon the various human-machine 
assemblages instantiated in f ile processing.
It also bears resemblance to the way in which Kurenniemi def ined 
his obsession with archiving as both a biological and machinic drive. He 
called himself a ‘self-f lagellation machine’. The personal drive to make 
an archive and new media’s drive towards archiving produce a series of 
new individuations. Constant shows how these drives not only operate 
between an archivist and his tools but operate across time and space as 
relation-making practices through a politics of sharing.
Sharing and social memory
What happens to social memory in a time of altered connections between 
humans and technologies? Today, memory needs to be rethought in relation 
to a more general politics of life. The proliferation of discourses that view 
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technologically mediated life as a self-constituting entity are understood 
by many critics as a key symptom of a new form of biopower.47 If the new 
emphasis on life issues is at times taken to indicate the return of ‘real bodies’ 
and ‘real materiality’ – a new metaphysics of presence – it is more precise 
to say that the new biopower is premised on revised conceptions of the 
body as well as of materiality. There is, for instance, a tendency to see an 
extension of life principles and biological functions in the realm of digital 
technologies. Eugene Thacker writes, ‘the major problem concerning life 
has to do not with its def inition … but with the very plasticity of life, [as] a 
shape-shifting quality.’48
Such renegotiation of the question of life is a key feature of computing 
history. In its early stages, computer scientists suggested that intelligence 
(in Turing’s version) and memory (in von Neumann’s version) were not 
exclusive to humans and could be reconstructed in a computer. Now, 
Thacker explains:
The very concept of life itself begins to dissolve and dissipate, while 
still remaining in use and in circulation. What if life is not assumed to 
reach its pinnacle in human life? What if life is only incidentally, and 
not fundamentally, an anthropocentric phenomenon? And what if life 
actually has very little to do with the presumed self-evident nature of 
the living?49
Such insights are fueled by phenomena such as biocomputing and the 
development of biosynaptic computer chips and are becoming part of 
standard medicine. Thacker uses the term biomedia to discuss the ‘technical 
recontextualization of biological components and processes.’ The body is 
reconceptualized as ‘compiled’ through modes of information processing, 
modeling, data extraction, and in silico simulation.50 Kurenniemi prefigures 
such ‘compilations’.
Both Kurenniemi and Constant imply that life can express itself through a 
series of materialities and media. Indeed, there are many possible ontologies 
of life today, and they also recall Thacker’s notion of a ‘superlative life’ which 
exists at different stages in history going back to certain ancient vitalist 
positions where life is seen as ‘that which flows or pours forth.’51 Here, life 
is ‘distributive, pervasive, and outflowing.’ Life is ‘at once everywhere and 
nowhere, a pure excess and generosity, and yet in itself not any one, single, 
individual instance of life.’52 Aspects of this notion reappear in biomedia 
practices that resituate life in relation to media. Here, life relies no longer 
on the ‘wet lab’ but the ‘dry lab’; biology is done ‘in silico’. Life expands into 
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media technologies and their specif ic features and affordances: ‘If the en-
coding process carried patterns of relationships across material substrates, 
then the recoding process will extend the functionality of those encoded 
or translated data in ways that are specif ic to the medium.’53 This implies 
that ‘the generosity of life is itself irreducible and unlimited, though the 
particular manifestations of life may in and of themselves be constrained.’54
Kurenniemi’s work may be a symptom of the general questioning of ‘life’ 
identif ied by Thacker, but it is important to distinguish between Kuren-
niemi’s ideas and other visions of technologically aided afterlife. On the 
one hand there are ideas about biological afterlife secured through various 
forms of cryonics; on the other hand we have ideas about afterlife secured 
through information technologies and artif icial intelligence. Kurenniemi 
clearly belongs to the latter strain, as seen in his technical conception of the 
material body: ‘Man is a machine. A machine produced by evolution. I f ind 
it impossible to think that for mere nostalgic reasons, such a slime-based 
system would be preserved,’ he says in an interview.55 Yet the specif icity 
of his project resides less in such a vision of body/machines than in his 
emphasis on life as memory – seeing the personal archive as a point of 
departure for the potentially continued life of an autonomous entity. Es-
sentially, he believed in future computers’ ability to turn the remains of a 
personal archive into some kind of consciousness. He seems less interested 
in the emerging f ield of bioinformatics where both the biological (genes) 
and the computational (codes) are conceived of as informational structures.
In the latter part of his active life, Kurenniemi increasingly took interest 
in an ecological perspective in which flesh-based life on earth is viewed as 
detrimental to the environment. He believed that artif icial forms of con-
sciousness could be stacked in small balls and sent to outer space: cultural 
heritage would be salvaged in the sense that these balls of consciousness 
could enjoy the Earth’s past as some kind of digital entertainment in outer 
space. He also discusses the politics of cloning and how certain democratic 
freedoms can be sustained in a posthuman artif icial world of clones and 
extraterrestrials.56 In this respect he was several decades ahead of many of 
his compatriots who have only recently started working on what they call 
the constitutional rights of extraterrestrials.57
Constant ’s online version of Kurenniemi’s life is severed from any direct 
association with the extraterrestrial aspect of his afterlife. They do not 
talk about consciousness or artif icial intelligence. Their horizon of op-
erationality belongs to the Internet culture. Unlike Constant, Kurenniemi 
was prevented from experiencing the way in which digital networks have 
turned life into a series of interconnected events. In the transition from 
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early computing to Internet culture, ‘life’ is extended in a variety of ways and 
associated with the ongoing researches in biocomputing. While Turing and 
von Neumann were interested in computational explanations of human-
centred attributes such as intelligence, learning, or memory, biocomputing 
focuses on molecular processes. At this level, ‘life’ is both non-human and 
intelligent. Life is both an automatic process and an intelligent process in 
the way it relies on heritage, memory, and interaction with its environment. 
It is informational and networked. Modern biology represents, in other 
words, a shift in the human-computer relation from an emphasis on mind 
(and cognition) to an emphasis on ‘life’ as articulated in complex networks. 
Thus in the ‘PC era’, computing is seen as nonconscious and distributed, 
and as a parallel to life rather than to mind, cognition, and intelligence.58 
Constant foregrounds this trajectory by capitalizing on the inherent life of 
f iles, their dynamic sociality. In Constant’s work, Kurenniemi’s life becomes 
extended as a networked entity. He is shared, distributed, and transformed 
by a network of users and producers. This development is allied to the 
social turn within computation, and it also comes with a catch. As Jose 
van Dijck writes, making the web social actually means making ‘social-
ity technical’ – a development that some would see as another instance 
of the instrumentalization of social relations.59 Constant is aware of this 
and endeavours to project an alternative to a homogenizing sociality by 
instantiating Kurenniemi’s ‘life’ through a hacker ethos based on the use of 
open source code. How does this transform the concept of social memory?
Archives and collections have always been part of cultural memory, but as 
archives become digital, they become more dynamic and potentially more 
like social memory. No longer relatively stable storage systems, archives 
increasingly f igure as dynamic living systems, constantly transformed 
and updated, constantly the object of mergers with new informational 
clusters and programs. The work of Constant is focused on bringing out 
the living or social dynamic in the technological infrastructure of digital 
archives. The group’s microscopic work on the life of f iles in a world of 
shared data show how the presence of a f ile, the f ile in question, does not 
simply testify to a unique singularity but to a multiplicity of past, present 
and future actions. The f ile is, so to speak, the ‘undead of information’, an 
‘enduring ephemerality’.60 It is always the result of undead layers of actions 
at a distance.
After Gabriel Tarde, we can investigate how social memory works in a 
deeper, more pre-cognitive way. Memory is whatever creates some form 
of association or connectivity. Such associations are not found ‘in’ soci-
ety but constitute the social link as such and may be mapped by tracing 
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movements of imitation and invention.61 The impact of the newspaper in 
the nineteenth century made Tarde speak of imitation as a form of ‘action 
at a distance’ – a perspective that has become even more relevant with the 
introduction of electronic media technologies.62 Influence ‘at a distance’ 
works in, through, and around our connected lives, our file lives. Constant 
shows how such dynamics of imitation and invention are capacitated and 
exploited through digital technologies, generating new connections along 
the complex pathways of ‘living’ f iles. The politics of sharing advocated by 
Constant shows not only how Kurenniemi’s f iles always already existed in 
connected, disassembled, and reassembled cartographies of socio-technical 
memory arrangements but also that such arrangements are always bat-
tlef ields. Algorithms and codes are not neutral tools that neatly imple-
ment whatever is given to them – they constitute a transformative f ield of 
constant renegotiations and reconnections.
Constant ’s politics of sharing, analyzed in this chapter, shows that what 
differentiates one memory assemblage from another is to a large extent a 
question concerning different ways of assembling the sociality of f iles. The 
art and media group’s three modes of sharing – sharing the f ile, sharing 
the knowledge of sharing, and sharing the knowledge of the users – is 
an approach to memory that underscores the active involvement in the 
new technological infrastructure of memory events. The new technologies 
do not represent a dead repository or a neutral tool for memory, they are 
rather a living system where memory itself becomes a mode of action. As 
we have seen, software is not simply mathematics but a consolidation of 
long traditions of knowledge, memory, habits, and techniques of ordering 
and remembering. As they are implemented in shareware (FOSS), memory 
becomes action. Constant foregrounds the eventness of memory by enter-
ing the operations going on both inside and outside the f iles. These are 
operations that make the f iles speak and remember, work, connect, and 
transform themselves. Constant does not see the archival document or f ile 
as a single static entity, an image or a text to be preserved and classif ied in 
a static dead repository according to its unique singularity; it activates the 
f ile in its living multiplicity and brings out its networked condition through 
events of associations and connections where a single f ile no longer simply 
represents an image but a series of complex arrangements and operations 
(DCFs, JPEGs, RGBs, and a series of FOSS), each with their own controversies 
that can be readdressed directly by well-targeted algorithmic operations.
Kurenniemi wanted his life archive experiment to become a template 
for mankind. He did not know how it would be remembered or continued, 
but he devoted much of his intellectual life to projecting the ways and 
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means of doing it. Interestingly, several of the Kurenniemi videos used in 
Mika Taanila’s documentary f ilm show Kurenniemi talking about his life 
archive at parties and among friends. He opened up his archive and shared 
his ideas whenever he had the chance – and recorded his sharing. In this 
way, Kurenniemi’s archive was social, improvisational, and reflexive from 
the start. The f iles contain a self-reflexivity that projects a series of possible 
future trajectories. Constant does not monumentalize Kurenniemi into an 
object to be commemorated but opens up the f iles to a multiplicity that 
demonstrates their dynamic sociality as well as their ability to produce 
future memories.
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45. The documentation of some of these experiments is available online. The 
Dataradio is here but currently not working or is incomplete, see Constant 
(n.d.l). Here is a sample of the annotations: Constant (n.d.m). 
46. Constant (n.d.n). 
47. See Braidotti (2010), Clough and Willse (2011), Thacker (2004 and 2010), as 
well as Rose (2006).
48. Thacker, 2010, p. 4.
49. Ibid., p. x.
50. Thacker, 2003, pp. 11 and 15.




55. Taanila, 2015, p. 298.
56. See Kurenniemi (2001) and Taanila.
57. See for example this research initiative at The British Interplanetary Society, 
2013.
58. The argument follows Eugene Thacker who demonstrates how the ‘PC era’ 
or what I call ‘Internet culture’ is allied more to biocomputing and com-
puting’s relation to notions of ‘life’ and less to Turing and von Neumann’s 
notions of computation as ‘intelligence’ or ‘mind’. See Thacker, 2004, pp. 
106-107.
59. Dijck, p. 12.
60. These are Wendy Chun’s terms for understanding the life of information in 
a networked society. See Chun.
61. Tarde, p. 48. 
62. The term ‘action at a distance’ is taken from Newton’s law of gravitation; see 
Tarde, pp. 26, 61-64. Both Lazzarato and Latour have underscored the fact 
that Tarde’s theories have become even more relevant now after the rise of 
the Internet, big data brokers, and statistical computing.
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Mapping the World: Les Archives de la Planète and the 
Mobilization of Memory
Trond Lundemo
They Had to See Paris. And in order to see it, a traditional family from rural 
Oklahoma who had struck it rich in oil, depicted in a little-known 1929 
comedy by Frank Borzage, decides to go there. But why did they have to 
see Paris instead of New York, London, Berlin, or Tokyo? Because they had 
already seen it. They had seen photographs in newspapers and f ilms and 
read descriptions of the City of Light. The image of Paris was the most 
propagated in the world, and the logic of tourism takes them to the place 
they already know from visual media. They had to see Paris because they 
had a memory of the city, even if they had never been there. Even as they 
decide to cut their visit down to a couple of days, feeling homesick after 
having covered the sights reproduced in the media, their choice of destina-
tion indicates how images of places format memory. The main production 
value of Borzage’s f ilm is a series of views of Paris, which serve to perpetuate 
the image propagation that makes the rural family want go there in the 
f irst place. The simple denomination of Paris in the f ilm’s title releases 
swarms of images and expectations and demonstrates the close relation 
between memory, images, and topographical location. For this reason, 
memory always takes place, as images are spatial and topographic. I will 
probe this topographical layout of memories as sociotechnical networks of 
images by looking at a well-known (psycho-)geographical location, Paris, 
and the visual construction of its mnemotechnical properties.1
As examples of such networked memory topographies, I will focus on 
the media configurations and mapping techniques of two rather unique 
productions, separated by almost a hundred years. The f irst is Albert Kahn’s 
Les Archives de la Planète, a collection of photographic images forming an in-
ventory of ‘the surface of the globe’. Financed and supervised by the French 
banker Albert Kahn between 1908 and 1931, it prominently features the city 
of Paris at different moments during the production of the collection. The 
second example, also configured as an inventory, is the web installation 
Paris ville invisible created by Bruno Latour and Emilie Hermant in 2004 
which portrays the infrastructural composition of networks upholding 
the City of Light. The ‘invisible’ aspects of the city are accessible only to a 
214 trOnd lundEMO
few, notably the technocrats and maintenance personnel in city planning 
off ices who follow its operations on surveillance monitors, but even so, 
they subtend the visible aspects of Paris. The difference between the media 
employed in the two mapping projects – analogue f ilm and photography 
in Les Archives de la Planète and digital interactive installation in Paris 
ville invisible – allow us to approach not just the changing technologies 
of geographical mapping during the past century but also the different 
conceptions of memory that underpin these changes. Both cases form het-
erogeneous media networks in their own right but also display interesting 
connecting points between image technologies and visual media in a larger 
context. I will analyze these configurations of images with regard to the 
specif ic processes of individuation that they facilitate and discuss them in 
the light of Gilbert Simondon’s theories of imagination and individuation 
as well as Gabriel Tarde’s concept of the ‘public’ as an eminently modern 
social formation. For in Tarde’s work, the public is notably defined in terms 
of its capacity to affect and to be affected ‘at a distance’ – that is, across 
spatial and temporal boundaries – a capacity afforded by forces of image 
propagation that may be understood as networks of memory.
Memory as image propagation
Before we move to a discussion of the two media networks mentioned 
above, the role of the image in relation to memory and the topographical 
dimensions of this relation call for some elucidation. An image, in this 
broad sense, is never one but a composite structure, a cluster, governed 
by interconnectabilities and montages. Images are pre-individual and 
autonomous beings forming networks of memory through association and 
propagation. In Gilbert Simondon’s view, memory is a form of imagination 
because it consists of forces and energies and forms processes rather than 
fixed representations of time and place. Memory is not the ‘storehouse of the 
past’, to be retrieved or not by the individual, as described in Freud’s theory 
of the unconscious, but a dynamic process that produces consciousness 
and subjectivity. Memory is a medium where images act upon each other, 
agglomerate and multiply, and modulate the present as well as the past 
for the purpose of future action. Simondon takes as his point of departure 
the mental image as a relatively independent agglomeration in the human 
being, but it soon becomes clear that the image transgresses any boundaries 
between subject and object, interior and exterior, concrete and abstract. He 
outlines the role of ‘object-images’, ‘aesthetical, prosthetical, technical’ in 
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the process of image formation and propagation and how they play a crucial 
role in forming collective life and memory.2 As Simondon notes, imagina-
tion (and by extension memory) is a pre-individual vehicle of ontogenetic 
processes where mental and material images are formed. The life of images 
starts with spontaneous growth into a framework of motoric tendencies; 
develops into perceptual patterns that structure experience and serve an 
organism’s adaptation to the world; and f inally forms a system of relations, 
evocations, and mutations that creates analogical and reflexive models 
of the world.3 These models are symbols, according to Simondon, in the 
sense that they are integrated with objects in the world. The universe of 
symbols is capable of integrating new complete images through synergic 
compatibility and can open itself up to invention. By incorporating the past, 
the image makes the past accessible for projection into the future. In the 
process of multiplying and propagating, images can transform and reinvent 
themselves and change the ways in which the objective, the subjective, and 
the social are configured.4 Images are in this sense eminently political.
Imagination can be turned towards future (anticipation), present (per-
ception), and past (recollection). It should be noted that not only the last 
dimension of images are concerned with memory, because memory entails 
also perception and dispositions and agencies for the future.5 Signif icantly, 
Simondon’s concept of imagination, and by extension our understanding of 
memory, is not centred on individual creativity, inventiveness, or ability to 
retrieve moments and events of the past. Imagination is a process of image 
propagation – hence its name – in which images act like micro-organisms 
that invade the mind and body of the thinking and remembering subject at 
certain times and leave him/her on others. Images, material or mental, can 
be viral, as we have learned from YouTube and other online video servers, 
and act like parasites in memory. They are genetic processes that present 
themselves according to their own proper forces and can act autonomously, 
with an agency of their own.6 There is an emergent potentiality to images 
that allow them to modify and re-arrange themselves as well as the larger 
arrangement of images we live by.
If images are the matter of memory, it explains how recollections are 
always in modulation and change. The question of memory is where Simon-
don meets Bergson, who equally understood matter/memory as streams of 
images: such images are at the core of memory’s regulation of the relation 
between present, past, and future.7 For both philosophers, memory and 
imagination are non-psychological concepts that pass beyond the interiority 
of the subject; in contrast, image streams, as continuously evolving asubjec-
tive perceptions, constitute processes of individuation and socialization.8 
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However, such modes of memory and processes of individuation are subject 
to alterations and transformations due to changes in image technologies. 
Simondon is not directly concerned with historical changes within these 
networks of images in his thesis on imagination, but he is certainly aware 
of them when he calls for the ‘philosophical, psychological and social task 
of saving phenomena, by analysing the image that they emit, and reinstall 
them in the becoming and in invention’.9 Taking the cue from Simondon, 
I will analyze the mnemotechnical image networks emanating from the 
two geographical mappings of Paris, with particular attention to the way 
in which differences in mnemotechnical modes inform the individuation 
of these projects.
The life of images takes place in sociotechnical networks that change 
over time and according to context, opening up to analysis specif ic modes 
of propagation and mutation in distinct but interconnected visual technolo-
gies. The technological image networks of f ilm and photography, which 
constitutes its own micro-network in the Les Archives de la Planète, form one 
such historical memory layer, while digital photography and hyperlinked 
text materials in Paris ville invisible represents another. As will become clear, 
however, these networks never operate in isolation but interact with and 
transform each other. The life of images, and hence of memory, is always 
intermedial as well as intermediary, connecting technical objects, bodies, 
and minds with subjects and collectives and the world.10
When the image acquires self-motion with the advent of cinema, the 
connectibilities of images are reconfigured. In an epistemological sense, 
the montage between images takes on new exigencies and affordances by 
submitting the spectator to a specifically designed time flow and hence also 
a specif ic network of memory and individuation. The emergence of time-
based analogue media technologies at the end of the nineteenth century 
redistributes the connectibilities of the media networks, underscoring the 
asubjective role of memory and perception. With the distributed networks 
of the Internet and the feedback loops and recursive programming of com-
puting, memory and individuation is modulated according to a different 
temporalizing dynamic. Memory is, then, in motion, because the media 
are changing. Moreover, this change in media does not only entail a shift 
from ‘old media’ to new, as in the often proclaimed development from 
the analogue to the digital, from f ilm to computer, from TV to Youtube or 
Netflix. The very concept of media is in motion. Computer media not only 
store and transmit information but actually process it – a procedure that is 
closer to action-oriented memory than passive storage of data. If the mode 
of connectivity between images is changing, so are the specific processes 
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of memory and individuation that they afford. But this also means that the 
concept of ‘the public’ cannot be taken for granted and neither can related 
concepts such as ‘the audience’, ‘the mass’, and ‘the crowd’. In their place 
we have to identify other and more distinct collective individuations based 
on the agencies at work in each case.
These concepts are not historical and social stable categories but depict 
processes of becoming that always proceed through networks of images, 
media, and people. In Simondon’s theory of individuation, collective and 
psychological individuation consists of forces that expand on and refer back 
to biological as well as technical individuation by posing problems that 
cannot be f inally resolved and consequently lead to interminable processes 
of formation. These problems depend on an incongruity between perception 
and action, between consciousness and body, and lead to a succession of 
individuations going from metastability to metastability.11 These processes 
form the ‘transindividual’, or what we often call a personality, for a limited 
period of time. Collective and psychological individuation always proceeds 
in the relation between a body and the world, a subject and other subjects, 
and hence on the circuits of the propagation of images that make up imagi-
nation and memory. Psychological and collective individuation depend on 
each other, ‘they permit the def inition of a category of the transindividual 
that tends to account for the systematic unity of interior (psychological) and 
external (collective) individuation’.12 This unity of the system of individua-
tion proceeds through links between the body and its environment, mental 
images and object images, making the individual a ‘transindividual’ in 
becoming, going from metastability to metastability. The psychological 
individual as well as the collective are not stable or isolated entities but 
formed in the process of affecting and being affected by each other.13 The 
historical shifts in connectivities between images strongly def ine these 
processes of collective individuation.
If Paris is the locus for our discussion of shifting modes of collective 
individuation, it is because media and memory always entertain complex 
relationships with places and their history. As Cicero already observed, ars 
memoriae are about assigning what should be remembered to a place and 
about performing a spatialization of the past. Classical mnemotechnics, 
as described by Frances Yates in The Art of Memory, deploy the ‘method of 
loci’, memory palaces, a way of recalling information drawing on visualiza-
tion and spatialization.14 Moving images have continued to reshape this 
topography of memory. The City of Light, eminently visual and visible in the 
history of painting, photography, and f ilm as well as in literary description, 
is a privileged place for the formation and propagation of images. It is the 
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capital not only of a nation or a culture but also of a period of pervasive 
technological change worldwide. As the ‘capital of the nineteenth century’ 
(to use Walter Benjamin’s words), Paris is a luminous point of entry for 
addressing shifting processes of image propagation and individuation.
Les Archives de la Planète
It is not only the case that images install memory through representations of 
places; different modalities of memory are also produced by different kinds 
of locations and locational techniques or cartographic procedures. A case in 
point is the collection of f ilms, colour photographs, and stereoscopes that 
make up Albert Kahn’s Les Archives de la Planète, formed between 1908 and 
1931 in France – a part of the world-mapping ventures of the early twentieth 
century. Les Archives de la Planète was initiated in late 1908 when Albert 
Kahn made a trip around the world. While visiting the United States, Japan, 
and China, he had his chauffeur take photographs and f ilms from the trip. 
After this trip, Kahn decided to create a photographic and cinematographic 
archive of the planet and appointed Jean Brunhes, a pioneering cultural 
geographer, as its director. Between 1912 and 1931, Kahn f inanced camera-
men travelling to more than 50 countries around the world to make this 
inventory. When the collecting processes were brought to an abrupt end 
in 1932 due to Albert Kahn’s bankruptcy in the wake of the stock market 
crash, it comprised 72,000 autochromes (a new colour photography process 
on glass plates invented by Louis Lumière in 1907), 183,000 metres of f ilm 
(over 100 hours of projection), and 4,000 stereographs. There are also some 
4,000 black-and-white photographs, but their role in the archive appears to 
be secondary in comparison to the other technologies used. A small part of 
the film footage was acquired from newsreel companies and was not shot by 
the Kahn cameramen. The archive was kept intact after Kahn’s bankruptcy 
and even survived the occupation of France, which commenced shortly after 
Kahn’s death in 1940. Almost all of the f ilm material is stored as unedited 
shots, and only small parts of the material were spliced together for use in 
Jean Brunhes’ courses at Collège de France or the occasional screening for 
invited guests at Albert Kahn’s mansion. The collection was never exploited 
commercially, and the material largely remained locked up in the vaults 
of the archive.
The collection is embedded in the globalizing and colonizing technolo-
gies of modernity, aiming to construct an image of the world in its spatial 
as well as in its historical dimensions. Albert Kahn described the project 
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as an ‘inventory of the surface of the globe inhabited and developed by man 
as it presents itself at the start of the 20th Century in order to fix once and 
for all the practices, the aspects and the modes of human activity, whose 
fatal disappearance is only a question of time’.15 This description reveals 
the topographical dimensions of the project as well as its temporal ones. 
The mapping of the world takes place at a moment of change, for use in an 
unknown future when these modes of human existence have disappeared. 
The visual media employed in this charting of the surface of the globe 
immobilize and ‘f ix once and for all’ a moment in time. The photographic 
terminology employed by Kahn announces what André Bazin later will 
describe as the ‘Ontology of the Photographic Image’– a fundamental and 
eternal human need for the preservation of the past in order to defy death.16 
Moreover, the stylistic prescriptions identif ied by Bazin for this ontology 
– long takes, staging in depth, deep focus – are intimately linked with the 
topographic properties of photography and cinema. What is to be ‘f ixed 
once and for all’ for Kahn or ‘embalmed in time’ for Bazin is, essentially, a 
geographical location.17
In most mapping projects, local detail is multiplied until it makes up a 
coherent world map. In a geographical world atlas, the map of the globe 
is broken down into separate sections of continental, national, regional, 
and municipal scope.18 Brought together, the different parts of the atlas 
are supposed to form a coherent and comprehensive map of the world. 
This interconnection between the local and the global, the social and the 
national does not only apply to the spatial dimensions of Kahn’s project. 
Kahn’s collection is also a historical map. Certain places and regions are 
included in the ‘archive’ at different times and given intervals, producing 
a historical cartography, a network of world-encompassing techniques of 
control that inscribed the local in a larger global system and the single event 
in world history. In such an approach, cinema unifies the eagle’s perspective 
with that of the fly.19
If Les Archives de la Planète is a geographical and historical mapping 
project, it is only by stretching the sense of the term that it can be called 
cartographic. There are, of course, a plethora of cartographic techniques 
in different cultures throughout history, but the collection makes no use of 
cartographic maps of the kind that was shaping geographical representation 
and imagination at the time it was produced. No maps in the ordinary 
sense of the word form a coordinating interface for the collection, nor are 
maps inserted in the f ilms or photographs as means of orientation or links 
between places. The presence of cartographic maps was a convention in 
f iction and documentary f ilms at the time, deployed in order to situate 
220 trOnd lundEMO
the individual shots within spatial coordinates and to create a continuous 
world of the f ilm. In this sense, cartography is often allied with the unifying 
embedment of the shot in classical editing.20 In the relative absence of edit-
ing of the f ilm shots or sequential ordering of the autochromes, the singular 
images in Kahn’s collection present us with a fragmentary world, isolated 
islands of spaces as places and time as events. If there is a cartographic 
principle to the organization of the shots and autochromes, it is closer to 
the loose juxtapositions of places and times known from ancient Japanese 
and other oriental maps, where fragments of space are separated by amor-
phous clouds, lakes, and streams (a mode of cartography that Albert Kahn 
would have known well through his fascination with Japanese culture). A 
compelling image of this dissociative organizational principle can perhaps 
be found in its adjoining gardens in Bolougne-Billancourt in Paris, whose 
forking paths lead abruptly from the Japanese to the English garden and 
further into the French garden, the blue forest, and the ‘prairie’. This garden 
is an integral part of Kahn’s geographical mapping project, in the sense 
that it forms a heterotopic collection of places on the site of the archive, but 
like the f ilms and autochromes, it disregards any latitudinal-longitudinal 
coordinates in its layout.
There is also a temporal dimension to this mapping, as some locations, 
especially in Paris, are f ilmed or photographed by Kahn’s cameramen on 
repeated occasions. This is partly motivated by an awareness of historical 
change, sometimes actualized and sometimes anticipated. In the area 
around the Arc de Triomphe, there are f ilms shot before the First World 
War to document contemporary life, traff ic, and fashion. During the war, 
the location was intensely photographed and f ilmed, along with the rest 
of Paris, in the fear that the approaching German forces may ruin the city. 
The streets were populated with a majority of women, as many men were 
drafted and killed in the war. The celebrations at the end of the war mark 
a new layer of the historical sedimentation of the place, followed by the 
baby boom a couple of years later. Towards the end of the 1920s, changes in 
fashion and a dominance of automobiles shape the urban landscape. These 
updates of the visual identity of a place at irregular intervals, function-
ing as superimpositions of images of the same place at different times, 
emphasize how Les Archives de la Planète’s geographical mapping of the 
world is inseparable from a historical and temporal mapping.
There are a few rare shots in the archive that highlight this temporal 
superimposition of the same place at different times in a physical image. 
A f ilm of 50 seconds called Superimposition Test (Essai de surimpression) 
(AI20405), from November 1920, presents clouds passing over shots of the 
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Arc de Triomphe and the Panthéon. Camille Sauvageot, the cameraman 
employed by the project who most often conducted technical experiments, 
also shot superimposed f ilms at different speeds. In Place de la Concorde 
(AI120347) from October 1923, only twelve seconds long, he superimposed 
night scenes of lights and cars in fast motion with shots from the same 
camera positions during daytime in normal speed. This layering of the 
temporality of ‘normal’ perception with the technological time of cinema, 
which he dubbed ‘the master of time and scales’, is repeated in two 1926 films 
of similar length: Avénue de l’Opéra le soir (AI137517) and L’arc de Triomphe 
(AI120266). Sauvageot also directed a series of colour f ilms in 1929, but these 
experiments are exceptions in the collection. Still, they provide a visual 
metaphor for the multi-layered temporality informing the project.
As it happens, the concept of temporal superimposition also informed 
Les Archives de la Planète as a whole. The project was to a large extent made 
for a context that remained unknown at the time of its creation. It was 
rarely shown or exploited, had no f ixed future use in view, and was created 
as a kind of time capsule, addressing a spectator or user in an unknown 
future when the world inscribed in the f ilms and photographs had disap-
peared. The f ilms and the photographs were, in other words, not intended 
for a contemporary public but for a time when the relation between the 
individual and the crowd or the mass might be a very different one due 
to a transformation of the modes of life inscribed in the collection. While 
photography and cinema have been powerful tools for formatting social 
memory in general, and in the twentieth century in particular, these images 
sought no immediate impact on human memory but rather constituted a 
‘living memory’ for the future. Of course, any archive and collection has a 
future use as its motivation, but most often they consist of documents that 
are already embedded in a social context and that attest to particularly 
signif icant moments in the past. Since Kahn’s collection deployed cinema 
and photography to chart a vast and fragmentary world of life forms, it 
invests the archive with a wholly new temporality. This archive is made 
for a future world, for future collectivities.
This locational projection into the future is what makes Les Archives de 
la Planète an aberrant ‘archive’. The organization of the collection, with its 
lack of editing between f ilm shots or a f ixed order between autochromes 
and moving images, removes it from the cartographic logic that informed 
the colonial and globalizing projects of its time. Instead of creating physical 
connections between images, places, and dates, there are only virtual con-
nections to be actualized or not at some future moment. The project simply 
eludes the representational ambitions of most other mapping projects at the 
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time and proceeds according to a disjunctive logic. While archives are usu-
ally defined by rules of selection that determine what to include and what to 
discard, as well as universal principles of indexing and ordering, Les Archives 
de la Planète is a cartographic project in the unusual sense evoked by Gilles 
Deleuze in order to describe the work of Michel Foucault. Kahn’s collection 
is diagrammatic, in the sense that it forms ‘a spatio-temporal multiplicity’ 
that is ‘co-extensive with the social f ield’ and that superimposes ‘history 
with becoming’.21 Of course, Kahn’s collection does not map the diagrams of 
power through an exposition of the visible and the sayable, as Foucault does 
in his archaeologies and genealogies. However, the dissociative logic in the 
connections between shots and autochromes as well as its projection into an 
unknown future elude the representational primacy in other archives and 
mapping projects. If we recall the processes of individuation and memory 
that Simondon identif ied in the image and apply them to Kahn’s collection, 
we might read Deleuze’s diagnosis of Foucault’s cartography as a description 
of Kahn’s mapping project:
…every diagram is intersocial and in becoming. It never functions to 
represent a pre-existing world, it produces a new type of reality, a new 
model of truth. […] It makes history by undoing previous realities and 
signif ications, constituting points of emergence or creativity, unat-
tended conjunctions, improbable continuities. It doubles history with 
a becoming.22
The forces and energies unleashed by the propagation and transmutation of 
locational images compose circuits of memory that go beyond the historical 
or the predetermined notion of place. Such a cartography contrasts with 
French historian Pierre Nora’s famous concept of lieux de mémoire – the 
extensive externalization of memory in static representations of places, 
dates, and events that characterized a modern obsession with memory and 
the problems of remembering. The concept identif ies a shift in history and 
historiography in a French social context as late as the 1930s.23 With the 
end of rural communities and the advent of mass media, a ‘real’ memory 
invested in life – what Nora called milieux de mémoire – gives way to a 
memory shaped through monuments, archives, institutions, and dates. In 
the place of a memory embedded in the gestures and spaces of a community, 
the lieux de mémoire are erected because spontaneous memory is lost and 
‘we must deliberately create archives, maintain anniversaries, organize 
celebrations, pronounce eulogies and notarize bills because such activities 
no longer come naturally’.24 They are ‘the rituals of a society without ritual’.25
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Hence, a memory that is immediate, natural, real, and part of life is con-
trasted with a memory-history that is constructed, artif icial, and external. 
Many of the distinctions between true memory and externalized memory 
echo those of Plato: where Plato’s media critique focused on writing, Nora 
identif ies ‘the trace, the immediacy of the recording, the visibility of the 
image’ as the problem. ‘What began as writing ends as high f idelity and 
tape recording’, Nora claims, without noting the line of descent from Plato’s 
argument.26 The key role played by cinema in this process becomes clear in 
Nora’s choice of metaphor: ‘Indeed, we have seen the tremendous dilation of 
our very mode of historical perception, which, with the help of media, has 
substituted for a memory entwined in the intimacy of a collective heritage 
the ephemeral f ilm of current events.’27 This dilation of perception is exactly 
the propagation of images constituting memory and imagination itself.
There has never been a true and real memory separated from media 
nor a ‘life’ independent of tools, technologies, and spatial constructions, 
and this is why memory itself has a history. In Nora’s account, however, 
it appears eternal and stable up until a very recent date. Not only is this 
account premised on a distinction between human internal memory and 
technological, external memory; it also produces an image of the social as 
a distinct entity, criss-crossed by channels of communication, rather than 
as emergent agglomerations of forces, where technologies function as living 
memory networks.
In their organization, the images in Les Archives de la Planète are in-
timately connected to places and the time of their recording, but this by 
no means implies that these images-places, still or moving, are f ixed in 
time and space. Since images are always acting on each other, propagating, 
modulating, and undoing themselves, their connecting points and constel-
lations are always changing. An image of an event is never f ixed but in 
constant motion because other images are always affecting it. The constant 
accumulation of images in the collection each time assigns a new place to 
the single shot and autochrome and relocates it in new circuits of propaga-
tion. One example could be the many f ilms of socialist and communist 
meetings and manifestations. The socialist meeting in support of Russia 
captures the crowds outside the Wagram theatre in Paris in November 1920 
(AI138016), and it may or may not be seen in conjunction with the f ilm of 
the delegates in the Third International Congress in Tours a month later 
(AI107253). A conventional documentary on social and political movements 
would edit these shots together with the footage from the Manifestation of 
the Communist Party on the occasion of the death of Lenin in Saint-Denis, 
Paris, in February of 1924 (AI138063). In this collection, however, no one has 
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made these montages, and there is no way of determining how they would 
relate to each other. Any other juxtaposition is equally possible, making 
the montage a virtual aspect of the images, to be realized or not in some 
future. The individual f ilms and photographs in Kahn’s collection may lend 
themselves to representations of individual persons and specif ic crowds 
at given times and places, as has been done in various recent documenta-
ries – for instance in THE BBC TV production Edwardians in Colour: The 
Wonderful World of Albert Kahn (2007). However, as an aggretate of potential 
connections and disjunctions, Kahn’s images are instead a resource for 
the type of virtual associations that constitute memory in processes of 
collective individuation.
Judiciary and administrative archives store documents that have a legal 
and bureaucratic political function. As Cornelia Vismann has shown, it is 
only after their use has changed and they no longer exert the same political 
power that they become documents for historiography.28 Historians then 
make use of the documents to reconstruct the ways in which they were 
once active and exerted power. Both while in use and as historical source 
materials, archival documents form precedence for future decisions or offer 
a means of scrutinizing authority. In contrast, Les Archives de la Planète is 
devoid of any such history of usage. It deploys the visual media of its time 
to make an inventory of the world but does not collect documents that have 
been in use. For this reason, the techniques of inventory invest the collection 
with a memory that is more cartographic, or better, diagrammatic, than 
institutional or individual. They aim at an inscription of forms of social life 
but are never themselves part of the social context they seek to document. 
It is a collection without a social history, very much in contrast to the way 
almost all other f ilm and photography archives or collections are a monu-
ment to an epoch, a nation, or a social movement.
If images are endowed with a particular capacity for propagation and 
association, the associational or social forces of the Kahn archive are also 
inf initely delayed. There is an intentional anachronism in the images from 
the outset, since the images are mobilized only at the moment when they 
diverge from the social life they purportedly represent. The deferred propa-
gation of memory is perhaps best exemplif ied in the various shots of Paris 
mentioned above, where the Kahn cameramen visit the same places again 
and again at different times to inscribe a changing social world. Paris is 
comprehensively mapped before the First World War, and the life of the city 
is again recorded through the cameras when the post-war fervour is taking 
place and on other potentially life-changing occasions. Rather than seeing 
this lack of an ‘original’ social context as an obstacle to analysis, it presents 
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an opportunity to reconsider the mediating functions of images and to 
chart the mobilization of memory in the deferred time between shooting 
and showing, collecting and exhibiting. The images did not contribute to 
the social memory of their time, as they were seldom shown or projected. 
The collection was indexed according to the nations, regions, and cities 
where it was shot, and it adheres to the topological principles of histori-
ography. However, it would only become active as a network of memory 
once the social modes of life inscribed in the collection had disappeared. 
It is premised on an insurmountable leap into the future, a mode of action 
at a (temporal) distance. In this sense, the collection not only has change 
or difference built into it, it even contributes to the very disappearance 
of social life forms by which it is motivated. The new media of f ilm and 
photography are powerful forces in the globalization observed by Kahn 
and contribute strongly to the changes in local cultures that this process 
sets about. The life of images always creates feedback loops in relation to 
the world they are sensed to document, but in Les Archives de la Planète, 
where the temporal dissociation between the ‘inventory’ and the world is 
the impulse for the collection itself, these recursions create superimposed 
temporalities. The media are themselves propelling the end of what they 
document by inscribing a place and time that will only emerge as such once 
it has disappeared, once the map no longer f its any terrain.
Les Archives de la Planète is invested with a latency where the connec-
tions between images remain virtual. This suspension of the propagation of 
images is an important aspect of Simondon’s concept of collective individu-
ation. Psychological and collective individuation is caused by problems that 
biological individuation cannot resolve: an incongruity between perception 
and action such as the relation to the environment and other individuals 
or the consciousness of death. Collective individuation intervenes as a 
deferral or slowing down of the processes of vital individuation where these 
problems emerge. Simondon describes these processes as a bending back 
to pre-individual and individual individuations – a kind of regression that 
creates types of collectives based on the transindividual realm that includes 
the environment as well as other individuals.29 The networks of images 
involved in these processes operate according to intervals and suspen-
sions, as Bergson also identif ied in the streams of images and matter. These 
disjunctions form a becoming that is ‘co-extensive with the social f ield’ (to 
quote Deleuze’s description of Foucault’s diagram) rather than a stable and 
resolved representation of the world.30
The Kahn archive, then, provokes juxtapositions between its images 
and the geographical sites as they look today, and this was part of Kahn’s 
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intention. However, he probably did not foresee that the material recorded 
with the new media of his time – autochromes and f ilms – would become 
accessible in another medium only. Since most of the shots in the archive 
only exist in one screening print due to their lack of exhibition, and since 
the autochromes could only be reproduced through re-photographing, the 
material has been almost entirely inaccessible until today. The archival im-
perative of digitization has made the documents accessible only as a world 
in bits. The FAKIR database, available on the premises of the Albert Kahn 
Museum, and its small web version Mappemonde, still wanders between 
the local and the global, the small event and the historical panorama, 
the individual and the nation.31 Indexed according to continents and na-
tions ‒as most f ilm histories are ‒on a world map interface, the shots and 
photographs seem to contribute to the traditional cartographies of world 
geography and history. The digitized images of Les Archives de la Planète, 
which in their f leeting analogue constellations eluded representations of 
crowds, places, and events as f ixed entities, are in a very literal sense reter-
ritorialized. Their interconnections depend on relays between places and 
historical periods, such as the pre-war years, the battles of First World War, 
the post-war years, etc. The interface of the FAKIR and the Mappemonde da-
tabases reproduces the traditional coherent and totalizing representational 
strategies of the atlas and cartographic mapping. In an age of increasingly 
privatized and individualized reception and representation, however, as 
epitomized by television, the personal computer, and the Internet, the 
‘inventory’ made by and for Kahn’s archive resurfaces in a different format 
within another mode of life. The media technical affordances emerging 
from these new connective modes of networks inevitably also inform the 
way they operate. Alongside the traditional representations of place in 
the database interface, there is a simultaneous deterritorialization of the 
relations they impose. These current processes of memory and collective 
individuation in digital networks are the topic of the web installation 
Paris ville invisible.
Mapping the invisible city
When the social theorist Bruno Latour returned to the photographic inscrip-
tion of Paris almost a century later, the city had become mute and invisible. 
Bruno Latour and Emilie Hermant’s 1998 book Paris ville invisible, with text 
by the former and photographs by the latter, was made into a web database 
in 2004 which demonstrates and analyzes this shift in the image of the 
chaptEr EIght 227
crowd and of the city. The reason why Paris is invisible is that every aspect 
forming the logic of urban networks takes place ‘under the surface of the 
world’, in city planning off ices and bureaucratic institutions. The once so 
luminous city, with its monuments and institutions, eludes representation 
through f ixed inventories of places and crowds. Paris ville invisible already 
announces its representational limitations in its title. This is not because 
the web installation is overwhelming or beyond the grasp of the subject. 
The pictures and the text can actually be entirely covered in a few hours. 
The title of the book and web installation is instead designed to address the 
concept of visibility rather than to be taken literally. Why would Latour and 
Hermant make a ‘photographic inquiry’ if Paris had really become invisible? 
The invisibility only concerns one layer of visuality, and the project aims 
to make another visibility stand out.
The City of Light has not given way to the ‘City of Bits’, as argued by 
William Mitchell in his book from 1995, as the streets and monuments of 
Paris still co-exist with the urban roles of computer surveillance and infra-
structural operational images.32 Latour and Hermant aim to make another 
level of the visual composition of the city apparent, one that is normally 
hidden to the inhabitants and visitors of the city and that is only visible to 
a few. This is why they call their web installation an ‘oligopticon’, and the 
project is in this sense intensely concerned with visuality and visibility: to 
make visible the images one doesn’t normally see and to investigate how 
these images subtend the intensely propagated images of the city informing 
the memory of Paris. Paris ville invisible is an archaeology of a globalizing 
image that depends on other images and especially on the networks they 
create. The tourist attractions and monuments propagated all over the 
world, the images that make people want to ‘see Paris’, are only the surface 
layer of a connective network of images and media subtending them. The 
continuities between the city and its representation in f ilm and photog-
raphy – a de facto monumentalization of the city in cinema theatres and 
museum galleries – change once the city’s images are navigational means 
in a virtual as well as an actual urban space. Places of transit, designed to be 
anonymous and non-specif ic as well as emptied of memory, form key parts 
of the ‘invisible’ Paris in Latour and Hermant’s oligopticon. Their project 
is to analyze these subtending images with an emphasis on their social or 
connective dimensions.
Adapted to the digital techniques of the web installation, these 
alternative views of the city are exempt from ‘social life’ as ordinarily 
understood. The streets are empty. The life of the city is now found in the 
off ices for infrastructure and city planning and their operational images 
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for controlling traff ic and surveillance of the city. Operational images 
tracking traff ic and automated work processes, rarely seen and perhaps 
only read by an individual salaried worker, make up the visual panorama 
of the web installation. Paris ville invisible focuses on the new role of images 
as control tools for the waterworks, sewerage, train services, and public 
safety ‒images that propagate a very different form of memory than the 
cartographic representation of the city. These images do not display the sites 
and monuments of the arguably most remembered city of the world but 
instead become functional through intermittent yet continuous updating: 
they are mapping a Paris in motion.
The control rooms for traffic and public safety surveillance are populated 
by screens that change at regular intervals, where human or automated 
reading devices are programmed to react to certain changes in the images. 
These networked images constitute processes of memory thanks to the way 
in which they are interconnected, updated, and read by stored algorithms 
that respond to emerging data. Such memory networks thus depend on 
computing operations whose microtemporalities are beyond the grasp of 
the human sensorium: even more so since a change in the composition of 
the image or in the constellations between the different constituents of 
the network produce recursive effects in the image networks. These image 
networks operate through feedback loops and transmutations: operational 
images never stand alone. They only function through interoperability, and 
their links and connections instigate a form of memory that is continuously 
updated with a view to future action.
In Latour and Hermant’s description, the city has changed from ‘the 
City of Light’ into an opaque city, but this does not mean that it cannot be 
traced through digital means. However, their database project provides 
little reflection on the way in which the media used for the web installa-
tion also form part of this reconfigured visibility. In reality, the physical 
properties of the digital camera for the inscription of (the city of) light 
constitute a radical change in social techniques. The images and texts of 
the web database cannot implement the continuous updates and recur-
sions of the image networks they depict, and consequently they resort to 
a different temporality. The website is constructed so as to create connec-
tions between the iconic views of Paris and the networks of images that 
subtend them, but they cannot implement the updating and feedback that 
make the interconnections operable. The images are the same as when the 
installation was put online in 2004, and the itinerary through the designed 
pathways remain stable. The movement of the single images is restricted to 
navigation within a frozen panorama where the user may pan across the 
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landscape: there is no movement in the image itself. By clicking on the text 
at the bottom of the image, the whole of the text is superimposed over the 
image, and the still images lend themselves to a variability of movement 
at the user’s impulse of navigation. The interconnections between the 
images and the texts may change according to the navigation of the human 
agent, but the pre-established order between images and texts remains 
f ixed. This can be understood as an unavoidable concession to the online 
installation format, where the processual dynamics of the operational 
images are irretrievable. The archival logic of the web installation had to 
sacrif ice such dynamics, but it may still pinpoint important changes in 
the collective modalities of these image networks. The introduction to 
the piece reads:
Paris, the City of Light, so open to the gaze of artists and tourists, so 
often photographed, the subject of so many glossy books, that we tend 
to forget the problems of thousands of engineers, technicians, civil serv-
ants, inhabitants and shopkeepers in making it visible. The aim of this 
sociological opera is to wander through the city, in texts and images, 
exploring some of the reasons why it cannot be captured at a glance.33
According to Latour, Paris has probably never been visible at a glance, as it 
has always relied on the networks and actors forming the city. The opening 
image of the web installation’s indicated pathway is a shot from the top of 
the Samaritaine department store which can be panned 360° by moving 
the cursor to the left or right edges of the image. The adjoining text reads:
‘You can f ind anything at the Samaritaine’ is this department store’s 
slogan.
Yes, anything and even a panoramic view of the all of Paris. All of Paris? 
Not quite. On the top floor of the main building a bluish ceramic pano-
rama allows one, as they say, ‘to capture the city at a glance’. On a huge 
circular, slightly tilted table, engraved arrows point to Parisian landmarks 
drawn in perspective. Soon the attentive visitor is surprised: ‘But where’s 
the Pompidou Centre?’ ‘Where are the tree-covered hills that should 
be in the north-east?’ ‘What’s that skyscraper that’s not on the map?’ 
The ceramic panorama, put there in the 1930s by the Cognac-Jays, the 
founders of the department store, no longer corresponds to the stone and 
flesh landscape spread out before us. The legend no longer matches the 
pictures. Virtual Paris was detached from real Paris long ago. It’s time 
we updated our panoramas.34
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The revelatory panorama of Paris that opens and ends Paris ville invisible 
fails to make a representational inventory of the city: ‘it no longer holds any 
attraction, and gives no information’. Since Latour and Hermant produced 
their web installation, the Samaritaine has closed, and the blue ceramic 
panorama is no longer accessible, if it is even there. So perhaps it is also 
time to update the web oligopticon. The key point of Paris ville invisible, 
however, is that the temporal logic of the panorama itself has changed. It 
is no longer a question of just replacing the panorama of Paris with a new 
one and including the Centre Pompidou and other changes in the surface 
cityscape. In the f inal ‘station’ of the indicated pathway of the installation, 
it returns to the panorama presentation:
The term Virtual Paris doesn’t refer to the downloading from the Web, the 
complete disembodiment, ultimate modernization or f inal connection 
that is the stuff of hackers’ dreams; on the contrary, it means a return to 
incarnation, to virtualities. Yes, the power is invisible, but like the virtual, 
like the plasma, like the perpetual transformations of the Pont-Neuf. […] 
We suddenly notice that if we spoke of Paris, the Invisible City, it was, 
essentially not simply to combine social theory with a photographic 
inquiry, but to give back, in a little beauty, some of the lavish splendour 
that the City of Light has in store. Paris scan, Paris can.35
This new beauty of Paris resides in its capacity for new incarnations rather 
than representations. Latour’s Paris is a network of social and technological 
mediators, couplings, and relays. The operational images surveying traff ic 
and sewer systems, shopkeepers, and mailmen are parts of the same net-
work as the photographic images in the web installation and the inhabitants 
and the visitors that navigate the city through paper maps, signs, Google 
maps, GPS, or Google earth searches. Paris ville invisible charts the city as 
a memory that is being reconfigured at the bureaucratic and technological 
levels every day.
Incidentally, Paris ville invisible was itself invisible for a period: the URL 
of the web database, <http://www.bruno-latour.fr/virtual/index.html>, had 
expired in the fall of 2011 and only returned a ‘page not found’ message.36 
Web retrieval is always unreliable, and any page can disappear at any 
moment, and it was perhaps in anticipation of expired links that Latour 
published the web project as a text-only PDF book, with the caution that: 
‘This text is not understandable without the pictures. It is provided simply 
to help those who have diff iculty tracing the complete legends on the web.’37 
The sudden invisibility of the web installation demonstrates the ambiguous 
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visibility upholding these networks addressed in Hermant and Latour’s 
title. They subtend the ‘off icial’ and stable representations of the city and 
yet operate beyond the thresholds of perception, thus instigating different 
forms of collective individuation. The infrastructural networks integrate 
technological and human forms of memorizing by operating in terms of the 
connective forces of memory itself. The individuating capacities of images 
are thus folded back onto the representations of Paris, now investing them 
with a virtual dimension. Les Archives de la Planète, through its deliberate 
time lag between shooting and projecting and the disjunctive logic between 
shots and autochromes, also operates according to a diagrammatic mode 
of mapping, where the connections constitute points of emergence and 
invention. ‘It doubles history with a becoming’ that is ‘co-extensive with the 
social f ield’. The futural logic of Kahn’s cartographic project is now realized 
at the level of media infrastructure.
Collective individuation and the public
In Les Archives de la Planète, the media of autochromes and f ilm contrast 
and complement each other in order to make an inventory of the social 
modes of life at the time of shooting for a time to come. Like a time capsule, 
the surface of Paris at a given time was to be compared and contrasted with 
Parisian life in an unknown future. However, this visual information is 
unleashed at a time when archival image technologies operate according 
to a different processual logic. Today, the images of the collection are only 
accessible in digitized formats and through digital interfaces. Kahn and 
Latour’s respective cartographies thus reveal two different yet intersecting 
approaches to the life of images. Kahn’s mapping of Paris, or any other 
city in his collection, is oriented towards a future when the map no longer 
matches the terrain. Where Latour evokes a Paris of the past, as represented 
for instance by the panorama on the top of the Samaritaine, it is only to fold 
the city’s infrastructural connections and relays back onto its representa-
tions, inscribing these representations within a processual and connective 
dynamics.
Both mapping projects form temporalizing image networks, but they 
produce different types of collective individuations. The temporal deferral 
in Les Archives de la Planète seems to entail the type of individuation that, 
according to Simondon, takes place when the individual is confronted with a 
world in which perception and action becomes incongruous, i.e. a ‘problem’ in 
Simondon’s terminology of individuation. The experienced lack of continuity 
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between the historical world and its anticipated, undefined present can only 
be resolved with recourse to the environment and other individuals. Since 
imagination and memory are key elements in all processes of individuation, 
the suspension of image propagation invests such processes with a diagram-
matic becoming that is co-extensive with the world itself. Along similar 
lines, Paris ville invisible depicts memory as a virtual power of incarnation in 
which temporal images network themselves. The connections and recursions 
between images are determined by processes beyond human perception 
and action, but they still constitute collective individuations. The problems 
Simondon sees as characteristic of this mode of individuation always refer 
back to biological and technical individuation as a kind of regression to pre-
individual individuation.38 These different individuations are distinguished by 
degrees rather than processual forms: also technical individuation encounters 
incongruities with the environment that produce concretizations of technical 
objects.39 As a principle, individuation must consequently be understood 
in terms of processes of deferral and quantum leaps, metastabilities and 
recursions, and not in terms of specifically human or machinic substances.
These processes of individuation, actualized by Kahn’s and Latour/
Hermant’s image networks, consequently demand that we understand the 
concepts of the audience, the mass, the crowd, and the public in new ways. 
The instances of metastability we often refer to as the person, individual, 
and collective are not pre-existing or subjected to these processes. They are 
isolated fields to be described and analyzed, since they only exist within these 
very individuating processes. Such insights confront us with a very different 
social ontology than the one underpinning, for instance, the Frankfurt School. 
If we understand individuation as processes of memory operated through 
the propagation of images, we also have to think about the media networks 
historically, as different network forms produce different modulations of 
memory and images. Collective memory was always in motion since it is 
formed through ontogenetic processes where images propagate and transmute 
like micro-organisms, but the velocities and technologies of connectivity have 
undergone radical changes. These shifting velocities and connecting points 
between images – material and mental, past and present ‒ have reconfigured 
and transformed the very idea of what is communal and social.
For Simondon, collective individuation is a function of the affectivity 
between living organisms, objects, and technologies.40 Such affectivity is the 
matter of images ‒‘material’ as well as ‘mental’‒ and the way in which they 
propagate, act on, and transmute each other. Collective individuation is in this 
sense a continuous process of affecting and being affected according to the 
connectivity between elements in image networks. This capacity for affecting 
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and being affected also informs Gabriel Tarde’s concept of ‘a public’ formed 
by a dynamics of imitation and invention. In a move that prehends certain 
aspects of Simondon’s concept of individuation, Tarde finds invention at the 
intersection of (or disjunction between) two imitative trends. In contrast to the 
concepts of crowds or the mass (la foule), Tarde’s concept of the public depicts 
the capacity to affect and be affected over a distance but congregated in time.41 
This theory of the public is developed in the years between 1893 and 1901, with 
reference to the impact of newspapers and more generally the development of 
the printing press, the railway, and the telegraph.42 Yet these are also the early 
years of cinema. With its many different forms of distribution and exhibition 
throughout history, individual and collective, from ‘peep show’ to projection, 
cinema is instrumental in forming the ‘public’ as a temporal social formation.
Les Archives de la Planète implements collective individuations in similarly 
temporal terms – through a suspension of memory and the introduction of a 
latency in the propagation of its images rather than fixed spatial representa-
tions of places and crowds. By inscribing history within a logic of becoming 
and by giving the document an explicitly multitemporal mode of existence, 
Les Archives de la Planète forms an idiosyncratic archive of its time. It is 
perhaps a paradox that when this archive is just re-emerging in a medium 
able to support dynamic processes of connectivity (the digital databases 
FAKIR and Mappemonde), Kahn’s project is reterritorialized and stabilized 
as representations of places and events of the past. The current version of his 
cartography forms a coherent historical and geographical atlas; the disjunc-
tions between the shots have been edited into self-sustained narratives and 
the differences between the media of the archive have been smoothed out. 
Instead, it is an entirely different database memory of Paris that points us in 
the direction of what might perhaps be a more appropriate interface for the 
Kahn archive. Paris ville invisible produces connections between images that 
themselves have the status of infrastructural memory networks, defined by 
the time-critical feedback processes of collective individuation.
Notes
1. I call Paris a psycho-geographical location to emphasize how it also has a 
place in memory and consciousness. The term calls forth associations to 
the dérive of the situationist movement and their psychogeographical maps 
(and Guy Debord’s 1955 psychogeographical map of Paris in particular), but 
I will not pursue a further elaboration of the situationist theory of specta-
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cle, the city, maps, and memory here, as it would lead to a clouding of the 
theories of place and memory I am focusing on in this context.
2. Simondon, 2014, p. 16.
3. Ibid., pp. 18-23. For a discussion of the ontogenetic role of images in Simon-
don’s philosophy, see Väliaho, pp. 91-93.
4. Simondon, 2014, p. 13.
5. Ibid., pp. 15-21. 
6. Ibid., p. 7.
7. Which is, of course, not to say that their philosophies of the image are 
identical: Simondon doesn’t conceptualize a ‘plaque sensible’ or a centre 
of indetermination halting and making cuts in the streams of images, and 
he notes how Bergsonian intuition only partly accounts for the processes 
involved in the genetic cycles of imagination leading to invention (ibid.: 23).
8. The whole of Bergson’s Matière et Mémoire [1896] treats this problem; see 
pp. 11-17 for an introduction to the thesis.
9. Simondon, 2014, p. 14.
10. When Simondon persistently refers to images as ‘intermediary’, he uses the 
term differently from Bruno Latour’s distinction between ‘intermediaries’ 
and ‘mediators’. An intermediary is for Latour ‘what transports meaning 
or force without transformation: defining its inputs is enough to define its 
outputs’, while with mediators, ‘their input is never a good predictor of their 
output; their specificity has to be taken into account every time’ (Latour 
2005: 37). Simondon is also concerned with the agency of elements within 
networks, but he understands the intermediary role of images, material and 
mental, as transmutations, propagations, and deferrals where the output is 
never decided by the input – in other words, along similar lines as Latour 
understands mediators. This is clear from his first paragraph in Imagination 
et invention (1965-1966), where he claims that images ‘present themselves 
according to their own forces, inhabiting consciousness like an intruder 
who comes to disturb the order in a house where he has not been invited’ 
(ibid.: 7).
11. Simondon, 2005, p. 29. Simondon’s concept of individuation is explained 
and discussed in Chateau, pp. 45-64.
12. Simondon, 2005, p. 29.
13. Chateau, p. 59.
14. Yates, pp. 27-30.
15. Albert Kahn quoted in Amad, p. 144 (my italics).
16. Bazin, pp. 9-17.
17. Tom Conley points out this ‘cartographic’ property of Bazin’s aesthetics in 
Conley, pp. 6-8.
18. Teresa Castro employs the atlas metaphor to describe Kahn’s endeavour in 
‘Les Archives de la Planète: A Cinematographic Atlas’.
19. Siegfried Kracauer sees the interdependence of these two perspectives 
as the ideal for modern historiography and illustrates the method with 
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cinema’s constant shifts between the establishing shot and the close-up. See 
History: The Last Things Before The Last. 
20. Of course, there are many exceptions to this general assessment, as ana-
lyzed by Tom Conley in his mapping of cartographic cinema.
21. Deleuze, pp. 42-43. Tom Conley also draws on Deleuze’s discussion for his 






27. Ibid., pp. 7-8.
28. Vismann.





33. Latour and Hermant, 1998, p. 1.
34. Ibid., p. 2.
35. Ibid., p. 103.
36. It was back online by the spring of 2013, accessed 8 April 2015.
37. Ibid., p. 1.
38. Chateau, pp. 57-58.
39. For a discussion of the interdependencies between different forms of indi-
viduation in Simondon, see De Boever et al., pp. 36-45.
40. Simondon, 2005, p. 165.
41. Tarde.
42. ‘Ainsi s’est formée, par un faisceau de trois inventions mutuellement auxili-
aires, imprimerie, chemin de fer, télégraphe, la formidable puissance de 
la presse, ce prodigieux téléphone qui a si démesurément grossi l’ancien 
auditoire des tribuns et des prédicateurs.’ (ibid.: 12).
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 Chapter Nine
Stills from a Film That Was Never Made: Cinema, Gesture, 
Memory
Pasi Väliaho
Among their myriad of powers, images may become propellants of memory 
- dynamic, even explosive materials that force the bullets of remembrance 
and imagination into motion, conscious or unconscious.1 One particular 
photograph so triggered the flights of my thought as I encountered it, quite 
accidentally, whilst browsing through the Yad Vashem photo archive online.2 
The photograph affected me strongly and has obsessed me since, causing a sort 
of historical reverie – or nightmare – that I will unravel in what follows. Perhaps 
the photograph acquired in my eyes the status of what the art historian Aby 
Warburg called an ‘emotive formula’ (Pathosformel): a temporal and psychic 
force that with particular affective and corporeal intensity compels the recogni-
tion of something that has been buried in oblivion, the return of the repressed.3
The photograph spoke to me in at least two ways. On the one hand, I 
was made to wonder how the past leaves us memories we f ind diff icult to 
categorize, memories that stir our imaginations of history and obliges us to 
acknowledge something (in our past as well as present) we normally don’t 
want to acknowledge. On the other, I was led to ask how we become the 
protagonists of our lives and the histories we belong to; how we become the 
beings we perceive we are. These questions emanated from the photograph 
that I felt was seeking to burst the stillness of its frame and that materialized 
a particular ‘memory in motion’: the gestures of the characters in the picture 
were already anticipating their next position, and the photograph itself was 
to become meaningful only when viewed in relation to the images that (one 
might imagine) preceded and followed it.
Thus the problem also became one of motion and stasis, of images that 
move, either in imagination or animated by a machine. There is an enigmatic 
but compelling statement Giorgio Agamben has put forward that every 
image can be considered a still ‘of a lost f ilm’ wherein it regains its ‘true 
meaning’.4 Every image, on this account, is ‘mobile’ in the sense that it ‘virtu-
ally anticipates its future developments and remembers its former gestures’.5 
This is true for the images that live within us, in our dreams, memories, 
imaginations, and desires; they are never at rest. I started to speculate that 
perhaps the position of cinema has at some point become so powerful that 
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also these inner images – including those evoked by our encounters with 
pictures – have started to follow the cinematic medium’s formulaic patterns. 
The paths and forks of my historical reverie followed this direction: I started 
to look for the ‘lost f ilm’ the photograph was part of and simultaneously to 
question cinema’s role in telling us who we have been and who we could 
be, indeed, cinema’s power to mould our actions and make history. What 
became evident was that cinematic images should not only be considered 
recordings and revelations of the past but also as memories of the future: 
as forces that tell us what is or was (if taking a retrospective look) to come.
Two moments
A man and a woman, both dressed and groomed for celebration: an ex-
change of looks. The man is wearing a Nazi uniform, the woman a black 
evening dress. The pine trees in the background and the branch positioned 
on the dining table betray, one can assume, that it is Christmas. A moment 
of intimacy: we can detect something about the relation between the man 
fig. 9.1: Westerbork, holland, camp commandant gemmeker and his secretary on christmas 
Eve 1943. photograph by rudolph Breslauer. courtesy of Yad vashem photo archive (album no. 
fa29/153).
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and the woman that was not perhaps meant to be so obviously apparent. 
The way their arms almost touch one another suggests amorous tension 
and desire, the cigarette that burns in the man’s hand defying the moment’s 
f initude, hailing its fleeting eternity. The man’s gaze is seductive but tender 
at the same time. How did the woman respond to it? That we cannot directly 
witness, although she’s def initely smiling.
The photograph was taken at the Westerbork ‘transit camp’ (Durchgang-
slager) in the occupied Netherlands on Christmas Eve in 1943. The man 
who casts the seductive look is the camp commander SS Obersturmführer 
(Lieutenant) Albert Gemmeker, the woman his secretary Elisabeth Hassel. 
The photograph was taken by one of the Jewish inmates, Rudolph Breslauer, 
who was a professional photographer before he was taken into captivity. 
Gemmeker gave Breslauer permission to document daily life at the camp 
with his Leica camera. A range of different kinds of photographic material 
taken by Breslauer still survives: of manual (and forced) labour in the camp; 
of Hannukkah celebrations; of the empty bunks in the barracks; of young 
women dancing; of selected inmates boarding the train that transported 
them to the east; and of the Christmas Eve celebration in 1943 that was 
organized in the SS mess hall.6
fig. 9.2: Westerbork, holland, camp commandant gemmeker with his secretary and an Sd officer 
on christmas Eve 1943. photograph by rudolph Breslauer. courtesy of Yad vashem photo archive 
(album no. fa29/152).
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But to go back to my question: how did Frau Hassel respond to camp 
commander Gemmeker’s gaze? With a similarly affectionate and seductive 
look, as we can witness in a photograph that must have been shot only a few 
seconds before or after the one I started with (f ig. 2). Crucially, the exchange 
of looks was captured as if in a cinematic shot-countershot (f ig. 3). The work 
of editing that combines these two moments into a continuum, however, 
has in this case not been relegated to an apparatus but is the duty of the 
observer’s imagination. Here, images come together and get juxtaposed and 
blended with one another through a spontaneous mental power of montage 
that composes the textures of memory and perceptions of the past.
What is striking in the way these two photographs communicate the 
past is that they seem to tell a story that is quite different from the ones 
we ordinarily associate with the Holocaust: no visible signs of suffering, 
death, and horror. Neither piles of corpses nor of clothes they left behind, 
no starving and naked bodies, no chimneys or railway tracks. The fates 
of those who were transported to the death camps in the east (including 
Breslauer and his family, all of whom were killed, except for his daughter, 
in Auschwitz in 1944) rather colour the pictures like an afterthought. The 
imagery we are familiar with today, made especially after the liberation of 
the camps, looms only perhaps as a series of ghostly apparitions that our 
contemporary gaze returns to these photographs. These are, nonetheless, 
mere retrospective superimpositions. The victims of the persecution are 
signif icantly absent from the documentation of the Christmas Eve, the 
reality of the genocide perhaps being, from the viewpoint of the perpetra-
tors, a matter of duty and of the everyday one wants to forget momentarily 
during an evening of celebration. The photographs seem to want to betray, 
even cancel the world they come from, emanating from a psychic space 
fig. 9.3: frame enlargements: Elisabeth hassel and albert gemmeker.
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where one can act out one’s dreams and desires, no matter how absurd and 
horrif ic the circumstances.
The two moments captured on photosensitive emulsion speak of a world 
that seems as oneiric and detached from (historical) reality as a Hollywood 
script. The man and the woman were, indeed, lovers, but Frau Hassel was 
married to another man (Gemmeker’s adjutant, we are told). A powerful 
drama thus plays out through Breslauer’s photography worthy of mainstream 
cinematic clichés. Here, crucially, when perceived in a cinematic continuum 
– a continuum that defies the image’s evidentiary function and instead ‘burns 
imagination to heat up reality’7 – photographic images reveal an essential 
aspect of their own making. They can even testify to, if not bring forth, a 
realm of possibility, of forgetfulness and fantasy, which is carved out of the 
present moment’s facticity. We learn from psychoanalytic theory that the 
temporality of the psyche’s reservoir of images, desires, and meanings, which 
translate into reality as our actions, is different from the linear sequence of 
events we often call history. Defying the consciousness of time’s course (and, 
by consequence, of death), these phantasmatic productions are forces that can 
make time stop and disjoint the individual from her/his habitual dwellings.8
The amorous looks, the cigarettes: each belong to a dream space carved 
within a general nightmare. But where did they learn these poses? Where 
do these gestures come from?
Cinematic doubles
‘So perhaps we could try to get married once again?’ a man asks a woman. 
Paul Wendlandt, a lieutenant in the Luftwaffe, has been wounded in ac-
tion, and his lover Hanna Holberg, a famous singer of Danish origin, has 
figs. 9.4 & 9.5: frame captures from The Great Love (Die Grosse Liebe, 1942).
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come to see him. The couple was to have married three weeks prior to this 
day, but Paul got suddenly called to the Eastern front where his plane was 
subsequently shot down. Now this brave man is back on German soil healing 
his wounds in a hospital in the mountains. The lovers’ amorous encounter 
is captured in a series of shot-countershots (f igs. 4 and 5) that results in 
a kiss (f ig. 6), which is interrupted by a fleet of bombers crossing the sky. 
Paul and Hanna follow the spectacle in awe before Hanna responds to the 
marriage proposal with a nod and a smile, and they both gaze anticipatively 
but confidently at the sky (f ig. 7).
This is how Rolf Hansen’s The Great Love (Die Grosse Liebe) ends. The f ilm 
premiered in 1942 and soon became one of the most successful UFA f ilms 
of the Third Reich. It starred Zarah Leander as Hanna and Viktor Staal as 
Paul. Staal and Leander (who was also a hugely popular singer) were Nazi 
Germany’s key cinematic icons, at the forefront of the popular dramas that 
f illed the German Volk’s imaginary. In The Great Love, they are lovers whose 
marriage attempts are constantly put off by the uncertain conditions of 
the war and would perhaps be completely thwarted were it not for Hanna’s 
devoutness and forbearance.
But why I am looking at this f inal scene of The Great Love in conjunction 
with the photographs of the Christmas Eve celebration at Westerbork? 
Of course, we don’t know whether Gemmeker and Hassel ever saw The 
Great Love (was there even a movie theatre in the town of Westerbork?). 
However, the resemblance between the couples comes across as striking: 
stars and starlets groomed in the UFA studio in Berlin appearing in Nazi 
Germany’s scrapbook of ideal social types on one side, and on the other, 
petty functionaries of the most powerful machinery of death in history, 
located in a remote camp in the occupied Netherlands. The former are 
clearly not murderers, whereas the latter couldn’t have been completely 
figs. 9.6 & 9.7: frame captures from The Great Love (Die Grosse Liebe, 1942).
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blind about the deathly roles they played. Yet these individuals seem to be 
cast in the same mould: tall blond men in uniform, brunette women whose 
haircuts and picked eyebrows are almost identical. One cannot fail to see 
how much their postures are alike (f ig. 8). Hassel and Leander’s eyes bear 
the same spark of affection (even if the former’s is a bit more mischievous, 
lacking perhaps the token of devotion we can read in the latter’s). And 
it is almost as though Gemmeker was about to ask his secretary on that 
Christmas Eve in Westerbork in 1943: ‘Will you marry me?’
Leander and Staal are clearly acting out a script, but could it be that 
Gemmeker and Hassel are, too? Is that how history works and how we 
become protagonists of the f ilms that we call our lives – through a mimicry 
of gestures that mark at once our freedom (potentiality) as well as our 
submission to destiny (necessity)?9
Gestures on screen
In the 1960s, anthropologist André Leroi-Gourhan put forward a powerful 
thesis about the prominence of gestures, alongside speech, as primary 
expressions of the mind - collective and individual, conscious and uncon-
scious. Leroi-Gourhan saw how any culture is based on a certain repertoire 
of gestures that gets repeated and conditioned between individuals. 
Gestures, he argued, are organized into ‘operational sequences’ that are 
‘borrowed from a collective tradition that one generation passes down to 
the next.’10 These sequences establish a form of collective bodily memory 
fig. 9.8: frame enlargements: Elisabeth hassel and Zarah leander.
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that guarantees gestures their social function as well as meaning. From the 
carpenter’s skilled hand movements utilizing a saw to the bodily expres-
sions of courtship – from the use of tools to aesthetics – the organization of 
the body’s movements into culturally coded manners is a matter of learning 
to cope with the material environment as well as becoming a member of 
society.
Even if gestures have played this social and mnemic role throughout 
millennia, one might argue that it was not before the introduction of modern 
moving image media that their dynamic became a matter of systematic re-
cording, dissemination, and standardization as well as of new mutations and 
differentiations across the planet. Art historian Erwin Panofsky observed 
already in the 1930s how ‘it is the movies that mold, more than any other 
single force, the opinions, the taste, the language, the dress, the behaviour, 
and even the physical appearance of a public comprising more than 60 per 
cent of the population of the earth.’11 It is not certain where Panofsky got that 
f igure (60 per cent) but the crux of his argument is clear: moving images 
operate as external forces or attributes that we assimilate into our habitus 
and that begin to take charge of our collective gestural programmes.
Cinema’s intimate relation with the habits of moving and gesticulating 
was likewise observed by Marcel Mauss. Suffice it to recall the often-quoted 
passage from his 1935 essay ‘Techniques of the Body’, in which Mauss re-
counts an uncanny observation he made whilst lying ill in a hospital bed 
in New York:
I wondered where I had seen girls walking the way my nurses walked. 
I had the time to think about it. At last I realized that it was in movies. 
Returning to France, I noticed how common this gait was, especially in 
Paris; the girls were French and they too were walking in this way. In fact, 
American walking fashions had begun to arrive over here, thanks to the 
movies. This was an idea I could generalize.12
And Mauss goes on to think about how societies are built on ‘prestigious 
imitations’ whereby the ‘individual borrows the series of movements of 
which he is composed from the action executed in front of him, or with him, 
by others’.13 Social life is a question of the embodiment of shared patterns 
of movement, of common styles of acting and doing. Through this imitative 
behaviour, society in a sense ‘writes’ a person into its textures; gestures func-
tion as the graphein (marks) that form the basic elements of this writing.
Also worth considering is the fact that Mauss seems to make no dif-
ference between the gestures people learn from others in so-called real 
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life and those they absorb from the movies. The silver screen is in a sense 
transparent in Mauss’ account. The movie theatre appears above all as a 
global educational institute organized around circa 90-minute lessons in 
bodily pedagogy, which people leave moving their hips, legs, bums, arms, 
shoulders, and heads differently than before but in a curiously uniform 
fashion. We can perhaps, following Leroi-Gourhan’s vocabulary, speak of 
particular cinematic operational sequences that become inscribed into the 
codes of bodily comportment, even into people’s def inition of themselves 
and their location of themselves in the world.
On a personal note, one that lends itself to such a conceptualization, I 
remember how at primary school (at the age of seven or eight) we used to 
spend the breaks between lessons playing in the snowdrift on the school-
yard and mimicking the characters from the Star Wars f ilm series. One child 
was moving, gesticulating, and speaking like R2-D2, another fencing like 
Luke Skywalker, and so forth. Who was playing what character depended 
on the roles that each person had within the group’s hierarchy. What is 
important here, however, is that I don’t think many of us had actually seen 
any of the f ilms (there was no movie theatre in my small town, and VCRs 
were still scarce), so most of my classmates must have come to know the 
characters only from secondhand accounts. But it is precisely through this 
type of contagious mimicry, if you will, that the ethereal play of light and 
shadow on the (cinema or televisual) screen acquired material reality, or 
more generally speaking, images became cultural and cognitive forces.
Do images thus operate as contagious elements that move with/in our 
bodies as much as on the screen?14 When talking about gestures as forms of 
imitation (and, by implication, about the power of cinematic images), Mauss 
did not mention the French criminologist Gabriel Tarde’s seminal work on 
the topic. This is curious, because Tarde was the f irst to position imitation 
as the basis of the formation of societies. ‘All resemblances of social origin 
in society,’ Tarde argued, ‘are the direct or indirect fruit of the various forms 
of imitation, custom-imitation or fashion-imitation, sympathy-imitation 
or obedience-imitation, precept-imitation or education-imitation; naïve 
imitation, deliberate imitation, etc.’15 Tarde’s point was that a society’s 
makeup could be explained by these spirals of mimicry within which shared 
beliefs and desires become transmitted from one individual to another and 
translated into modes of doing and thinking. Tarde argued that these beliefs 
and desires, anchored in a collective memory of images and gestures, are 
passed from one person to another through suggestion. Imitation is based 
on an individual’s fundamental openness to others, on the porousness of 
our composition as ready to absorb, beyond conscious control, energy and 
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influences from the environment. This porousness is what Tarde’s references 
to the hypnotic state and the notion of suggestibility crystallize: the impos-
sibility to distinguish between imagination and reality as well as between 
images coming from the outside and the mind’s internal productions.16 
In this sense, social life is composed of a dream-like imagery, one that 
everybody acts out in concert with others: ‘The social like the hypnotic state 
is only a form of dream, a dream of command and a dream of action. Both 
the somnambulist and the social man are possessed by the illusion that 
their ideas, all of which have been suggested to them, are spontaneous.’17
Social life is imitation, and imitation is ‘somnambulism’, Tarde summa-
rized.18 Indeed, for me and my classmates playing Star Wars in the snowdrift, 
this held true: the gestures of popular f ilm had been assimilated into our 
everyday reality, into the frames of our perception and comportment, and 
perhaps even into our desires. Importantly, this imitative behaviour doesn’t 
concern children only but, in Tarde’s terms, the ‘social man’ in general. From 
this angle, then, we can draw similarities between Zarah Leander in The 
Great Love and Frau Hassel at the Christmas Eve party in Westerbork, for 
instance, and so recognize resemblances that are perhaps ‘uncanny’ in the 
sense of something that is familiar and incongruous or repressed at the same 
time: the repetition of a f ilm-like scene at the Westerbork concentration 
camp in people’s gestures and postures, and the return of the appearances 
of these functionaries of death in f ilm stars’ and starlets’ personas.19 In this 
perhaps abrupt montage, we begin to see cinema as an industry of imitation 
and of a collective ‘gestural memory’, the images of which quickly spread 
contagiously from one somnambulist to another, inside as well as outside 
the movie theatre.
Cinema’s historical signif icance – its place and meaning in def ining 
the contours of our bodies and the world we locate ourselves in – lies in 
the fact that movies effectively erase the difference between the image 
and imagination, the reality external to our bodies and what emanates 
from the inside. As Marc Augé puts it, ‘the miracle of cinema is that I don’t 
imagine this image, I see it.’20 But f ilm theory reminds us as well that the 
presence of bodies on the silver screen is by no means unambiguous. We 
cannot touch these bodies (even if they can touch us); an attempt to do so 
only ends up breaking a spell that we very much try to avoid breaking. The 
absent or the dead ones keep repeating their lines but don’t respond if they 
are spoken to. Akira Mizuta Lippit summarizes the paradox: ‘The body is 
there as an animated photograph, carrying with it all of the phantasms of 
photographic reality, but the body, that same body doubled, is profoundly 
and irreducibly absent.’21 This absent body becomes doubled – and moved, 
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made present – by the body of the cinematic apparatus: camera movements 
(pans, tilts, tracks, etc.) and editing. ‘To understand movement in cinema, 
and gesture in particular, one must recognize the activity of two bodies or 
sources of movement in cinema,’ Lippit points out.22 The moving camera 
puts the frame (the spectator’s viewpoint) into motion, whereas editing 
dictates the rhythm of shots and ensures (or alternatively breaks) continuity 
in space and time.
These two aesthetic operations of camerawork and editing in the f inal 
analysis compose bodies on screen: they give bodies their rhythm (style) 
and unity, that is to say, their phantasmatic presence. This means that the 
programming of the collective memory of gestures ‒ of what Leroi-Gourhan 
called operational sequences ‒ in the movies is largely a question of the 
cinematic apparatus’ movements (as mechanical as subtle). Hanna and 
Paul’s love affair f inds its reality only as a result of the cut that joins their 
bodies and their gazes in the shot-countershot. Likewise, Gemmeker and 
Hassel’s scenario becomes conceivable only by means of an (imaginary) 
montage that sutures the two bodies into a circuit of desire. Any gesture is 
thus a blend of f lesh and bone and screen phantasms. Hence, perhaps, the 
power that cinematic spectacles have in shaping the contours and frames 
of our bodies: they amalgamate gestures into a screen fantasy, which for 
us somnambulists becomes collective reality.
A fantasy of consecration
My argument so far has placed cinema’s social as well as historical func-
tion (only partly, needless to say) in the medium’s capacity to capture 
our gestures and inscribe itself in the collective memory of movements 
that we execute mostly out of our awareness – a memory that is made of 
phantasies (screen presences) as much as so-called real events. But there 
is an important aspect to cinematic images as ‘self-spreading contagions’ 
(to use Tarde’s words) that remains to be addressed.23 Namely, following 
Tarde’s thought, imitation – the ways in which we repeat the gestures of f ilm 
stars and starlets like puppets of the cinematic apparatus – only explains 
half of the picture. The other half contains the moment of ‘invention’ (very 
generally understood) that inheres in imitative behaviour at least poten-
tially, the germ of differentiation that every act of repetition bears within 
itself. ‘Socially, everything is either invention or imitation,’ Tarde wrote.24 
However, in contrast to what the ‘either-or’ disjunction used by Tarde might 
suggest, invention and imitation are not mutually exclusive. Imitation 
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(which, as noted, consists of the repetition of shared beliefs and desires) can 
involve ‘interference’ within and between repetitions – interference that 
in a ‘fruitful’ case may not simply reiterate the same but create something 
new, that is to say, make a difference.25 Invention happens when two (or 
more) old beliefs, for instance, become so combined that they change in 
shape, or when the encounter of two desires leads to the transformation 
of one or both.
What does this imply with respect to conceptualizing the contagious 
mimicry of cinematic images? Simply that our imitations of cinema’s phan-
tasmatic bodies are in potentia moments of invention; that our encounters 
with images can yield transformation – of our perceptions, our desires, even 
ourselves. This also means that cinema’s relation to collective memory (of 
gestures, in particular) should not only be considered in terms of storage, 
reiteration, and recollection; importantly, it also involves the anticipation 
and performance of the future. The potential transformation of our desires 
and beliefs means the reshaping of what we expect is to come and how we 
seek to fashion it.
This ‘inventive’ function of the movies might further explain the position 
of the likes of Zarah Leander in Nazi Germany’s makeup (just as it might 
explain the power of moving images in any modern society of spectacle 
‒  totalitarian or ‘democratic’). Let me pause for a moment on this particular 
starlet’s glossy image. Originally a Swedish singer and actress, Leander 
was perhaps the most famous f ilm actress of the National Socialist period, 
competing with Hollywood stars like Greta Garbo and Marlene Dietrich. 
Her position as the iconic female of the Third Reich was nonetheless not 
uniform, at least in ideological terms. We are told that Leander was never in 
Adolf Hitler’s favour and that Joseph Goebbels didn’t like her either. When 
her salary was cut due to the war effort eating the UFA’s budget and her 
villa in Grünewald ruined in an air raid by the allies, she secretly moved 
back to Sweden in 1943.26 After her departure, an article that appeared in 
the newsletter Politischer Dienst for SS and police off icers condemned her 
persona: ‘She dealt in a whole new form of eroticism: a cunning mixture 
of transparent prudery and trivialized lasciviousness. She divulged to the 
masses how a “great” woman conquers the hearts of men.’27 The Nazi idol 
of German womanhood ‒ a loving, dedicated, and self-sacrif icing wife 
and mother ‒ became denigrated into a greedy vamp incapable of real 
feelings: ‘If she ever loved, truly and self-sacrif icingly, is impossible to say. 
It seems that for this imported Swede – cool, calculating and cunning as she 
was – love has never been more than a game, which she played on screen, 
playing with the confused emotions of an insuff iciently educated public.’28
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The description in Politischer Dienst crystallized Leander’s star image, 
which wasn’t without contradictions. From one f ilm to another, Leander 
meandered between ‘maternal warmth and vampish sadism’.29 But isn’t this 
precisely why she was populating the screens of the Third Reich? Going back 
to Hassel, our more or less f ictional Leander fan who might or might not 
have read the condemning piece in Politischer Dienst, we can detect a blend 
of both piety and eroticism in her eyes, which resembles Leander’s gestures 
that combined ‘maternal warmth’, even ‘self-sacrif ice’, with vampishness 
(f ig. 8). A star image (a screen fantasy) arguably became an object of (more 
or less) unconscious mimicry, suggesting how the collective body’s imitative 
comportments and individuals’ ways of refashioning themselves dealt with 
conflicting erotic drives.
Critics point out that Nazi cinema was generally focused on ‘the rous-
ing, diversion, and re-containment of desires and impulses’, that is to say, 
both the invention and standardization of a certain model of being and 
doing.30 One might argue that The Great Love’s display of gestures held sway 
precisely in this purpose. Let me cut to a scene in The Great Love where 
Hanna and Paul meet for the f irst time. An allied air raid interrupts Hanna 
and Paul’s evening and they go to Hanna’s apartment to leave Paul’s dog 
behind before taking shelter in the basement. Just as they are ready to leave, 
Hanna opens the window onto a blackened Berlin. ‘Gosh – beautiful, isn’t 
it?’ Paul remarks. Hanna replies: ‘Hmm… like in fairy tales.’ ‘No, much more 
beautiful – like reality,’ Paul corrects. ‘Yes. And that’s why we now must go 
quickly to the cellar, because in reality there are shell splinters and bombs,’ 
Hanna urges. But Paul interrupts her: ‘And yet, the reality is beautiful, even 
if there are dangers. Perhaps even because there are dangers.’
The last sentence is underscored by Paul’s suggestive look into Hanna’s 
eyes (f igs. 9 and 10), which is followed by a quick cut to Hanna, whose 
facial expression is worried whilst at the same time seeming to flirt with 
the possibility of an erotic encounter as well as with the imminence of 
death. This shot-countershot is a brief but signif icant moment in the f ilm, 
at odds with its overall narrative. For a split second, the couple is toying 
with the danger that comes from the skies, embracing the possibility of 
their elimination and its ‘beauty’. For a brief moment, one could argue, the 
world becomes the stage for something much more sinister than a fairy 
tale of the German nation’s triumph: the nearness and indeed intimacy of 
death as a sexual fantasy.
If the characters were allowed to smoke in Nazi f ilms, this could be the 
moment that Hanna and Paul light their cigarettes. This is also the moment 
at which Hanna and Paul’s love affair gets further intertwined with Elisabeth 
250 paSI välIahO
and Albert’s at Westerbork. The latter’s romance is a perverse twist (by 
no means unheard of, one might assume) on a classic drama, staged in a 
landscape of horror. If death haunts this love affair and the two photographs 
that have turned this story into a cinematic scene, it does so precisely by 
couching itself with sexual attraction and desire. The cigarettes in Gem-
meker and Hassel’s hands epitomize a compulsion towards life’s eventual 
annihilation in combination with the seductive looks: a dramatic moment 
within which the sex drive blends with its apparent opposite, the death wish.
Early in his career, Sigmund Freud noticed how gestures work as ‘symp-
toms’ or ‘derivatives’ of the psyche’s underlying forces.31 These forces can be 
memories of a traumatic nature but also, just as importantly, phantasies that 
are the building blocks of psychic life and need not have a reference point in 
the so-called real world, past or present.32 What phantasies are derived from 
the above gestures of holding a cigarette, ambiguous looks, slightly fatal facial 
expressions, etc.? My aim here is not to go into the intricacies of psychoanalytic 
theory. Let me simply note that these bodily positions and the scenarios they 
support express a dark and perverse desire of the abolition of life – a desire 
that in this case manifests itself in a ‘state of exception’, which the extralegal 
conditions of the concentration camp in Westerbork particularly crystallize 
but which we can also feel to be present in wartime Berlin where life’s ordinary 
course becomes regularly suspended by the nearness (and ‘beauty’) of death.
Thus, the deathly eroticism of gestures in both scenes acquires a political 
dimension that relates to their particularly ‘exceptional’ circumstances. 
Giorgio Agamben has analyzed how modern societies are predicated on a 
generalized logic of exception that constitutes the political body with its 
inclusions and exclusions and ultimately allows the eradication of those who 
cannot be incorporated into the political system.33 What the state of exception 
permits is the separation of those considered worthy of political existence 
figs. 9.9 & 9.10: frame captures from The Great Love (Die Grosse Liebe, 1942).
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from those who are deemed unworthy of living and can hence be killed with 
impunity. In Nazi Germany, the state of exception in this sense acquired a 
particular role in differentiating and separating the German Volk, which 
symbolized life in its vitality, from the Jews, Romani people, homosexuals, 
and so on, who represented life unworthy of being lived. The death machine of 
the camps was the extreme expression of this process, where those excluded 
from the political body were subjected to systematic elimination.
However, this attempt at the reinvention and ‘purification’ of the German 
Volk had detrimental consequences for the body of the nation itself. As 
Agamben notes, the process of exclusion that the state of exception makes 
possible is by definition ‘inclusive’, suggesting that what becomes excluded 
from political life appears simultaneously as its intimate interior: the life 
that is considered unworthy of living enters the core of the political body 
itself.34 That is to say, when relegating its others to the forces of death, the 
German Volk also included within itself the germ of its own destruction. 
Death returned as the ‘repressed’ (to paraphrase Freud) of the Nazi politics 
of life. The Nazi political body consecrated itself to death.35
Perhaps the gestures dealt with above express ‒ or, using Freud’s term, 
derive precisely from ‒ this consecration through which the Nazi politi-
cal body sought to transform itself. What shapes and, if you will, haunts 
these gestures is a fantasy of self-annihilation turned into eroticism. Death 
is the repressed of these scenarios of love, but it is simultaneously life’s 
annihilation of itself that consecrates these gestures. In retrospective, I 
realize it might have been this thought that f lashed involuntarily in the 
back of my mind when I saw Gemmeker and Hassel gazing at one another 
in a suggestive manner: that one’s own destruction is the collective desire 
that animates these looks. It is what programmed the Nazi political body’s 
operational sequences, which were rendered in The Great Love as a screen 
fantasy and performed at Westerbork as a real-world scenario. And by 
extension, to be extreme, it is what appears to programme our gestures of 
love at large – however tender and beautiful – if we consider the normal 
from the viewpoint of the abnormal (following Agamben) and take the Nazi 
political body as paradigmatic of the political space of the West generally.36
***
I will end here. We all know what happened subsequently when the gestures 
performed by Gemmeker, Staal, Hassel, and Leander became history, when 
their freedom became destiny. But let me conclude by pointing out that, if 
moviegoers are somnambulists, as suggested above, they dream a particular 
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kind of dream. This is a dream where the projections of light and shadow on 
the silver screen merge with the psyche’s internal productions and where 
the postures and behaviours of starlets and stars are assimilated into an 
individual’s bodily repertoire – and where thus a ‘programming’ of our 
phantasies and gestures, and potentially a process of transformation of 
ourselves, takes place. In this way, cinema inscribes itself into the collective 
psyche as well as its mnemic textures.
What is crucial to take into account here is that dreaming, as François 
Roustang reminds us, is a particular kind of power – a power to configure 
what the world could become. It is thus not focused on memory in the sense 
of recollection of the past; instead, it makes a memory of the future. Or, as 
Roustang puts it, the power of dreaming ‘is not in history, but it is the motor 
of history as the capacity to invent. It is a reservoir of possibilities, which 
is why it is a power.’37 The same could perhaps be said about the collective 
dreaming that happens in the movies. Film-induced somnambulism doesn’t 
come across merely as mechanical repetition but also as a process of becom-
ing. The programming of the bodily memory of gestures and the phantasies 
these gestures express is a question of the reinvention of ourselves as well 
as the world around us. Going to the cinema means the (re)discovery of 
who we could be. We remember ourselves in a different light at the movies.
Cinematic images, when viewed again after their original moment of 
making, do not come across as simple historical records of what was but is no 
more. The deictic function of ‘that has been’ ‒ which we can in certain cases 
assign to photographic images ‒ as well as the capacity to reveal the reality 
of the past are missing from cinematic ones.38 That is because cinematic 
images, when viewed through the lens of history, are images of what will 
have been. They speak of memories that were to be made: the reality of the 
future that the gestures animated on the silver screen were to accomplish. 
The submissive but simultaneously slightly vampish manner in which Zarah 
Leander moves her head as she removes her hat and looks into Paul’s eyes 
was a gesture of consecration by which the German Volk performed its fate 
(f ig. 11). This might be a crude overstatement, but I cannot help thinking 
about how this fate – and the dark fantasy of life’s annihilation that animates 
Hanna and Paul’s love affair – was similarly played out (with the very same 
gestures and expressions) by Hassel and Gemmeker at Westerbork, in the 
way they invented themselves as protagonists of their lives.
Thus, our understanding of the past should encompass these moments 
where the ‘what was to come’ was already played out as a screen fantasy. So 
cinematic images have the power to animate our bodies so that they become 
historical forces. As Vilém Flusser asserted, cinema ‘makes history’.39 And 
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so our thinking about memory (whether personal or collective, conscious or 
unconscious) should take into account these memories of the future – these 
stills from f ilms that were never made.
Notes
1. This essay should be read as a companion to my ‘video essay’ entitled ‘Stills 




3. On the emotive formula, see Didi-Huberman, p. 16.
4. Agamben, 2000, pp. 55-56.
5. Agamben, 2008, p. 61.
6. In 1944, Gemmeker commissioned Breslauer to make a documentary 
film about the camp, to be sent to Berlin as evidence of how orderly his 
approach to camp discipline and transportation was. This footage is the 
subject of Harun Farocki’s film Respite (2007), which has heavily influenced 
this essay.
fig. 9.11: frame capture from The Great Love (Die Grosse Liebe, 1942).
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11. Panofsky, p. 94.
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31. Freud and Breuer, p. 95.
32. On the notion of fantasy in the psychoanalytic sense, see Laplanche and 
Pontalis, pp. 314-318.
33. Agamben, 1998, pp. 171-174.
34. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
35. Ibid., p. 180.
36. See ibid., pp. 187-188.
37. Roustang, p. 26.




Agamben, Giorgio. 1998. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, transl. Daniel Heller-Roazen. 
Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
—. 2000.‘Notes on Gesture.’ In Means without End: Notes on Politics, trans. Vincenzo Binetti and 
Cesare Casarino, 49-60. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
—. 2008. ‘Nymphs.,’ transl. Amanda Minervini. In Releasing the Image: From Literature to New 
Media, eds. Jacques Khalip and Robert Mitchell, 60-80. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
Ascheid, Antje. 2003. Hitler’s Heroines: Stardom and Womanhood in Nazi Cinema. Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press.
Augé, Marc. 2009. Casablanca: Movies and Memory, transl.Tom Conley. Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press.
Barthes, Roland. 1981. Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, transl. Richard Howard. New 
York: Hill and Wang.
Belting, Hans. 2011. An Anthropology of Images: Picture, Medium, Body, transl. Thomas Dunlap. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Didi-Huberman, Georges. 2007. ‘Knowledge: Movement (The Man Who Spoke to Butterf lies).’ 
Foreword to Philippe-Alain Michaud, Aby Warburg and the Image in Motion, transl. Sophie 
Hawkes, 7-20. New York: Zone.
Flusser, Vilém. 1994. Gesten: Versuch einer Phänomenologie. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer 
Taschenbuch.
Freud, Sigmund. [1919] 2001. ‘The Uncanny.’ In vol. 17 of The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, transl. James Strachey, 219-256. London: Vintage.
Freud, Sigmund, and Joseph Breuer. [1895] 2001. Studies on Hysteria. In vol. 2 of The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. James Strachey. London: 
Vintage.
Green, André. 2000. Le Temps éclaté. Paris: Minuit.
Laplanche, Jean, and Jean-Bertnard Pontalis. 1988. The Language of Psychoanalysis, transl. 
Donald Nicholson-Smith. London: Karnac Books.
Leroi-Gourhan, André. 1993. Gesture and Speech, transl. Anna Bostock Berger. Cambridge: 
MIT Press.
Lippit, Akira Mizuta. 2008. ‘Digesture: Gesture and Inscription in Experimental Cinema.’ In 
Migrations of Gesture, eds. Carrie Noland and Sally Ann Ness, 113-131 Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press.
Mauss, Marcel. 1992. ‘Techniques of the Body.’In Incorporations, eds. Jonathan Crary and Sanford 
Kwinter, 455-477. New York: Zone.
Panofsky, Erwin. 1995. ‘Style and Medium in the Motion Pictures.’ In Three Essays on Style, ed. 
Irving Lavin, 91-128. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Rentschler, Eric. 1996. The Ministry of Illusion: Nazi Cinema and Its Afterlife. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press.
Roustang, François. 2003. Qu’est-ce que l’hypnose? Paris: Minuit.




The Archival Promise of the Biometric Passport
Liv Hausken
Throughout its history, the international passport has been an archival 
practice. As Mark Salter underscores in Rights of Passage: The Passport in 
International Relations (2003), the passport as well as other ID documents 
have always been a feature of the activity of matching a person to a number 
through which the particulars of that person can be traced in other records.1 
As Craig Robertson explains, regarding the USA: ‘In the 1920s the increased 
administrative reach of the federal government produced a documentary re-
gime of verification in which documents begat documents to produce official 
identities verified through the archival memory of the state.’2 Admittedly, this 
confidence in the archive contrasts with earlier practices. Even in countries 
where one had both international passports and checks at the national 
borders, passport inspectors did not always believe that it was necessary to 
check the passport and did not always have confidence in this document.3 
Robertson illustrates the latter case with an example from the US borders 
before the First World War. At that time, immigrants were not required to 
carry identification documents, even if the federal government had taken 
control of the administration of the US borders in the late 1870s. Until the 
outbreak of the First World War, such documents were not thought to provide 
an accurate determination of an individual’s identity. Robertson refers to the 
documents issued to Chinese immigrants who were exempt from the Chinese 
Exclusion Act, which the immigration officials apparently ignored. The of-
ficials trusted their own ability to verify on the basis of physical appearance 
the identity of Chinese as merchants and students rather than the distant 
authority of Chinese government officials and U.S. diplomatic agents distilled 
in what they considered a questionable document.4 According to Robertson,
It was only during and after the World War I that an increased off icial 
perception of the value of identif ication documents led to suff icient 
enforcement of documentary evidence in the issuance of passports and 
visas for the U.S. off icials then to trust them to provide a useful form of 
individual verif ication at the border – that is, to perform the specif ic 
role of allowing ’the state’ to remember people who crossed the border 
at off icial points of entry.5
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The foundation of the League of Nations and the organization of the f irst 
Conference on Passports in Paris in 1920 confirm that this history of the 
US passport is part of a general shift in the direction of more committed 
international agreements and regulations of human mobility. This entails 
objectifying the passport as an archival practice.
Passport guidelines and a general booklet design emerged from the 1920 
Paris conference. As the booklet design was developed and implemented 
during the 1920s and 30s, one may in some sense also consider the passport 
booklet itself a small archive. It is not just a travel document like the safe 
conduct pass of earlier centuries, which was a letter including the name 
of the traveller and the purpose of his mission asking that the bearer not 
be hindered in his journey.6 Nor is it just a standardized travel document 
issued by the state and part of a network of archives certifying that the 
document of the passport is identical to other documents.7 The booklet is 
also a place for the storage of documents and records, a means and method 
of inscribing, storing, and transmitting information.8 In addition to the 
information on the cover page and the identity page that is entered when the 
passport is issued, there are passport pages reserved for visas coming from 
different embassies or consulates. These pages also include stamps from 
passport control off icers of both the holder’s home country and countries 
visited, revealing the history of entering and exiting those countries. In 
some countries, there are also pages for amendments where the issuing 
country may place travel restrictions, modify conditions for travel abroad, 
or change the period of validity. The passport not only allows the state 
to remember people who crossed the border at off icial points of entry, as 
Robertson reminds us; the passport booklet is also an archive producing 
and recording events for the traveller.
Today’s passport booklet is in many ways still a small archive. Yet, since 
more and more regions of the world are opting for passport-free border 
crossings, one may experience travelling through many countries without 
having one’s passport marked with the stamps or visas. This means that the 
externalized memory of traveling is now full of holes and missing tracks. 
What is more, in the contemporary ePassport, the inscriptions of data on 
a microchip are also subject to archival restrictions. Such registration can 
only be done at the time of the issuing of the passport. To prevent the 
data on the chip from being overwritten, a public key infrastructure (PKI) 
scheme has been implemented to assure the reader of the chip that the 
original data of the authorized issuer have not been altered in any way.9 As 
Wolfgang Ernst points out, ‘It is worth remembering that the archive as the 
condition for our knowledge of history becomes dependent on the media 
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of its transmission.’10 If we consider the electronic microchip as a medium, 
it is a medium that enables read-only access. In a certain sense, we may 
therefore say that the booklet as such (including the chip) is less an archive 
today than it used to be in its pre-electronic era. However, as an electronic 
document, today’s passport is inscribed in larger and far more complex and 
mutable archival networks.
This text will investigate the biometric passport as an archival practice. 
Drawing on conceptions of the archive as an epistemological project 
(Foucault 1991, 2010), as technology and medial logic (Ernst 2013), as well 
as a practice (de Certeau 1984), I will show how the introduction of the 
biometric passport has transformed the passport not only as a tool and 
technique for regulating mobility but also as a techno-political model of 
the world. My argument is informed by recent studies of the history of 
paperwork technologies, like Cornelia Vismann’s work on the law and 
its mutual relationship with the technology of f iles and Lisa Gitelman’s 
investigation of the document as object of inquiry and epistemic practice.11 
Previous studies of the history of passports and other ID documents have, 
of course, also been very helpful. Most of these historical accounts focus 
primarily on the development of the modern state and often end their 
stories around 1920, which is exactly when the international community 
recognized the passport as a record for the regulation of identity and mobil-
ity.12 Very little is written about more recent passport history, Mark B. Salter 
being a notable exception.13 Even less has been published about the current 
biometric passport and its technology and materiality, which is the topic 
of this chapter. By comparing a variety of pre-electronic passports, I will 
investigate transformations in the archival conditions of today’s biometric 
passport in order to show the way in which it produces a specific conception 
of individual identity as well as a special condition of social vulnerability. 
But f irst, a brief outline of what a biometric passport actually is.
What is a biometric passport?
In 2005 the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) approved 
a new standard for international passports, now commonly known as 
biometric passports or ePassports. A biometric passport is a machine-
readable passport (MRP) containing biometric information on a contactless 
integrated circuit chip.14 The United Nations agency ICAO presents their 
specif ications for machine-readable passports in a document called Doc 
9303 Part 1. In its sixth edition in 2006, this document is divided into two 
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volumes, the f irst dealing with passports with machine-readable data 
stored in optical character recognition format (MRPs), the other volume 
giving specif ications for electronically enabled passports with biometric 
identif ication capability (ePassports).15
The machine-readable passport was launched in 1980 and its specif i-
cations published as the f irst edition of Doc 9303, titled A Passport with 
Machine Readable Capability.16 The sixth edition of Doc 9303, Part 1, is the 
f irst that also indicates regulations of biometric information to be stored 
on an electronic chip. The machine-readable data refers to two strings 
of alphanumeric characters printed at the bottom of the identity page. 
It is formatted in such a way as to be readable by machines worldwide. 
It is considered a different representation of the data found in the visual 
inspection zone (VIZ) of the identity page, as it provides verif ication of 
the information in the VIZ ‒data not specif ically intended to be read by a 
machine but by human beings.17 The two strings of machine-readable data, 
however, do not duplicate the information offered by the photograph also 
present on the identity page of the passport. The photographic information 
was singular and displayed in one format only until the introduction of the 
biometric passport.
The chip contains all the data from the MRP identity page, a biometric 
measure of the passport holder, and a security object to protect the data 
with Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) cryptographic technology and which 
conforms to the specif ications of Doc 9303.18 The ICAO recommends facial 
recognition as the primary biometric, mandatory for global interoperability 
in passport inspection systems, while the f inger and iris are recommended 
as secondary biometrics to be used at the discretion of the passport-issuing 
state.19 The biometric measure of the passport holder is, in other words, a 
measure of the face and sometimes also contains f ingerprints or iris scans. 
The biometric capture of the face is an integral part of passport photography, 
which explains why one can no longer use one’s own photographs when ap-
plying for a new passport. The specif ications require that biometric data be 
stored in the form of high-resolution images on a high-capacity contactless 
integrated circuit (IC), the IC also being encoded with a duplicate of the 
MRZ data.20 Since the data in the machine-readable zone (MRZ) already 
duplicates the information in the visual inspection zone, the biometric 
passport provides yet another place and format for the registration of 
information; notably the microchip.
The machine-readable passport represents a shift from human to machine 
in the verif ication of the traveler’s identity. The biometric passport presents 
the chip as its primary source of information. The passport inspectors do 
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not even have to open the booklet to verify its identity. The microchip is 
coupled to an aerial (antenna), which allows data to be communicated 
between the chip and an encoding/reading device without the need for a 
direct electrical connection.21
Why biometrics?
What is the reasoning behind the introduction of biometric passports? Ac-
cording to the ICAO’s Doc 9303, the biometric passport is a crucial measure 
for allowing authorities to connect identif ication papers to the physical 
singularities of actual human bodies:
11.1. It has long been recognized that names and honour are not suff icient 
to guarantee that the holder of an identity document (MRP) assigned to 
that person by the issuing State is guaranteed to be the person purporting 
at a receiving State to be the same person to whom the document was 
issued.
11.2 The only method of relating the person irrevocably to his travel docu-
ment is to have a physiological characteristic of that person associated 
with the travel document in a tamper-proof manner. This physiological 
characteristic is a biometric.22
Between these two paragraphs, we f ind the history of the international 
passport as we know it. The f irst paragraph is an understatement, since the 
guaranteed identity between person and document has been internation-
ally recognized as a challenge for more than hundred years. The latter, 
however, appears as a deliberate misrepresentation, presenting the latest 
solution to the challenge identif ied in paragraph 11.1 as if it was simply not 
the last in the line of attempts at solutions but the f irst and only. Biometrics 
is here considered a ‘physiological characteristic’ relating the person ‘ir-
revocably’ to his travel document; the ‘only method’ of doing this is to have 
a physiological characteristic of that person associated with the travel 
document in ‘a tamper-proof manner’. The entire paragraph comes across 
as peculiarly insistent, almost like an incantation. After a century of effort 
to produce the foolproof passport, one is now determined to f inally make it.
In 1920, the League of Nations organized the Paris Conference on Passports 
& Customs Formalities and Through Tickets. The League of Nations was a 
predecessor of the United Nations,23 an intergovernmental organization 
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founded the very same year as a result of the Paris Peace Conference that 
ended the First World War. The Passport Conference of 1920 was the f irst 
League Council Session, and it was at this conference that, for the f irst 
time, a set of standards for all passports issued by members of the League 
was agreed upon.
For many years there had been great variations both in terms of the physi-
ological characteristics to be included in the passport and whether or not 
the passport should also contain a photograph of its holder. In 1914, the US 
Secretary of State introduced the requirement that all new passports issued 
should include a photographic portrait.24 The British passport required a 
physiological description of the passport holder in 1915.25 Although there 
have been a wide variety of requirements and practices also after 1920, it 
is from this point onward that we can speak of a transnational history of 
the international passport. In many ways, this history revolves around 
the question of how one can relate ‘the person irrevocably to his travel 
document’.
Biometrics essentially refers to metrics related to human characteristics and 
traits, as seen, for instance, in fetal biometry, where antenatal ultrasound 
measurements are used to assess the growth and well-being of a foetus. 
Yet, the concept tends to be used more specif ically to refer to technologies 
that measure and analyze human body characteristics for identif ication 
purposes (authentication, verif ication).26 Within this operating range, some 
consider biometrics an appropriate term for ‘automated biometrics’ only, 
which is often dated back to the 1960s and related to the computer-assisted 
registration, storage, and distribution of biometric data.27
The physiological information of the passport holder in the 1920s is a 
biometric as well in the sense that it measures human body characteristics 
for identif ication purposes (authentication, verif ication). This is in keeping 
with the def inition of biometrics in Doc 9303, although the term is not 
used in this general meaning in this document. In a list of def initions and 
terms, biometrics is explained as a ‘measurable, physical characteristic 
or personal behavioural trait used to recognize the identity, or verify the 
claimed identity, of an enrollee’.28 With this def inition in mind, one could 
say that biometrics has been part of the international passport for about 
one hundred years.
In his entertaining and idiosyncratic book The Passport. The history of 
man’s most travelled document (2003), Martin Lloyd refers to a variety of 
different practices of relating physiological characteristics of a person to his 
travel document, one of them being the passport of the Kingdom of Belgium, 
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which in 1920 required a list detailing hair, eyebrows, eyes, forehead, nose, 
mouth, chin, face, beard, and height ‒ in addition to a photograph.29 Many 
of us remember our passports from earlier decades or that of our parents 
or grandparents. The Swedish f ilmmaker Ingmar Bergman opens the short 
f ilm Karins Ansikte (Karin’s Face, 1986) with an image of the photograph in 
his mother’s last passport before letting the camera slowly slide down the 
passport identity page and showing the data that the Swedish authorities 
at that time (1964) deemed relevant in order to identify Karin Bergman as 
a person with permission to leave and enter the country: profession (in 
her case, her marital status), date of birth, place of birth, residence, height 
(without shoes), colour of hair, colour of eyes. Compared with the biometrics 
Lloyd refers to in the Belgium passport of 1920, the amount of information is 
markedly limited. Compared with a more contemporary Belgium passport, 
we see the same tendency; Jean Chevremont’s Belgian passport from 1968 
lists profession, place and date of birth, face (shape), eyes (colour), height, 
and ‘special peculiarities’ in addition to name, nationality, signature, and a 
photograph of the passport holder.30 The biometric passport that the ICAO 
launched in 2006 further reduces the amount of information. At this point, 
the only mandatory biometrics is the face.
To be more precise, the face is the only mandatory biometric requirement 
described as just this in Doc 9303. It states quite explicitly that ‘Doc 9303 
considers only three types of biometric identif ication systems’: facial recog-
nition (which is mandatory), f ingerprint recognition, and iris recognition 
(the latter two are optional).31 These are the biometrics to be stored on the 
microchip. However, if we apply the more general def inition of biometrics 
from Doc 9303, there is more biometric information in today’s passport 
than the biometric measures stored on the chip. More importantly, with 
the biometric passport, biometrics has been given a new status and also 
some radically new archival premises.
From eye-readable to machine-readable biometric inscriptions
If we f irst compare the current requirements for mandatory categories on 
the identity page of the machine-readable passport (MRP) with those of 
the pre-electronic passports, three or four additional biometric features are 
signif icant: date of birth, sex, signature, and, in a sense, also photographic 
portrait. These are all mandatory for MRPs as well as for ePassports, and 
they are in line with the abovementioned generic def inition of biometrics 
in Doc 9303.
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Date of birth is usually not considered biometric information. Hower, 
as an indicator of age, it provides some information about the individual 
even though it is not distinct enough to enable differentiation between 
two individuals. The same goes for biological sex. Just like date of birth, 
the sex of the holder may be considered permanent. Doc 9303 provides 
three categories for the sex of passport holders, ‘F for female, M for male, 
or X for unspecif ied’.32 These may, as all categorizations, be discussed and 
criticized.33 The point here is to show that biological sex, just like date of 
birth, satisf ies one of the two fundamental premises about biometrically 
relevant body traits: relative permanence. However, as biometric traits, both 
date of birth and biological sex suffer from a lack of discriminative power. 
It is therefore sometimes referred to as ‘soft biometrics’.34
The signature is the third additional biometric feature that is mandatory 
on MRPs.35 Like date of birth and sex, it should be displayed on the data page. 
For ePassports also, it must be stored on the chip. The signature has been 
considered a behavioural (rather than physical) biometric modality,36 and 
signature verif ication is still regarded as a poorly developed biometric mo-
dality. It is nevertheless considered vital in international passports because 
of its long pedigree, its considerable legal recognition, and its continued 
usage in document authentication and autorization related to, for instance, 
checks and credit card receipts.37 Comparative approaches to the interna-
tional requirements specif ied in Doc 9303 may thus include date of birth, 
sex, and signature. A possible fourth candidate is the displayed photograph. 
Different countries or states may also supplement identif ication features to 
be displayed on the passport’s data page. The Swedish passport, for example, 
also contains information about the passport holder’s height.38
If we compare the visible (eye-readable) information about physiological 
characteristics in contemporary Belgian or Swedish passports with the list 
of data in Karin Bergman’s 1964 passport, we see a signif icant reduction 
in biometric information. At f irst glance, it may seem that all the physical 
features that a fraudster might easily change and that today’s law-abiding 
citizens are in fact changing on a regular basis ‒such as hair colour (and to 
some extent also eye colour, thanks to coloured contact lenses) ‒have been 
removed from the list. Only physical traits that cannot easily be altered 
remain, such as age, gender, and (for the Swedish passport) height.
Yet, as mentioned above, these features are all typical examples of soft 
biometrics ‒physical, behavioural, or adhered human characteristics that 
have been derived from the way in which human beings normally recognize 
their peers.39 The substantial reduction in biometric information on the 
chaptEr tEn 265
passport identity page is, then, also a reduction of the types of information 
that people rely on in order to identify other human beings.
Instead, biometric information has been displaced to the chip, to be veri-
f ied by machines. Certainly, and somewhat surprisingly perhaps, the choice 
fell on computerized face perception, which is proving to be an incredibly 
diff icult technology to engineer.40 This stands in sharp contrast to the 
human ability for face perception, often described as the most developed 
visual perception skill in humans.41 Despite this diff iculty, the ICAO chose 
to concentrate on only one body part (the face) and one primary method 
(facial recognition technology, or FRT), with the option of including two 
additional features (f ingerprint and iris scan).42 Comparing biometrics 
in pre-electronic and electronic passports, we now see fewer biometric 
inscriptions on the human-readable identity page. The current passport 
is primarily aimed at just one area, which is investigated more thoroughly 
through digital technologies.
Body, network, state
In addition to the changes in biometric information described above, a 
comparison between the pre-electronic passport and the current biometric 
passport (as specif ied in Doc 9303) shows three major changes.
First, compared with Karin Bergman’s 1964 passport, the current ID 
page in international passports indicates a striking reduction of the social 
dimension of individual identity: profession, social status, children, and 
residence are no longer mandatory information.43 There is, in other words, 
a substantial decrease in all the types of information that people rely on 
in order to recognize and identify other human beings, both biometric and 
social information.
Second, the list of inscriptions on the ID page inscribes the passport as 
well as its holder into a network of registries. This applies not just to the 
passport number (passport registry) and the personal number (national 
registry) but also to the date and place of birth. Place of birth is often used in 
legal documents, together with one’s full name and date of birth, to uniquely 
identify a person.44 Place of birth then indicates entries in databases like 
church records and population registries and refers to individual identi-
f iers like ‘personal number’, ‘social security number’, ‘Unique Population 
Registry Code’, or else ‘Personal ID Code Number’. The date of birth ‒ an 
indicator of age that may be considered biometric information ‒ equally 
refers to a number of public registries, databases, and archives. As stated 
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by Doc 9303, the holder’s date of birth shall be specif ied ‘as recorded by 
the issuing State or organization’.45 So even as date of birth may be a physi-
cal biometric and place of birth could be said to have a social dimension, 
both connect f irst and foremost the holder of the passport, as well as the 
passport document itself, to public bureaucracy and to the state to which 
the document belongs.46
Third, this emphasis on the state or nation is repeatedly stressed on the 
passport identity page: the issuing state and the nationality of the holder 
are stressed twice, both in full (e.g. SVENSK SWEDISH) and by a three-letter 
code (e.g. SWE for Sweden). In countries where the place of birth automati-
cally determines the nationality of the baby, the holder’s place of birth also 
indicates the nationality (or citizenship) of that person or his or her parents 
(such as NEW YORK, USA, which would also indicate US citizenship).47 In 
these cases, there are three entries explicitly stating nationality only in the 
visual inspection zone (VIZ) of the identity page. In cases where the issuing 
state is the same as the nationality of the holder, the nation is almost more 
pronounced than the person.
The political dimension of this emphasis is particularly evident in cases 
where national aff iliation is disputable or unclear. This is strikingly obfus-
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fig. 10.1: On the Id page, both the types of information and location of data elements are strictly 
regulated.
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the list of three-letter codes for nationalities specif ied in the f irst volume 
of Doc 9303. Remarkably, this is the only footnote to the list. It refers to the 
dispute between the governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland ‘concerning sovereignty over Falkland 
Islands (Malvinas)’, as it says. The code that has been provided with this 
footnote is FLK.48 It may, in other words, seem as if Doc 9303 has taken sides 
with Great Britain in this dispute, as the British name ‘Falkland Islands’ is 
chosen over the Spanish ‘Islas Malvinas’. More important in this context, 
the example shows how strongly the contemporary passport nationalizes 
its subject. This nationalization of individual identity is also clearly demon-
strated in cases where people are without nationality (e.g. stateless persons, 
refugees), as this must be marked in the passport as XXA, XXB, XXC, or 
XXX, codes that define people according to the requirement of nationality. 
Both these examples underscore the signif icant connection of nationality 
to machine-readable passports as well as the political dimensions of such 
nationalization.
To sum up, the biometric passport specif ies a person’s identity in terms 
of a name and signature, gender and age, a biometric measurement of the 
face, as well as a body of data connecting individual identity to societal 
regulations of work, taxation, government benefits, health care, and other 
governmental functions. This information is given maximum-security 
protection in accordance with current ideologies, systems, and technologies 
of document security. In the current passport regime, individual identity 
is thus def ined as: (1) machine-readable body measurements and (2) a set 
of personal data recorded in governmental and other public archives that 
are (3) mediated by a document owned and managed by the state.
The archival practices of enrolment and inspection
As we have seen, few ‒if any ‒human observations of physical (or social 
for that matter) traits are inscribed in the ePassport. Admittedly, some 
countries do note both physical details (such as height and eye colour) and 
place of residence in a local or national passport registry. For the passport 
booklet, however, the passport issuer will verify the identif ication papers of 
the applicant against available records and databases before capturing one 
or several biometric samples from the applicant by use of a high-resolution 
image capture technology for facial image enrolment (mandatory glob-
ally) as well f ingerprints or iris scans in countries where this is required. 
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Sometimes biometrics is also used in the identif ication process in order to 
improve the quality of the background checking that is part of the passport 
application process.49 Identif ication is then understood as performing ‘a 
one-to-many search between proffered biometric data and a collection 
of templates representing all of the subjects who are enrolled in the sys-
tem.’50 This assumes, of course, that one has biometric records such as a 
passport registry or a police record that can be searched in order to f ind a 
biometric template of the enrollee.51 Doc 9303 def ines ‘biometric template’ 
as ‘a machine-encoded representation of the trait created by a computer 
software algorithm’ which ‘enables comparisons (matches) to be performed 
to score the degree of conf idence with which separately recorded traits 
identify (or do not identify) the same person.’52 Such a template is, as they 
also say in Doc 9303, of relatively small data size.53 This is due to the amount 
of information being sharply reduced compared with the high-resolution 
image as captured during enrolment. It is, therefore, a highly simplif ied 
representation created by a computer software algorithm.
Biometric templates are used for matching the high-resolution image 
on the microchip against archives during enrolment (as mentioned above) 
as well as in passport inspections. The templates and their readers are not 
internationally standardized.54 Each manufacturer of a biometric system 
uses a unique template format, and templates are not interchangeable 
between systems.55 According to Doc 9303:
Facial recognition vendors all use proprietary algorithms to generate their 
biometric templates. These algorithms are kept secret by the vendors as 
their intellectual property and cannot be reverse-engineered to create 
a recognizable facial image. Therefore facial recognition templates are 
not interoperable between vendors ‒ the only way to achieve interoper-
ability with facial images is for the ‘original’ captured photograph to 
be passed to the receiving State. The receiving State then uses its own 
vendor algorithm (which may or may not be the same vendor/version 
as the issuing State used) to compare a facial image captured in real 
time of the MRP holder with the facial image read from the data storage 
technology in their MRP.56
Doc 9303 does not specify a globally interoperable machine-assisted 
verif ication method. However, it warns against relying on a single feature 
to verify authenticity because this increases the risk that the method will 
be compromised.57 Overall, we can still say that the high-resolution image 
of the face is stored on the chip to be used as input in facial recognition 
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systems.58 The verification system uses a camera to capture a facial image of 
the traveller in real time and uses an algorithm to compare this image with 
the one stored on the chip. Mark Salter (2003) underscores the fact that ‘[…] 
the modern passport does not guarantee the ‘security’ or even the ‘identity’ of 
the bearer’. He also claims, somewhat inaccurately, that ‘the passport certifies 
only that the document of the passport is identical to other documents.’59 
When looking into the verification process from an archival perspective, we 
can see that the information inscribed in the pre-electronic passport implies 
a human verification not only of documents but also of people’s appearance. 
The same applies to the electronic passport, except that now a machine checks 
the papers as well as the traveler’s appearance. But Salter is right that the 
passport cannot prove the identity of the traveller. This also holds true for the 
biometric passport, no matter how hard the ICAO insists that the ‘only method 
of relating the person irrevocably to his travel document is to have a physi-
ological characteristic of that person associated with the travel document in 
a tamper-proof manner.’ As Julian Ashbourn and others have underscored, 
we should never consider a biometric as positive proof of identity.
In the early days of automated identity verif ication, a common claim was 
that a biometric check proves that you are who you say you are. Of course, 
this is simply not the case; a biometric check proves no such thing. […] All 
we are doing is comparing two sets of data and, according to predefined 
criteria, reaching a conclusion as to whether they are alike enough to be 
considered a match.60
So, when a traveller enters or exits a state or for any other reason has his/
her biometric passports checked, the information on the chip is not just 
compared with the image of the traveller captured on the spot (often 
referred to as a ‘one-to-one match’).61 The information on the chip and the 
newly obtained image data can also be compared against a small number of 
biometric reference templates on f ile (locally or accessed from elsewhere), 
for instance when matching against a ‘watch list’ of persons who warrant 
detailed identity investigation or are known criminals, terrorists, etc.62 This 
is the archival practice of passport verif ication.
The archival promise
The background for developing electronic passports with biometric capabil-
ity is the perception of increased security threats in our globalized society. 
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The first volume of Doc 9303 asserts that: ‘The growth in international crime 
and illegal immigration has led to increasing concerns over the security 
of travel documents and calls for recommendations on what may be done 
to help improve their resistance to attack or misuse.’63 Research gives no 
indication that crime is on the rise, yet we witness (as Doc 9303 also states) a 
more ‘security-conscious world’. As a result, ‘the need for machine-assisted 
global interoperability has become pressing’ and has ‘necessitated the 
standardization of one primary biometric identif ication method and of 
one method of data storage.’ The ICAO has therefore developed recom-
mendations ‘specif ically in response to the needs of passport issuing and 
immigration authorities to ensure accurate identif ication of a passport 
applicant or holder while minimizing facilitation problems for the travel-
ler.’64 The primary purpose of using chip technology in the passport has 
been to augment the security of authentication of the passport documents 
as well as their legitimate holders.65
Another reason for developing electronic passports is the desire for ef-
f iciency, faced with a global population increasingly ‘on the move’ across 
borders. Doc 9303 tells the story of how the ICAO started this work in 1968 
with the development of the f irst machine-readable travel documents. A 
panel was charged with developing recommendations for a standardized 
passport book or card that would be machine-readable ‘in the interest of 
accelerating the clearance of passengers through passport controls.’66 In 
1998, the next chapter of this story began ‒the work ‘to establish the most 
effective biometric identif ication system and associated means of data 
storage’ for use in passports and other machine-readable travel document 
(MRTD) applications, ‘particularly in relation to document issuance and 
immigration considerations.’67 ‘Throughput’ they call it (e.g. ‘travellers per 
minute’), whether it refers to ‘the biometric system or the border-crossing 
system as a whole.’68
This call for security and eff iciency in the identif ication and verif ication 
of individual identity overlaps in striking ways with historical attempts at 
registering and storing biometric information about repeat offenders in 
late nineteenth-century police archives. Allan Sekula is often credited for 
having brought forth the Paris police off icial Alphonse Bertillon in this 
regard. In his influential essay ‘The Body and the Archive’ (1986), Bertillon 
is described as the inventor of:
the f irst effective modern system of criminal identif ication. His was a 
bipartite system, positioning a ‘microscopic’ individual record within a 
‘macroscopic’ aggregate. First, he combined photographic portraiture, 
chaptEr tEn 271
anthropometric description, and highly standardized and abbreviated 
written notes on a single f iche, or card. Second, he organized these cards 
within a comprehensive, statistically based f iling system.69
Anthropometric description refers to a measurement of the human body 
(from the Greek words anthropos, meaning ‘man’, and metron, meaning 
‘measure’) transformed into a verbal text. This text was pared down ‘to 
a denotative shorthand, which was then linked to a numerical series’.70 
According to Sekula, this was ‘not merely a self-contained archival project. 
We can understand another, more global, imperative,’ Sekula states, ‘if we 
remember that one problem for the late-nineteenth-century police was 
the telegraphic transmission of information regarding suspects.’71 Bertil-
lon’s response to the problem was to make all the data telegraphable. The 
ambition was, as we can see, global ‒both in its technical design and with 
regard to current communication technologies.
Sekula is mostly interested in the photographic archive. He is concerned 
with the way in which the archive, as he argues, became the dominant insti-
tutional basis for photographic meaning somewhere roughly between 1880 
and 1910.72 However, for photography, the ‘archival promise was frustrated 
by the messy contingency of the photograph as well as the sheer quantity 
of images’.73 As Sekula sees it, the solution to this was ‘to invent a machine, 
or rather a clerical apparatus, a f iling system, which allows the operator/
researcher/editor to retrieve the individual instance from the huge quantity 
of images contained within the archive.’74 This is what Bertillon did and 
with success. ‘Thus Bertillon arrested the criminal body, determined its 
identity as a body that had already been defined as criminal, by means that 
subordinated the image – which remained necessary but insuff icient – to 
verbal text and numerical series.’75 Herein lies the archival promise of the 
late nineteenth-century police archive: it allowed the operator to retrieve 
the individual instance from the huge quantity of instances contained 
within the archive and the exchange of information between police depart-
ments and between states.
The Bertillon system should not only be precise but also eff icient. 
Bertillon wanted ‘to accelerate the work of processing criminals and to 
employ effectively the labours of unskilled clerks’. Sekula positions Bertillon 
as a ‘prophet of rationalization’ akin to Frederick Taylor, ‘his American 
contemporary, […] the inventor of scientif ic management, the f irst system 
of modern factory discipline.’76 In his discussion of the history of the US 
passport at the beginning of the twentieth century, Craig Robertson refers 
to Sekula’s perception of Bertillon’s project as the invention of a system 
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‘for regulating and accelerating the flow of texts, profoundly linked to the 
logic of Taylorism.’77 Robertson argues that the passport developed into an 
archival technology that ‘classif ies and orders evidence in the service of the 
production of truth to be used to explain who “we” are and where “we” come 
from’. And it does this, Robertson states, ‘in the anticipation of a future need 
to know. The archival pact with the future is established through the “ra-
tionalization” which Sekula foregrounds to articulate archival practices.’78
The parallels between the late nineteenth-century police archives and cur-
rent biometric passports are striking both in terms of ambition and mindset, 
even if the techniques vary and the archival conditions are radically dif-
ferent. One of the most conspicuous keywords in Doc 9303 is the notion of 
‘global interoperability’. It shows up already in the foreword to volume one 
and is introduced with reference to the previous edition of Doc 9303 (from 
2003): ‘global interoperability’ is understood as ‘the capability of inspection 
systems (either manual or automated) in different States throughout the 
world to exchange data, to process data received from systems in other 
States, and to utilize that data in inspection operations in their respective 
States.’79 Yet ‘global interoperability’ is not only understood descriptively 
but also normatively: it is ‘a major objective of the standardized specif ica-
tions for placement of both eye readable and machine readable data in 
all MRTDs’. With reference to ‘the security-conscious world of today’, it is 
further stressed that ‘the need for machine-assisted global interoperability 
has become pressing’ and that this has ‘necessitated the standardization 
of one primary biometric identif ication method and of one method of data 
storage’.80 I will maintain the importance of scrutinizing these standardiza-
tions of archival entries and functionalities of the biometric passport to 
understand how this practice shapes identities and societies.
The ICAO’s standardized specif ications of eye-readable and machine-
readable data in MRPs apply not only to the placement of data but also to 
the question of which information to convey and in what form it should 
be conveyed. Earlier in this article we saw how the information on the 
identity page of the ePassport has been signif icantly reduced. The issuing 
state is to some extent free to select certain traits (such as Sweden, where 
information about the passport holder’s height is included), but the choices 
are limited. Doc 9303 also strictly regulates the location of the various types 
of information on the identity page, but in addition to these factors, another 
form of cultural homogenization is also operative. Cultural homogenization 
may notably be seen as one of the main characteristics of globalization and 
refers to the reduction in cultural diversity as the result of processes by 
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which local cultures are transformed or absorbed by a dominant culture. 
Homogenization of the international passport has been an ambition since 
the f irst convention on passports in Paris 1920, if not earlier. In addition 
to the general booklet design and other passport guidelines (including 
requirements for physiological descriptions and photographic portrait), 
the League of Nations decided that all passports were to be written in at 
least two languages, one of which was French, the diplomatic language of 
that era.
Today, all passports contain information in at least two languages, of 
which one is either English, French, or Spanish (an extension of what is 
considered to be internationally accessible languages, from one to three). 
Meanwhile, Doc 9303 specif ies a strict regulation of acceptable letters, 
particularly in the machine-readable zone (MRZ) but also in the visual 
inspection zone (VIZ) of the identity page. National characters may be 
used in the VIZ, but if they are not Latin-based, then a transliteration into 
Latin characters must be provided.81 Dates should be entered in accordance 
with the Gregorian calendar,82 and numbers must be presented as ‘Arabic 
numerals’ (i.e. Indo-Arabic or Hindu-Arabic numerals).83 States that use 
numbers other than ‘Arabic numerals’ to represent numerical data in 
the VIZ shall provide a translation into Arabic numerals.84 If national 
characters are accepted in the visual inspection zone (VIZ) of the identity 
page, they shall not appear in the machine-readable zone (MRZ). The 
same applies to diacritical marks or accents, apostrophes, etc., which 
are not allowed in the MRZ.85 The explanation is simple and technical: 
national characters and diacritical marks generally appear only in the 
computer-processing systems of the states in which they apply and are 
not available globally.
The desire to develop such a globalization of letters, calendars, and num-
bers is not surprising and also perhaps necessary for better international 
communication between societies. However, I will argue that it is vital to 
notice who is creating the world in their image, that is, which local standards 
act as templates to create global standards: Latin letters, the Gregorian 
calendar, and what is often called Arabic numerals. These standardized 
specif ications for both eye-readable and machine-readable data in the 
MRP are part of a practice that produce not just the document but also the 
specific human identity the passport provides evidence for.
The second major security and eff iciency measure in Doc 9303 involves 
technical standardizations of the MRP as such as well as the development 
of a standardized biometric identif ication method and a method of data 
storage. The two strings of alphanumeric characters at the bottom of the 
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identity page (referred to above as the machine-readable zone, or MRZ) 
enables border controllers and other law enforcement agents to process 
passports more quickly without having to input the information manually 
into a computer. In other words, MRPs incorporate an MRZ to facilitate 
the inspection of travel documents. In addition to increasing eff iciency at 
passport checkpoints, the MRZ provides verif ication of the information in 
the VIZ and may be used to provide search characters for a database inquiry. 
In addition, it may be used to capture data for registration of arrival and 
departure or simply to point to an existing record in a database.86 These 
are the archival promises of the MRZ.
According to the ICAO, the primary purpose of using chip technology is 
to have the ability to capture biometrics in the travel document.87 Further, 
the key application of the biometrics solution is to relate an MRP holder to 
the MRP he or she is carrying.88
CONSTRUCTION OF THE MACHINE READABLE ZONE
OF THE PASSPORT DATA PAGE
P indicates that the document
is a passport book. One
additional character may be
used to further identify the
document at the discretion of
the issuing State.
Primary identier. Where
there is more than one
component, they shall be
separated by a single ller.
Secondary identier.
Each component is





is the end of the
primary identier.
Filler characters used to
complete the upper machine
readable line, which indicate
there are no other name
components included.
The three-letter
code to indicate the
issuing State*
P < UTO ERIKSSON << ANNA < MARIA <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
L898902C < 3
Document number
comprising up to 9
alphanumeric characters.
Unused character positions
































digit on the lower
machine readable
line
690806 F 940623 6 ZE184226B<<<<< 1 4UTO
fig. 10.2: In consideration of national privacy laws, the data in the machine-readable zone (MrZ) 
must be visually readable as well as machine readable.
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Each time a traveller (i.e. MRP holder) enters or exits a State, his identity 
can be verif ied against the image created at the time his travel document 
was issued. This will ensure that the holder of a document is the legitimate 
person to whom it was issued and will enhance the effectiveness of any 
advance passenger information (API) system.89
Such verif ication can be done without touching the passport booklet, since 
the aerial connecton allows data to be communicated between the micro-
chip and an encoding/reading device at a distance of ten centimetres.90 
Hence, the biometric passport presents the chip as its primary source of 
information. The chip also functions as a backup of all the vital informa-
tion otherwise available in the booklet (except visas and stamps). The 
standardization of one primary biometric identif ication method (facial 
recognition technology) and one method of data storage (the chip and the 
security object) are presented as more than promising for the fulf ilment of 
the desire for greater safety and eff iciency in the regulation of travelling. 
These are the archival promises of the microchip.
The contemporary biometric passport is developed in the name of security 
and eff iciency, its biometrics presented as something brand new, unrelated 
to the international history of the passport and its changing attempts to 
connect the traveller irrevocably to his travel document. Yet, to see its 
parallels to the nineteenth-century police archive, we must f irst note 
some signif icant differences. First, Alphonse Bertillon’s police archive 
was a system designed to register and detect criminals (more specif ically, 
recidivists or repeat offenders). The biometric passport, on the other hand, 
is a system put in place to register all travelers and to protect society from 
criminals. Both are, therefore, systems for the protection of society against 
criminals, but the f irst is aimed at the criminals and registers these, while 
the other detects (in principle) all people to protect them from any potential 
criminal among them. The second difference is connected to the f irst and 
concerns scale. As the director of the Identif ication Bureau of the Paris 
Prefecture of Police, Bertillon’s archival practice was large and ambitious. 
It could be used internationally and was also exported and used in other 
countries, particularly the US. However, the archive was soon outdone by 
other methods (particularly f ingerprinting) and never enjoyed enduring 
global distribution. In contrast, the ICAO is an international organization, 
a United Nations specialized agency with nearly 70 years of experience in 
addition to the 26 years of The League of Nations. It collaborates with 191 
member states and global aviation organizations to develop an international 
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Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) that are used as a reference 
by states when developing national civil aviation regulations, including the 
current biometric passport.91 In Doc 9303, global interoperability is one of 
the ICAO’s major keywords.
However, the large-scale collection and archiving of data of entire 
populations also changes the archive. As underscored by Jonathan Finn 
in Capturing the Criminal Image. From Mug Shot to Surveillance Society 
(2009), ‘Once brought into the archive, all bodies can be identif ied and 
re-identif ied according to changing needs of those in control of the data 
and the specific parameters for searching and using the archive.’92 And with 
digitally networked, large-scale archives, they will. This is not just a techni-
cal condition for the large-scale archive but also its political terms. One clear 
example is seen in the recurring phenomenon of ‘function creep’ or ‘scope 
creep’. Scope creep is, simply put, when a service conceived for one purpose 
is pressed into service for another purpose. According to Julian Ashbourn 
in Guide to Biometrics for Large-Sale Systems (2011), this is among the most 
prevalent and destabilizing effects within large-scale systems, particularly 
in the public sector.93 The source of scope creep is often political, Ashbourn 
states: one government agency wishes to access data held by another.94
Scope creep is not a new phenomenon. A very widespread case is the 
quite blurry histories of the development of identif ication numbers. Many 
countries issued identif ication numbers for a singular purpose, but over 
time, they became de facto national identif ication numbers. The most well-
known and obvious example is probably the Social Security number system 
developed in the United States in order to disburse Social Security benefits. 
Due to scope creep, however, these numbers are used for other purposes 
to the point where it has become more or less mandatory for one to have a 
Social Security number if one wants to open a bank account, obtain a credit 
card, or drive a car. Yet, if the phenomenon is not new, it is reasonable to 
assume that digital information technologies and networked databases 
make scope creep easier to resort to and also more tempting politically. This 
is, however, in conflict with privacy principle number one, the purpose for 
collection: information is collected for a lawful purpose connected with 
a function or activity of an agency, and the collection of the information 
is necessary for that purpose. Scope creep threatens to undermine this 
basic principle in democratic societies. It also seems to compromise the 
operational integrity of the archive.95
By way of concluding, I will give an example of how scope creep can make 
visible the political radicality of the biometric passport and its archival 
promise in a way that demonstrates the parallels rather than the differences 
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between the nineteenth-century police archive and the biometric passport. 
The example also sheds light on the inscription of the passport in the his-
tory of the effort to combat crime as part of an emergent global archive of 
pre-criminals.
On 21 June 2013, the Norwegian Passport Act (1997) was adjusted on an 
important point: the § 8, which concerns the Passport Registry. The general 
rule was, and still is, that only the passport authorities ‒Kripos (the national 
unit for combating organized and other serious crime) and the Norwegian 
border authorities ‒should have access to the passport registry unless 
otherwise provided for by law or by regulation pursuant to law.96 On 21 June 
2013, a list was added (section 8a) specifying the kind of cases where the 
police could access and repurpose information from the passport registry. 
‘We will make the passport registry an effective tool in combating crime,’ 
stated then Minister of Justice and Public Security Grete Faremo during a 
press conference.97
This is a classic example of scope creep. The source is political; one gov-
ernment agency wants to access data held by another. There are reportedly 
several types of cases that form the basis for this bill, including grooming 
and child abuse. But the main background was the off icial report from ‘the 
22/7 commission’ (2012) following the terror attacks in Norway in 2011.98 
This report does not restrict itself to discussing the actions that took place 
before, during, and after the terror attacks; it also provides recommenda-
tions and advice as to how to prevent similar attacks in the future. As part 
of these preventive measures, the report states that the ‘PST [Norwegian 
Police Security Agency] would like to gain access to a number of […] infor-
mation sources, including the Customs Directorate and the Immigration 
Administration records, as well as Employer and employee registry and 
the Passport registry […]’.99 And so, less than a year later, the access was 
granted, not just for serious crimes under investigation (as was the case 
previously) but also for more minor offenses, including ‘the prevention or 
investigation of an action that according to law may lead to a higher sentence 
than imprisonment for six months’.100
This particular example of scope creep also demonstrates another 
tendency in today’s society that is vital for assessing the archival situation 
of the contemporary passport: the increasing emphasis on the precaution-
ary principle in criminal law. To accept that personal information from a 
passport registry can and should be handed over to the police to prevent a 
criminal action from happening seems to be not just a challenge to the pass-
port as institution but also in conflict with the presumption of innocence, 
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the principle that one is considered innocent until proven guilty.101 To risk 
being charged based on the suspicion that you may think of planning illegal 
actions is also a threat to the freedom of thought and the freedom of speech 
and even undermines the possibility of changing one’s mind.
The example illustrates that the history of the passport is no longer simply 
a parallel to the history of the police archive. The two archives converge. 
The genealogy of the passport can be traced back to nineteenth-century 
criminal records as an instrument of discipline and subordination to the 
state. This confirms and exemplif ies Jonathan Finn’s more general point 
about the body and the archive in current society:
In the nineteenth-century archive, the image captured the criminal, rep-
resenting his identity within its frame. In the new digital space, the image 
captures the body independently of any such f ixed identity. Criminality 
is less a function of an actual criminal event or body than it is an attribute 
that all bodies are prone to. As a result, all bodies, not just those identif ied 
as criminal, are sites to be monitored and administrated. The body in 
the digital archive exists as something that is potentially criminal and, 
therefore, as something warranting continued surveillance.102
The passpost is not just an archive; it is a pre-active criminal archive an-
ticipating a future need to know: we are all potentially criminals, and the 
passport is part of a global surveillance system for monitoring all citizens 
to prevent and solve crime. This is the archival primise of the biometric 
passport.
To conclude, the biometric passport defines individual identity as machine-
readable body measurements and personal data recorded in governmental 
and other public archives mediated by an electronically enabled document 
(or micro-archive) owned and managed by the state. This small archive is 
part of an archival assemblage of national, bilateral, and international hubs. 
The passport is thus not just ‘Man’s Most Travelled Document’, as Martin 
Lloyd put it. Its archival condition has radically changed since the paper-
based archives of Alphonse Bertillon, which depended on the telegraphic 
transmission of information to communicate across countries and regions. 
It is not just less space-based and hence to a lesser extent dominated by 
spatial order.103 Today, the archive is, in principle, ubiquitous, premised not 
just on networks but also on transfer speed. Temporal eff iciency ‒achieved 
through the combination of machine readability, connection between 
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microchip and aerial, and biometric templates that match high-resolution 
chip images against various types of archives ‒underpins the impression 
that the passport is increasingly interwoven in a system of ubiquitous 
surveillance. Accessing information in close-to-real-time also stimulates 
scope creep and other challenges to the rule of law. The biometric passport 
has thus transformed travelling individuals from being socially def ined by 
peer recognition to bodies of information sorted according to ever-changing 
political perspectives on who is on the inside and the outside of a ‘we’ 
def ined by its vulnerability to crime, terrorism, or other threats.104
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A Neomonadology of Social (Memory) Production
Tiziana Terranova
Hypotheses fingo
– Gabriel Tarde, Monadology and Sociology
On the evening of the 7th of January 2015, a crowd of over 100,000 people 
assembled in one of the main squares of the city of Naples in southern Italy 
for the funeral mass of Pino Daniele – a beloved musician who had been 
overwhelmingly popular with his hybrid and soulful version of Mediter-
ranean blues.1 His sudden death due to a heart attack at the age of 59 had hit 
the social networks f irst, as is increasingly the case with celebrity deaths. A 
mass sharing of songs, videos, and personal memories had flooded the walls 
of Italian Facebook starting from the night of the 5th, peaking on the 6th and 
the 7th, only to quickly peter out when displaced by comments and articles 
relating to slaughter of the French journalists of Charlie Hebdo in Paris.2 
Standing in the silent and sombre crowd, it was impossible not to notice 
how, when Daniele’s most popular songs sounded through the loudspeakers, 
the dark sea of people sparkled with the bright glow of thousands of small 
screens, which they lifted up to f ilm and record the crowd softly singing 
along. Sri Lankan vendors criss-crossed the packed square with their latest 
street wares: extendable stick monopods made in China that allow ‘group 
self ies’ to be taken from above. The day before the funeral, photos and 
videos of a ‘flash mob’ immediately summoned through the Facebook event 
page had also presented the same images of bright blue screens lighting up 
and f ilming a vast crowd of guitars and voices singing Daniele’s songs in a 
spontaneous social memorial.
Watching both scenes, the f irst one live, the second one through Face-
book’s newsfeed, I could not help thinking that these acts of social memori-
zation, of social production and sharing of memories, were producing ‘value’ 
for somebody else. Undoubtedly they were registered by the corporate 
owners of the social Internet as a local spike in activity generating views 
on YouTube, suggesting consumers’ propensities to algorithms, raising the 
income streams of telecom operators, and providing free content for news 
outlets.3 The event, one of many that agitate and animate transnational 
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digital networks, pointed to the process whereby the generation of a social 
memory becomes a direct productive force in the economic domain. At 
the same time, such acts also genuinely produce what Marxists would call 
‘use values’ that are not consumed by marketization: a feeling of solidarity, 
social meanings, a moment of collective reflection, the sharing of memories 
producing a sense of belonging.4 These ‘use values’ could be further quali-
f ied: a sense of beauty (aesthetic or cultural values such as the sound of 
Naples as a ‘black’ European city) and of truth (truth values about one’s 
life to which Daniele’s songs had been a soundtrack or about the city and 
its history of interrupted modernity)5. The scene I witnessed is, of course, 
both unique in its singularity and common, as photographing, f ilming, 
recording, and sharing have become, thanks to digital technologies, a daily 
practice for many, thus constituting a new mode of social memorization. 
The production of economic value (exchange and utility), cultural and social 
values, technology and memory are inextricably enmeshed. Remembering 
and sharing by technological means produce surplus value for netarchical 
capitalists but also an excess of affects, desires, and beliefs materializing 
a ‘common ground’.6 It struck me how this strange effect was enabled by 
technologies that, while constructing an undoubtedly social experience, 
would read this event as predicated on the existence of a (social) network 
composed of individuals and/or ‘dividuals’ but also exceeding both.
Two tales of social production
There is a constitutive tension between the network (a diagram composed 
of nodes and links), the individual (the concept of the autonomous, rational 
subject), and the ‘dividual’ (its dataf ied digital shadow) in that strange 
phenomenon called ‘social production’ or ‘social cooperation’, which both 
mainstream and Marxist theorists have identif ied as a key source of the 
production of value in contemporary societies. Acts of social memorization 
such as the one presented above constitute just such a case of a larger 
continuum spanning the extremes of ‘mechanical’ and ‘non-mechanical’ 
cooperation, which Yochai Benkler calls ‘social’ or ‘p2p production’.7 
Theorists of social and peer-to-peer (p2p) production have registered the 
eff icacy of organizational strategies that enable individual autonomy and 
voluntary participation in the f ield of information and knowledge produc-
tion. They have explained social production as the result of the ‘falling 
costs of access to the means of production’ coupled with the action of the 
‘invisible hand of the social’ enhanced by a peer-to-peer architecture or 
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scale-free networks somehow harmonizing individual wills activated by 
‘social motivations’.
For Benkler, but also more recently Jeremy Rifkin, the key factor at work 
in social production is internal to the movement of capital, so to speak: the 
falling costs of access to the capital needed to be an actor in the informa-
tion economy allow for an amplif ication of the powers of decentralized 
individual action.8 Social production is based on the coordinate effects of 
non-coordinate actions in as much as one does not need to be consciously 
cooperating in order to be actually cooperating.9 Just the act of recording 
and registering events of daily life and putting them online is enough to 
be cooperating from the point of view of the creation of economic value in 
a networked economy. For Benkler, the combination of individual social 
motivations and eff icient coordination resolves the ‘tension between the 
values promoted by liberal markets and the values of liberal democracy’.10 A 
collective or social event that produces value brings together the individual 
capacity to choose, the social motivations which imply a kind of ‘peer pres-
sure’ on individual choice (such as acquiring social capital or standing 
with others), the consolidation of a feeling of similarity and belonging 
which constitutes society, and also the effect produced by a commercial 
network of smart devices which allows for memories to be registered as 
traces to be stored, tagged, classified, related, and made available for current 
and future consumption. Techno-social memory thus starts as a series of 
actions (recording, uploading, tagging, posting, commenting, storing) that 
precipitate into digital objects producing value for the market and value for 
the social in what would appear as a seamless continuum that increases 
market value while consolidating social order.11 Post-workerist Marxists, on 
the other hand, following Marx’s Grundrisse, have instead argued that social 
cooperation is not simply a new source of value but the specif ic historical 
expression of living labour in an economy def ined by the hegemony of 
immaterial value production and f inancialization. From this point of view, 
social co-operation is involved at every stage and throughout every layer 
of value production in post-industrial economies, involving not simply the 
completion of a task and the reproduction of a template but the production 
of new values and the socialization of invention. Daniele’s music, emerging 
out of a proletarianized urban milieu ravaged by a crisis of industrialization, 
relied on the cooperation of a number of musicians and the re-invention 
of musical and cultural memories constituted by the social circulation of 
sounds, instruments, techniques, media, and rhythms in a transnational and 
transcontinental space spanning Europe, Africa, the Caribbeans and North 
America. The devices, protocols, platforms, and programming languages 
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that allow for the storing and sharing of the products of such cooperation 
are the means through which the productive powers of living labour are 
appropriated and captured by contemporary capitalism – turning rent and 
f inancialization into the new mode of extraction of surplus value.12 The 
relational, linguistic, and technological abilities released by post-Fordism 
become crucial components in the market-based production of value, but 
they can no longer be organized within the boundaries of the f irm and 
the form of waged work. In as much as it enacts a reappropriaton of por-
tions of f ixed capital, this new source of value also retains an autonomous 
potential that is not exhausted or captured in advance by marketization. 
For post-workerist Marxists, this potential constitutes the (virtual) engine 
of a post-socialist and post-capitalist common, a co-poietic production that 
holds together the collective and the singular.13 Here, as in Paolo Virno’s 
adoption of Gilbert Simondon’s philosophy, the common or social is the 
pre-individual (such as species-specif ic expressive capacities) and at the 
same time that reserve of being which allows the individual to undergo 
ever new transformations.14 It is the social memory of music but also the 
singularizing tendencies that each one brings to such memory and the 
new productions that it enables (including the production of new forms of 
social life). Among the autonomist Marxists, however, nobody has gone as 
far as Maurizio Lazzarato in posing ‘autonomous and independent’ social 
cooperation as the ontological and historical presupposition of economic 
valorization and the division of labour.15 Monetization and the creation of 
social wealth depend on the primary flow of social currents that mobilize 
‘mnemonic work’ or the ‘labour of attention’. The creation of value, from this 
perspective, depends only secondarily on capital and the division of labour 
while resting primarily on the ‘cooperative dynamics of inter-cerebral 
psychological forces which are not unilaterally contained in the relation 
capital-labour. Cooperation, in fact, is social in so far as it is not founded on 
work or capital, but on the activity of the ‘spirit, soul, or memory.’16
If value is f irst of all a social production mobilizing the powers of memory, 
in what way is it reconfigured by the digital networking of the social, by 
the ubiquitous social activity of recording, storing, and sharing?17 Theories 
of social production or cooperation also need to account for the series of 
elements included in an event such as the one described above: the indi-
vidual holding up her digital device and looking at the scene through the 
mobile screen in a posture that recalls a kind of neo-monadic architecture of 
subjectivity; the simultaneous process of aggregating a multitude of audio-
visual and linguistic digital traces that are recorded and stored in databanks 
and that constitute her at a micro-scale as a ‘dividual’; the social f low of 
chaptEr ElEvEn 291
currents of values that individuate the ‘common ground’ of the crowd; 
the relational recursiveness of the network as digital objects are posted, 
shared, and diffused; the multiplication of agencies at the technological 
level (screens, interfaces, protocols, programmes, code, algorithms, bots, 
buttons, etc.); and also the international and ethnic division of labour and 
the logistical arrangements that assemble the devices and bring Southeast 
Asian migrants to the streets of Southern Europe.18
While Marxist theorists of social cooperation maintain the common 
and co-operation as the presupposition of economic valorization, liberal 
theories tend to emphasize the action of autonomous individuals – even 
as such actions at a collective level somehow obey a kind of mechanical 
coordination or even intrinsic social laws. If a networked society presents 
itself as a ‘society of individuals’, this is possibly also due to the ways in 
which devices are constructed as f irst of all ‘personal’. The social life of 
digital media presents the recurring image of individual users interacting 
with their devices, so that the networked society comes across as ‘a “society” 
of individual users connected by an information architecture.19 Devices are 
constructed for individual use (desktops, laptops, tablets, smartphones), 
and individuals can be spotted in both public and private spaces staring or 
talking at their screen, shifting their attention in and out of their physical 
environment. The design of digital devices and interfaces mobilizes a ‘mo-
nadic’ architecture of subjectivity where ‘users’ are individually enveloped 
by their devices in ways that allow them to abstract themselves periodically 
from their physical surroundings in order to engage in communicative acts. 
As Sherry Turkle has put it, digital devices pose ‘being alone’ as a ‘precondi-
tion for being together because it is easier to communicate if you can focus, 
without interruption on your screen’.20 Individual users ‘prehend’ and are 
‘prehended’ by their devices including the network as a series of actions 
and relations (searching, clicking, opening, commenting, liking, posting, 
sharing, f ilming, photographing, reading, watching, ‘digging’, blogging, 
sharing, chatting, listening, following, friending, etc.). As it unfolds itself 
in the network, the individual ‘monad’ is ‘divided’ in the act of constituting 
a digital double or ‘dividual’.
Monadology and digital media
This relationship between the irreducible singularity of the agent and the 
inf inite divisibility of the ideal mathematical continuum is crucial to the 
set of problems that led the Baroque German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm 
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Leibniz to articulate his strange concept of the monad in Monadology (1714). 
Nominated by Norbert Wiener as the patron saint of cybernetics for his 
‘calculus ratiocinator’, Leibniz’s strange hypothesis of the existence of 
simple substances called monads, who are also true agents in the world, 
stimulates speculation on the nature of social production in a situation 
such as the one described above.21 It is, of course, thanks to Gabriel de Tarde’s 
Monadology and Sociology (1893) and his lectures on Economic Psychology 
(1902) that Leibniz’s monadology was f irst turned into a component of an 
economic theory where the ‘general form of activity’ is no longer the form 
of work through which a social expenditure of thermodynamic energy 
transforms nature into an object but rather ‘inter-cerebral or social labour’ 
involving a relation between agents ‘acting-at-a-distance’. Such labour 
follows the logic of the multi-form work of the ‘soul’, ‘spirit’, or ‘memory’, 
which is that of mutual influence rather than unilateral appropriation.22 
The domain of production and that of conduct, which Foucault understood 
as the conduct of oneself as well as others and involving a creative and inven-
tive relation with resistance and counter-conduct, are thus seen as inextri-
cably intertwined.23 Deleuze, of course, dedicated an important book to 
Leibniz called The Fold, which seems to provide a particularly fruitful entry 
point into the relationship between monadology and digital media. In 
Leibniz, the monad is an image of ‘enclosure’ or ‘self-envelopment’ and 
indicates the ‘soul or subject as metaphysical point’. Leibniz had borrowed 
the term from the Neo-Platonists ‘who used it to designate a state of One, 
that is a unity that envelops a multiplicity’. If Giordano Bruno’s monad had 
allowed the Neo-Platonist emanations to give way to a larger zone of im-
manence (even as formally respecting the rights of a transcendent God or 
higher Unity), Leibniz, in Deleuze’s view, stabilized the concept of the 
monad through his ‘mathematics of inflection, which allowed him to posit 
the enveloping series of multiples as convergent inf inite series ‒ through 
the metaphysics of inclusion which posits enveloping unity as irreducible 
individual unity’.24 Far from presenting a self-enclosed, individualistic 
subjectivity, the monad is a model of networked subjectivity and social 
production that composes a number of different elements in network 
culture. ‘Leibniz’s most famous proposition’, in fact, held that ‘every soul or 
subject (monad) is completely closed, windowless or doorless’, while con-
taining ‘the whole world in its darkest depths’ and ‘illuminating some little 
portion of that world, each monad a different portion’.25 As a simple sub-
stance (without parts), ‘each monad includes the whole series of predicates’ 
(actions and relations) and conveys the entire world but expressing ‘more 
clearly a small region of the world, a “subdivision”, a borough of the city, a 
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finite sequence’.26 Deleuze explains well the architectural model that informs 
Leibniz’s vision of the monad: more than an atom, the monad is a ‘cell’ with 
its dark background out of which everything is drawn out, ‘like those places 
which have existed for ages where what is seen is inside (cell, sacristy, crypt, 
church, theatre, study, print room)’. The Baroque monad is lit by a ‘crushing 
light’ coming from ‘openings invisible to their very inhabitants’ and presents 
zones of clarity.27 The clear region of the monad is, as Deleuze again recounts, 
extended in the clear portion of another, and in a same monad the clear 
portion is prolonged inf initely into the obscure zones, since each monad 
expresses the entire world as convergent infinite series.28 Deleuze suggested 
that if the Baroque monad can be read ‘politically and socially’ and repre-
sents a mutation of the ‘system window-countryside or window-painting’ 
with the dyad ‘city-information table’,29 then it can be also read historically 
as an architecture of subjectivity. Such architecture then presents a series 
of historical cases: the system ‘car-windscreen’ (exemplified by Tony Smith’s 
famous description of his minimalist sculpture in terms of a car speeding 
along a dark motorway lit only by the car’s headlamps, with the tarmac 
hurtling by in the windscreen) or ‘a computer screen in a closed room’. But 
we could also think about today’s ‘hand held screens’ on the interior walls 
of a subject moving as much in closed rooms as in open spaces. The walls 
of the networked monads are covered with ‘black mirrors’ or screens 
through which, in Deleuze’s terms, they ‘read’ the world more than they 
are actually ‘seeing it’, in the sense that reading is here described as a rela-
tion to the concepts of universals and singularities rather than to a thing.30 
If the monad thus expresses the architecture of the interiority of the ‘node’ 
or the irreducible singularity that each individual brings to the network 
experience, in Leibniz this also involves the existence of a material ‘façade’ 
which corresponds to what contemporary network cultures might call the 
‘wall’ or ‘profile’ – a standard component of the architecture of social media. 
It is through the ‘wall’ or ‘profile’ that the networked monad, which envelops 
the world through the screen, can be said to f irst appear. From the wall or 
prof ile it emerges as part of an inf initely divisible digital continuum that 
constructs it as a ‘dividual’ or ‘digital shadow’’ ‒ an object among other 
objects caught up in a continuum of variations (other prof iles but also 
software, algorithms, protocols, plugins, and audiovisual objects in general, 
etc.). If on the inside, the monad represents the simplicity and closure of 
the soul that reads the world, its outside corresponds to an inf initely divis-
ible digital ideal, where indivisibility is displaced by an inf initely divisible 
‘dividual’ acting like a node or relay in a ‘collective’ represented by the image 
of the network. For Leibniz, inf inite divisibility belonged to the 
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‘mathematical or ideal continuum’, while matter as such was constituted 
by folds. In thinking about the strange materiality of social quantities such 
as data, for example, one can consider the difference between the ideal 
mathematical continuum composed of points and what Leibniz called the 
physical point of inflection or ‘the ideal genetic element of the variable 
curve or fold or the active spontaneous line, the authentic atom’.31 In 
Deleuze’s words again, ‘inflection is the event that happens to the point or 
the line’, thus complicating what Anna Munster calls ‘the foundational 
cartography of the network as a map of links and nodes that have become 
the representative image of network design.32 As a predicate or event of the 
point and line, ‘inflection is that which makes a fold from variation and 
brings it to inf inity’: as such, it is a ‘site of cosmogenesis’.33 In Deleuze’s re-
reading of Leibniz, the physical line of inflection ‘cannot be separated from 
an inf inite variation or an inf initely variable curve, passing through an 
inf inite number of angular points and never admitting a tangent, envelop-
ing an inf initely porous world constituting more than a line and less than 
a surface’.34 As such, the mathematics of inflection turns the ideal diagram 
of nodes and lines into the inf initely variable curve of social value produc-
tion: the local event of a large crowd assembling to mourn a beloved musi-
cian (like many other social events of different kinds) are recorded in the 
network as a series of variations, made continuous by meta-data in relational 
databases connecting disparate recordings to be stored and shared in large 
data farms. As in the ‘metacommunities of code’ project, which is analyzing 
‘code-sharing practices in free and open source software repositories with 
a particular focus on GitHub’, variation is the basic form of the production 
of networked value, and small differences or variations are less subject to 
division than to various forms of inflection.35 Leibniz’s monadology estab-
lishes a basic relation between variation and point of view ‒ the second 
component of his reinvention of the Neo-Platonist monad. Leibniz estab-
lished the problem of point of view on the model of the sections of the cone, 
leading him to argue that ‘there are as many points of view as inflections 
in inflections.’36 In Baroque mathematics, as Deleuze recounts, the point 
of view is ‘the point where the lines perpendicular to tangents meet in a 
state of variation…not exactly a point, but more a place, a position, a site, 
a “linear focus”, a line emanating from other lines’.37 This concept of point 
of view establishes ‘perspectivism’ not as ‘dependence on a pre-given or 
def ined subject but as that which turns the subject into what comes to or 
remains in the point of view’. Every point of view is a point of view on vari-
ation, as it is not what varies for the subject but the condition in which an 
eventual subject apprehends a variation (metamorphosis) or equivalence 
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(anamorphosis). For thinkers such as Leibniz, Nietzsche, and William and 
Henry James, point of view is the condition in which the truth of a variation 
appears to the subject.38 Finally, the metaphysical point, or the point of 
inclusion, is def ined as the entelechia or the final cause of the fold. What is 
folded is the included or the inherent. The monad (which has no windows) 
is working from a condition of closure or envelopment and could hence be 
posited as a soul or subject.39 The mathematics of inclusion helped Leibniz 
to stabilize the monad by presenting enveloping unity as an irreducible 
singularity, foreclosing the risk of making individuals relative in the sense 
that they would simply melt into a universal spirit or soul of the world as 
seen in the Neo-Platonist monad or contemporary notions of collective intel-
ligence.40 Monadology recasts the very distinctions between the dividual, 
the individual, and the collective that are so crucial for theorizing networked 
subjectivity. The monad is an ‘agent’ but an ‘infra-individual’ one: it refers 
to the multiplicity of forces that compose the ‘individual’ and hence the 
‘social’. It is neither the ‘dividual’ because it cannot be divided, being without 
parts; nor is it is the ‘individual’ as usually understood, because individuals 
as such are aggregates of simpler parts, involving complex hierarchies of 
dominant and dominated monads. Yet the monad, in all its irreducible unity 
and singularity, is the agent of sympathetic cooperation or, as we might call 
it today, social production: this is how it is presented in Tarde’s economic 
psychology. It can be argued that Leibniz’s monad corresponds neither to 
the def inition of the ‘individual’ as a rational subject of choice in theories 
of social production nor to phenomenological accounts of the embodied 
(human) subject. In Monadology, Leibniz described the monad as a ‘simple 
substance that enters into composites’: ‘simple means without parts’ or 
‘indivisible’; and substance, as he put it elsewhere, ‘is a being capable of 
action’, which is, however, ‘altogether immaterial’ or a ‘metaphysical point’.41 
Every monad is thus f irst of all an agent, ‘each different from all other ones 
while at the same time endowed with an internal principle of change and 
the internal complexity of that which changes’.42 As ‘incorporeal automata’ 
that are to some extent perfect and self-suff icient, they are ultimately ‘the 
source of their own internal action’.43 Monads are thus not necessarily 
human, nor do they correspond to the individual; rather they indicate ‘any-
thing that has perceptions and appetites’. What distinguishes souls properly 
speaking from simple monads is the fact that their perception is more 
distinct and that they have memory.44 Every single portion of matter can 
thus be seen as animated by an inf inity of tiny agents or souls, turning the 
monad into a posthuman concept resonating with the contemporary return 
of panpsychism in speculative realism.45 Gabriel Tarde, who developed his 
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own esoteric concept of the monad in his 1895 essay Monadology and Sociol-
ogy, defined the monadologists as ‘monists who believe that all matter is 
spiritual’ (or subjective) but who, unlike what he called the ‘idealists’, do 
not think that matter is simply ‘the projection of the mental states of an I’. 
For monadologists, the whole universe is populated with ‘souls distinct 
from my own, but fundamentally similar’. Unlike the idealists who claim 
that ‘one knows nothing of the being-in-itself of a stone or a plant, and at the 
same time stubbornly persist in saying that it is’, Tarde described monadolo-
gists as those who believe that if this being of a stone or a plant ‘in itself is 
fundamentally similar to our own being, then it will no longer be unknow-
able, and may consistently be aff irmed’.46 Tarde notably ‘opened’ the monad 
up to ‘action-at-a-distance’ by other monads. He criticized the impenetrabil-
ity of Leibniz’s monads and their reliance on a ‘pre-established harmony’, 
arguing instead for ‘open monads which would penetrate each other recipro-
cally rather than being mutually external’.47 In as much as they act, and act 
at a distance, they are no ‘points’ but:
[e]ach element, hitherto conceived as a point, now becomes an indefi-
nitely enlarged sphere of action…and all these interpenetrating spheres 
are so many domains proper to each element, so many distinct though 
intermixed spaces, perhaps, which we wrongly take to be a single unique 
space. The centre of each sphere is a point, which is uniquely def ined by 
its properties, but in the end a point like any other; and besides, since 
activity is the very essence of the elements, each of them exists in its 
entirety in the place where it acts.48
A neo-monadological model of social cooperation
It is possible to think of ways in which a (neo)monadological concept of 
the social could make an actual difference in modelling key processes of 
network culture, introducing a new concept of social memory. Contempo-
rary theories of social or peer production seem like particularly reductive 
versions of monadic inter-penetration, reducing the monad to the human 
individual, bracketing off the fact that what we conceive of as an individual 
is in fact the ‘f inal term’ of a previous series (physical, biological) which does 
not stop with it. Such an interpretation downplays the relation with other 
non-human elements and forces while retaining from Leibniz the closure 
of the soul within itself and most signif icantly his notion of harmony. For 
reasons that are personal and autonomous, we are told, individuals choose 
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to ‘act together’ or ‘cooperate’ (even when such cooperation involves the 
simple act of converging on a city square for a celebration). Technology 
allows such cooperation to become immediately productive of social 
memories that flow through the timelines and newsfeeds of social network 
sites, only to be copied and stored more or less permanently in individual 
devices or on centralized server farms. For a key theorist of social produc-
tion such as Benkler, individuals ‒def ined as ‘the moral anchor and actual 
moral agent of political economy’ ‒voluntarily and eff iciently coordinate 
with others, driven by social motivations in producing informational goods 
whose specif ic characteristics (the marginal cost near zero of information) 
enables peer production in certain sectors of the economy.49 Technologies 
such as digital objects are here just tools that individuals use to cooperate, 
while agency is allocated exclusively to the human individuals and the 
value of the products of peer production is defined by utility and exchange. 
The methodological individualism that is at the core of liberal theories of 
social production is introduced to make the phenomenon intelligible‒ or 
rational‒in the eyes of mainstream economists. In explaining how volun-
tary cooperation is successfully performed without the promise of f inancial 
rewards and without the display of command lines within the f irm, the 
notion of utility value is central. To freely and voluntary cooperate, the 
individual needs to be motivated, and this motivation can only be linked 
to the actualization of a satisfaction (hence a pleasurable sensation) such as 
that induced by the growth of one’s social capital or influence with others. 
Even if for Leibniz the individual was not the monad but an aggregate of 
monads, theorists of social production maintain his notion of individuals as 
closed unities harmoniously cooperating with other closed monads, identi-
fying the social as the combination of the ‘internal’ drive of the individual 
with the external mechanisms of harmonization (or social laws): the social 
motivation to gain pleasure by accumulating social capital in one’s circle of 
peers somehow submits to the laws of social physics. The invisible hand of 
the social, which supplements the invisible hand of the market in theories 
of social production, is a model of coordination that poses the origins of 
value in individual initiatives of exchange and production – the equivalent 
of the pre-established harmony of Leibniz’s monadology.50 Tarde objected to 
the notion of pre-established harmony, arguing that sympathetic coopera-
tion was the far-from-pre-established result of complex processes through 
which monads unilaterally or reciprocally capture each other’s attention, 
leading them to follow, adapt, or oppose other monads. Cooperation is 
not based on exchange but on an asymmetrical relationship of mutual or 
unilateral capture which presupposes a whole social and psychic economy 
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of power. It is diff icult to underestimate the importance of the notion of 
motivations for liberal and mainstream theories of social production – a 
notion that illustrates a crucial difference with Tarde’s neo-monadology of 
sympathetic cooperation. For Benkler, motivations are a universal of human 
behaviour, relaying a utilitarian model of pain and pleasure or utility value. 
A simple model of human motivation is what gives economics analytical 
tractability, in Benkler’s words – to the extent that all human motivations 
can be more or less reduced to something like positive or negative utilities 
translatable into a universal medium of exchange or money.51 From this 
perspective, the key to understanding social production is catching the 
difference between money-oriented motivations from socially oriented 
motivations, but the difference seems to be only one of orientation: in as 
much as they are oriented towards social standing or capital rather than 
economic standing (and ultimately pleasure), social motivations still obey 
an economic logic (positive/negative utilities) even as they bypass the 
question of money.52 Motivation is thus closely linked to interest, a concept 
that Dardot and Laval examine in their critique of neoliberal rationality. 
Following Foucault, they point out how in classical liberalism, interest 
is the other name of desire, a principle of action that is endowed with its 
own principle of internal regulation and whose foundation is the liberal 
government of the self. To reduce pain and increase pleasure according 
to the right calculation of the consequences of action, makes the ability 
to calculate interest the f irst great secular principle of the regulation of 
conduct.53
From the point of view of monadology, we might say that the concept 
of the liberal individual moved by motivations and interests that def ine 
its ‘appetite’ for the satisfaction of a certain sensation seems, remarkably 
enough, to lack the dimension of belief. Liberal theories of the social 
thus produce what we might call a ‘mutilated’ version of the inf initesi-
mal forces that for monadologists are the truly infra-individual social 
agents. While they assume a heterogeneity of motivations, they present 
a univocity of desire (reducible to the sensation of pleasure derived by 
the act of cooperation) and a homogeneity of beliefs (a presupposed 
agreement on the goals of cooperation). In as much as social production 
relies on the principle of utility, which is in turn based on sensation, it 
thus mobilizes a qualitative element in the monad that, like interest in 
liberal political and economic theory, is non-transferrable. In contrast, 
Tarde’s neomonadology pushed him to criticize the exclusive emphasis 
on sensation in the emerging neo-classical economic paradigm and to 
argue for the key importance of the transferrable: that is, social quantities 
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such as desires and beliefs. For Tarde, the qualitative element of sensation 
was not transferrable and hence not social. What made the monad social 
was not the drive to acquire pleasurable sensations (and the individual 
memory of pains and pleasures undergone in the past) but its being 
constantly immersed in the objectif iable f low of social quantities such 
as beliefs and desires. Beliefs and desires express the objectif ication 
and quantif ication of the two main virtual mnemonic forces of the soul 
that belong to every existing monad (inorganic, organic, or human); that 
is, the static force of belief and the dynamic force of desire (in Leibniz, 
perception and appetite).54
By the universality of their presence in all psychological phenomena, 
both human and animal, by the homogeneity of their nature from one 
end of their immense gamut to the other, from the slightest inclination 
to believe or to want up to certainty and passion, and f inally by their 
mutual penetration and by other no less striking signs of similarity, 
belief and desire play exactly the same role in the ego, with respect to 
sensations, as do space and time in the external world with respect to 
material elements.55
Unlike sensation, belief combined with desire is not only transmittable, 
it also comprises unconscious states of being and is present in even a 
protoplasm or a spore. When applied to the f ield of social cooperation as 
the source of the production of value, we can say that we do not just join a 
project, subscribe to a platform, or turn up at a social event advertised on 
social media because it makes us feel good but because we desire something 
and refuse something else, because we believe in somebody or something 
and no longer believe in something else. The actions of believing and 
desiring re-actualize the forces of time as memory. They are transmittable 
social quantities of variable intensity that inform the production of value 
in sympathetic cooperation. They make the difference between success 
and failure, underpin the reproduction of the existent, and constitute 
the power of the true event. Tarde’s merit, for some, was not so much to 
have ‘opened up’ Leibniz’s monad and hence made it ‘social’ but to have 
inserted Nietzsche’s forces into Lucretius’ atoms, to have disposed of the 
transcendence guarantee by God and his pre-established harmony in 
order to grasp the monads as avid and possessive elements driven less 
by the urge to preserve their being than with a plan to conquer the world 
and pattern it on itself. To do away with the emphasis on ‘harmony’ as 
the modality of cooperation and to introduce dissent, conflict, hostility, 
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and avidity at the core of social cooperation is an operation that does not 
necessarily lead to the postulation of a need for a new social contract. It is 
true that every monad ‒ every simple element without parts that brings 
unity or enfolds a multiplicity ‒wants not so much to preserve itself as 
to spread. Every idea, affect, belief, truth, but also digital object, virus, 
protocol, or image aims for maximum diffusion or to express its power 
to the maximum. Not a substance like the self ish gene of neo-Darwinism 
but a force or agent individuated by its milieu, each monad has its ‘design’: 
it strives to expand and proliferate to the point where it will have become 
the whole world and have patterned the world after itself. The Nietzschean 
will to power of Tarde’s monads only come to a halt when it encounters 
a limit in the resistances and wills emerging from other monads. The 
complex architectures of physical, biological, and social assemblages are 
the outcome of these strange subterranean struggles – the oppositions, 
adaptations, and inventions that constitute monadological production. 
If this avidity were the only thing that def ined a monad, we would in 
fact f ind ourselves in a cosmological version of Hobbes’ concept of war 
as the basis of sociality. But Tarde considers that the sympathetic side 
of the monad is as important as the hostile or combative side: no single 
monad is  able to carry out such a conquest on its own. By being attracted 
to the similar in others, they also form bonds with others ‒ that is, form 
societies. This interdependence of hostility and sympathy, combined with 
the drive to expand, constitutes the key to understanding the relation 
between subjectivation and subjection, freedom and domination in the 
neo-monadological social universe of Gabriel Tarde. The coexistence of 
sympathy and hostility, like and dislike, and the interplay of autonomy 
and dependence is essential to social production. ‘[I]n every atomistic or 
monadologist system, every phenomenon is nothing other than a cloud 
which depends on actions produced by a multitude of agents which are 
so many invisible and innumerable gods (polytheism or miriateism)’, and 
yet these microscopic gods mostly appear to us as having given up their 
absolute freedom, becoming ‘prisoners or subjected’.56 In their drive to 
realize their design, i.e. their particular combination of beliefs and desires, 
monads are drafted into the projects of other monads. They let themselves 
be hegemonized and place themselves voluntarily under somebody else’s 
lead – they ‘follow’ or ‘combat’ others. Since the relation between monads 
always plays out in the space of freedom afforded by distance, what we 
have then is not physical combat but a subtle process of mutual sugges-
tion involving an asymmetrical and more or less reversible capture of 
‘followers’. It is almost as if the Gramscian concept of hegemony – the 
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ability to govern by consensus and to wage a war through persuasion that 
produces the relationship between dominating and dominated, hegemonic 
and subaltern ‒ is taken to a microscopic (or infra-individual) and social 
level, making it reversible and unstable. Hegemony is, so to speak, almost 
ontologized. The engine of voluntary and collective social production is, 
in fact, a willingness to follow, to copy, to imitate (even one’s own self), to 
become part of a f low, to join somebody else’s design, all the time hoping 
to realize one’s own small or great invention.
Conclusions
A neo-monadology of social memory production is a speculative experiment 
that allows us to understand ordinary events of social memorialization 
in networked cultures as an expression of social co-operation that breaks 
with theories of motivation and the harmonization of individual choices 
entailed by concepts of ‘social laws’ and also of ‘emergence’. Understood 
in neo-monadological terms, social cooperation rests on a multiplicity 
of relations of mutual inf luence and capture: it engages inf initesimal 
forces and directly mobilizes the capacity of memory to retain time and 
introduce difference as well as its ability to act at a distance according to a 
logic of mutual appropriation or unilateral subjection. The social action of 
memory thus explains the production of values – utility but also truth and 
beauty – as a force of repetition and difference, where every repetition and 
difference is also a social action (even when it takes place in the multiplic-
ity that constitutes each individual). Such is the action-at-a-distance in 
social digital media in which avid yet essentially connective forces are 
synthesized by new media objects: widgets and plug-ins such as ‘like’, 
‘share’, or ‘tweet’ buttons. Societies of monads produce and are character-
ized by asymmetrical relations of micro-hegemony that are more or less 
stabilized but always open to internal revolt. Social memory production 
must therefore be understood in terms of the infra-individual relations 
that haunt the individual, the capacity of memory to retain time and 
introduce difference, as well as its capacity to act at a distance according 
to a logic of mutual appropriation. The human aspects of social memory 
must therefore be understood in terms of their implication in larger socie-
ties of inorganic, organic, and technical forces that constantly reinvent 
mnemonic actions such as possessing and being possessed, sympathy and 




1. On the Mediterranean blues of Pino Daniele, see Cavallo, Chambers, as well 
as Festa.
2.  On the morning of the 7th of January 2015, a commando of three men at-
tacked the offices of the satirical French magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris, 
killing twelve people, mostly journalists and two policemen. The three 
men, all of whom were later killed by the French police, hailed Allah while 
shooting their kalashnikhovs, thus placing the massacre under the rubric 
of ‘Islamist terrorism’. The massacre soon became a mass event on social 
networks, where the twitter tag #jesuischarles was one of the most popular 
ever in the history of Twitter (see Whitehead).
3. On the political economy of ‘propensity’, see Thrift. 
4. On use values as essential sites of struggle exceeding exchange value and 
fully investing the production of subjectivity, see Mezzadra. 
5. On the ‘interrupted modernity’ of the Mediterranean, see Chambers.
6. For Kostakis and Bauwens, netarchical capital ‘is that fraction of capital 
which enables cooperation, but through proprietary platforms that are 
under central control’ (2014: 38). On the production of ‘common ground’ as 
a political stake, see Gilbert. 
7. While postulating that social production is at the core of the production of 
value in the networked economy, Benkler posed a difference between me-
chanic cooperation (as that enacted in cases such as Nasa Clickworkers or 
by corporations such as Google and Amazon) and non-mechanic coopera-
tion, involving deliberative processes such as in Wikipedia (2006: 75).
8. See Benkler 2006: 32-34; On the ‘zero marginal cost’ revolution, see Rifkin. 
9. Benkler, p. 3.
10. Ibid., p. 2.
11. On the biopolitical genealogy of social networking sites as technologies of 
stabilization of the social, see Terranova. 
12. For an account of digital technologies as mechanisms of capture, see 
Pasquinelli; on rent and financialization as new measures of value, see 
Fumagalli and Mezzadra.
13. For a political theory of the common, see Hardt and Negri. 
14. For Paolo Virno, the ‘social’ indicates what Simondon calls the ‘pre-individ-
ual’ but also in a ‘strong sense’ the whole of productive forces historically 
defined as much as the biological features of the species (2001: 238).
15. Lazzarato, p. 8
16. Lazzarato, pp. 35 and 39.
17. In Lazzarato’s account of Gabriel Tarde’s Psychologie Économique (1902), 
Tarde is presented as a critic of both the labour theory of value, ground-
ing the latter in the division of labour, and of utility value in neoclassical 
economics (Lazzarato 2002: 8).
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18. On the intrinsic connection between racism and the capitalist process of 
valorization, see Curcio and Mellino. 
19. Munster, p. 11.
20. Turkle, p. 155.
21. In his introduction to Cybernetics, Wiener so articulated the importance of 
Leibniz for his new science: ‘If I were to choose a patron saint for cyber-
netics out of the history of science, I should have to choose Leibniz. The 
philosophy of Leibniz centers about two closely related concepts ‒ that of 
a universal symbolism and that of a calculus of reasoning. From these are 
descended the mathematical notation and the symbolic logic of the present 
day. Now, just as the calculus of arithmetic lends itself to a mechanization 
progressing through the abacus and the desk computing machine to the ul-
tra-rapid computing machines of the present day, so the calculus ratiocina-
tor of Leibniz contains the germs of the machina ratiocinatrix, the reasoning 
machine. Indeed, Leibniz himself, like his predecessor Pascal, was interested 
in the construction of computing machines in the metal. It is therefore not 
in the least surprising that the same intellectual impulse which has led to 
the development of mathematical logic has at the same time led to the ideal 
or actual mechanization of processes of thought.’ (1965: 12).
22. Lazzarato, p. 18; Gabriel de Tarde’s Monadologie et Sociology was originally 
published in 1893 but according to Filippo Domenicali composed mostly 
in 1875. Domenicali argues for an esoteric Tarde who expresses himself in 
his monadology as ‘secret metaphysics’ but which he tended not to make 
so public or central for fear of going against the positivist spirit of the time 
(See Tarde 2012; Domenicali). For a Tardean reading of digital networks that 
deploys Tarde’s concept of imitation to think virality, see Sampson; for a 
perspective on the relation beween Tarde and social psychology, see Black-
man.
23. On the notion of conduct and counter-conduct in Foucault, see Davidson.
24. Deleuze, 1993, pp. 23-24.
25. Deleuze, 1995, pp. 157-158.




30. Deleuze, 1995, pp. 156-158.
31. Deleuze, 1993, p. 14.
32. Munster, p. 21.
33. Deleuze, 1993, p. 17.
34. Ibid.
35. ‘Metacommunities of Code’ is a collaboration between Matthew Fuller, 
Richard Mills, Adrian Mackenzie, Stu Sharples, and Andrew Goffey (see 
http://metacommunitiesofcode.org/).  See their contribution to this volume 
on pp. 87-101.
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36. Deleuze 1993, p. 20.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., pp. 18-19.
39.  Ibid., p. 22.





45. On the post-human and the post-humanities, see Braidotti; on the return of 
panpsychism in contemporary philosophy and media theory, see Shaviro; 
on machinic animism, see Melitopolous and Lazzarato. 
46. Tarde, 2012, p. 15.
47. Ibid., p. 26.
48. Ibid., pp. 26-27.




53.  Dardot and Laval, p. 297.
54. Tarde, 2012, p. 24.
55. Ibid., pp. 24-25.
56. See Tarde 2012, p. 66.
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 Chapter Twelve
On the Synthesis of Social Memories
Yuk Hui
We must therefore expect a completely transposed Homo sapiens to come into 
existence, and what we are witnessing today may well be the last free interchanges 
between humans and the natural world. Freed from tools, gestures, muscles, from 
programming actions, from memory, freed from imagination by the perfection of 
the broadcasting media, freed from the animal world, the plant world, from cold, 
from microbes, from the unknown world of mountains and seas, zoological Homo 
sapiens is probably nearing the end of his career….
– André Leroi-Gourhan1
This essay is about the synthesis of social memories rather than social 
memory per se and discusses such a synthesis in the light of digital tech-
nologies. Synthesis here is understood in the Kantian sense of ‘putting 
together different representations and grasping what is manifold in one 
[act of knowledge]’.2 Synthesis thus demands an active unif ication of parts 
in contrast to an unconscious or mechanical repetition. To remember 
something is always a reconstruction in which the fragmented past and 
the projected future are brought into the present. In the early twentieth 
century, Maurice Halbwachs introduced the concept of social memory in 
order to critique a psychological approach that understands memory as 
personal and individual activity. Since memories in his view do not reside 
in the individual but ‘are recalled by me externally, and the groups of which 
I am part at any time give me the means to reconstruct them’, the social 
conditions of memory should be the object of study.3 This psychosocial 
account of memory notably emerges alongside the new discipline of social 
psychology.
In L’individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information, the 
French philosopher of technology Gilbert Simondon offers a concise sum-
mary of the conflict between the psychical and the social. Pure psychology 
understands reality according to the motivation of the psychical individual; 
pure sociology understands reality by reducing the individual to a product of 
the social. However, neither of these approaches, which start from extreme 
propositions, are able to explain individuation. Hence, Simondon outlines a 
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principle that he calls a psychic and collective individuation. The synthesis 
of memories must be grasped as a psychic as well as a collective process in 
which memory individuates precisely by overcoming the tension between 
the psychological and the collective as well as the inconsistencies of the 
psychological individual.4 According to Simondon, ‘social memory’ is an 
ambiguous concept since all memory has a social dimension, even genetic 
and the phylogenetic memories. A narrower concept of social memory is 
thus needed, one that focuses on what is shared among individuals and 
serves to unify a social group. But, in addition to the concepts of the social 
and the psychical, Simondon’s theory of individuation included another 
decisive dimension, notably the technical and the technological, too often 
understood as the mere background of the psychic and the social. By fol-
lowing Simondon’s emphasis on the centrality of the technical, it is possible 
to extend Halbwachs’ analysis of social memory to a more contemporary 
situation in which digital technologies take centre stage.
This essay will argue that the synthesis of social memory is fundamentally 
technical. In recent decades, the externality of remembrance and hence 
the technicity of the mind has gained much attention. Early twentieth-
century research on memory in biology, especially Eric Kandel’s work on 
cellular and molecular brain mechanisms that help explain short and 
long-term memories, opened up new terrain for the study of memory.5 
While certain researches in neuroscience have the tendency to reduce the 
mind to the brain and the technical and social to the physiological, recent 
cognitive science has questioned this reduction and brought to light a new 
understanding of the role of technics in the functioning of the brain and 
memory. Andy Clark and David Chamber’s extended mind hypothesis, 
in which they propose that the mind thinks beyond the skull so that the 
technical apparatus becomes an interiorized function of the brain, is one 
notable example6; John Haugeland’s concept of the embedded mind7 and 
Fred Dretske’s externalism are others.8
Yet the question of the externality of the mind has long been addressed 
in f ields such as anthropology and philosophy of technology, opening 
up inquiry concerning not just the mechanism of the synthesis of social 
memory but also the relation between nature, culture, and technics. How, 
then, is such a synthesis to be addressed in relation to exteriorization? 
And how will the emphasis on exteriorization affect our understanding 
of social memory in the digital age? I will try to address this question by 
outlining three syntheses of social memory as found in the works of André 
Leroi-Gourhan, Gilbert Simondon, and Bernard Stiegler.
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Three syntheses of social memory
In contrast to Halbwachs’ effort to account for the social condition of 
memory, my aim is thus to describe the digital condition of social memory. 
For this purpose, my concept of social memory is broader than that of 
Halbwachs’: social memory here designates all products that result from 
the operation of transindividual relations. I take the term transindividual 
from Simondon, who saw all involvement with technical objects ‒whether 
invention or use ‒as a fundamental form of communication. The ‘technical 
object taken according to its essence, that is to say the technical object as 
it is invented, thought and wanted, assumed by a human subject, becomes 
the support and the symbol of the relation that we would like to call 
transindividual.’9
The twentieth century is a century in which the question of social or 
collective memory becomes critical due to the consequences of world wars 
and the rapid changes caused by urbanization. Walter Benjamin stated 
that it is more diff icult to honour the memory of the nameless than that 
of the famous; the nameless are those who are not inscribed and who 
cannot be inscribed in historical writings.10 Martin Heidegger, for his 
part, endeavoured to deal with the question of the forgetting of Being, 
amplif ied by the advancement of a modern techno-science that marks 
the end of metaphysics and pushes it towards total oblivion. The effort to 
retrieve that which is about to disappear or be forgotten thus becomes a 
key philosophical task of the twentieth century. This task encompasses two 
contradictory trajectories. The f irst consists of the effort to document, in 
the name of history and humanity, what has happened; to leave a record 
through writings, monuments, archives, museums, etc. The expansion of 
social memory in the twentieth century was therefore a mise en scène of 
intensive writing circulated globally thanks to the accelerating technologies 
that are paradoxically also the cause of forgetting. The other is the effort 
to remember that which cannot be retained or memorized – in particular 
the trauma of the Holocaust. If, on the one hand, one tends to exploit the 
anamnesic nature of technical artifacts, on the other hand, there is an effort 
to get beyond the merely factual level of memory documents in order to 
reach the wounds that remind us of the unmemorable. This contradiction 
is further amplif ied in the twenty-f irst century due to the digital revolution 
and intensif ied globalization processes.
Bernard Stiegler, following Jacques Derrida, tried to resolve the op-
position between mnemotechnics and the unmemorable by considering 
mnemotechnics as a support that provides the access to the unmemorable. 
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If the unmemorable is the inf inite since it cannot be recorded or written, 
this inf inity is only possible as conceived in the f inite. In other words, 
technics becomes the condition of possibility under which the anamnesis 
of the inf inite is possible. For Stiegler, technics is thus a supplement to the 
retentional f initude or limitation of human beings, producing the (im)pos-
sibility of the infinite. Hence we encounter two different syntheses of social 
memories, or two modes of existence of historical memory and historicity.
The two syntheses govern the operation of transindividual relations, yet 
they also result from the crystallization of transindividual relations. But 
since the transindividuality of technical objects extends beyond historical 
memory and its writings and monuments, we need to discuss another, 
earlier synthesis of social memory. This f irst synthesis is not necessarily 
related to any historical events but is expressed in the invention and use 
of technical objects, for example in a new method of metallurgy or the 
construction of a well. Both invention and use are signif icant terms here, 
designating at once the ideal and the real. Invention is not the production 
of the object itself; it is, rather, the invention of a scheme, activating a 
theatre of images, signs, and symbols.11 These signs and symbols suppose 
transindividual relations, social and aesthetic. Invention is the realiza-
tion and restructuring of these relations and also the introduction of 
an element of indeterminacy within the determination of the scheme. 
The evolution of technics entails the constant crystallization of these 
structures, from the biface of the Australanthropus to the modern chop-
ping machine.
According to Simondon, technical objects create an inter-human relation 
that is transindividual in the sense that the technical object already involves 
both functionality and protocol.12 This synthesis springs out of need, and its 
traces are retained in the technical objects and their wider networks of rela-
tions. The conception of technical objects as a form of social memory is also 
found in Stiegler, where they constitute an epiphylogenetic memory, a ‘past 
that I never lived but that is nevertheless my past, without which I would 
never have had a past of my own’.13 Stiegler’s notion of the epiphylogenetic 
memory draws on the work of anthropologist and palaeontologist André 
Leroi-Gourhan, for whom memory is the constant process of exteriorization 
in the ethnic group:
Like tools, human memory is a product of exteriorization, and it is stored 
within the ethnic group. This is what distinguishes it from animal mem-
ory, of which we know little except that it is stored within the species.14
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Epiphylogenetic memory is distinct from genetic memory as well as epige-
netic memory (the memory of the central nervous system); in the words of 
Stiegler, it is a ‘techno-logical memory’,15 which we can find in languages, the 
use of tools, the consumption of goods, and the practices of rituals. For Leroi-
Gourhan, signs and symbols represent a progressive ‘intellectualisation of 
sensation’, which liberates and exteriorizes the gestural and the f igural to 
idealized objects.16 Symbols are not purely pragmatic or functional; they 
are products of a genesis from the physiological, modulated by the rhythm 
introduced by technical objects. Stiegler associates epiphylogenetic memory 
with what Leroi-Gourhan calls ‘social memory in expansion’. The f irst 
synthesis of social memory is then also an epiphylogenesis. This genesis is 
not linear but functions like a cycle, in the sense that whatever is exterior-
ized is reintroduced to the body so that a new process of exteriorization 
takes place.
However, this f irst synthesis also overlaps with the second one, fun-
damentally because both rely on all sorts of technical objects. The an-
thropologist Tim Ingold has produced a diagram that concisely illustrates 
the relation between memory and technics in Leroi-Gourhan’s concept of 
human evolution.17
If we paraphrase Pierre Nora, we could say that what distinguishes the 
second synthesis from the f irst is that the second is based on the conscious 
construction of memory based on historical events or on the description of a 
particular longue durée, as well as on archives and monuments. Jan Assmann 
has since produced a slightly different schema: he distinguishes between 
communicative memory, cultural memory, and political memory. For him, 
only the latter two correspond to what we call the second synthesis.18 The 
f irst synthesis can be lived and transmitted to the next generation through 
fig. 12. 1: Scheme of leroi-gourhan’s understanding of technics and memory in evolution by tim 
Ingold.
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a variety of practices, without being explicitly expressed. It is within such 
lived forms of transmission that social or collective identity is formed and 
also reconstituted through acts of invention. This is probably a more pri-
mordial and necessary process than the explicit exteriorization of the second 
synthesis, which is usually politically constructed. Put differently, writing 
as such probably has a more signif icant role in the def inition of ethnicity 
than writings on historical events. Yet the two cannot be separated, and 
indeed Leroi-Gourhan also observed that progress in writing technologies 
accelerates the production of explicit memories, as seen in the expansion of 
printing in Europe in the eighteenth century, and the digital technologies 
of the twentieth century.
The three syntheses of social memory are, then, as follows: the exteri-
orization of memory by means of tools, rules, and rituals; the construction 
of explicit historical memories; and the anamnesis of the unmemorable. 
There is a clear reference here to Jean-François Lytoard’s analysis of the 
synthesis of time in habits, memorizing, and what he calls ‘passibility’19 
as well as Gilles Deleuze’s analysis of Humean habits, Freud’s concept of 
Nachträglichkeit, and Nietzsche’s eternal return. However, in our context, 
the synthetic nature of social memory is no longer a mere function of the 
mind; it is fundamentally exterior in virtue of its technical nature. Social 
memory is like a sphere that englobes the individual and represents the 
universal incarnated in the individual at the same time as the memory of 
each individual contributes to the universal. When Leroi-Gourhan com-
ments on social memory, he emphasizes this two-way traff ic: the human 
being is a zoological individual and also a creator of social memory.20 Such 
memory does not reside ‘in’ the brain but, like human evolution, starts 
with the feet that liberate the hands for using and inventing tools.21 This 
is a reflexive model of social memory which includes the participation of 
individuals as well as of technical objects, processes of invention and use, 
as well as the conscious and explicit assemblage of idealized memory traces. 
With this tripartite schema of the three syntheses of memory in place, I 
will attempt to describe the impact of the digital on our understanding of 
the f irst synthesis and partly on that of the second.
Memory, ethnicity and the technical milieu
As we have seen, the f irst synthesis refers to an implicit form of social 
memory that is embedded in and communicated through technical 
objects in everyday use. This provides us with a rather vague concept of 
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social memory, since there are innumerable technical objects. However, 
Leroi-Gourhan’s concept of the technical milieu outlines the associations 
of technical objects in a way that lends more specif icity to the question of 
their social relations. In Speech and Gesture (1964, 1965), Leroi-Gourhan 
describes the evolution of homo sapiens as a history of the living being 
and its milieu, shaped through technological interventions. In an earlier 
book Milieu et Techniques (1945), Leroi-Gourhan analyzes the formation 
of ethnicity through the concepts of the exterior and interior milieu. Put 
simply, the exterior milieu consists both of unchanging nature and dynamic 
exchanges with other groups with different technologies. The interior milieu 
consists of affairs that are internal to the physiological and biological needs 
and social operations within the ethnic group. Within the interior milieu, 
Leroi-Gourhan identif ies what he calls the technical milieu. The technical 
milieu is always geographically and historically specific but also modifiable. 
It functions as a membrane in the sense that it f ilters and hence protects the 
interior, and it is also able to adopt forces from the exterior milieu. Ethnicity 
is therefore always, as Leroi-Gourhan emphasizes, a process of becoming.22
The technical milieu thus maintains the internal dynamics and the 
exchange with the exterior milieu. Simondon also noted that competition 
between the ethnic groups is part of a dynamic of adaptation an d adoption 
of technicity.23 When a group develops new technologies, the neighbour-
ing group, which has more advanced technologies, can easily adopt it and 
integrate it into its own social and economical system. But when the other 
group has a lower degree of technicity, it will have to adapt to the new modes 
of production in order to keep abreast of them. These are the extreme cases, 
but between them we can register different types of exchanges between 
different groups based on analyses of their technical milieux. In the extreme 
case of adaptation, the technical milieu is no longer able to function as a 
membrane: its function as a f ilter and protection is lost, and the separation 
between the interior and the exterior will be reconf igured. This results 
in disorientation, which needs to be resolved in order for the group to 
attain another metastable identity. The industrial revolutions initiated 
in England probably had such an effect on other European countries, but 
it seems that the similarities in cultures and the long history of wars and 
other exchanges allowed industrial production to be quickly absorbed 
into their interior milieus. Another example is the importation of Western 
technologies to China after the two Opium Wars (1839-1842 and 1856-1860). 
When the defeated Ching dynasty had to import military and industrial 
technologies from Europe and the United States, the technical milieu that 
had been strong and stable in China before the sixteenth century was totally 
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broken. Colonization always starts with the disruption of the technical 
milieu, which of course is partly def ined by military technologies. When 
the technical milieu stops functioning as a membrane, the exterior and 
the interior becomes antagonistic entities, since metastability is no longer 
attained.
In such a situation, it is the f irst synthesis of social memory that is before 
all else disrupted and transformed. The second synthesis ‒ the documenta-
tion and analysis of these historical events‒ always arrives later, and such a 
synthesis is often placed at the service of nationalist or fascist fantasies. The 
disrupted technical milieu invariably seeks a metastability that has to be 
reconstructed through inventions that produce new kinds of technical facts. 
As Leroi-Gourhan saw it, these may be aesthetic or decorative functions that 
are compatible with cultural traditions as well as the military technologies 
that keep the country abreast of other countries.
The second and later synthesis also demands a technical medium as well 
as a technical reality that reconstitutes the interior and the technical milieu. 
If we follow Simondon’s analysis, archives and monuments are the key 
points [les points clefs] of reticulation in modern societies – the nodal points 
in their network formations. To briefly summarize the speculative history 
of technology outlined by Simondon in the last part of Du Mode d’Existence 
des objets techniques, primitive society is considered to be of magic origin, 
so that society is reticulated by means of a number of magic nodes, for 
example tall mountains, special trees, or animals. Once society bifurcates 
into religious and technical spheres of authority, producing further separa-
tions between science and technology or theory and practice, technical 
objects slowly take on the role as nodal points in the processes of social 
reticulation.24 Simondon’s point is that the progress of civilization can be 
described in terms of changing modes of reticulation, which become more 
and more dependent on the formation of the techno-geographic milieus:
Look at this TV antenna of television as it is … it is rigid but it is oriented; 
we see that it looks into the distance, and that it can receive [signals] from 
an emitter far away. For me, it appears to be more than a symbol; it seems 
to represent a gesture of sorts, an almost magical power of intentionality, 
a contemporary form of magic. In this encounter between the highest 
place and the nodal point, which is the point of transmission of hyper-
frequenies, there is a sort of ‘co-naturality’ between the human network 
and the natural geography of the region. It has a poetic dimension, as 
well as a dimension having to do with signif ication and the encounter 
between signif ications.25
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The question is how digital technologies affect the dynamic techno-geo-
graphic milieus of social memory. The f irst effect is the technical tendency 
of digital technology to turn various forms of manual production into 
exteriorized memories through all sorts of computational operations and 
apparatuses. I take the term ‘technical tendency’ from Leroi-Gourhan, who 
distinguishes it from technical facts. While technical facts are accidental, 
a technical tendency is necessary: the invention of wheel is a technical 
tendency, but whether or not wheels will have ray structures is a matter of 
technical fact. The digital exteriorization of memory is of course not a new 
phenomenon, but contemporary technologies have pushed it to a new stage: 
the advancement in artif icial intelligence replaces ever more human activi-
ties, with the result that automation no longer simply takes over human 
physical movements, as in nineteenth-century industry, but increasingly 
also cognitive processes. Tools converge in terms of functionalities and 
become increasingly removed from the specif ic geographical sites.
A typical example is social networking platforms, which have penetrated 
into almost all cultures with their particular functionalities and aesthetic. 
The convergence of the technical milieu thus is one of the consequences of 
the technological globalization and new forms of industrial standardiza-
tion. We may as yet only have a vague idea about the consequences of 
these changes, but we can already observe that the invention of technical 
tools has tremendous effects when it comes to the synchronization and 
assimilation of gestures and thoughts. The truly planetary scale of these 
technical changes will probably be even more evident to people outside of 
the European cultural sphere.
Second, digital technologies have further accelerated the already rapid 
expansion of social memories that, according to Leroi-Gourhan, started in 
eighteenth century in Europe:
The eighteenth century in Europe marked the end of the ancient world 
in printing as well as in technology … Within the space of a few decades 
the social memory had engulfed in books the whole of antiquity, the 
history of the great peoples, the geography and ethnography of a world 
now def initely acknowledged to be round, philosophy, law, the sciences, 
the arts, the study of technics, and a literature translated from twenty 
different languages.26
As Leroi-Gourhan points out, human memory is no longer able to encom-
pass these exteriorized memories and instead relies on index systems, 
punch cards, and artif icial intelligence. He uses the term ‘mechanical 
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memory’ to distinguish between human and animal memory, def ining 
it as ‘constituted through experience within the channel of a preexist-
ing program and of a code based on human language and fed into the 
machine by a human being’.27 Mechanical memory is, in other words, an 
explicit form of exteriorization in which what exists implicitly as collective 
memory is explicitly expressed in technical terms. While this formulation 
might lead us to believe that mechanical memory is mainly part of the 
explicit memorizations of the second syntheses of social memory, I will 
argue that it should also be analyzed as a constituent part of the first 
synthesis.
Concretization of transindividual relations
If today we must address the question of social memory in new ways, it is 
because a new dynamic between the three syntheses has emerged. The 
complexity of this dynamic is yet to be formulated – at this point I would 
only like to draw attention to the contingency of memory and the diversity 
brought by their digital systematization. Digital networks affect the very 
def inition of social groups and things, and in a way that contrasts with 
Simondon’s description of the philosophical task of future humanism. 
Towards the end of Du Mode d’Existence des objets technique, he suggests 
that philosophy should reunite the separated subjects and disciplines, since 
their divergence has created problematic oppositions between theory and 
practice, religion and science, culture and technics, etc. However, one of the 
consequences of the digital revolution is that it has led to the convergence 
of previously separate realms of knowledge and practice by reducing the 
distance between things and individuals and by synchronizing memory 
through media technologies.
In other words: once digital networks become the primary tools and 
reservoirs of social memory, the distance between the f irst and second 
synthesis diminishes. First, all the traces produced by the f irst synthesis be-
come recordable, a fact that becomes even more evident with the realization 
of smart cities, smart homes, and smart objects; ordinary users are already 
faced with the recording and exploitation of their behaviour on Google, 
Facebook, and Amazon. Behaviour thus forms a new kind of ‘live archive’. 
Since behavioural data are already structured when they are captured, they 
are no longer simply raw data but are replete with semantic meanings that 
make them available for search. (I here refer to the use of formal or web 
ontologies in the semantic web or any other form of data classif ication).
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Second, explicit forms of social memory such as historical archives are 
currently in the process of being digitized. This process takes place at a 
much higher speed in post-colonial countries, where the building of national 
identity demands a destruction of colonial memories, reducing them to 
disembodied sensual effects. In economically advanced countries, this is 
also happening at the pace of urbanization, so that whatever is destroyed 
by gentrif ication is transferred to digital images and archives. Numerous 
institutions are forced to open up their archives through digitization or to 
deploy digital strategies such as interactive models, crowd sourcing, open 
access, etc. Every second, billions of images document ongoing events, 
attesting to a constantly ongoing and unconscious effort to create living 
memories out of the past. Increasingly, the synthesis of memory is reduced 
to the production and consumption of data, with the implication that col-
lective memory is often the result of big data analysis, digital behaviourism, 
etc.
The question of archive therefore needs to be understood in terms of the 
technical milieu and viewed from an anthropological perspective.28 How-
ever, we first need to examine the technological condition of exteriorization 
in the digital age. Following Simondon, the evolution of technical objects 
can be understood in terms of the concretization of technical individuals. 
They are assimilations of nature to the extent that, like natural objects, they 
can only be understood in terms of always ongoing processes of becoming. 
Even so, Simondon’s conception of technical objects is relatively limited. He 
lived at a time when the principles of quantum physics were mainly used for 
the development of electrical devices, and so his examples tend to revolve 
around diodes, triodes, tetrodes, pentodes, etc. His understanding is also 
limited by the working principles of these devices, which primarily depend 
on physical contact. The operation of a diode is based on the transmission 
of electrons from the anode to the cathode, and the same is the case with 
a triode, which in addition to the anode and cathode has a gate in between 
them to amplify the current. In digital technologies, by contrast, physical 
contact as the foundation of reciprocal causality is displaced by a causality 
operated through data. I use the word ‘displace’ instead of ‘replace’, since 
we can never replace a causality based on physical contacts: my point 
is simply that within the dynamic of the technical development, direct 
physical contact is no longer the only reality. Data, which are essential 
to understanding the digital, have become the new material medium of 
operation. For this reason, I want to distinguish between digital objects 
and Simondon’s technical objects, even though I retain other features of 
Simondon’s analysis.
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Simondon understands technical objects as intermediaries between 
humans and nature, as the organizer of relations between the user and the 
milieu. However, with digitization, the role of technical objects becomes 
less easy to define, since the escalated processes of exteriorization make the 
lifeworld increasingly technical. Digitization is a process that renders digital 
objects ubiquitous and hence also naturalizes them. Data thus becomes the 
medium that unif ies the two syntheses of social memory. This description 
exceeds Simondon’s description of technical ensembles, which is based on 
examples such as factories, clusters, and other interconnected technical 
objects whose power of reticulation is limited in space and time. This is 
no longer the case, and had Simondon lived today, he would probably have 
revised his concept of the technical ensemble.
If we can speak of the temporality of concretization (i.e. the evolution-
ary process in which the technical object spatializes by materializing its 
relations), then we may today speak of the concretization of temporality 
itself as one of the consequence of this technical progress. Spatialization 
leads to an enlargement of the networks that extend from objects to objects 
and from ensembles to ensembles. The temporization of concretization, in 
contrast, leads to ever more f inely calibrated synchronization. It is because 
causality is now also increasingly mediated through logical inferences 
rather than mechanical contact that we can talk about real time as well 
as micro-temporalities. Acceleration approaching the speed of light is an 
effect of the digital concretization of temporality, and systematization is 
an inevitable part of the process.
fig. 12.2: the evolution of diodes as a process of concretization. photo by Stefan riepl, licensed 
under creative commons attribution-Share alike 2.0 germany.
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It is from this perspective that we may consider the concretization of 
transindividual relations in the digital age. As already noted, Simondon 
understood transindividual relations as implicitly expressed through 
invention and usage. The functionalities of a technical object def ine its 
essence and also def ine its transindividual relations. For example, when 
a book is used as a wedge or a pedestal, it doesn’t bring any information. 
Information is the result of a relation between forms, and the book loses 
information once its form is misused or misrecognized (e.g. when the book 
is used as a wedge or a pedestal).29 Transindividual relations are therefore 
not just interpersonal and functional, they are also mediations in the sense 
that they emerge in operations that cannot be fully captured in material 
terms. Simondon is absolutely right to attribute the concept of the apeiron 
(unlimited, infinite, or indefinite) to technical objects.30 There is something 
in the technical that cannot be exhausted and that goes beyond its func-
tionalities. Yet between the concept of concretization and the concept of 
transindividual, there is a tension that Simondon did not address and that 
concerns the concretization of transindividual relations.
I suspect the reason that such thought is not present in Simondon is 
largely due to his reluctance to discuss materialism, which he saw as mere 
reduction.31 This may also be the reason why Simondon did not emphasize 
the material aspects of the operational relations inside technical objects 
and the transindividual relations outside them. Since materialization is 
a genuinely transformative process that also produces new types of im-
material relations, there is no contradiction between placing emphasis 
on the open or indeterminate aspects of technologies and focusing on its 
material mediations. Leroi-Gourhan is clearer on this point than Simondon. 
Simondon understands individuation in terms of the play of information: 
having overcome Aristotelian hylomorphism, he saw information as more 
primordial than form. In contrast, Leroi-Gourhan saw matter as the fun-
damental cause, more fundamental than form. Even so, latent materialist 
perspectives also inform Simondon’s discussion of how human memory and 
machine memory become compatible despite their differences in nature. 
For while human memory is characterized by a unity of form and order, 
machine memory is multiplicitous and disordered. Nevertheless, these two 
memories can communicate:
The coupling of human and machine starts to exist from the moment 
when a common code between the two can be discovered, so that one 
can realise a partial convertibility of one in the other, for that a synergy 
is possible.32 (my italics)
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The example that Simondon gave is the use of magnetic ribbons to record 
telephone calls, in which machine memory and human memory can ef-
f iciently communicate. Such convertibility has passed from the analogue 
technology that Simondon described to the digital technologies of our time. 
The cybernetic auto-regulation that interested Simondon now seems to be 
extended from the human-machine relation to a wider human-technical 
network that is at once intimate and social. The productivity of data in every 
aspect of our life is not just what Leroi-Gourhan called a technical tendency 
but what I would call an industrial technical tendency that emerges less out 
of the need to solve a specif ic problem (defined by Simondon as invention) 
than by forces of innovation fuelled by market and economic factors. This 
intensif ied relation between technology and innovation is then the key 
feature of the concretization of transindividual relations in the realm of 
digital technologies. Data technology is thus all at once the key technology 
of both the f irst and second syntheses of social memories. For sure, there 
is still an explicit production of social memory – the historical archives, 
museums, monuments, and landmarks that emerge as a result of urbaniza-
tion and the culture industries. But they no longer necessarily function as 
nodal points of social reticulation. It is just as likely that digital images 
and videos of such monuments – ensembles of digital objects ‒ function as 
nodal points, since they amplify and distribute the impact and meaning of 
such memories. The signif icant and positive impact of digital technology is 
that it reactivates the explicit memory production of the second synthesis 
by connecting it to the more implicit life practices of the f irst synthesis. 
Today’s informal and ‘instant’ access to archives, facilitated by navigational 
tools and semantic technologies, attests to this perspective.
Rhythm and the becoming of social memories
Social memory is related to the question of rhythm, and changing pro-
cesses of reticulation necessarily also produce new types of rhythms. In 
Leroi-Gourhan’s Rhythm and Memory, he describes rhythms as creators 
of space and time. While the exteriorization of memory is produced ac-
cording to one rhythm, the reintroduction of that memory product in 
everyday life produces another rhythm, which is all at once physiological, 
gestural, psychological, and social.33 The domestication of nature is also a 
rhythmic process: the rhythm of walking gives the measurement of miles 
(or kilometres), and the rhythm of hands leads to the ‘immobilisation of 
volume’.34 Rather than giving form, rhythm modulates: according to Michel 
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Guérin, Leroi-Gourhan’s materialism is thus hylo-rhythmic rather than 
hylo-morphic.35 Rhythms also synchronize, and social memory is unif ied 
by the compatibility of rhythms performed by individuals and groups. 
Here Leroi-Gourhan notably distinguishes between musical and mechani-
cal rhythms: if musical rhythms mediate between the natural world and 
humanized space, technical rhythms ‘transform untamed nature into 
instruments of humanization.’36 Mechanical rhythm is an exteriorization 
of musical and poetic rhythms, reducing them to the repetitive standards 
of synchronization: the standards of metronomes, clock time, calendars, 
assembly lines, computational time, and real time.
To understand the technical tendency of today’s mechanization, au-
tomatization, or digitization and the specif ic ways in which it produces 
social identities or ethnic becoming, we need to consider the rhythms of 
these new industrial programmes. As Leroi-Gourhan saw it, ‘individuals 
today are imbued with and conditioned by a rhythmicity that has reached a 
stage of almost total mechanicity (as opposed to humanization). The crisis 
of f iguralism is the corollary of the dominance of machinism’.37 Simondon 
also described the rhythm of industrial technical objects as a major source 
of alienation:
With the passage to industrial motricity, the situation was profoundly 
changed. (…)The worker was placed in the presence of sections of net-
works measured out by the machine’s rhythm, of series of movements 
that left the subject on the outside, a complete ‘technical deculturation’ 
occurred, conjointly with the loss of belonging to a group with a clearly 
def ined personality and on a comfortable scale.38
Rhythm here is understood as a mere repetition of patterns. In Technics and 
Time 2, Bernard Stiegler returns to this critique, asserting the importance 
of rhythm for the diversif ication of gestures and idioms: ‘this notion of an 
aesthetic requires a typological description of programs as rhythms even 
more than as memories.’39 He then describes the relation between rhythm 
and the industrialization of memory, which takes place f irst through 
transportation networks, and then through telecommunication networks:
Networks affect and dis-affect, organize and disorganize rhythms and 
memories. The network in general is, in this sense, programmatic. And 
further, transmission of programmatic rhythms suspends, from outside, 
other rhythms and programs through its opening to the other, while the 
becoming-material of frameworks, the objectif ication or exteriorization 
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of territorialization in deterritorialization is subsumed within the tech-
nological tendency.40
The rhythm embedded in the industrial programme leads to disorientation. 
It is necessary to constantly reassess the relation between rhythm and 
technics. With automatization, Leroi-Gourhan observed, the diversif ica-
tion of rhythms decrease, and the very question of rhythm shifts from the 
metaphysical to the political and pragmatic. This is an obvious feature of 
the automatized recommendation systems of Amazon, Google, and other 
digital corporations. The new nodal points of social reticulations are built 
through ‘algo-rhythmic’ modulations of transindividual relations, as seen 
in this passage from an article published by the leading consultant f irm 
McKinsey & Company:
Employing advanced analytical methods, algorithmic marketing 
provides real-time offers targeted to individual customers through a 
‘self-learning’ process to optimize those interactions over time. That can 
include predictive statistics, machine learning, and natural language text 
mining. It harnesses big data such as customer location and behavioural 
information along with powerful computing systems to match customers 
with context-sensitive products and services.41
At this point we may f inally evoke the third synthesis of social memory: 
namely the memories of that which is unmemorable. The unmemorable is 
something that cannot be inscribed in memory and remains always a line of 
f light. Like the Kantian sublime, it does not reside in things but interrupts 
the concepts supported by the memory system. Such memorizing is only 
possible when transindividual relations are not exhausted by automatisms 
or repetitions that pre-empt or preclude imagination. In the last chapter 
of Rhythm and Memory, Leroi-Gourhan speculates on the future of homo 
sapiens, given the regression of the use of the hand and the liberation of 
other biological organs. For centuries yet, predicted Leroi-Gourhan, ‘reading 
will go on being important…but writing is probably doomed to disappear 
rapidly, to be replaced by dictaphonic equipment with automatic printing.’42 
Fifty years later (the book was published in 1965), we see that handwriting 
has been replaced by keyboards and autocompleting programmes, and that 
the question of what to read is always already submitted to calculation, 
another ‘liberation’ through exteriorization.
The question we face is thus whether social memory is entering a phase 
of technological exteriorization, where global processes of automatization 
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and synchronization have accelerated to the point of pre-empting the 
imaginative dynamics of living memory – i.e. the environmental adapta-
tions that take place through rhythmization and invention. However, an 
overly totalizing critique of the synchronization and the homogenization 
of rhythms may be dismissed. Not only has this not yet taken place, given 
that a large part of the world’s population is not even connected to the 
digital networks; more signif icantly, absolute synchronization is not even 
possible since it essentially equals death. Under any circumstance, opinions 
on this matter are divided. For example, in a 2012 debate on search engines, 
Michel Serres – countering the perspectives of Bernard Stiegler – argued 
that the exteriorization and objectivation of the cognitive automats were 
extraordinary liberations.43 It is beyond the scope of this article to explore 
the debate between Stiegler and Serres (and the thorny issue of ‘liberation’), 
but the current transformations of the f ield of social memory urgently call 
for a debate that passes beyond the familiar issues of technological opti-
mism and pessimism. The focus should instead be on the technopolitics of 
rhythm – a research agenda that re-opens the question of anthropo-technics 
in the digital age. Hopefully my outline of the three syntheses of social 
memories and their relations to the industrial programme of digitization 
can provide a framework for analyses of the new fate of social memory in 
the twenty-f irst century.
Notes
1. Leroi-Gouran, 1993, p. 407.
2. Heidegger, p. 186.
3. Halbwachs, p. 38.
4. Simondon, 2005. See chapter 3 of the second part, where Simondon 
reproaches the psychology of ignoring the tensions produced within the 
psychical individual against itself.
5. Ameisen, pp. 168-188.
6. Clark and Chambers.
7. Haugeland.
8. Dretske. 
9. Simondon, 2012, p. 247 (my translation).
10. Benjamin, p. 124.
11. On this point, Simondon emphasizes that in comparison with machines, 
human beings have the capacity of transforming the a posteriori (empirical 
facts) into a priori (symbols, signs). See Simondon, 2012, p. 175.
12. Ibid., p. 248. 
324 YuK huI
13. Stiegler, 1994, p. 140.
14. Leroi-Gourhan, 1993, p. 258.
15. Ibid., p. 177.
16. Bidet, p. 22.
17. Ingold. Even though Ingold admires much of Leroi-Gourhan’s programme 
of exteriorization, there is, however, something very doubtful when he says 
‘regarding the machine as a perfect substitute for the tool-assisted human 
organism, he feels justified not only in treating the operations of the organ-
ism as mechanical, but also in describing the machine itself as just another 
kind of organism whose physical existence is nevertheless external to the 
body’. It should be reasserted that for Leroi-Gourhan, exteriorization does 
not imply at all an equality between organism and machine but rather an 
equivalence of certain functionalities; moreover, it is not a replacement of 
such function but rather a cycle as I have described above.
18. See Assmann, p. 122.
19. Lyotard, pp. 57-67.
20. Leroi-Gourhan, 1993, p. 208.
21. Ibid., p. 209. 
22. Leroi-Gourhan, 1945, pp. 340-343.
23. Simondon, 2013, p. 319.
24. Simondon, 2012, Part III, Chapter 1, ‘Genèse de la technicité’.
25. Simondon, 2009, p. 111.
26. Leroi-Gourhan, 1993, p. 262.
27. Ibid., p. 258.
28. Hui.
29. Simondon, 2012, p. 336.
30. Ibid.
31. Simondon, 2005, p. 159.
32. Simondon, 2012, p. 173.





38. Cited by Stiegler, 2009, p. 75.
39. Ibid., p. 82.
40. Ibid., p. 144.
41. Goff, McInerney, and Soni, 2012.
42. Leroi-Gourhan, 1989, p. 404.
43. Serres and Stiegler, 2012: ‘I am not very Simondonian on this point, I find 
that philosophers of technologies a bit limited on certain things, therefore 
objectivation in the cognitive automats are extraordinary liberations.’
chaptEr t WElvE 325
Works cited
Ameisen, Jean-Claude. 2012. Sur les épaules de Darwin: Les battements du temps. Paris: France 
Inter.
Assmann, Jan. 2010. ‘Globalization, Universalism, and the Erosion of Cultural Memory.’ In 
Memory in a Global Age Discourses, Practices and Trajectories, eds. Aleida Assmann and 
Sebastian Conrad, 121-137. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Benjamin, Walter. 1991. ‘Vorstufen, Varianten und Fragmente zu ‘Über den Begriff der Ge-
schichte’.’ In Walter Benjamin – Gesammelte Schriften, Band I.3 Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Bidet, Alexandra. 2007. ‘Le corps, le rythme et l’esthétique sociale chez André Leroi-Gourhan.’ 
Techniques & Culture 48–49: 15-38.
Clark, Andy, and David Chambers. 1998. ‘The Extended Mind.’ Analysis 58: 10-23.
Dretske, Fred. 2004. ‘Knowing What You Think vs. Knowing that You Think It.’ In The Externalist 
Challenge, ed. Richard Schantz, 389-400. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Goff, Joshua, Paul McInerney, and Gunjan Soni. 2012. ‘Need for Speed: Algorithmic marketing 
and customer data overload.’ McKinsey & Company, McKinsey on Marketing and Sales.
Guérin, Michel. 1999. ‘A. Leroi-Gourhan ou le primat de la matière.’ In Géopolitique et Arts 
Plastiques, eds. Franck Doriac and Kenneth White, 95-103. Aix-en-Provence: Université de 
Provence.
Halbwachs, Maurice. 1992. On Collective Memory, transl. Lewis A. Coser. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press.
Haugeland, John. 1993. ‘Mind Embodied and Embedded.’ In Mind and Cognition: 1993 Inter-
national Symposium, eds. H. Yu-Houng and J. Ho Houng, 121-45. Taipei: Academica Sinica.
Heidegger, Martin. 1997. Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, transl. 
Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Hui, Yuk. 2015. ‘Contribution to the Political Economy of Personal Archives.’ In Compromised 
Data: From Social Media to Big Data, eds. Greg Elmer, Ganaele Langlois, and Joanna Redden, 
171-190. London: Bloomsbury.
Ingold, Tim. 1999. ‘“Tools for the Hand, Language for the Face”: An Appreciation of Leroi- 
Gourhan’s Gesture and Speech.’ Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical 
Sciences 30, no. 4: 411-453.
Leroi-Gourhan, André. 1945. Milieu et Technique. Paris: Albin Michel.
—. 1993. Speech and Gesture, transl. Anna Bostock Berger. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Lyotard, Jean-François. 1988. L’inhumain: causeries sur le temps. Paris: Galilée.
Poulet, Régis. 2012. ‘Le lieu et le milieu — autour de Fûdo de Watsuji Tetsurô.’ La Revue des 
Resources. Available at www.larevuedesressources.org/le-lieu-et-le-milieu-autour-de-fudo-
de-watsuji-tetsuro,2189.html.
Serres, Michel, and Bernard Stiegler. 2012. Dialogue organized by the Philosophie Magazine. 
Available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=iREkxNVetbQ
Simondon, Gilbert. 2005. L’Individuation à la lumière des notion de forme et d’information. Paris: 
Editions Jérôme Millon.
—. 2009. ‘Entretien sur la méchanologie.’ Revue de synthèse: tome 130, 6e série, no. 1: 103-132.
—.1989, 2012. Du Mode d’Existence des objets techniques. Paris: Editions Aubier.
—. 2013. Sur la Technique. Paris: PUF.
Stiegler, Bernard. 1994. Technics and Time 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, transl. Richard Beardsworth 
and George Collins. Stanford: Stanford University Press.




David M. Berry is Professor of Digital Humanities in the School of Media, 
Film and Music, at the University of Sussex.
Ina Blom is Professor at the Institute of Philosophy, Classics, History of Art 
and Ideas at the University of Oslo.
Wolfgang Ernst is Professor and Chair at the Institute for Musicology and 
Media Studies at Humboldt-Universität in Berlin.
Matthew Fuller is Professor of Cultural Studies and Director of the Centre 
for Cultural Studies, Goldsmiths, University of London.
Andrew Goffey is Associate Professor in the Faculty of Art at the University 
of Nottingham.
Liv Hausken is Professor at the Department of Media and Communication 
(IMK) at the University of Oslo.
Yuk Hui is postdoctoral researcher at the Centre for Digital Cultures of 
Leuphana University Lüneburg.
Trond Lundemo is Associate Professor in Cinema studies at the Department 
of Media Studies at Stockholm University.
Adrian Mackenzie is Professor of Sociology at the University of Lancaster.
Sónia Matos is a designer and lecturer at the Design School at the Edinburgh 
College of Art.
Richard Mills is a researcher at Lancaster University with a background 
in statistics.
Jussi Parikka is Professor in Technological Culture & Aesthetics at the 
Winchester School of Art in the United Kingdom.
Eivind Røssaak is Associate Professor at the Film and Media Section of the 
National Library of Norway, Oslo.
328 cOntrIButOrS 
Stuart Sharples is Lecturer in Mathematics and Statistics at Lancaster 
University.
Sean Snyder is a visual artist based in Berlin.
Tiziana Terranova is Associate Professor in New Media and Cultural Studies 
at the University of Naples (L’Orientale).
Pasi Väliaho is Senior Lecturer in Film and Screen Studies at the Depart-
ment of Media & Communications, Goldsmiths College at the University 
of London.
 Name index
Page numbers in italics refer to images.
Adorno, Theodor W.: 108, 111
Agamben, Giorgio: 237, 250, 251
Agre, Philip E.: 104




Ashbourn, Julian: 269, 276






Bartók, Bela: 48, 51
Bateson, Gregory: 174
Bauwens, Michel: 302 n. 6
Bazin, André: 219
Beniger, James: 93
Benjamin, Walter: 141, 177 n. 23, 218, 309
Benkler, Yochai: 32, 288–89, 297–98, 302 n. 7
Bergman, Ingmar: 263
Bergman, Karin: 263, 264, 265
Bergson, Henri: 11, 16, 23, 215, 225, 234 n. 7, 234 
n. 8
Bernard, Claude: 35 n. 34
Berry, David M.: 29, 195
Bertillon, Alphonse: 270–72, 275, 278
Bhaskar, Roy: 111
Blackman, Ralph Beebe: 68
Blesser, Barry: 79–80





Boutang, Yann Moulier: 35 n. 38
Brassier, Ray: 145 n. 5
Bregman, Albert: 69
Breslauer, Rudolph: 238, 239–43, 239, 253 n. 6
Brito, Ubaldo: 65
Brodey, Warren: 158
Brown, Wendy: 141–42, 145
Brunhes, Jean: 218
Bruno, Giordano: 292
Bruno, Giuliana: 145 n. 4
Buchanan, Richard: 113
Burt, Theo: 76, 77







Chun, Wendy: 12, 25, 143, 176 n. 18, 207 n. 60
Cicero: 217
Clark, Andy: 76, 308
Classe, André: 62
Comte, Auguste: 55
Constant: 30–31, 183–84, 185, 189–99, 196, 
200–04, 204 n. 2, 206 n. 28
Conway, Erik: 30, 135–38, 142–43, 144
Conway, John Horton: 176 n. 10
Cox, Geoff: 183
Crary, Jonathan: 158
Crutchf ield, James P.: 155, 176 n. 11
Daniele, Pino: 287, 289
Dardot, Pierre: 298
de Certeau, Michel: 259
Deleuze, Gilles: 18–19, 115, 148 n. 51, 161, 222, 225, 
292–94, 312
Derrida, Jacques: 15, 29, 34 n. 23, 44, 103, 120, 
141, 309
Dienst, Richard: 154
Downey, Juan: 180 n. 52
Dretske, Fred: 308
Duarte, Matias: 115
Durkheim, Émile: 14, 15, 22, 23, 43
Edison, Thomas Alva: 19, 48, 54
Elmer, Greg: 142
Ernst, Wolfgang: 12, 19, 27–28, 34 n. 14, 34 n. 21, 
35 n. 44, 61, 70–72, 75, 103, 106, 110, 118, 143, 
157, 176 n. 16, 178 n. 36, 183–84, 191, 204 n. 5, 
206 n. 28, 258–59
Evenson, Dean: 175 n. 4
Faremo, Grete: 277
Finn, Jonathan: 276, 278
Fisher, Mark: 130
Flusser, Vilém: 131, 143–44, 252
Foucault, Michel: 42, 44, 56 n. 4, 141, 181 n. 64, 
183–84, 222, 225, 259, 292, 298, 323 n. 23
Fourier, Jean Baptiste: 67, 70




Fuller, Matthew: 29, 173–74, 180 n. 59, 303 n. 35
330 naME IndEx 
Galloway, Alexander: 43, 194
Gemmeker, Albert: 239–43, 247, 251, 252, 253 
n. 6
Gibson, James J.: 69
Gibson, William: 129–30
Gillette, Frank: 159, 160, 161–66, 174, 178 n. 30, 
178 n. 31, 178 n. 33
Gitelman, Lisa: 259
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von: 28, 45
Goffey, Andrew: 29, 173–74, 303 n. 35
Goodman, Steve: 36 n. 46
Greenblatt, Stephen: 54
Grusin, Richard: 141–42
Guattari, Félix: 138, 148 n. 51, 159, 161, 178 n. 27
Guttormsgaard, Guttorm: 206 n. 28.
Guzmán, Patricio: 132
Haeckel, Ernst: 23
Halbwach, Maurice: 14, 15, 23, 35 n. 44, 43, 144, 
307, 308, 309
Hansen, Rolf: 242
Hassan, Robert: 15, 17




Hayek, Friedrich: 93, 138
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: 42, 131
Heidegger, Martin: 44, 309
Helmholtz, Hermann von: 68, 70, 198
Hermant, Emilie: 31, 213–14, 226–31, 231–33
Hippel, Eric von: 191
Hobbes, Thomas: 300




Ingold, Tim: 311, 324 n. 117
James, Henry: 295
James, William: 295
Jameson, Fredric: 119, 130, 148 n. 38
Janicaud, Dominique: 16
Johnson, Avery: 153–55, 163, 165, 171, 180 n. 54
Kadare, Ismail: 49
Kahn, Albert: 31, 213–14, 218–26, 231–33, 234 
n. 10
Kandel, Eric: 308
Kant, Immanuel: 44, 307, 322,
Karadzic, Radovan: 46
Karadzic, Vuk: 45
Karadzicas, Vuk Stefanovic: 46
Kelly, Kevin: 134, 146 n. 15
Kirschenbaum, Matthew: 33 n. 3
Kittler, Friedrich: 19, 34 n. 28, 57 n. 33, 191
Kohonen, Teuvo: 42
Kolpan, Steven: 172
Kostakis, Vasilis: 302 n. 6
Kracauer, Siegfried: 234 n. 19
Krysa, Joasia: 189
Kurenniemi, Erkki: 30–31, 132–35, 138, 140, 
142–43, 144, 146 n. 15, 146 n. 16, 147 n. 31, 148 
n. 51, 182–84, 185–89, 187, 194–99, 200–04, 
204 n. 9, 205 n. 19
Lacan, Jacques: 53
Lajard, Joseph: 62
Lamarck, Jean-Baptiste: 35 n. 34
Land, Nick: 140, 148 n. 51
Latour, Bruno: 31, 36 n. 52, 44, 139, 173, 176 n. 17, 
185, 192, 207 n. 62, 213–14, 226–33
Lazzarato, Maurizio: 17, 22, 23, 181 n. 64, 207 n. 
62, 290, 302 n. 17, 304 n. 45
Leander, Zarah: 242–43, 246, 248–49, 251–52, 
254 n. 29
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: 22, 32, 49, 291–96, 
296–97, 299, 303 n. 21
Leroi-Gourhan, André: 32, 243–44, 245, 247, 254 
n. 10, 307, 308, 310–312, 311, 313–16, 319–20, 
320–23, 324 n. 17
Lippit, Akira Mizuta: 246–47
Lloyd, Martin: 262, 263, 278
Lomax, Alan: 52





Lundemo, Trond: 31, 56 n. 8
Lytoard, Jean-François: 312
Mackenzie, Adrian: 29, 303 n. 35
Mako Hill, Benjamin: 91–92
Malevé, Nicolas: 183, 189–99, 200–04; see also 
Constant
Manovich, Lev: 55–56
Manrique, Antonio Maria: 62
Mansoux, Aymeric: 92
Marks, Laura U.: 179 n. 37
Massumi, Brian: 20–21, 34 n. 31, 141–42
Matos, Sónia: 27–28
Mauss, Marcel: 244–45
Maxwell, James Clerk: 198
McAdams, Steven: 69
McCulloch, Warren: 171, 176 n. 18, 180 n. 54
McLuhan, Marshall: 46, 50, 160
McTaggart, John M.E.: 161
Medjedovich, Avdo: 49
Meillassoux, Quentin: 145 n. 5
Meyer, Julien: 65–66, 74
Mills, Richard: 29, 303 n. 35
Mirowski, Philip: 93
Misztal, Barbara: 15, 33 n. 10
Mitchell, Robert: 35 n. 34
Monbiot, George: 140, 148 n. 38
Moore, Gordon: 33 n 8
naME IndEx 331
Munster, Anna: 294
Murtaugh, Michael: 75–76, 183, 189–99, 200–04, 
206 n. 38; see also Constant
Neumann, John von: 147 n. 31, 176 n. 18, 200, 202, 
207 n. 58
Newton, Isaac: 22, 207 n. 62
Nietzsche, Friedrich: 295, 299–300, 312
Nolan, Christopher: 133
Nora, Pierre: 12, 27, 222–23, 311
Ohm, Georg: 67–68
Olick, Jeffrey K.: 26, 33 n. 10
Ong, Walter: 41, 48, 52, 57 n. 26
Opel, Andy: 142
Oreskes, Naomi: 30, 135–38, 142–43, 144
Ortiz, Isidro: 54–66, 71, 72–73
Osborne, Peter: 147 n. 35
Paik, Nam June: 177 n. 21
Panofsky, Erwin: 244
Parikka, Jussi: 21, 30, 205 n. 19,
Parisi, Luciana: 36 n. 46
Parry, Milman: 28, 41, 46, 47–48, 49–51, 51–53
Pawlikowski, Pawel: 46
Peirce, Charles Sanders: 170, 171
Plato: 47, 53, 223
Prom, Christopher J.: 106
Pythagoras 68, 70
Quendefelt, Max: 62–63






Roads, Curtis: 69, 69, 70
Robbins, Joyce: 26, 33 n. 10
Robertson, Craig: 257–58, 271–2
Rodriguez, Lino: 64, 65, 66, 72
Røssaak, Eivind: 30–31, 56 n. 8, 146 n. 16
Rotman, Brian: 76
Roustang, François: 252
Ryan, Paul: 153, 158, 162, 167–75, 168, 170, 177 n. 
25, 180 n. 51, 180 n. 57
Salter, Linda-Ruth: 79–80
Salter, Mark: 257, 259, 269
Sarnoff, David: 156
Sartre, Jean-Paul: 154, 175 n. 5
Sauvageot, Camille: 221
Schmitt, Carl: 135




Serres, Michel: 129, 146 n. 22, 148 n. 40, 323, 324 
n. 43
Shakespeare, William: 54
Sharma, Sarah: 139, 142
Sharples, Stuart: 29, 303 n. 35
Shaviro, Steven: 131–32
Simondon, Gilbert: 20–21, 32, 34 n. 31, 35 n. 34, 
43–44, 56 n. 12, 214–217, 222, 225, 231–233, 
234 n. 7, 234 n. 10, 235 n. 39, 290, 302 n. 14, 




Staal, Viktor: 242–43, 251
Sterne, Jonathan: 76, 82 n. 48
Stiegler, Bernard: 109, 308, 309–11, 321–22, 323, 
324 n. 43
Taanila, Mika: 133, 204
Tarde, Gabriel: 22–24, 32–33, 35 n. 43, 35 n. 
44, 43, 139, 147 n. 32, 162, 164–65, 179 n. 41, 
202–03, 207 n. 62, 214, 233, 245–46, 247, 287, 
292, 295–300, 302 n. 17, 303 n. 22
Taylor, Frederick: 271–72
Terranova, Tiziana: 32–33, 35 n. 38, 121 n. 38
Thacker, Eugene: 187, 200–02, 207 n. 58, 145 n. 5
Thom, René: 169, 171
Thompson, William Irwin: 153, 155, 165
Thornton, Don: 82 n. 51
Torgue, Henry: 80
Torvalds, Linus: 87, 88
Trujillo, Ramón: 62–65, 67, 70, 72
Tukey, John W.: 68
Turing, Alan: 200, 202, 207 n. 58
Turkle, Sherry: 291
Tyndall, John: 68
Ulam, Stanislaw: 147 n. 31





Virno, Paolo: 290, 302 n. 14
Vismann, Cornelia: 18, 190, 224, 259
Waddington, Conrad Hal: 168–69
Warburg, Aby: 237
White, Hayden: 143
Whitehead, Alfred North: 43, 71,
Wiener, Norbert: 55, 68, 187, 292, 303 n. 21
Williams, Raymond: 154–55
Wishart, Trevor: 67, 68, 69, 70
Yates, Frances: 217
Zielinski, Siegfried: 129

